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ABSTRACT
Following the tradition o f Max Weber, this thesis is exploring the role o f social 
interaction as an important part o f a society. As social interactions encompass a very 
wide range , the focus is on the role o f news in printed media (newspapers) as the part o f  
the social construction o f reality where what is defined as reality is in fact a subjective 
definition upon some event or matter whose Value is inherent within the society. In the 
definition o f  Peter Berger, what we know as reality is actually socially reconstructed.
News, as a reconstruction o f reality presents its readers, viewers or listeners with a 
fractured definition o f certain events. As it is a fractured representation o f  reality, news 
can only present a limited interpretation o f reality. This thesis examines how Australian 
and Indonesian newspapers presented the crisis in East Timor during and after the 
referendum in August 1999. The event that follows has without doubt affected the 
relationships between Australia and Indonesia and has had a long term impact in the 
region.
But what is most important is the event has deconstructed the perceptions within 
Australian and Indonesian societies towards each other. By using various research 
methods and most importantly grounding the findings within its social contexts, this
11
thesis has found that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers have perceived the East 
Timor crisis in 1999 as a major issue and did a significant coverage accordingly. But 
beyond the obvious differences in the amount o f coverage both Australian and Indonesian 
media have represented the crisis from different points o f view- views that after a series 
o f in-depth analyses, have turned out to be a reflection of how Australian and Indonesian 
societies perceived the issue.
This thesis found that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers reflect deeply upon 
their own societies in how they are representing the event. It found that Australian and 
Indonesian societies in turn reflect towards their own history, culture and values in 
viewing the East Timor crisis. The result is different perceptions are made regarding 
similar events in which both societies believe that what they perceived is correct.
This proved that media is an important part o f  the social process within a society but most 
importantly the power o f the media actually lies within its capability in understanding its 
own society with its audience functioning as a mirror. What is significant is that this 
mirror is not a passive object but an active participant within the complex social 
processes where news media helps to create a socially constructed reality while at the 
same time being influenced by the society itself.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction.
By the end of Twentieth century, the world’s news media had thoroughly saturated 
the realm of daily life. The media’s presence was everywhere, from the remotest part 
of Africa to the highest mountain in the world.
In 1992, a group of scientists and journalists from The National Geographic Society 
discovered an area in the Congo, Central Africa, which had never felt the presence of 
a human being.1 The team recorded an amazing finding -  the animals on location 
reacted to the human presence like they had never seen one before. Accordingly the 
event was reported in depth in The National Geographic magazine.2 The modern 
media had finally touched one of the remotest places on earth, Ciaran Me Cullagh 
described this reality:
At the level of everyday life it has become routine and normal to encounter the media. Just as 
offering a cup of tea or coffee is a method of making people feel at ease, the provision of 
some form of media is rapidly becoming complementary to it. We accept without question the 
availability of newspapers in dentists’ waiting rooms, bank managers’ offices, the waiting 
rooms for job interviews, and in aeroplanes. We live in a media-saturated world, and for the 
most part are no longer surprised by it.
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The news media is an inescapable reality in today’s life, particularly in a well 
established society such as Australia or even a diverse and developing society like 
that of Indonesia. Indonesia as a developing society, it seems, cannot have enough of 
the media. Since the fall of the New Order regime in Indonesia in May 1998, which 
under the Suharto regime 1964 -  1998 had imposed strict censorship on all media, by 
June 2000, the number of registered media (print, radio and television) had increased 
from 292 to 1,687 registered (print, radio and television).4 Though the numbers of the 
media surviving that period may be significantly less than registered, the issue here is 
that for Indonesia, the media is seen as an attractive commercial venture.5
The news media, in particular their product - the news - is more than simply 
providing information to society. News is part of creating a sense of reality for 
people, providing a mirror on society. This thesis will be focusing on that concept in 
respect to newspaper reporting from Indonesia and Australia over a distinct period in 
the 1999 East Timor crisis. Before a discussion of news as realities for societies, and 
before analysis and comparison, there will be a scene setting discussion of the context 
of the role of the media in the society.
The tradition of the relationship between the news media and society is rooted in a 
concept in sociology; that news media, as an integral part of society, plays a 
functional role within that society. Media scholar Dennis McQuail stated that the 
relationship between the media and society has both a political and a normative or
socio-cultural aspect6 and he defined this as:
The media constitute a separate ‘social institution’ within society, with its own rules and 
practices, but subject to definition and limitation by the wider society. Thus the media are 
ultimately dependent on society, although they have some scope for independent influence
5
and they may be gaining in autonomy as their range o f activity, economic significance and 
informal power grows. This is a potentially spiralling and self-fulfilling process, driven by 
ever increasing estimation o f their significance by political and cultural actors.
The bottom line is the same; the news media are about sending a message to an 
audience8 and this can be very complicated and usually driven by commercial and 
political imperatives. The message itself has to be found, created or re-created. Then 
it has to pass through a complicated process within the mass media organization until 
it is transmitted to the audience. When the audience receives the message they will 
process it accordingly to fit prior knowledge. Consequently more action may take 
place in the form of a change in behaviour once the new information is processed in 
terms of the prior knowledge. This classic description by Klapper, sums up the idea 
o f ‘active reception’:
Media do not operate on susceptible audiences. Audiences have prior social connections, prior 
social attitudes and prior opinions and it is through these that the material from the media was 
filtered and against which the validity and relevance o f its content was assessed.
This media and society relationship is a complex and evolving process and as 
societies are inherently different, different societies and sections within society will 
react differently to information or ‘news’ of the same events. This thesis will focus on 
this aspect of the print news media -  the societal relations through an extended 
analysis of an event that had special significance for both Australia and Indonesia: the 
1999 crisis in East Timor.
This study will focus on Australian and Indonesian newspaper accounts regarding the 
East Timor crisis, thus the textual base of the study is all newspaper reports including 
‘opinion pieces’ within the Australian and Indonesian newspapers within the period 
of the crisis from 1 August to 1 October 1999.
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The East Timor crisis itself is defined as the time where the escalating tension due to 
the referendum in East Timor, which created a socio-political and security crisis in 
East Timor, thus affecting forever - Indonesia, Australia and the world.
This study will explore the different perspectives presented by the Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers. The different perspectives will be analysed within a broader 
context of the Australian and Indonesian societies’ perception of the crisis, as 
represented in the Australian and Indonesian newspaper accounts.
A hybrid research method based upon quantitative and qualitative research methods 
was applied to examine these news accounts. Further, the method of Grounded 
Theory10 will be applied to contextualise the various news accounts.
Grounded theory is a research methodology devised initially by Glaser and Strauss.11 
As a research method, grounded theory has an ability to develop a theory from a 
series of ‘normal’ occurrences. Unlike traditional theoretical method, grounded 
theory does not present a hypothesis in the beginning, rather it builds the hypothesis 
along the research process, during which the hypothesis is constantly being tested 
until a new theory emerges. As it is a very powerful and versatile method, grounded 
theory will be used as the foundation methodology in analysis. Grounded theory will 
be described later in greater detail within the methodology section of this chapter.
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1. 2. W hy the 1999 East Tim or crisis?
The choice of the East Timor crisis in 1999, as the event for analysis through news 
reports from Australian and Indonesian newspapers, was due to several factors:
• The East Timor crisis in 1999 was one of the pivotal points of history in 
Australian Indonesian relations. The crisis brought the two nation’s relations 
to a serious diplomatic and security crisis (Tiffen, 2001, AKSARA, 2000, 
Siahaan et ah, 2001, Greenless and Garran, 2002).
• An important aspect of the East Timor crisis was played out through the 
actual reports of the news media, in particular the print news media.12
• The East Timor crisis turned out to have a long lasting impact in relevance to 
Australian and Indonesian societal relations. Fresh evidence of East Timor’s 
longevity may be seen most recently in the way East Timor is a frequent 
reference point. The most recent issue was when the Indonesian government 
expressed their disappointment over the Australian government decision on 
42 refugees from Papua. Further, the recent 2006 intervention in East Timor 
by Australian troops has put the troubled spot back into the spotlight, so 
reinforcing the importance of the analysis as contained in this PhD.
The East Timor crisis reached beyond Australia and Indonesia. It involved the United 
Nations and many countries in the South East Asian region. But in this thesis, the 
focus will be on Australia and Indonesia and in particular, the selected newspaper 
reports on the crisis itself. The selected newspapers are chosen as representative of 
each country’s print media.
8
Earlier content analysis research conducted by the a non-profit AKSARA Foundation, 
a Jakarta-based think tank, were a foundation to the methods used in this PhD, where:
1. Selected Indonesian, Australian, British and American newspapers, and 
magazines, which published articles regarding East Timor within the research 
period, were cited.
2. The analysis was conducted by categorising the articles from each media 
outlet into different categories within the frame of a particular issue; that is, 
whether the articles were negative, positive or neutral in reporting from an 
Indonesian perspective.
3. The findings were tabulated and presented in tables, showing any trends.
The AKSARA Foundation research did not go beyond a simple quantitative analysis 
of the data. The research conducted by Hotmail Siahaan followed similar steps except 
the newspapers analysed were all from East Java.
This thesis will take this type of analysis further by drawing on international theories 
regarding journalism, as well as a focus on the accepted methods of practice of 
Australian journalism and of Indonesian journalism. The theories emanating from this 
and the related research methods will be described in greater detail in the 
methodology section in this chapter as well as in Chapter 2. In what follows, I shall 
analyse the 1999 crisis in East Timor as general political context of this thesis.
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1.3. Research context.
In December 1998, the Indonesian President BJ Habibie announced that he would 
offer two options to the East Timorese people: to remain part of Indonesia with a 
special autonomy, or if the people declined that offer, East Timor would cease to be 
part of Indonesia.
Under a special agreement with The United Nations and Portugal, it was decided that 
a referendum would be held under UN supervision. A special body was created -  
UNAMET (United Nations Missions for East Timor) and it was decided that the 
referendum would be held on August 30 1999.
Dennis McQuail has asserted that although there are wide ranging differences in 
media practice throughout the world, one common ideal is that the press should be 
neutral.18 It is also the case, however, that during an international incident that 
involves conflict, the media often seem to find it difficult to be neutral. As the 
American Senator Hiram Johnson said in 1917: “The first casualty when war comes, 
is truth”.19
In East Timor as the preparations for the referendum were being readied, all sides (the 
Indonesian, the local East Timorese, the FALINTIL, the political wing of FRETILIN, 
the supporters of the integration and the supporters of the pro-independence 
movement and the press) were gearing up for their campaign to serve their own 
interests.20
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The political struggle for information control was not limited to the parties involved 
on the ground in East Timor, but reached beyond national boundaries. The AKSARA 
Foundation has shown that during the peak of the crisis, the international media were 
highly attuned to getting the right spin on the news stories (2000). For the Indonesian 
and Australian news media the spin and compliance with government agendas 
developed into a war of statements. Both media tried their best to present the view 
from their point of view while accusing the other of being biased.21
One example of the way partisan sentiment took over was when The Sydney Morning
Herald journalist’s Lindsay Murdoch published the headline: “Stacks of bodies went
up to the roof’ which later was found to be unverified.22 He felt it was justified at that
time claiming it was understandable journalistic practice.23
The entire place was going up in flames. We didn’t know the extent o f the killings. We still 
don’t. When an eyewitness says she saw bodies stacked to the ceiling, I’ve just come out to 
the place and seen it burning, the streets are empty and anybody who goes on that street gets 
killed. What do you expect us to do? Not publish it? There isn’t a journalist in the world who 
wouldn’t publish that.24
Another extreme example is when The ABC Raphael Epstein, filing from Darwin, 
after fleeing East Timor with everyone else, reported falsely of severed heads on 
stakes, some with word ‘independence’ carved on their forehead. This ‘incident’ was 
also found to be false but in Australia the news itself already took effect in creating an 
impression of chaos, lawlessness and desperation in East Timor. This ‘impression’ 
contributed to the idea of an emergency situation which Australia should do 
something about it.
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For Indonesia the situation was perceived differently. Officially, the government and 
its military spokesmen insisted that they had done everything they could to prevent 
violence. And indeed the violence was mainly conducted by pro-integration militias, 
many of whom were hardened fighters embedded with the military (TNI) against the 
rebels (who subsequently and naturally, became strong pro-independence 
supporters). In subsequent Indonesian inquiries the military was found to have no 
direct connection with the violence,26 though many would argue otherwise.
The Indonesian media were active in reporting events which threatened the unity of 
the nation. Reports of violence were published, especially in the mainstream 
newspapers such as Kompas or The Jakarta Post. Unlike their Australian 
counterparts, the Indonesian media took a different stand, which was one that appears 
closer to journalistic neutrality. At least this was the case until the involvement of the 
foreign military (in form of INTERFET).27
All the factions, including the Indonesian and Australian governments, were quick to 
utilise the news media for their own ends. This thesis will show how the news media 
in both Australia and Indonesia were involved in this web of self-interest and in what 
could only be described as subjective reporting.
My research complements a study by the AKSARA Foundation (2000) which shows 
that both the Australian and Indonesian media were far from neutral in reporting the
12
East Timor crisis. The media (newspapers) in both countries were compromised to
the extent that they were caught in the political impasse between the two countries.
Undoubtedly many foreign journalists were not pleased with the conduct o f Indonesian 
government officials and members o f TNI during the referendum. The Indonesian
government (and its military) was widely viewed as having failed in meeting its commitments
29under the UN mandate.
The political wrangle between Indonesia and Australia erupted when Australia took 
the initiative on behalf of the UN in sending in a peacekeeping force to East Timor.
1.4. Historical context.
Australia has historical connections with East Timor, especially with respect to the
• i nties created during World War 2. For the Australian media, East Timor was both a 
tragic and open-ended story. In December 1975, advancing Indonesian forces in 
Balibo killed five journalists who were working for the Australian media. This 
established a longstanding sense of injustice, or moral breach in the Australian media 
and so in the Australian public eye. Respective Australian governments from both 
sides of politics have exploited this moral breach in their various forms of 
manipulation of the Australian public. The concept of ‘moral breach’ is used 
deliberately here as it is understood as a key element in determining newsworthiness, 
in prioritising stories and in shaping the actual news story content and will be
32explored in detail in the analysis of news texts in Chapters four and five.
The Indonesian army (TNI) insisted that the journalists were killed in cross fire
' X  ' Xduring a gun battle when they were taking refugees in a house. Many elements
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within the Australian media, and the public, strongly believe the journalists were 
deliberately killed by the Indonesian forces (Ball & McDonald: 2000).34
The issue of the death Malcolm Rennie (Nine News Network) , Tony Stewart 
(Channel Seven), Gary Cunningham (Channel Seven), Brian Peters (Nine News 
Network) and Greg Shackleton (Channel Seven) in Balibo remains a thorn to some 
elements within the Australian media and this structures their subsequent view 
towards Indonesia {McDonald, 2000 #50;Pembaruan, 1999 #20;Conboy, 2003
-> c
#8;Subroto, 1997 #41}.J During the East Timor crisis, the issue was often in the 
background to stories, a shadowy reminder for the Australian public about the 
unresolved issue, the moral breach underlying Australian perceptions of East Timor’s 
relations with Indonesia.
There are other issues in respect to analysis and describing what kind of agendas are 
being proposed or created by the media, which in turn affect public opinion. The 
Chomsky theory is that the media will invariably convey certain views by using 
certain facts, while omitting others, and that this is often the view of those who 
control the media or their associates (Chomsky and Herman, 1994).
In line with Chomsky’s theory, the findings in Chapters four, five, six and seven 
show that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers did present certain views, or to 
be exact certain ways in viewing the East Timor crisis. What the newspapers did that 
is measurable in analysis, was to present information from certain sources while 
omitting or minimizing other sources. Inevitably this leaves journalism as being
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likely to be seen as promoting certain issues that may emphasize certain views of 
society or worse, a particular a section of society who may benefit from the 
presentation of news in this way. As my findings show, the promotion of certain ways 
on viewing or comprehending the East Timor crisis in 1999 can be categorized as 
setting certain agendas for the public.
As stated by White36 these ‘agenda setting’ actions often were embedded within the 
body of news texts. Being embedded, readers are then likely to be influenced by those 
perceptions without realising.
In this study I employ a number of research methods, including discourse analysis 
within case study research. This enables me to explore the differences evident in the 
newspaper texts. I am questioning how these texts might reflect certain interests, and 
specifically, to what extent that control of the news texts impacted on the content and 
tone of media reports surrounding the East Timor crisis in 1999.
1.5. The Indonesian perspective.
The Indonesian media in 1999 was in transition. After decades of systematic 
repression by the Indonesian government, the press finally had a reprieve and their 
freedoms were dramatically increased. This was due to a sequence of circumstances 
that would eventually play out in the East Timor Crisis in the following year of 1999.
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In mid-1997, a massive economic crisis hit Asia and Indonesia was not exempt. The 
result was millions of people suddenly lost their jobs. The national average income 
was slashed to almost nothing so that poverty skyrocketed. Before long, people were 
restless and demanding real action from government.
The Indonesian government’s reaction in dealing with people in revolt is by the use 
force. On May 12, 1998, a peaceful demonstration at a private University in Jakarta 
ended in a bloodbath. Five students were killed by unknown gunmen. This incident 
triggered a massive revolt, which ended in riots, lootings and lawlessness.
Faced with the mounting threat of mutiny from all ranks in the government, President 
Soeharto declared his resignation, passing the power to his vice-President, BJ Habibie 
on May 21, 1999 in line with the Indonesian constitution.
President Habibie was unique. Formally he had no real power base, except in his 
hometown in South Sulawesi.37 He came from the GOLKAR party, which was the 
ruling party, but he had a poor relationship with the military -  the main sponsor of 
GOLKAR.38
Habibie had spent half of his life in West Germany, studying, and later working for a 
leading aircraft company, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm. One of the first things that 
Habibie did as President was to allow greater press freedom, although it wasn’t until 
early 1999 that he officially declared all previous press laws no longer valid,
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confirming the freedom immediately by increasing the number of press licenses
issued.40
This higher degree of freedom meant the beginning of a new era for the Indonesian 
press and so it was bound to be contested. Since independence in 1945, the 
Indonesian press was systemically re-modelled into what can be defined as a 
developmental press model.41
McQuail has argued that one of the main characteristics of developmental press is 
that it is subordinate to the efforts of developing nationhood and society.42 As the task 
of developing society and nation is the task of the government, then this renders the 
press sub-ordinate to the government.43 President Soeharto himself saw the role of the 
press thus:
Since it occupies such an important position, the press has an enormous impact in all sectors 
such as politics, the economy, the social-cultural environment whether it does or does not 
fulfil its role and responsibilities. A successful press will accelerate efforts to achieve national 
targets while a press which does not fulfil its role will no doubt delay the attainment of 
identified targets. It is precisely this realisation on the part o f the press that has caused it to 
urge us to support the slogan: ‘positive interaction between the press, the government and the 
people’, as stated in the Main Guidelines o f State Policy (GBHN -  Garis-Garis Besar Haluan 
Negara).44
By 1999, the Indonesian press was still in the process of finding its new form, re­
writing the rules of the game and re-educating its members about the new role and 
responsibilities. This task continues today.45 During the 1999 East Timor crisis, the 
dilemma faced by the Indonesian press was very apparent. On the one hand there 
were signs that the members wanted the industry to become fully independent, while 
on the other hand, it cannot be denied that Indonesian pride was embedded in the 
status quo, the integrity and unity of the nation were at stake.
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On those occasions when the Indonesian press chose to side with the Indonesian 
government regarding the integrity and unity of Indonesia, it meant that the press was 
inevitably supporting the interests of the Indonesian military. This was troubling, 
because over the decades the Indonesian military had been one of the main oppressors 
of the press.
On the other hand, choosing to side with the internationally popular view of East
Timor separating from Indonesia was to be seen as in direct conflict with most
Indonesian views about the integrity and unity of Indonesia as a whole. Toeti
Adhitama of Media Indonesia explained:
In the case o f East Timor, there indeed was a dilemma. We feel annoyed that the East 
Timorese want to separate from us -  after we had considered them one o f us for so long. But 
it’s still hard to sit idle when we see East Timorese trembling with fear, made to squat with 
their hands on their head and guarded by large Australians who enthusiastically point the 
muzzles o f their weapons at those helpless people.46
The case of the Indonesian dignity being at stake became more evident when the 
international pressure for intervention increased with the escalating level of violence 
after the referendum. Australia, and in particular the Australian media, was noted by 
Indonesians for its obvious highlighting of Indonesian mishaps and moral breaches. 
The Indonesian Ambassador for Australia at that time noted:
[1 am] Simply amazed at the enthusiasm and glee in reporting our shortcomings and 
misfortunes.... [A lot o f  sensible people] are wondering, is Australia a friendly countiy, a 
neighbour, or w h at? ......Australians have become too intrusive, too arrogant, too boastful.47
For Indonesia, especially the general public, the reaction from Australia towards the 
situation in East Timor was very surprising. As explained by Ambassador Wiryono
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above, such strong reaction led to a perception of cheering on Indonesia’s misfortune 
which was totally unexpected from Australia. It was as if Australia had turned from a 
close friend and ally to a total stranger who was now pointing a gun at you.
1.6. The Australian perspective.
The Australian media viewed the whole situation with a totally different view. There 
was a greater tendency for the Australian media to view Indonesia through what it 
found to criticise.48 This does not necessarily mean that there was a direct and 
conspiratorial campaign against Indonesia; rather the view was historical in respect to 
the Balibo five and perhaps a spin of cultural superiority in newspaper texts that were 
encouraged by the Howard government.49
The Australian media can be defined by what Dennis McQuail stated as ‘a free press 
system’. Within the free press system, the media are basically free to present their 
view in any way within the law that is afforded all citizens. It is held that the media 
also should be free from any form of censorship and oppression.50
The culture of the Australian media places much emphasis on ‘being straightforward’
and giving direct criticism. As Alan Knight stated:
Australian journalists learn industry practices and priorities within a Western professional 
culture that tolerates if not encourages criticism of governments, corporations and prominent 
personalities. They usually endorse the first article o f the code o f professional conduct for the 
International Federation of Journalists, which states that ‘Respect for the truth and for the 
right o f the public to the truth is the first duty o f the journalists’.51
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Coming from such a background, Australian journalists are often at odds in particular 
with local officials and governments in Asia. Asian journalists, officials and 
government (including Indonesia) have different backgrounds, culture and 
professional expectations as described earlier.
Foreign correspondents quickly discovered, furthermore, that it is frequently impossible to 
ring an organisation's press spokesperson for instant comments and analysis on the topic issue 
o f the day, as they would expect in their home countries (Kakialatu 1994:71).
Press secretaries often feel insecure about making frank on-the-spot statements to journalists, 
tending 'to be ignorant o f decisions and issues or deliberately evasive' (Beutler 1982:28).
Foreign correspondents find that they gain information from such departments (such as the 
Indonesian Armed Forces) on 'an hoc basis' with the success o f their interactions largely 
dependent on their personal relations with individuals in the institutions (Schwarz 1995).
Barry Lowe (2000) found that the negative reporting of Indonesia has been apparent 
for decades. He asserts that the Australian media often emphasise conflict, human 
rights abuses and poverty rather than providing a positive outlook of a country.54 
Even more troubling was the tendency for the Australian press to describe the 
Indonesian press as biased, tied in with the TNI and only representing certain kinds of 
news.
But their construction o f  Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is weighted heavily on the 
downside o f life in the life o f  those countries. It describes these countries as appearing to 
falter in their quest for modernity, prosperity and brutality, danger and disappointment. The 
negative news focus may be partly been result o f habit. Insurgency, disasters, repressive 
politicians and sleaze have been loud themes in International news media coverage o f  South 
East Asia for decades. It seems difficult for media gate keepers to refocus on other issues. The 
innate conservatism o f  news production practice determines that they keep doing things the 
traditional way, until they are confronted with compelling reasons to look for a new issue.55
From that constructed and conservative public view, it seems that the Australian 
media stood to be relatively easily influenced by government, despite the idea that it 
was supposedly of a developed and free nature.
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During WW 2, for the first time, Australia was directly threatened militarily and the 
threat came from Asia (Japan). In 1960 the rising waves of Communism brought new 
fears and so Australia was thrown into the Vietnam War, which ended when 
Communist forces took over the Republic of South Vietnam.
The significance of these two conflicts was that they reinforced the fear that Australia 
is always under threat from Asia. This was underlined by the view that Australia was 
a European bastion in the middle of a vast mass of Asian cultures and this was at odds 
with the predominant culture within Australia.56
The result of this is long lasting and even today, there are heated debates about 
Australia’s position in the world and in the region in particular. While there are major 
differences between Asia and Australia in culture, values and politics, there will 
always be a level of distrust and fear, in particular from the Australian side in respect 
to the issues of location, a long way from its historical, constitutional and cultural 
origins in England.
To some extent the mass media content represents dominant social values and 
framing of events {Chomsky, 1994 #l;Damien Kingsbury, 2000 #28;Lichtenberg, 
1990 #39;McCullagh, 2002 #31;McQuail, 2001 #9}. News discourse that frames 
Australia’s position in the region as being vulnerable to terrorists and as ‘dangerous’ 
for Australians abroad, reinforces ideas that Australia is isolated from its origins and 
is alone or even ‘constantly under threat’. Therefore, in analysing media performance 
and discourse in this PhD, care has been taken to read Australian news discourse
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against a historical tendency for Australians and Australia to perceive themselves as 
‘the other’ in the Asian region.57
1.7. Research questions.
There are two questions to be examined in detail within this thesis. First, how have 
the Indonesian and Australian press represented the East Timor conflict?
The second research question is can we understand the representations as symbolic 
constructs of different perceptions of the political realities, reflecting and serving 
different political, economic and ideological interests?
Referring again to the research model by Arie Soesilo (Soesilo and Washburn, 1994) 
and based on the findings of my previous research, I am formulating several 
hypothesis as for examination in this thesis:
- Despite being part of a supportive Developmental Press, the Indonesian press 
demonstrated a tendency to hold an unspecific view on the East Timor Crisis.
- The Australian media on the other hand, known to be part of a Free Press System, 
appeared to be working in ways unlike a Free Press System. It worked instead, in 
close response to carefully designed media releases, leaks and spin from sources 
like the office of the Prime Minister, John Howard, and his ministers.58
- The Indonesian media as part of a supportive Developmental Press, during the 
East Timor Crisis of 1999, showed a tendency to be relatively independent of the 
government.59
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- The reports on the East Timor Crisis within the Australian media tended to serve 
the political, economic and ideological interests of the power elite within 
Australian society.60
- As if it was acting on behalf of the US in the region,61 Australia’s relations with 
Indonesia throughout the crisis presented a difficult case for journalism and 
diplomacy.
1.8. Rationale and theoretical framework
For this study, it was necessary to present a wide range of methodologies and 
significant writers in the field. As argued before, this thesis will cover a wide range of 
issues as it will analyse newspapers from two different countries; Australia and 
Indonesia -  very much of two different countries with different cultures, histories and 
values. The analysis, therefore, will have to take into account the two different 
societies with everything that comes with it.
Due to the complexity outlined above and before, it was concluded that a single tool 
of analysis would not be ideal as the wide range of areas being analysed requires a 
more advanced approach. As the aim of the thesis is to understand the different 
accounts produced by Australian and Indonesian newspapers over the same issue -  
the East Timor crisis, then it is an imperative that the methodology applied here is 
flexible and able to cover wide range of issues and type of data.
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The problem of known and traditional methodologies is that they tend to be strict in 
one singular point of view in the task of viewing specific events. This is in particular 
true to an extent with a positivist approach. Nevertheless, the positivist approach does 
have a strong point in its ability to replicate, thus fulfilling the requirements of exact 
science in determining what constitutes known facts. Facts can be defined in a simple 
manner as something that existed, can be measured and in term of scientific findings 
must be able to be replicated within the specific research parameters in which it was 
designed.
The problem in examining social occurrences is that often, social occurrence is not 
something that can be measured or replicated in specific terms or conditions. This 
issue has been a long standing argument within the discipline of sociology which is 
considered to be the foundation of social sciences, even until today. It is not an irony 
that August Comte, the founder of the term -  sociology - believed that sociology 
should rigidly follow the exact sciences’ basic rules of what is constituted as ‘fact’. 
But over the time and during the development of sociology, it is accepted that not all 
social occurrences are measurable in an exact manner, nor can they be replicated in 
specific ways by using specific method.
The issue for this thesis is that it should not be a debate about the usage or which 
methodology, but about understanding the issue -  why the Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers presented the East Timor crisis in 1999 in very different ways. The 
representations are so obviously different that even in using a quantitative method, as
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the case for the AKSARA Foundation, the research was able to present the stark 
differences without difficulty. This leads to the questioning of the respective 
journalistic practices in both Australia and Indonesia, and to what extent they differ 
and how and why they differ and what is the purpose or reasons for such differences.
It is the position of this thesis then to define a methodology that can best examine the 
issue in great detail and understand the great complexity within the issue. The details 
to be examined here are the texts of news reports regarding East Timor crisis within 
the set period of August 1 -  October 1, 1999. Even by limiting the scope of the study 
to the time frame above it still resulted in more than a thousand articles. To analyse 
those articles in full to minute detail was impossible within the limited time and space 
of this thesis. Thus a further method was needed and so it was decided that a method 
of sampling would be used.
The sampling method most appropriate in this case is purposive sampling. It was 
done by choosing purposively certain news reports as samples of the issue being 
analysed. Further discussion about the methodology and in particular this sampling 
method will be explained in the methodology section. But the aim of purposive 
sampling is to find valid and representative sample of the Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers regarding the East Timor crisis.
Once the samples were finally selected, then came the task of analysing them. As 
mentioned above finding an appropriate methodology is very difficult as there are 
many methodologies that will proclaim themselves as the most appropriate method of
25
analysis. This was not helped by the tendency within the scientific community to 
prove oneself as right by way of proving the other as wrong.
Exacting methods used by the AKSARA Foundation have clearly presented the issue 
by using a quantitative method, thus following the positivist approach, but that 
analysis is yet to explain further, in depth, rather than imply showing the trend of the 
news.
Analysing the whole text of articles published within the research period, thus using a 
qualitative approach such as textual or content analysis is prohibited by time and 
scope of the articles (more than 1000 articles). Thus it was decided that the 
appropriate methodology best be deployed here should be one that is able to analyse 
the issue in a very clear manner and yet manage to capture the complexity within the 
issue itself.
A possible approach as a research method is by using discourse analysis. Discourse 
analysis itself is defined in general as a general term for a number of approaches in 
analysing written, spoken or signed language use.65 The Discourse analysis is a useful 
method for this study. It can show interactions between various actors or elements 
within the process of news making. It can also show the relations between media 
(including the journalists that write the news stories) with their respondents and their 
audiences. This method is also able to show the relationships between the media and 
the society where they are exist. The combination of events, skill of the journalists to
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present the news events and the social-political condition/context of the society that 
received the news can be a very powerful formula for analysing high impact news.
High impact news is defined here as news stories, which ideally should be based upon 
actual news events, that due to their nature, their ‘newsworthiness’, their timeliness 
and possibly subject matter, can create a strong impact upon a particular society.
A more recent example is the TIME magazine reports on the alleged massacre in 
Haditha, Iraq by a group of US Marines.66 The incident happened November 2005, 
was reported in January by the TIME magazine. Later TIME magazine brought their 
findings (as reported by them) to the attention of the US military.
The initial response from the US military was contradicting the TIME magazine 
reports, but finally in February 2006, the US military announced that they were 
conducting an investigation over the incident.67 The news itself by June 2006 was a 
major headline in the US mainstream media and in particular brought on a strongly 
negative perception of the US military and the Marines in particular.68
The discourse analysis itself is still a very general concept. It encompass various 
methods of analysis covering various issues such as: Text grammar (or 'discourse 
grammar'), Rhetoric, Stylistics (linguistics), Interactional sociolinguistics, 
Ethnography of communication, Pragmatics, particularly speech act theory , 
Conversation analysis, Variation analysis and Applied linguistics. Understanding that
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discourse analysis is still a very general concept, a new and more specific method was 
needed.
Discourse analysis has been promoted by many prominent scholars such as Michael 
Foucault, Alessandro Duranti, Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough. The latter two 
are among those often associated with the method. Both like other discourse analysis 
scholars, share the same basis that is linguistic, but in term of the focus of the study 
they have different focus.
For this research, I am not going to use the methods from either Van Dijk or 
Fairclough. Indeed this research will focus on the contextual analysis between written 
news and its social -  cultural context, which is similar with the focus of Van Dijk and 
Fairclough. Nevertheless without diminishing the importance of the two scholars, I 
am going to employ methods proposed by Robert Entman69, Peter White70 and Gadi 
Wolfsfeld71.
My reason is because I believe that the three scholars above have more suitable and 
appropriate method of analysis to study the differences and contexts between 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting on East Timor crisis in 1999. Robert 
Entman method was designed to analyze frame within the print media reports. His 
method was deemed to be one of the most systematic while still being inductive like 
other discourse analysis methods.
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Peter White’s method is based on understanding the power behind the news. White 
proposed a comprehensive understanding from what makes the news to the power 
within the grammar of the news. Being a linguist like Van Dijk, White proposed a 
method that is much based on the linguistic of the news while connecting it with a 
broader social context (like other discourse analysis methods). Discussion regarding 
Peter White’s model of analysis will be available in Chapter 2.
Gadi Wolfsfeld proposed a rather different method. Instead of focusing mainly into 
the language of the news, Wolfsfeld method is focusing more into the context of the 
news.74 Wolfsfeld believes that news is part of a much bigger process such as 
political conflicts.75 During political conflicts, news and news media play a very 
important role that presenting to the public the views of the warring parties.76 The aim 
of the parties is to attract as much as possible public attention and support, from 
which they generated their political power.77 A more detailed explanation of White’s 
model is available on Chapter 2.
1.9. M ethodology.
The methodology section in this chapter is acting as an introductory section to the 
overall methodology used in this thesis. A further and more thorough discussion over 
the theoretical foundations and methodologies will be found in Chapter 2.
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Two main methods of study were ultimately chosen within a generally applied 
technique of discourse analysis. The main assumption is that systemic cultural 
practices, though hidden to casual observation, are confirmed through various kinds 
of discourse found in documents of a formal nature. They might be legal, 
administrative or mass media generated discourses; but they reflect many of the 
ideologies and ethical positions of those in power and those who produced them.
The particular focus of this PhD study period relates to the Australian context and the 
Indonesian context. Specific definition of the research methodologies applied here is 
best described as a blend of the following:
1. Case study research - applied to a select number of examples where the 
subsequent “logging” of the issues being examined were recorded in the form 
of Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports (as the primary sources) as 
well as reflective journal entries after obtaining primary documents, 
sometimes of a privileged nature.
2. Action research and participatory action research - two educational research 
methodologies that allow me, as educator (who was educated in Australia in 
the Journalism discipline) and journalist practitioner (photojoumalist and 
writer), to set up a project around research questions on journalistic practice, 
to keep records of the progress, and reflect upon and respond to, those 
findings and any theories evolving from them over the period of study.
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1 .1 0 . Case study research.
Case study research involves the use of analytical induction. Applied on its own, it 
has been shown to be a defective research method. When cases like print based news 
and news features are selected for discourse analysis and used in conjunction with 
other methods, then case study research has value. The method employs an 
exhaustive examination of cases to draw universal causal generalizations within the 
systems being studied. After an appropriate number of cases are observed and have 
been found to satisfy the hypothesis formulated before the study, then a universal 
causal relationship can be established.
This case study research, then, is supported by dual methodologies (i) participant 
observation, discourse analysis of media reports, conferences and case documents in 
public domains and (ii) interviews with experts and key personnel and stakeholders.
1.11. A ction research.
The action research method was used in this PhD to develop theoretical principles 
and guidelines. In simple terms, action research is a collection of research 
methodologies, which are most suited to this particular study. The research
31
methodologies simultaneously pursue action (or modification and response) and 
research (or conception). In most of its forms, a recurring process is used that 
interchanges between action and critical reflection enacts this process.
In line with Grounded Theory methodologies, this method is ideal for me as a 
journalism lecturer/practitioner in researching and analysing events that were closely 
related to me as a professional while also relating to me through personal experience. 
In this thesis I was looking for a research method that allows me to analyse a process 
that was interacting between action and critical reflection.
In later stages, while continuously refining methods, data and interpretation (which is
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what Grounded theory is all about), new understanding and knowledge is developed 
from the outcome of the earlier stages.
Media reports from both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding East 
Timor in 1999 are essentially part of a long process of reporting about East Timor, 
which goes back a long way prior to the time of the Indonesian invasion in 1975. As a 
continuing process, action research builds a better understanding through the creation 
of a new theory that emerges through the continuous process of analytical stages 
regarding the issue. In the majority of the cases, action research is qualitative and 
participative, where the researcher is involved. The research method used here then is 
an extended version of action research -  and is categorically known as ‘participatory 
action research’.
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1.12. Participatory action research.
Participatory action research, like action research, is a broad collection of scholarly 
activities involving community, solidarity and commitment: “all are necessary to 
carry the arguments to confront the psychologizing and socializing of research and 
method and their engagement in social life”.78 As it covers such a broad spectrum of 
analysis, this method is best deemed to be suitable for my research here in 
understanding the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports regarding the East 
Timor crisis in 1999.
In this thesis, I believe that participatory action research (PAR) is more suitable than 
action research as PAR can provide recognition that all research methodologies are 
political in character. This is appropriate to journalism and particularly to the media 
reporting of the East Timor crisis in 1999.
Journalists starting their work believing that they are doing ‘objective’ reporting will 
rarely acknowledge the power of differences within the reports they produce. A 
sample in this context would be the reports from Lindsay Murdoch with the 
headlines: ‘Stacks of bodies went to the roof.79 The story turned out to be false, but 
Lindsay Murdoch vehemently defended his action by saying that there will be no 
editor in the world who would not publish such stories (even if it later turned out to 
false).80
Writer David Hamilton says that there are at least three democratic propositions that 
have been adopted by the participatory action research movement. The first is that the
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twenty first century democracies should empower all citizens, not only those of the 
already privileged elite. Secondly, he says that research of any kind in the humanities, 
arts and the liberal social sciences, is never morally or politically disinterested, 
political positions always present themselves. And thirdly, he agues that maintaining 
a separation and a distance between research and practice “is psychologically,
o  1
socially, and economically inefficient”.
The view above is in line with the classic theory from C. Wright Mills, that social 
research and theory is always influenced by the imaginations of certain political 
ethics. This theory is rooted in the theory of Max Weber, a prominent sociologist, 
where Weber asserted that there is a big difference between ‘objective’ facts with 
‘subjective’ interpretation by humans (including social researchers) as members of
o o
their society.
In agreement with the egalitarianism inherent in participatory action research as well
as the support from Max Weber’s theory above, suggests the case for adopting this
particular method in analysing the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports on
the East Timor crisis in 1999. Me Taggart reinforces the argument:
What counts as research is not merely a matter o f  elegant argument about methodology; social 
research is also about the politics o f having arguments heard, a precursor to being understood 
and accepted. Because participatory action researchers sought to redefine the often privileged 
relation o f the researcher to the researched, the vindication o f participatory action research 
required more than the validity o f arguments to achieve acceptance by the research 
establishments it confronted and by the people it claimed to support.
Within participatory action research, a thorough and multi dimensional ethical 
discourse allows discussion, argument and resolution through a non-confrontational 
dialogue. The multi dimensional ethical discourse should recognise that pre-exiting
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legitimacy of people, epistemology, legal philosophy, cultures, values and 
international and civil and human rights. Participatory research is a systematic and yet 
a collaborative approach ideal in collecting evidence in these ways and generally, 
arriving at a theory of action.
This process is ideal for industrial reflection, dialogue, decision and outcome
analysis, the results of which can be deployed back into the next stage.
Participatory action research is n o t  simply problem solving. It involves problem posing, not 
just problem solving. It does not start from a view of ‘problems’ as pathologies. It sees values 
and plans problematized by work in the real world and by the study o f the culture and nature 
o f work by people themselves. It is motivated by a quest to improve and understand the world 
by changing it and learning how to improve it from the effects o f the changes made.85
One important thing to note is that somebody else outside the system does not 
conduct participatory action research. Rather, my position as a working (Indonesian) 
journalist during the East Timor crisis in 1999 means the participatory research 
method can be applied to the daily practices (in a professional line of work) in order 
to improve that professional practice. As such, participatory action research reduces 
the perception held by some that they must take positions they feel they need to 
defend.
1.13. D eveloping theory.
One basic rule learned as a student of sociology studying sociological theories is all 
the theories of sociology are created reflecting the various factors that influenced the 
person that created theory itself. Thus one was taught to understand sociological 
theories as a reflection upon the social, political and economical conditions (among
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other factors) of the day when the theory was created. The therory of Marx for 
instance was ‘framed’ for us as a reflection of the life and times of Karl Marx, a 
brilliant thinker who lived and died in poverty. This social condition reflected in his 
thought was therefore mainly about the struggle of the lower classes against the 
‘bourgeois’ class.
As presented earlier, the issue of Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting of 
the East Timor crisis in 1999 represents a complex issue. First it involves two 
different countries with different cultures, values and norms. Second, it involves press 
organizations bound by different press systems. Third, except a for the book by 
Damien Kingbsury et al86 and few others, not much comparative discussion is 
available in regard to how the Australian press compared with their Indonesian 
counterparts. Fourth, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers and their journalists 
believed that they did the best they could in providing the public (or the society) with 
the best possible news reports according to their standard (of the day).
Bearing in mind the issues above, as stated previously, it was decided that the best 
possible way in formulating theory on the workings of the Australian and Indonesian 
newspaper reporting and how they might be improved, was to use methodologies 
based upon Grounded Theory. As stated earlier, this was a methodology capable in 
analysing and theorizing the issue, which could cover both the empirical aspects and 
the subjective aspects simultaneously.
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The reality in East Timor during those fateful months of August to October 1999 was 
essentially empirical. It was simply a fact that it happened at that time. The issue now 
was how was the event being interpreted by the Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers, which in reality were a collection of people working to a specific goal, 
which was often driven by political and always commercial imperatives.
Grounded theory was founded by Glaser and Strauss87 and it became clear that it was 
the only methodology that was able to give a theoretical foundation to create an 
understanding of such complex and multi dimensional issues. Grounded Theory also 
provided a solid theoretical foundation for a more applicable research action as used 
in this thesis - namely participatory action research.
The process of developing a theory in journalism practice should cover as many 
factors as possible including the personal experiences of individual journalists. In 
reality, journalism today still relies very much on an individual journalist’s 
capabilities chat were developed through the course of time, in other words, through 
experience.
This argument is supported with the fact that most of the news media professionals 
(journalists) do not have a formal or tertiary educated journalism background. Thus it 
was an imperative that the professional conduct of the modern news media, such as 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers, should be understood from the perspective of 
individual people who were involved with the process of reporting.
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My experience as a working journalist during and after the East Timor crisis will 
become one of the analytical factors from a particular perspective. My professional 
experience as well as my personal experience, both as journalistic educator and a 
journalism student in Australia prior to the crisis in 1999, plays strongly in the 
process. Indeed a question that might arise is about objectivity, but as argued earlier 
the position of this thesis is not about finding an ‘objective judgement’ but rather 
trying to find a subjective understanding.
It is the aim of this thesis that the emerging theory is of one that will be able to take 
into account the social factors such as cultures, values and history that often were not 
present in conventional journalistic analysis. To achieve this goal, participatory action 
research as applied throughout this thesis was then to be extended to an appropriate 
process for the development of theory through grounded theory.
Newspaper reporting is essentially a process with a context in both production and 
management, and as an educator I needed to consider these and other conceptual 
issues. Consequently I decided to follow an approach based upon ‘grounded theory’. 
This method seemed able to allow the combination of all the contexts -  allowing my 
professional print journalist experience, my years as a journalistic educator and my 
exposure to Australian journalism education, conventions and culture, to allow me in 
developing a theory on comparative journalism practice between the Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers.
1.14. G rounded Theory.
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Grounded theory (GT) is a general research method (most often associated with 
qualitative research) for social sciences developed by the sociologists Barney Glaser 
(b. 1930) and Anselm Strauss (1916-1996).88 Grounded theory is unique as it can be 
deployed in various situations from hospital management to classroom research, The 
strong point of grounded theory is its ability to build a new understanding (resulting 
in a creation of a theory) from a collection of cases that do not seem to be related at 
first scrutiny. As such, grounded theory is most suitable for this thesis where a new 
understanding was being developed from the analysis of Australian and Indonesian 
newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis in 1999. To avoid repetition, a 
comprehensive discussion regarding Grounded Theory will be presented in the 
Chapter 2.
1.15. R esearch as subjective interpretations.
Johannes Muller described in the introduction of Peter Berger’s book Pyramid of 
Human Sacrifice that there is an eternal conflict with the social sciences regarding 
what can be constituted as ‘facts’.90 Some social scientists have insisted upon the 
usage of an exact scientific (empirical) method and standard as the benchmark, thus 
often referred to as the ‘positivist school. On the other hand, there are those who 
believed that social events are by their nature a subjective event. The event itself is an 
objective fact but how the society interprets the ‘objective’ fact itself that made the 
process is subjective. Both lines of thought have their supporters with the positivists
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school led by scholars like August Comte. In the other camp, Max Weber is 
considered as a leading figure.
What becomes the issue of this thesis and in line with the above discussion is how the 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented the East Timor crisis in 1999, in 
such a different mamier. The different manner of representation is actually a 
reflection of the different perception of the crisis and the underlying culture and 
politics. Thus the issue here is about the politics of perception, how two different 
societies perceived and then represented similar issues and event through their news 
media, finally arriving at completely different accounts.
As described earlier, this thesis will rely heavily upon my own experience as a 
working journalist in Indonesia during the East Timor crisis (1999). This 
consequently gives rise the question about objectivity, as the researcher here becomes 
a central point of references in analysis. Such a position of research would not be 
possible if I was following the positivist line of thought. Within the positivist point of 
view, the researcher should limit their involvement to a minimum. Any breaches 
should be considered as being un-ethical and unscientific, thus contaminating the 
finding(s).
But my position as researcher here is clear as I see the researcher as an inseparable 
part of the analysis. As the researcher I am central to the research and so the 
subsequent thesis. Such a stance best serves the aim of this thesis, to develop an 
understanding of the journalism around the East Timor crisis in 1999. Max Weber, C
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Wright Mills and Peter Berger are in keeping with the position presented in this thesis 
- that there should be a clear, transparent definition and delineation between the 
objective action and facts and the subjective interpretation.91 Within this line of 
thought, a social researcher will never be able to be truly objective as everyone is a 
product of their own society and language and thus they will always perceive events 
according to their subjective perception.92
The key issue then is not about the ‘objectivity’ of the perception in absolute terms, 
rather the social researcher should admit when they are being subjective. When the 
social researcher is able to do so, they should create more ‘objective’ observation and 
data collection and in doing so, clearly define where their subjectivity lies.
As a working journalist in Jakarta at the time of the East Timor crisis (1999), I had a 
first hand experience on how the Indonesian newspaper worked and so I reacted 
accordingly during the time. I will therefore apply my ‘subjective’ experience in 
explaining and deconstructing the Indonesian newspaper reports on the East Timor 
crisis. On the other hand, between July 1997 and July 1998, I was educated in 
Australia in the journalism field in journalistic method and practice, theory, ethics and 
the law from the Australian, and perhaps, ‘western’ perspective. That enabled me to 
experience and learn about Australian media and culture.
Being an active participant, my subjective perception will be visible throughout the 
thesis. Galen Rowell, a photographer described the power of participatory action 
research: humans are always reflecting upon things that we see as visual stimulus to
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what we already know.93 What happens later is a passive response to the stimuli 
presented by our surroundings. Instead of actively questioning what we saw in front 
of us, we often passively accept as something that we already see or know and so 
process accordingly.94 My position as social researcher is to transform the common 
news reports into something that is sociologically and journalistically meaningful. 
This kind of participatory action research expanded upon through grounded theory is 
a method I believe that will be able to put journalistic events into a new perspective 
on the East Timor crisis of 1999.
1.16. Overview of the structure of this thesis.
This chapter has explained that the significance of the East Timor crisis in 1999 in 
comprehending print journalism practice in Australia and Indonesia is of critical 
importance -  especially as foreign peacekeepers, predominantly from Australia are 
again serving in East Timor in this year of 2006. For the crisis in 1999 Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers depicted the enfolding events in a markedly different manner 
of presentation with different emphasis on certain aspects. These differences in 
reporting ranged from the political standing of both the Australian and Indonesian 
governments to the direct accounts of the unfolding violence. This leads to the 
imperative to question why the news media of Australia and Indonesia, who claimed 
to be professional news organizations, were so diverse in their accounts of the same 
events.
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In the next chapters these issues will be examined in more detail. The analysis will be 
undertaken through using both quantitative and qualitative techniques with emphasis 
on a framing methodology. Chapter two will continue to detail relevant theories. 
Chapter three will provide a general overview regarding the Australian and 
Indonesian print press and how they stand differently. Chapter four and five will 
centre on the framing analysis of selected incidents. Chapter six and seven provide 
further analysis using quantitative analysis and content analysis. Chapter eight will 
sum up and serve as the conclusion to the thesis.
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C H A PT E R  2
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
2 . 1 .  T heoretical perspective -  key constructs.
This chapter is divided into two sections and outlines the theory and methodology 
used in this research. The methodology section leads off from the brief comments on 
methodology mentioned in the first chapter and describes and discusses the approach, 
concepts and methods to be applied in more detail than was provided in Chapter 1.
The theory section contains a literature review regarding the theory used and the 
theory itself. The event in East Timor in 1999 that defined the East Timor crisis as 
such was a social event. It was an event happening in one society, East Timor, but 
quickly engulfed the nearest countries and the world. How can one explain a simple 
choice of accepting or rejecting an offer of autonomy that turned into something 
totally different where violence was the norm and hundreds of thousands people were 
forced to leave their homes and livelihood.
Max Weber argues that events that happen in society follow certain rules but nothing 
about it is exact.96 He links this to the basic nature of humans of being inquisitive and 
strongly independent in choosing their actions but also at the same time dependent
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upon their society to provide them with their basic needs such as identity and means
to survive. The role of the social scientist is to observe the events that unfold in
daily life." Harste and Mortensen described Weber’s position in this way:
The social reality is real and the person the researcher must stand in an observing position. As 
a normal “everyday” person and as part o f scientific institutions, he participates in changing 
and developing the social reality. But research is subject to reality perspective. Researchers 
must take cognisance o f society instead o f trying to change it.100
Thus as described in Chapter 1, the position of the researcher in this thesis is of an 
observer looking back to the events that have unfolded in East Timor in 1999 and the 
impact the events had on both Australian and Indonesian societies and in particular, 
their media. As the researcher, I am applying the concept from Max Weber described 
above combined with the theory from Peter Berger (to be explained more below), of a 
participatory, or grounded observer.
The position I took here is based on the fact that I am part of Indonesian society, in 
particular the press corp. I was actively working as journalist during the East Timor 
crisis. But I was also in a unique position to earn my formal journalism education in 
Australia, from 1997 -  1998. Therefore, I was a witness in both societies, 
experiencing first hand the way both societies evolved and functioned. Indeed, my 
basic upbringing in Indonesia will allow me to understand more about Indonesian 
society, but I believe my experience of living and studying in Australia (back in 1997, 
as well as between 2001 and 2006) will help understand more about Australian 
society and in particular its press.
The theory that I will show and later use is to reflect on my position outlined above; I 
will refer back to Max Weber’s theory regarding society and the theories from Berger
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regarding the society and what constitutes ‘reality’101. Critics have often declared that 
the problem with social science is that it is too unpredictable. Indeed, sociology was 
first developed by August Comte102 as a replica of ‘exact’ science in understanding 
society. The debate still continues today. I remember the time I was a sociology 
student in the University of Indonesia (1988 -  1996), and the emphasis of my school 
was to present our arguments with strong empirical evidence, and to do this, we were 
strongly advised to use quantitative methods such as statistical analysis.
In the case of East Timor crisis however, I felt that much of the explanation should 
reflect the understanding of differences between Australian and Indonesian societies. 
The case studies in Chapter 4, regarding the death of Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes 
has shown us that the issue is far from an exact perspective. Instead we have two 
different societies arguing strongly about the issue. As the foundations of the 
perspectives are inherently different, it should not be surprising that the findings are 
different too.
Taking off from the basic premise that we are dealing with two different societies that 
tried to understand the same issue, the methodology selected and applied that seemed 
most appropriate was case study research and participatory action research supported 
by the Grounded Theory method. The initial discussion can be read in the 
methodology section in Chapter 1. With that in mind, I begin with these positions:
• The Australian and Indonesian society are two different societies with 
different histories, cultures and values;
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• In order to understand the different perspectives presented by their 
newspapers regarding East Timor crisis, we have to understand the context of 
the perspectives from both the Australian and Indonesian sides;
• The process of understanding includes understanding the history of the two 
countries: the history of their press and how the relationship between 
Australia and Indonesia has evolved, with particular relation to the press;
• As we are dealing with delicate social symbols here, it is best to use 
methodologies that allow the issues to be analysed within their contexts. It is 
essential that the method should not force the data to fit into any particular 
theory or concept;
• The researcher, as mentioned in Chapter 1 and in line with the theory by 
Weber and Berger below, has a central role in analysing and explaining the 
data and the findings. The researcher here will play an active participatory 
role -  acting as a guide in taking the readers through the journey to understand 
the East Timor crisis from both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers’ 
points of view.
The argument of this thesis is that the news reports from Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers do not simply report news. The news reports create a sense of realism to 
what was happening in East Timor within the context of Australian and Indonesian 
societies. This is evident from the mood within Indonesia immediately after the 
announcement of the referendum in East Timor.
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I remember that I was awoken by the phone call from my editor in Singapore at 6AM 
(Jakarta time) on September 4th, 1999. He said that the East Timorese had decided to 
reject the Indonesian offer to be part of the Indonesian nation but with special 
autonomy. This meant that East Timor would cease to be part of Indonesia. My editor 
wanted to have an article to be published that day about what Indonesians felt about 
the result of the referendum. Immediately, I called a few people. Every single 
Indonesian that I spoke to expressed their surprise, including those who used to serve 
in the Indonesian military. But one thing was quite apparent: there were mixed 
feelings of relief that a burden had been removed, and a hope that the East Timorese 
people would have made the best choice for their future.103
But the East Timor problem was a problem that did not want to go away. Almost 
immediately we saw and read news reports about how East Timor had descended into 
chaos. It was sad indeed, but the whole of Indonesia was also in chaos at that time. 
Food rationing was common and even in some areas in Jakarta, people had to line up 
to get basic needs like rice. Simple food ingredients such as chillies were becoming 
very expensive, creating a sudden urge by some of my friends to start businesses 
selling chillies. Suddenly, there were these reports about the riots and people running 
amok in East Timor. Frankly it was not a big deal for most Indonesians at that time. 
Riots and lawlessness were the norm of the day even in Jakarta.104
The turning point as far I remember was the day I saw the picture of Australian troops 
with their tanks on the front page of Kompcis daily, sometime in September.10' The 
caption declared the readiness of the Australian troops to enter East Timor to ‘save
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the East Timorese’. As I came to my office at The Indonesian Observer, the the 
Indonesian staff were very evidently upset, and the question on everyone’s minds 
was: is Australia is going to invade East Timor?106
From then on, East Timor was no distant reality. Suddenly everybody started to talk 
about how Indonesia has provided so much, in particular infrastructure in East Timor 
for more than twenty years. Stories of how thousands of Indonesian soldiers were 
killed in East Timor fighting the rebel group FRETILIN were revived.
The big issue then was the news about how the international world, drummed up by 
Australia, was pressuring Indonesia. In our perspective at that time, as bad as it was, 
we thought Indonesia should be given time and chance to solve the problem. We had 
no other choice than to accept our leader’s statements as they were the leaders. But 
one thing that was seriously misrepresented at that time was Indonesia’s 
determination to solve the situation.
1998 was probably the darkest time of Indonesia’s history in my living memory. I 
remember walking around in a burned out mall in Jakarta. Walking inside, was the 
fresh smell of charcoal just like in a camping ground but this was no camping ground. 
This used to be a busy mall selling electronics.107 I remember talking with fellow 
Jakarta residents about how in May 1998 there was almost no law in the streets. 
Everyone was in fear and almost all males had to stay out all night armed with 
whatever they had to protect their homes from rioters’ attacks. The feared security
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apparatus was almost nowhere to be seen and even if troops were evident, they 
seemed to be incapable of stopping the mayhem.
But gradually things changed for the better. I also remember how I cherished so much 
reading the news that a car robber on the Jakarta -  Bogor highway was shot dead by 
patrolling Marines. Finally, I thought, law and order would prevail. Indeed it took us 
some time, but gradually, the troops and police started to take over the streets in 
Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia. Life began to return to normal again and I could 
travel between cities without much fear of being caught up in riots. But it took time. 
This then was the reality of living in Jakarta during a time when the government was 
in the process of turbulent change, and the effects of the economic crisis were 
oppressive. This, and these social, political and cultural realities coloured Indonesian 
citizens’ outlook in 1998 leading up to 1999, but these realities were very far from the 
experience of Australians at the same time.
2.2. The social construction o f reality.
The concept of the social construction of reality has its roots with the sociological 
theorist Herbert Blumer.109 Blumer argues that society is structured by interconnected 
interactions between the members of the society. During the interaction, a series of 
symbols are exchanged. Indeed the process of exchanging socially defined symbols 
becomes the essence of the process of interactions and led to his theory, symbolic
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interactionism. Harste and Mortenson described the importance of Blumer theory as 
follows:110
Blumer repeatedly takes exception to the view that social interaction simply expresses or 
represents the participating actor's inner condition and motives or an external cultural or 
structural order. In other words Blumer sees social interaction as fundamental formative 
process.111
For Blumer the process of social interaction represents the bigger social order that 
surrounds and controls the members of the societies in their actions. Each member of 
the society’s behaviour is constantly based upon the interpretation of the action by 
other members of the society and this process happens continuously. “ Thus what 
one does is based upon how others might interpret one’s actions. By way of example, 
let us consider why an act of vandalism such as graffiti almost always happens in 
public areas. Based on Blumer’s theory the reason is because the perpetrator or the 
actor realises that their action will be looked down on by other members of society. 
But part of the reason for the act in first place is its role as a symbol of defiance, a 
public statement or a protest against common norms. Understood in this way it makes 
perfect sense that the act of graffiti occupies public space.
Blumer’s theory was later expanded into two well known theories by two leading 
sociologists: the theory of self by Erving Goffmannllj and the theory of the social 
construction of reality by Peter Berger.114 These two theories were representations of 
the world at that particular time, the 1960’s, when the Vietnam War was raging and 
the Cold War was at its height. The world was facing enormous challenges to change, 
with the new generation bom after World War II challenging the world hegemony.
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For this generation, the perception that conflict should end in war was no longer the 
default position.
Erving Goffmann’s theory focused on the concept of self, an entity within every 
person but shaped by their surroundings and life experiences.115 Self is the identity of 
the person, on one hand being shaped by the society where they are but on the other 
hand, also shaped by the personal experiences of the individual. The centre of the 
theory is the concept that everybody is presenting their identity in a conscious and 
deliberate manner. A key concept for Goffman was ‘impression management’, that is, 
managing the impression we hope others will get of us.116 It’s like a theatre where we 
see what the directors and actors wanted us to see through the props, make-up and 
acting (Goffman, 1969, Goffman, 1997, Goffman, 2002, Harste and Mortensen, 
2000).
The theory of social construction of reality was published by Thomas Luckmann and 
Peter L. Berger in 1966.117 Like Goffman’s theory, it is based on the theory of 
symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer.118 But the focus of the theory is different 
from Goffman. Luckmann and Berger focus on the concept of knowledge and the 
impact of what we know to be ‘fact’ or ‘knowledge’. Goffman instead was focusing 
on the process of interaction in relation to the concept of "self.
Luckmann and Berger argue that what the society accepts as "knowledge’ or ‘reality’ 
is in fact what is defined by society as ‘reality’.119 So reality here is referring to
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something abstract and subjective in the sense of being socially or intersubjectively 
constructed. Put another way, reality is not simply 'there:
It follows from this that what is perceived as reality in one society may not be 
considered as reality in other society. Berger and Luckmann suggest further that to 
understand the relativity of the realities here it is necessary to understand the context 
of how different ideas and practices are understood in different social settings. One 
simple example is that in Australia, in answering a question it is considered 
acceptable to put up the left hand instead of the right hand. This gesture is considered 
to be impolite and even rude in Indonesia as left hand is associated with activities that 
are considered improper to be shown in public.121
Thus as part of global industry, news is not merely a passing of information but 
something more significant. News is now a product of global industry122 and even at 
local level, news is still considered to be a promising business. A good illustration of 
the currency of news comes from Indonesia where immediately after the fall of the 
New Order regime, hundreds of news corporations in the form of radio stations, 
publications and (in much smaller numbers) television stations emerged. In 1999, 
press licenses jumped from 292 licences for press corporations to 1.687. Of that 
number, according to the data from the Indonesian Ministry of Information, 812 were 
licenses for new publications. "
A study by Vhang, Wang and Chen argues that news play an important role in 
defining the ‘reality’ within a society.124 Vhang et al argues that what is known as
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leality especially in a remote setting is never given and generally comes from news 
media.1"' Furthermore, they argue that ‘social reality’ is product of interaction 
between the society’s objective reality and a society’s owns pragmatic and social 
needs.126
What constitutes the reality o f  a society, especially in a remote setting, is never given and 
generally comes from the news media (Lippmann, 1922). Social reality is a product o f the 
interaction between the objective reality and a society's own pragmatic and social needs 
(Cohen, Adoni, & Bantz, 1990). The end result-verbal rituals and other crude forms o f record 
in primitive societies and news in modem societies—is, in Boulding's words, "the transcript o f  
society (1956, p. 65). Within the boundaries and operational logic o f the recording medium, 
this transcript takes note o f events, issues, values, ideas, images, personalities, institutions, 
and experiences in and about a society, the totality o f which becomes social knowledge that is 
relevant and useful to its members (e.g., Bernstein, 1976). In other words, the content and 
validity o f social knowledge are ultimately tied to the general interests and common 
experience in society.127
Within that context, news is not only presenting the society with specific information 
but also the frame of how the news fits in within the knowledge or perspectives of the 
society. Vhang et al further described that news has been long recognized as the 
source of knowledge.1“8 News, they argue, shape the communal consciousness of the
• 129society.
News as a form o f knowledge has been recognized to be socially constructed and distributed. 
Park (1955) said that news is "one o f the earliest and most elementary forms o f knowledge," a 
way o f seeing and thinking about the social world (p. 84). The organization and circulation o f  
that knowledge help to shape "the individual and collective consciousness" o f a society about 
its everyday life and the more remote context o f their lives (McQuail, 1972, p. 13). To 
paraphrase Bames (1988), how a society acts, whether nationally or internationally, depends 
upon what it knows before it makes a move. To function effectively and efficiently, a society 
needs to make sense o f  its current practices and potential action.Ij0
The works of Tuchman actually is expanding the initial works of Berger and
Luckmann by adding the aspect of news as definer of social reality. ~ Vhang et al
argues that although Berger and Luckmann did not discuss news as social reality, the
concept and methodology is applicable. Vhang et al describes: J
Although Berger and Luckmann (1966) did not discuss how news may become part o f the 
foundations o f knowledge in everyday life, the essence o f their treatise-the social construction 
o f reality-can be applied, both theoretically and methodologically, to the field o f news (e.g.,
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Tuchman, 1978). As Hallin (1994) put it, "it is naive to imagine that journalists are free o f 
social location" (p. 7). Journalists' social location, o f  course, is part o f "the complex 
relationships that can exist among the political, cultural, and economic contexts in which 
[media] content is produced and distributed" (Ball-Rokeach & Cantor, 1986, p. 10). At the 
risk o f  oversimplification, the social construction o f reality conceptualizes knowledge in 
everyday life on three dimensions: function (e.g., understanding and interpretation o f 
subjective reality and sharing), formation (e.g., routinization, classification or typification, 
and relevance), and distribution (e.g., social dissemination and access to information).134
With a close link between the media and a ruling elite comes the risk that the interests 
of the ruling elite can influence the way the media reports the news. In this context, 
the social construction of reality produced by the media represents the reality that the 
ruling elite wanted to promote. This issue can be more complicated if the press 
system within a particular society allows collusion between media and government, 
such as in a developmental press system.142 But even if the press system is advocating 
for an independent media, the political situation may influence the orientation of the 
media in particular when general consensus among the society, government and 
media is similar. When the general consensus is high, there is a high possibility that 
the media will closely follow the government’s lines.143
Returning to the discussion regarding news and social construction of reality, we can 
see now that news is part of socially defined reality. The reality is defined 
subjectively by each society and presented as such. But as we have also discussed, 
there is much complexity surrounding this concept. In the next section we are going 
to try to understand the relations between the media as an institution with the creation 
and representation of socially defined realities.
2. 3. M edia and the social construction o f reality.
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In today’s world the mass media, in particular television, has become what Castells 
called uThe Cultural Epicenter” of our world.144 Such is the saturation of the mass 
media that our daily life is surrounded with the presence of mass media. Ciaran 
McCullagh described how the media is now very much embedded in our life:
We accept without question the availability o f newspapers in dentists’ waiting rooms, bank
managers’ offices, the waiting rooms for job interviews, and in aeroplanes.
We live in a media-saturated world, and for the most part are no longer surprised by it.'45
The impact of such media saturation within our daily life is that news, as media 
products in whatever form it takes, has become part of our daily life. In Indonesia for 
instance, it is a common thing as an ‘icebreaker’ for people who have just met, to talk 
to each other about the hottest issue in the media — mostly about economy or politics 
or recently regarding the various disasters that have struck Indonesia.146
News in my opinion is the essence of the media today, including during the time of 
the East Timor crisis in 1999. News is particularly important when general members 
of the society do not have direct access to the event {McCullagh, 2002 #31;Cottle, 
c2003 #18}. In a situation such as East Timor 1999, news fullflls the society’s need 
for information. However, news is giving the society more than just information. It 
also constructs a sense of reality which is why we need to understand the dynamics of 
the social construction of reality in relation to news.
As part of the ‘social construction of reality’ process, news is part of an on-going 
process within a society. Jaap Van Ginneken argues that society always had certain 
types of professional people engaged in producing what was considered as the ‘true 
knowledge’ about the real world.147 These ‘professional’ people such as clergymen,
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politicians or community leaders have now been usurped to an extent, by a 
professional and commercial/industrial institution -  the mass media. But whatever the 
form or institution that had the role of dispersing information, one thing remains 
similar: the information passed is not simply information but a part of the sense of 
reality for society.
From a sociological point of view, the media is the information provider for the 
society. Media circulates information critical to proper social functioning. A classic 
case would be how the media gives detailed information about major politicians 
before a general election. Such information is deemed necessary in order for the 
people to make an ‘informed’ choice during the election. But as much as the media is 
doing a noble job here, there are limitations. Media have been known to perceive
themselves as a ‘window of the world’ -  clean and undistorted.
There are two views on this. The first is that o f journalists and the media generally. This 
Characterises the media as the ‘window on the world’. Its job is to provide us with a window 
through which we can see out into the world This characterises the media as a window 
through which we can see out into the world. Like the glass in the window it should be clear 
and must not distort or refract what we are looking at; it must allow us to see the world as the 
world really is.149
In reality, the media has a very limited capacity and capability in providing 
information. Therefore a process of selection will be inevitable. The question is which 
information will be circulated and which will be left out? How does the media decide 
which information should be published?
Media sociologists examining this issue came to the conclusion that media effectively 
acts as a ‘gatekeeper’. Editors constantly check and review which information is to be 
passed on and which should be withheld. By acting as a gatekeeper, the media
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effectively becomes the controller of the knowledge and understanding that the 
people have (McCullagh, 2002).
2. 4. Further theoretical considerations  
2. 4. 1. T he L assw ell com m unication  m odel.
The traditional communication model coming from this perspective focused on the
process of who said what, through what and to whom. Ciaran McCullagh explains:
The Mass Media are simply the means through which content, whether fact or fiction is 
produced by organizations and transmitted to and received by an audience. As such the 
process o f mass communication involves the three fundamental factors: content, organisation 
and audience.130
Within this tradition, the mass media is perceived to be an objective and neutral 
participant within the communication process. As a neutral participant, the press does 
not involve itself in whatever consequences that may arise from its reports. 
Nevertheless the press is subject to 4influences’ from their surroundings - in particular 
the social and political system of the society in which it operates.
The pioneer of this model is Harold Lasswell (Lasswell, 1948). Lasswell was the first 
person who clearly defined the role of communication in society which he saw as 
essential for the maintenance of the society.1"1 In Lasswell’s theory it is clear that 
communication has an essential role of maintaining the society (Lasswell, 1948).152 
Diagram 1 shows the main relationships in Lasswell’s model.
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Diagram 1.
Communication model based on Lasswell theory.1“'
Society
Source N Channel
1 >
1/ (press)
Receiver/
Audience
This model perceived the media as a simple message carrier that carries the message 
from the message creator (sources) to its recipients (receiver). Yet experts have 
argued that this is overly simplistic.136
One example of how experts criticized the model may be found in the work of John 
Thompson.137 Although Thompson is basically a follower of the communication 
model above he argues that in order to analyze the media, three dimensions need to 
analysed: the content of media messages, the production and transmission of 
messages, and the reception of media messages. In the first dimension, Thompson 
argues that, being part of the society, it needs to be seen whether or not messages 
passed by the media reflect the society itself. In this context what needs to be 
analysed is how the stories (media content) are put together, selected and framed.
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In the second dimension, Thompson argues that being part of large and complex 
commercial bureaucracies, the structure and the environment of the media (wherever 
they operate) needs to be critically analysed. Factors such as structure and 
environment may have significant impact on the way the media operates. The third 
dimension, reception of media messages by the audiences, refers to how members of 
the society as the audience accept, absorb and later react towards media contents. In 
John Thompson’s terms, we are concerned with how audiences “... make sense of 
media messages and incorporate them into their daily lives”.
Thompson’s theory illustrates how the original linear approach of the Lasswell model 
may have missed the complexity of the media and its environment. This theory shows 
that an alternative model is needed if a more thorough understanding is desired.
2. 4. 2. An alternative com m unication model.
After looking at the ‘basic’ communication model above, we are confronted with a 
fact that the linear sender-receiver concept is too simplistic. This thesis aims to 
answer the following question: how can we understand the different perspectives of 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers, and how did these different perspectives 
shape reporting on East Timor crisis in 1999? Following the communication model 
above literally will make it very difficult to answer these research questions. John 
Thompson has given a clear illustration that in reality there are various factors that 
need to be addressed. In other words, it is actually a very complex affair to 
understand the media’s function and role in society.
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Dennis McQuail has stated that the media are subject to control from outside the
media itself. The media has its own goals, values and norms.
The simple picture o f a ‘two-step’ (or multiple) process o f  mediated contact with reality is 
complicated by the fact that mass media are not completely free agents in relation to the rest 
o f the society. They are subject to formal and informal control by the very institutions that 
have an interest o f their own in shaping public perceptions o f reality. The media are 
themselves an institution with their own goals, rules, conventions and mechanisms o f control. 
Their objectives do not necessarily coincide with the primary goals o f the society, nor even 
with the aim o f relaying some objective ‘truth’ about reality.158
This view is also supported by McCullagh who argues that social reality is very much 
shaped by what the media deliver to the society (McCullagh, 2002). The ability to 
‘selectively select’ and circulate information to the society is where the real power of 
the media lies:
This argument contends that our images and knowledge o f social reality are formed and 
shaped by the images and information that the media deliver to us. If these images and 
information are selective and partial, then our images and information will also be selective 
and partial. Thus the power o f the media is the power to define our sense o f social reality o f  
the society and the world we live in; they achieve this through control over the information 
that they present to us.159
Westley and Maclean160, Thompson161, McCullagh162 and McQuail163 have argued 
that the previous model is too simple and does not reflect the complexity of reality. In 
order to reflect the condition of the society better, a new communication model needs 
to be drawn. Here a model based on the developed version of Lass well’s model is 
adopted.
This communication model, though largely based on Lasswell’s model, incorporates 
the criticisms and refinements made over the years regarding the original model. The 
new model will have to acknowledge the complexity of the society and the media 
environment - something that was largely neglected in Lasswelfs original model. In
61
regards to the earlier communication model, the model used in this research can be
described by reference to the diagram below:
Diagram 2.
The Alternative model.
In the diagram above, all aspects of the communication process: sources, media and 
receivers are interconnected. Another significant point is that each player is trying to 
influence the others. This links to McQuail’s view above (McQuail, 2001) where 
McQuail argues that media is part of the society and yet it may actively pursue a goal 
of its own and reinforce a different values than of the society itself.
Before Dennis McQuail, the theory of ‘information mediation’ or ‘mediation of 
reality’ has been described by Westley and MacLean.164 While Westley and MacLean 
essentially follow the linear communication model created by Lasswell they refined
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the model. The refinement here is in terms of acknowledging the complexity the 
society in which the media operates. Westley asserted that messages are started from 
events or ‘voices’ within the society which then go through channels or 
communicators - in this case the media. The mediated message is then received by the 
audience.
Diagram 2 (above) shows a simplified model of Westley and MacLean’s model. In 
the diagram, it is clear that although it follows the linear model of Lasswell, it 
acknowledges that the whole process is not unidirectional. In the new model, it is 
acknowledged that each party is trying to influence the other. The result of such a 
process is that the message received will not be the result of single source. Instead it 
maybe a compilation of various sources which includes the media itself.
Dennis McQuail argues that media constitutes a separate ‘social institution’ within 
society, with its own rules and practices, but subject to definition and limitation by 
the wider society.163
Thus the media are ultimately dependent on the society, although they have some scope for 
independent influence and may be gaining in autonomy as their range o f activity, economic 
significance and informal power grows. This is a potentially spiralling and self fulfilling 
process, driven by ever-increasing estimation o f their significance by political and cultural 
actors.166
2. 4. 3. The G atekeeper and Prim ary definer theory
The Gate Keeper model is a metaphor where the journalist as the ‘gatekeeper’ simply
170decides which pieces of prefabricated news will allowed through the gate.
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‘Although this term has been around for some time, it is still valid and provides a 
handy if not altogether appropriate metaphor for the relation of news organisations to 
news product’.171
The history of the term of ‘Gatekeeper’ goes back in 1950 when studies were 
conducted in American news organisations on how the news organisations produce 
news products. The term ‘gatekeeper’ was coined by social psychologist Kurt Lewin. 
The term was later applied by several social scientists into journalism.172 Joseph 
Straubhaar and Robert LaRose described the concept by reference to Wilbur 
Schramm’s work as follows:173
In Wilbur Schramm’s heyday, from the late 1940s to the early 1980s, mass media were 
produced by large, multilayered media corporations, where an elite corps o f authoritative 
media commentators and professional producers acted as gatekeepers, deciding what the 
audience should receive and thereby serving an agenda-setting function. The editors and 
publishers, recognising their own power, were aware o f themselves as shapers o f public 
opinion and popular taste.174.
The main criticism about the ‘gatekeeper’ metaphor is that it simplifies the role of 
journalists and editors to a mechanical process of choosing what and which 
information is fit to be publicised.173 Though still relevant today, the metaphor does 
not critically analyse the kind of materials it actually passes. Thus, the critics are 
suggesting that the ‘gatekeeper’ model/metaphor oversimplifies the process of news 
production to a bureaucratic routine, production goals and impersonal relations within 
the newsroom.176
But there is more to the role of journalists/editors in the ‘gatekeeper’ model. The 
joumalists/editor role involves more than simply choosing which news is fit to print -
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it involves decisions about what kind messages that the society can receive. In a way 
the joumalists/editor becomes the ‘handler’ of the society.
Another weakness of the ‘Gatekeeper’ theory is the fact that the theory has been 
around for a long time. Since inception, many experts have argues against it (as it was 
perceived to be outdated, or tried to create a more advanced model based from it. 
Others tried to seek a different understanding how media and society interacts among 
those are Stuart Hall and Ciaran McCullagh.
Stuart Hall argues that media and society are interacting in such a way that from these 
interactions, the society perceived the meaning of the information presented by 
media.177 Hall believes that the media audiences do not simply accept what was being 
presented to them, instead the audiences are actively engaged in a decoding 
process.178 Within this process, the audiences are creating a subjective meaning of the 
information they received based on their experience, culture or believes.179
Although the audience plays an important role in this communication process, a more 
pivotal role is played by the media itself.180 What the media do is actually giving the 
stimulus to which the society can react to. Without the stimulus from the media, there 
is nothing to give meaning to. As such media are actually acting as the definer of the 
meaning by directing the society towards specific points where meanings were 
derived.
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Being a definer of meaning which translated here as the socially constructed reality, 
the media acted as primary definer of reality. Again, indeed the society will 
deconstruct the meaning of the information within the media based on the culture but 
it is the media who bring up which information that is considered to worthy to be 
deconstruct by the society. Within this context, media professionals such as 
journalists or the editors, are constantly redefine the knowledge of the society.
Journalists and their editors are constantly figuring, searching and presenting 
information that they see fit for their society. Such action results in the constant 
production of meaning, based upon the information presented. As the journalists and 
their editors are the major producers of information within the media, they become 
the primary definer of reality for the society. Just like what Galen Rowell refers 
previously that photographer captures and presented the visual image that we see 
based on their perception.181 Thus what we see in a photograph apart from our 
perception is the perception presented by the photographer. “
Ciaran McCullagh supports Hall’s theory above in her book: Media Power}** 
McCullagh took Hall’s concept further by stating media today, is without doubt the 
primary definers of reality for the society.184 There is almost no society today that is 
not influenced by the media. Media according to McCullagh, has become the major 
source of information and as such provides the society with the media’s 
interpretations of what is happening. There is simply, no escape in today’s society
185from media influences.
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• 186 • •Referring back to the Westley and MacLean model , the media also actively select
whose views they circulate:
Rather they relay to a potential environment, or they give access to the views and voices o f 
some o f those (such as advocates o f opinions, advertisers, performers and writers) who want 
to reach a wider public.188
This is where this thesis stands: the media is not a stand alone entity. It is part of the 
society and everything in it. It is part of an ongoing process within the society. In 
discussing the gatekeeper concept, it is worth to looking at an almost similar concept: 
‘agenda setting’.
2. 4. 4. The agenda setting theory.
In the agenda setting theory, the media directly or indirectly direct the attention and 
meaning of the information that is passed on by emphasising a specific angle or 
aspect. Thus the agenda setting theory can be understood as related to ‘framing’ 
theory and methodology which is important for this thesis.
Gatekeeper theory differs with agenda setting theory in terms of what is emphasized. 
Gatekeeper theory begins with the assumption that the media actively selects what 
should be passed on. Agenda setting, although also acknowledging the selective 
nature of the media, emphasizes the way the media direct what people should think 
about.
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Dennis McQuail describes agenda setting in this way:
[The] Process by which the relative attention given to items or issues in news coverage 
influences the rank order o f public awareness o f issues and attribution o f significance. As an 
extension, effects on public policy may occur.193
Various experts argue that with such power to create ‘reality’ in this way, the media 
can easily manipulate public opinion (McQuail, 2001, McCullagh, 2002, McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972, Edelman, 1988, Entman, 1991, Chomsky and Herman, 1994, 
Knightley, 2003, Davis, 1990). The argument is that the media has almost direct 
access in creating ‘social reality’. Therefore media can be used to manipulate the 
public by creating a specific representation of ‘social reality’ that conforms to the 
interest of a specific groups or elements within the society.
From the agenda setting theory point of view, news as the product of mass media is 
not a neutral object. News actively directs people’s attention, creating a specific 
impression of ‘reality’. Therefore to understand why media from two different 
countries such as Australia and Indonesia can present the same story differently, we 
have look into how they present their news and what news they present.
2. 4. 5. Fram ing.
In Chapter 1, the issue of framing was noted briefly. Framing is a key concept in this 
thesis and will be described in detail in the coming methodology section.197 
Nevertheless it is important to address the issue of framing here in relation to the 
theoretical context.
68
This thesis aims to explain why Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the 
East Timor crisis differently. Part of the explanation may be related to differences in 
the press systems within the two countries. Nevertheless it is also argued that the 
difference is also caused by the nature of media itself which systematically selects the 
information to be passed on (gate keeper) and actively promotes a specific angle/point 
of view (agenda setting).
Framing is closely linked to the agenda setting theory. Framing can systematically 
analyze the context of certain issues and explain in detail how different presentations 
can actually represent different perspectives even when based on the same facts.
‘Frames’ are basically the perspective of how a specific issue is being presented. 
Various experts have defined ‘frames’ and its method, ‘framing,’ in different ways 
but the basic idea is still same. It is about how a single issue may be presented in a 
specific manner within a specific background (Entman, 1991, Entman, 1993, Gitlin, 
1980, Edelman, 1988, Mander, 1999, Rachlin, 1988, Bennet and Paletz, 1994, 
Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Soesilo and Washburn, 1994).
They are the persistent patterns o f cognition, interpretation and presentation, o f selection, 
emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether 
verbal or visual (Gitlin, 1980). They enable audiences to locate, perceive, identify and label 
the information that is coming at them about the nature o f the social world (Goffman, 
1974).198
Through framing, the hidden meaning within specific stories can be analyzed. 
Meaning, or to be specific, the ‘hidden meaning’ can be understood as part of the 
‘social construction of reality’. We may not realize it but the (framed) meaning is
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there, creating a view of the world as the media sees fit. We as the audience tend not 
to see that the media has carefully embedded the frame within the text. This thesis 
aims to examine carefully the salient meaning of the frames existing within 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports regarding East Timor crisis in 1999.
Media frames as suggested before, are not clearly visible. Frames are often hidden
behind the narrative forms of the news reports (White, 2004, White, 1997, Entman,
1991, Entman, 1993, Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Goffman, 1974). To analyse the frames is to
go behind the narrative forms and outline the hidden meanings and ideology within
news reports. This can be done by carefully analysing the way the text was written,
presented and the bigger context of the news itself. As Wolfsfeld notes, in political
contests such as in the East Timor crisis, the contest is part of a larger context.199
The notion o f  context is important: it serves to remind us that the transactions between the 
news media and political antagonists never take place within a political vacuum.200
The real power of frames lies in their ability to relate meaning/s to the public. Though 
the term ‘public’ is universal, it is not so within the concept of frames.201 Frames 
become meaningful only if they can be understood by their recipients. For frames to 
be understood by the recipients, the creator of the frames (media, political power etc) 
has to base the frames within specific cultural values or norms. In other words, frames 
only work if they can be understood by the society. Not just any society but the 
specific society in which or for which the frames are developed.202
2. 4. 6. T he Press and the C onstruction o f M eaning.
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Before we discuss how to analyze news from Australia and Indonesia regarding East 
Timor’s crisis in 1999, we have to look into what actually is the reality presented by 
the media. Gadi Wolfsfeld203 argues that the definition by Davis204 is the best 
description:
Social construction o f reality theory is grounded on the premise that we live in a 
fundamentally ambiguous social world -  a world which persons, objects and actions have no 
inherent or essential meaning. If meaning is not inherent, then it must be created -  imposed on 
action, events or things through human action. But action is necessarily situated in a specific 
place and time. The meaning imposed is limited by and relative to the context in which 
meaning is generated. Moreover because action in situations is inevitably structured by 
groups that dominate those situations, those groups enjoy an inherent advantage in 
determining the meaning derived from action in situations.203
Davis’ concept above is the central idea of this thesis, that the media create a sense of 
‘reality’ for the society. The ‘reality’ here is based upon the ‘meaning’ of signs being 
communicated. The signs or content of the communication itself are not autonomous 
nor value free objects.
Framing derives from the argument that the media is not simply reporting events 
(news) as they are.206 Within each media report, there is also a specific perspective 
that is being passed on. Media is presenting more than just facts, they are actually 
presenting their own interpretation of the facts.207 The media interpretation of 
whatever is being reported is often elusive and disguised within the reports. The main 
point is that the ‘frame’ or the interpretation is there. As Davis stated, frames come as 
an interpretation as the meaning of what is being presented is not inherent.“ It is up 
to the presenter and the reader to create the interpretation. Nevertheless, the presenter 
here enjoys a relative freedom and advantages in determining the meaning of the 
action.209
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Gitlin described frames as; ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and 
presentation of selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol-handlers 
routinely organize, discourse whether verbal or visual’.210 This concept again, 
reinforced the idea here that frames are part of an interactive process. The creator of 
the frames did not create the frames based out of nothing at all. Instead frames were 
created from what the creator believes will be well understood by the readers.
Erving Goffman argues that frames enable audiences to; ‘locate, perceive, identify 
and label the information that is coming at them about the nature of the social 
world’. Basically frames should help us understand better what is being reported. 
But in reality, as Davis said, frames are used within the political process where 
certain ideas are being promoted as the meaning of the specific actions.212 In this 
process, certain parties are given more advantages as they have more freedom and 
power to define the attributed meaning of specific actions or events.
A simple example is the way Indonesian flag is being perceived. When I grew up in 
the 1980’s, I remember that the convention in schools and everywhere in Indonesia 
was that the red and white the colours of the Indonesian flag -  based on the colour; 
must not touch the ground. Our flag is sacred as it symbolizes the death of thousands 
possibly hundred of thousands of Indonesian freedom fighters. It also symbolizes our 
determination and pride in being able to take and defend our independence through 
war." In this context, it was the Indonesian government at the time (New Order 
regime) who reinforced the Indonesian flag as a sacred symbol. Being the ruling elite,
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the New Order regime was able to frame the flag in a special way for the Indonesian 
people.
Going back to Davis’ concept, frames here function as a ‘construction of reality’. 
What the society understands (from the media reports) is actually a kind of ‘reality’ 
that the media wants the society to see. But the media here is only one part of a very 
complex issue. Indeed media can create and promote frames, but the media may 
promote frames that come from outside the media organisation itself. Chapter 6 and 7 
of this thesis will show how media can be influenced by its sources in promoting 
specific frames.
In order for a frame or a particular construction of events to work effectively, it has to 
be well understood by the audiences. Therefore, effective frame creators (media) 
thrive on the skills of presenting their frames in ways that the meaning will be 
understood by the audience. Frames will not work if they are based upon things (such 
as values) alien to the society itself. This is due to the basic nature of the frame itself 
-  it is part of social interaction. Interaction here requires that the other party 
understands what is being exchanged in a communicative sense. If the interaction or 
communicative exchange does not happen, then the frame itself will be useless.
Understanding the nature of how the media works, it is understandable that each 
media will do whatever they see as fit to connect to their audiences. In Chapter 1 and 
later in Chapter 4, the case of Sanders Thoenes has clearly illustrated how media 
portrayed one single event from different perspectives. The media from Australia and
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Indonesia gave their own interpretation regarding the incident. For Australian 
newspapers, the issue was about history, culture and emergency situations. For 
Indonesian newspapers, the incident was about a criminal incident.
The impact of different perspectives is a continuation of what Davis described. 
Different framing will create a different interpretation of the ‘reality. In the Thoenes 
case, Australian and Indonesian newspapers perceived his death differently. The 
perception here is derived from the reports, thus it is about what we interpret of what 
was reported in the newspapers. But we have to remember that there are two societies 
involved here: Australia and Indonesia. Therefore we have to look at what happened 
when two societies interpreted the same event differently.
2. 4. 7. The press and the cross cultural struggle over m eaning.
The press is an integral part of society (McCullagh, 2002, McQuail, 2001). Social 
constructionists believe that the press helps to create an image of reality for the 
society members {Van Ginneken, 1998 #29;Berkowitz, 1997 #72; Wolfsfeld, 1997 
#86;Goffman, 1974 #91;Gieber, 1964 #76;Cottle, c2003 #18;Schudson, 1997 
#73;McCullagh, 2002 #31}. In social constructionist theory, news can be meaningful 
if the message it conveys can be understood by its audience. Wolfsfeld argues that as 
events have no inherent meaning, then the meaning should constructed through social 
process.214 Journalists fit the events to the already available frames. The press, 
Wolfsfeld argues, is always looking for something fit to preconceived images and not 
the other way around.213
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Events are a stimulus to the entire social constructing process. Journalists understand 
very well that people react differently to different stimuli. Therefore, the process of 
narrative is a cultural one in which journalists place the events of the day within a
? 1 f\meaningful context.
In reaching its audiences, the press is bound to what it knows -  its own society, its 
own audiences. Every media is trying to reach specific audiences within a specific 
society.
Within a political conflict where there are two or more parties involved, each is trying 
to influence the public more than their competitors. The main means to reach that 
goal is through the media. Media is the arena where the warring parties compete 
for a political victory. In a political conflict involving two different nations such as in 
the East Timor crisis, it is inevitable that each contender will have to look for support 
within their domestic base. Drawing on Wolfsfeld, I will show that the political 
contenders have to look for different frames in order to win political support for their 
cause.
Different frames used by the contenders are essential in their effort to communicate 
with their audiences. In this case, the Australian and Indonesian governments and 
press tried vigorously to present their views to Australian and Indonesian audiences. 
Each side tried to paint its side positively in order to gain support.
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But gaining support in this situation is not a straightforward matter. McQuail218 has 
described earlier that Australia and Indonesia have two different political and press 
systems. Each society has a different history and they have different social and 
cultural systems. The challenge for both the Australian and Indonesian press then is to 
frame the political conflict using frames that may be understood by their own 
audiences. It is the aim of this research to look what perspectives were used during 
the East Timor crisis.
2. 5. M ethodology.
As described earlier, this research aims to understand the different perspectives within 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers which shaped their East Timor Crisis reporting 
in 1999. The basis of the analysis in this thesis will be newspaper reports on East 
Timor during the crisis. There are four newspapers from Indonesia and two 
newspapers from Australia that will be analysed. All were chosen as they are deemed 
representative of different aspect/groups within their society as well as their standing 
in their country’s media market.
The time frame of the ‘Crisis’ here is defined from August 1st, 1999 until October 1st, 
1999. It begins with the official preparation of the referendum until the time 
INTERFET formally took over control of East Timor from the Indonesian military. 
But that time frame yields more than 2000 articles representing various frames and 
each frame will required significant amount of time and space in order to thoroughly
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analyse them. So, as stated in Chapter 1, the analysis will be conducted upon a 
sample of articles.
The sample articles will then be analysed with emphasis upon the written text in order 
to analyse the salient frames embedded within those articles. The rationale to analyse 
the text is as what has been stated earlier, namely that frames are embedded within 
the way the news reports were presented -  the written report. Thus to analyse the 
frame is to analyse the written text.
The sample articles are chosen using purposive method, meaning the articles are 
chosen deliberately as they fulfilled certain criteria. The criteria relied on here are:
• They represent a specific issue that was reported widely (at least by three 
Indonesian newspapers and by all Australian newspapers);
• The issue appeared to be constructed differently by Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers.
Based on these criteria, two issues have been short listed for close analysis: the death 
of Sanders Thoenes and the issue of possible border crossings by INTERFET troops. 
Sander Thoenes’s death was selected because as shown in Chapter 1, the case was 
able to show the distinction between Australian and Indonesian perspectives as it was 
evident within the news reports. The issue of border crossing by INTERFET was 
chosen not just because it reveals different perspectives but it also resonates with 
deeper issues within the East Timor crisis.
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The method of analysing the texts of the sample articles will be based on the 
approach by Entman219, Peter White220 and Wolfsfeld221. The rationale is that in order 
to create a thorough understanding of the frames promoted within the context of a 
political contest between Australia and Indonesia, no single method is deemed 
suitable. The issue of the East Timor crisis in 1999 is a very complex issue, related to 
but not limited to: the history of East Timor; the political history and situation of 
Australia and Indonesia from 1975 to 1999222; the social condition of Australia and 
Indonesia prior and during East Timor crisis in 1999; and the political hegemony 
surrounding the East Timor crisis in 1999.
I deemed the three methods chosen above as most suitable for analysing the text as 
they provide ways of analysing different aspects of frames. Used in conjunction with 
each other, the three methods can complement each other instead of overlapping or 
negating each other.
As stated before, each method is going to focus on different aspects of frame analysis. 
The Entman method is used here as it has the most definite or systematic method in 
analysing frames. Entman’s method is also the most quantitative method compared to 
the other methods. Other methods such as Peter White’s media discourse analysis““ 
will be used as cross methods. Peter White is regarded as the leading expert in 
language analysis in analysing frames in news reports. In fact, White is also the 
founder of the newsworthiness rating system that is currently being taught in the 
University of Wollongong. White’s method is geared towards systematic analysis of 
the salient meaning within the language used in the text of news reports. Wolfsfeld is
78
used to give this research more ‘depth’ in analysis as Wolfsfeld is geared towards 
‘contextual’ analysis of the news reports. Wolfsfeld’s method is not specifically 
analysing the text or languages but instead giving the reports context within the 
societies related.
Apart from the three analyses above, as stated in Chapter 1, this thesis will also 
employ grounded theory analysis as a global method. This means that I will use 
grounded theory analysis as the general way to reflect on, explain and analyse the 
studies as a foundation to the other methods employed here. Thus grounded theory 
will be used constantly over the course of the analysis.
The rationale of the usage of grounded theory is that grounded theory is the method I 
deemed most suitable to weave all different kind methods of analysis together in the 
context of this research. Grounded theory is able to allow the data to speak for itself 
without forcing it to fit into specific theory, unlike other methods of analysis.224 I 
shall explain the grounded theory method later in this chapter. Below is the 
description of each method.
2. 5 .1 .  Robert E ntm an approach.
Entman stated that critical textual choices in frame stories can be revealed by 
comparing media narratives.223 Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to 
detect fully and reliably.226 This due to the fact that many of the framing devices can 
be appear ‘natural’ choice of wordings.
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Entman described his methodology for analyzing frames through a series of 
aspects. The aspects, five in all, do not necessarily have to feature in each article. 
Also it is not necessary that for the aspects to be equally important.
The aspects are:228
1. Size judgements. In this thesis it will be referred to as the relative importance 
of news. It refers to the size of the related articles in term of words.
2. Agency. The usage by the media of certain words and images to suggest how 
and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed.
3. Identification. The usage by the media of certain words and images that 
encourage or discourage identification with those most directly involved in the 
media story.
4. Categorisation. The different way in which media label events or issues.
5. Generalisation. The degree to which the media generalise.
2. 5. 2. T he Peter W hite approach.
Peter White uses a similar but different approach than Entman. White advocates 
analysis of the language of the news. In particular White argues that emphasis on 
certain aspect of the reports and the way language or words are used can create a 
specific message. White asserted that using his method, hidden meanings within the 
messages can be deciphered, thus presenting the reader (for newspaper readers) with 
a new understanding of what the news actually talks about.
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The main premise of White’s method is that within ‘hard news’ or daily news that we 
see in newspapers, magazines or any other media, lie hidden ideological objectives.
White argues that most of the time the public perceives hard news or other common 
news as simply a collection of facts related to a specific events. Hard news in 
particular is perceived to be impartial, objective and apolitical.229 In reality news 
reports can be seen as a way to construct a model of social order. The model of social 
order presented, White argues, is not a specific one. Like in the society itself, values, 
norms and cultures are changing all the time. To understand the social order promoted 
within specific news is to understand the social order of the day. A key concept of 
White’s method is that society is always in a balance or at least always trying to be in 
one. Any possible issue or event that is perceived to be creating imbalance or disorder 
within the society will always attract the attention of the media.
The media’s attention to anything that may be breaking the balance of the society is 
part of the social order itself. The media acknowledges that change is part of society, 
but disorder is a threat to society. Therefore any possible disorder within society is 
worth reporting.230
Peter White’s methodology is based on using the text in understanding the hidden 
ideology within news reports. White argues that there are two main ways in analyzing 
the text: first is to analyze the newsworthiness and subject matter of the news. Second 
is to analyze the way journalists position themselves within the reports. 
Newsworthiness is the concept of how events are being ‘valued’ in term of how the
8 1
society will be able to relate or react to it. The bigger the possibility the society will 
react to certain events, the more newsworthy the event is for the media.
White’s argues that there are three variables that can show how newsworthy an
231event. The first one is aberrant damage. If within an event, the larger the damage 
done (due to natural disaster, conflicts or any other causes), then the more important 
the news will be. This is more important if the damage is mounting to incredible 
levels beyond normality.
The second variable is what is called power relations. Any disruptions (such as 
scandals) or anything not usual within the world of politics is worthy to be reported. 
The more unusual it is or the more disruption it creates, the better the news will be. 
The third variable is normative breach. This involves events or state-of- affairs 
construed as departing from either established morality or custom. News items that 
include breaches of morality such as crimes are always attracting public attention. 
The more hideous the crime or any morality breach, the more likely it will attract 
more attention.
Besides newsworthiness, White also proposed another variable to be analysed: the 
positioning of the reporter within the news itself. News, in particular hard news, 
always carries the notion of ‘objective’ and impersonal reporting. In reality, reporters 
often inscribe their own views even in hard news reporting. When reporters involve 
their own personal views within news reporting they run the risk that the news will
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not be ‘objective’. Therefore, in analyzing news reports, it is important to see how the 
reporters position themselves within the story.
As described above, Peter White argues that there are several points that can be used 
in analyzing hard news reports:232
1. Ideational orientation: Newsworthiness and the subject matter of ‘hard news’.
2. Interpersonal orientation: the voice of the ‘hard news’ reporter.
3. Textual organization of the ‘hard news’ report.
4. An informational pulse: repeating ‘the point of impact’.
2. 5. 3. The Gadi W olfsfeld approach -  The political contest model.
Wolfsfeld argues that news media have become a modem day arena where various 
parties are continuously trying to win the contest of public attention.233 Wolfsfeld 
argues that public attention is actually the key to public approval. Public approval in 
modem day democratic systems is the source of political power. Thus, the struggle 
for media control is actually the struggle for political power.2j4
Within this theory, political struggles are always fought between two sides. The fight 
is never fair as one side will have more advantages over the other parties. Wolfsfeld 
called the stronger party as ‘the Authority’ and the weaker one ‘the Challenger’. The 
authority here can be anything that holds more power or advantages over the other 
such as governments, political power institutions or large corporations. The 
Challenger may have less advantages but they may have some surprises of their own.
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Often challengers can beat more powerful authorities providing they know how to use 
the opportunities they are presented.
The model Wolfsfeld suggests is based on five basic premises:235
1. The political process is more likely to have an influence on the news media 
than the news media has on the political process.
2. The authorities’ level of control over the political environment is one of the 
key variables that determines the role of the news media in political conflicts.
3. The role of the news media in political conflicts varies over time and 
circumstance.
4. To understand the role of the news media is to look at the competition among 
antagonists along two dimensions: structural and cultural.
5. Though authorities have tremendous advantages over challengers in the 
quantity and quality of media coverage they receive, many challengers can 
overcome these obstacles and use the news media as a tool for political 
influence.
Wolfsfeld argues that there is no singular theory that can explain the interaction 
between media and politics in reports on political conflicts. What gets reported in the 
media is not due to political pressure but is due more to the fact that the news fits into 
the preconceived frames within the media itself. Politics also plays a significant role 
in what is reported in the media. As mentioned earlier, the struggle here is played on 
the structural and cultural level on which politics is also based. In any society, the 
media will reflect first on the society they are based upon, including the political
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dynamics of the society. As politics is one of the main powers that shape the society, 
it will also reflect on the media itself.
Nevertheless Wolfsfeld argues that politics is not the single most powerful reason or
cause. Media can also influence the politics.
They (the media) help set the political agenda. They accelerate and magnify political success 
and failure. They can serve as an independent advocate for victims o f oppression. They can 
mobilize third parties into a conflict and they are central agents in the construction o f social 
frames about politics. The press serves as a powerful catalyst for political processes and it is 
therefore essential to understand better how this catalyst operates. This cycle o f influence, 
however, usually begins with the world o f politics.236
Another important point to remember is that although the authorities can influence the 
media, it does not mean that the media will bend willingly. The media has in its 
arsenal anti-authority sentiments that they can use at will when the situation allows.237
There are two frames that often found among journalists in regards to their views in 
political conflicts. First is that power inherently tends to corrupt. Any news about 
corrupt power, dictatorships or anything similar will attract attention. Better still is 
that most readers will be able to relate to this issue easily. The second frame involves 
innocent victims. Human victims in any kind of political conflict are the major news 
attraction. Victims evoke a universal sense of morality and humanity. In building 
frames, the construct of a victim is an important thing to attract and create 
perceptions:
Victims (and potential victims) are a major ingredients o f news especially news about 
conflict. Victims provide human interest, good visuals and drama as well as important moral 
lessons about the evils o f  violence. News about victims is not restricted to the coverage of 
political conflicts: they are also a central part o f stories about crime, natural disasters, 
accidents and social problems.2j8
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These two basic frames are often found among journalists around the world. Almost 
anywhere violence and politics (especially a corrupt system) will attract and occupy 
media headlines at any one time. As much as journalists do not like to admit it, the
old saying of: “Bad news is good news’’ is still valid even today. Wolfsfeld 
elaborates more:
Those who can latch on to this frame are provided with an extremely powerful conveyor belt 
for bringing their messages to the public. I m a g e s  o f victims are an especially important factor 
in building such frames. Pictures o f protesters being beaten, o f bodies being thrown out o f 
planes by terrorists, o f  children dying due to the cruelties o f war resonates powerfully in the 
news media. The fact that Rodney King’s beating was filmed made all the difference in the 
world.2j9
The power of utilising the victims of political conflict is visible in many cases 
strengthening the idea that such frames have a universal appeal. The cases that 
studied by Entman shows how victims can be used as frames to emphasize a certain 
frame, for example the shooting of KAL 007 by Russian fighters was framed as cold 
blooded murder in the American press. Interestingly the shooting of an Iranian 
Airliner by US Navy ship was framed as accident that happened in a high tension 
area, thus just being seen as a mere accident but as a crime by the Iranians.
The two cases show that despite the number of victims high in both cases as both 
airlines were fall, the frames representing the cases are different. One was of cold 
blooded murder (a deliberate action). The other was a pure accident. In the first case, 
the victims were treated like martyrs in a struggle for freedom. The second case the 
victims are just accidental victims like a daily traffic accidents; tragic yes, but nothing 
more.
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Wolfsfeld closed his arguments in his books by underlining that the frame of 
‘innocent victims of political conflict’ is a very powerful frames but it is not the sole 
factor that will determine whether an antagonist will win in a political conflict.240 
Political conflict, Wolfsfeld argues, is a very complex process and to understand it 
requires an understanding over many factors involved.241
2.5.4. W olfsfeld’s m ethodology.
Central to Wolfsfeld theory is the concept of a continuous struggle over political
power. Mass media today has become the central arena for the struggle as media
provides a powerful medium to political power. The media occupies a central role
here as it owns a powerful tool — frames. The frames provide an interpretation to the
public of what is going on. Within the social construction of reality tradition, the
interpretation becomes the source of ‘reality’ as perceived by the readers.
The media serve as public interpreters o f events and as symbolic arenas for ideological 
struggle between antagonists. News stories about political conflicts are a form o f social 
construction, in which some frames are more likely than others to serve as the underlying 
theme o f news stories.242
In order to analyze the frames of news stories (especially those regarding political 
conflict), Wolfsfeld suggests researchers ask three different questions. These 
questions will be the guide in order to analyze how journalists construct media frames 
for news stories and how they attempt to find a narrative fit between incoming 
information and existing frames.24j These research questions will help us to 
understand two things: first to think like the journalists who are attempting to build a 
news story. Second is to allow us to understand better the influence of the events and
the professional and political inclinations of those who must cover them. 24 4
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The research questions are:
• How did we (the media) cover this conflict in the past?
• What is the most newsworthy part of the conflict?
• Who are the good guys?
Each of the questions serves a different purpose. The first question aims to understand 
the context of a news story. The second question aims to understand the 
newsworthiness of the event which is the most important professional consideration 
facing journalists. The third question is to understand the political influences as 
journalists find themselves allocating blame.245 In this research, as in previous 
methodologies, all cases selected for analysis will be subjected to the three questions. 
The aim is to generate an understanding of what kind of frames were used in reports 
of East Timor crisis.
2.5.5. The G rounded Theory M ethod.
Grounded theory is used in this thesis as I felt it was needed as a synthesising 
strategy. This research ventures into some known and unknown territory of research. 
Grounded theory is also most relevant with the qualitative method here. Qualitative 
method places a strong emphasis on the exploration of new ideas. Grounded theory is 
actually fulfilling that role by combining scientific findings with already present 
discourse. Barney Glaser explained the strength of the grounded theory in a way 
which shows its relevance to this thesis.246
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Grounded theory allows the relevant social organization and social psychological organization 
o f the people studied to be discovered, to emerge -  in their perspective! Grounded theory does 
justice to the data. The methods in Basics o f  Qualitative research will always produce 
research products, but not the aforementioned ones o f  emergence in the perspective o f the 
substantive area participant.247
Grounded theory is deemed to most suitable to this research as this research is aimed 
to understand why Indonesian and Australian newspapers presented the East Timor 
crisis in 1999, differently. A quantitative oriented research such as the AKSARA 
Foundation’s research shows the differences in quantitative manner, but as Glaser 
said249, it offers little in understanding the greater issue.
Grounded theory in the context of this thesis was able to cover and connect various 
factors and issues that were extremely complex. Grounded theory was able to seek a 
more thorough understanding. For instance, it was able to analyse the impact of 
Australian culture that was often described as ‘egalitarian’250 to the way the 
Australian newspapers reported the East Timor crisis in 1999.This method was also 
able to dwell upon my professional experience as working journalist, educator and 
student in Australia and so work at understanding the way the Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers reported the crisis.
Grounded theory is a very simple procedure yet it can cover wide range of issues, 
making it a versatile research method. Grounded theory, as first developed by Barney 
G Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967)251, works towards best practice and best 
management for the people working within the system under scrutiny. The grounded 
theory building process is suited to this study in that it employs, as the central aspect, 
theoretical sensitivity with rapid response provided to the subjects in a study. The
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descriptive function and heuristic role of grounded theory thus becomes a part of the 
interactive and continual development of the theory as the data is obtained. This 
model is ideal for education, health sciences and business where more truth is needed 
to engage in the problems of important dependent variables. Because of this, the 
model was ideal for developing a responsive theory for journalism practices of 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers when they were reporting East Timor crisis in 
1999.
Data in this thesis arose from the collection of news reports from two Australian
newspapers and four Indonesian newspapers, which I constantly analysed, while
reflecting back to my personal professional experience as a working journalist and
relating this to other materials from the public domain. Grounded theory provided the
context for the case study research as presented in Chapters four to seven.
Potential theoretical sensitivity is lost when the sociologist commits himself [sic] 
exclusively to one specific preconceived theory’ (1967: 48). The notion of sensitivity 
here refers to openness on the part of the researcher to different ideas, to a process of 
interrelating theoretical insights and data.232
Quoted above, Norman Denzin further developed grounded theory in respect to his 
notion of sensitizing concepts. He defined sensitizing concepts as “concepts that are 
not transformed immediately into operational definitions through an attitude scale or 
checklist”.253 The process involves key players, like journalists I interviewed, who 
give meaning in their own right to the concept being investigated. The process of 
developing grounded theory is deliberately loose and open ended. When a researcher 
participates in, encodes and analyses data in the continuous process of grounded 
theory, decisions are made progressively.234 Glaser and Strauss defined this 
theoretical sampling as the “process of data collection for generating theory whereby 
the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his [sic] data and decides what data to 
collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges”.“
The data for the initial case studies in this thesis development were selected based 
upon certain criteria: the news reports should be reported by accepted mainstream
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newspapers (two Australian newspapers and at least three of the Indonesian 
newspapers). My initial research found that there were very few specific events that 
were reported simultaneously by all the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. 
Therefore, my developing grounded theory was beginning to suggest that if such an 
occurrence happened, then it should be considered highly significant.
In Chapters four and five, the chosen case studies were found to be of high 
significance for both the Australian and Indonesian newspapers. The articles were 
then compared to personal notes of people involved and interviewed combined with a 
linguistic analysis in decoding the message within the articles themselves. From this 
process a new finding of how Australian and Indonesian newspapers perceived 
similar events was drawn. The findings then were continuously analyzed through 
comparison with other sources including my own notes taken during the same period.
The events covered by Australian and Indonesian newspapers are theoretically 
‘factual’ events.However it is significant that both Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers often presented these facts with different points of view, leading to 
different meanings and interpretations of the same event. These different points of 
view were the reflection of both countries’ newspapers’ cultures or even perhaps 
hidden agendas, in perceiving the event. Thus, a so called factual or ‘objective’ event 
can be perceived differently as humans tend to perceive things through their 
subjective judgments, just as Weber, Wright-Mills and Berger have asserted.256 What 
grounded theory does then is to put these ‘interpretations’ within a context, thus
91
giving the researcher a clearer perspective of what they might finally mean once 
stripped of their cultural bias.
Besides my notes as a working journalist at the time of East Timor crisis, I consulted 
various interviewees, in particular people who were involved in reporting the East 
Timor crisis. The veracity of the content from these interviews, was cross checked 
and supported, or otherwise, by documents or articles available in the public domain. 
Through this continuous consultative process a new understanding was developed in 
keeping with the research methods of participatory action research and grounded 
theory. In spite of this cross checking, I still felt that these methods may not be 
sufficiently convincing for a final argument and therefore, I decided to utilize a more 
advanced method of analysis.
In Chapters six and seven this other method is particularly visible. In those chapters, a 
new period of study was selected and all articles regarding East Timor’s crisis that 
were published at that time were analyzed. The focus of this analysis was upon the 
sources of the news in a quantitative way, rather than the qualitative approach taken 
in the earlier research. The selected period was chosen as it was possibly the most 
difficult period for accurate journalism during the East Timor crisis in 1999: the 
period when all foreign journalists were forced to leave the country. The inability to 
report directly from East Timor presented a major challenge for the foreign media, in 
particular the Australian newspapers. Yet the data shows that during that period, the 
Australian newspaper reporting was significantly higher (in quantity) than all the 
Indonesian newspapers (that were being analyzed here) combined.
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This reflects a significant importance in East Timor as perceived by Australian 
newspapers. But the question arising is how the newspapers managed to get their 
stories? The term ‘sources’, means they are the suppliers informing the writing of the 
stories. Journalists throughout the world are always trained that all news stories 
should have reliable, and if possible, multiple sources unless the journalist witnesses 
the event himself or herself. Again as in previous chapters, the analysis was 
conducted by comparing notes, interviews and other materials with the actual 
published articles. In this context however, I have placed emphasis quantitatively 
upon the type of sources used.
Sources in news reports here were found to be more than simply the impartial source 
of the news. Rather as the research progressed, they were emerging as active 
participants in providing the information and it was beginning to be noticed that by 
providing the information, there was likely to be a benefit to the interests of the 
information provider. Thus, without a clear and careful scrutiny by the journalist, 
sources could in fact manipulate the outcome of the news reports, to the extent that 
the journalist and their newspaper were being used by the source. This is something 
that I have learnt in the context of my education in Australia through a Master of 
Journalism and in my professional practice in Indonesia; that a story’s veracity is 
substantially improved if it was informed by as many reliable sources as possible. 
Indeed this is accepted universally as standard journalism practice and yet repeatedly 
the stories examined in this period were overwhelmingly written from information
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provided by one source -  often the Australian government. Again, grounded theory is 
pivotal here in giving the sources a context where their role can be seen and analyzed.
It is clear now that while grounded theory is more than important for the later 
chapters, it is the central concept or method within the overall thesis. Grounded 
theory can provide a context within which the case studies can be analyzed. Without 
this context, the case studies risk appearing as ‘normal’ events without showing any 
significance.
Grounded theory came in as the analysis method for the data collected. The data 
compiled will show a certain trend within the Australian and Indonesian newspapers 
-  in this case the choice of sources. What the data shows is just the trend, it does not 
give interpretation nor meaning unless it is put into a bigger perspective such as: the 
social conditions of both society, the political situation (at the time), historical 
background, values, culture and beliefs.
The main point is that data, though it may be empirical, needs to grounded -  
connected to the bigger and more complex background in order to understand it 
better. As detailed before, news is part of social construction of reality (Gieber, 1999, 
McCullagh, 2002, Berger and Luckmann, 1966, Cottle, c2003). The essence of news 
is information which means knowledge. The question now in this chapter is where 
did this knowledge come from? Does the choice of sources affect the knowledge 
created?
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The application of grounded theory is done by integrating into the findings in 
Chapters 4 to 7 to a personal account of the crisis. The personal account is acting here 
as the representation of the participatory research where the researcher is becoming 
an active part in analysing and explaining the findings. The personal account is also 
acting as connection between the findings and their context in Australian and 
Indonesian societies.
The personal account will be much derived from the first hand experience of the 
researcher, in particular reflecting back to his own experience during the East Timor 
crisis. Nevertheless, the accounts will be supplemented with other personal accounts 
from other journalists or researchers who were involved with the issue. I have also 
drawn on personal accounts from other media practitioners that have been published 
within the public domains such as newspaper articles or other media accounts.
In conclusion grounded theory is used in this thesis as the global methodology, 
meaning it is used throughout the thesis in order to give context to the findings 
derived from other methodologies used here. Grounded theory will be used in the 
form of participatory research analysis by the researcher by presenting personal 
accounts to give the findings their larger or most significant context. By giving the 
findings context, we can derive a new understanding regarding the Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers accounts about East Timor crisis in 1999.
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C H A PT E R  3
A U ST R A L IA N  A N D  IN D O N E SIA N  PRESS: 
A  G E N ER A L  O V E R V IE W
3.1 Introduction
This thesis is aimed to answer the question: why do Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers present different perspectives in reporting the East Timor (1999) crisis. In 
previous chapters I have explored the main theory about the press and have argued 
that the press is intricately affecting the society in which it is located. In this chapter I 
will be discussing how and why Australian and Indonesian press cultures and their 
production outcomes differ.
Australian and Indonesian journalists in 1999 had long been embedded within the 
global news media world. Traditional boundaries such as national borders could no 
longer stem the flow of news. Technological innovations such as the satellite 
endowed the world with television, telephone, facsimile, and later the Internet. These 
technologies mediate the way we receive and process news. Alan Knight described 
the impact of this new realism:
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Journalists can no longer hide behind national boundaries, ignoring the impact o f their 
reporting on neighbouring countries. Satellite television, interactive news services, improved 
telephone and fax services and the internet do not acknowledge the border checkpoints, 
challenging politicians’ attempts to censor or direct news. But these new technologies, spread 
by rising affluence, also allow wrong or insensitive reports to bounce rapidly around the 
region’s media, encouraging disharmony and discrimination.
Reports o f a racist politician receiving support in Australia can be transmitted instantly to 
audiences across ASEAN nations, threatening negotiated trade and diplomatic arrangements. 
Asian governments, which may not themselves espouse media freedoms, can choose to 
interpret such reports as evidence to support caricatures o f Australians as ignorant, ill- 
educated white supremacists. Australian reporters, meanwhile, can be characterised as 
dishonest by Asian politicians seeking to bolster sagging domestic political support. Reports 
detailing ruling family corruption in Jakarta during the Suharto period were likewise regarded 
as a direct insult to the national interest and international diplomacy.261
The main argument in Australian and Indonesian relations especially between the 
press and the nations, is very complex. The relationship reflects the history, the 
culture and the perception between the two nations. My point of argument here is that 
what is being reported in the press is merely reflecting the way the two nations (or in 
this thesis the term is societies) perceived each other.
My argument above is based upon my previous arguments in Chapter 1 and 2 that 
news is a social construction of reality. Social construction of reality itself is a multi 
faceted concept. The media presents a concept of reality but this very reality is 
packaged and presented using symbols already known to society. What the Australian 
and Indonesian newspapers report is part of how both societies perceived each other 
and as such, pre-existing symbols, values and knowledge profoundly colour the 
presentation of news in Australia and Indonesia.
This is the main context in analysis in answering the question as to why Australian 
and Indonesian newspaper reports differed. Immediately below, for context, that I
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provide an overview of the social, political and historical flows that have rendered 
Australian and Indonesian societies as distinctly different to each other. This will be 
followed by a more detailed sociological analysis of Australian and Indonesian press 
in the context of representation of their society’s social, political and historical 
factors.
3.2. R egional context.
Australian and Indonesian societies couldn’t be more different. Australia started as a 
British penal colony more than 200 years ago. Gradually, the new migrants not just 
from Great Britain but also from Europe started to come and settle in Australia. These 
migrants brought in more than people. They also brought in the values, cultures and 
beliefs that were rooted back in Europe. This helped create the title of Australia as the 
bastion of Europe in Asia and until early in the 20th century, Australia was officially a 
British colony. On the first of January 1901, the Federation of Australia was created. 
We shall further discuss the position and development of Australian society in 
relation to their respective press, East Timor and Indonesia, in the latter part of this 
chapter.
What is now known as Republic of Indonesia was a collection of small kingdoms at 
the time the Dutch arrived in the 16th Century262, trying to find the source of the 
legend of the ‘spice islands’ that Columbus was looking for. The pre- Republic of 
Indonesia had been known to by Portuguese and Spanish sailors, almost at the same 
time. By the 17th century, the Dutch had prevailed against other European
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competitors, to become the dominant European power in the immediate region, 
opening up the wealth of economic reserves that Indonesia has to offer. The 
Portuguese were only able to regain and retain control of the Eastern part of Timor 
Island as well as the small enclave in the central North West of Timor Island, called 
Oecussi.
During World War 2, Japan replaced the Dutch as ruling foreign power when the 
latter surrendered in 1942. Months before the end of World War 2, Japanese imperial 
forces promised Indonesia, its independence. Before Japan was able to fulfil that 
promise, Japan surrendered to the US and British led coalition force in August 1945. 
In the same month, nationalist leaders such as Soekamo declared independence. 
Within weeks, the Dutch manoeuvred to regain their control over Indonesia, meeting 
strong resistance from the nationalist camp. After two Dutch “police actions” -  their 
term -  in 1946/1948, seen as wars by the Indonesian nationalists who formed 
effective guerilla armies, the Dutch succumbed to international pressure principally 
from America and reluctantly acknowledged Indonesia’s independence on 
December 19th, 1949.
Next I will show the development and relations between Australian and Indonesian 
society and how this relates to their respective press perceived the East Timor crisis in 
1999. Firstly I will give an overview of the history of both the Australian and 
Indonesian; provide a short history of the Australian and Indonesian press; and the 
relationship between Australia and Indonesia in particular their press. It is also the 
position of this thesis that understanding the dynamic between Australia and
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Indonesia, in particular in respect to their press is pivotal in understanding the way 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented East Timor crisis in 1999.
This chapter then will be divided into three parts. The first is about the development 
of the Indonesian press, starting with the overview of modern Indonesian history and 
its relations with the birth of the Indonesian press; the issue of cultural identity within 
the Indonesian press system; and the general perception of the Indonesian press 
regarding the East Timor crisis. The second part will focus on the history and 
development of the Australian press; the subsequent press system that was adopted by 
the Australian press; and finally, the general perception of the Australian press 
regarding East Timor crisis. The last part of this chapter will focus on the history of 
the interaction between Australia, Indonesia and their respective presses, especially in 
the years prior to East Timor crisis.
3.3. A b rief Indonesian history and the developm ent o f the Indonesian Press.
The history of modem Indonesia, in particular the period leading up to independence 
in 1945 is very important for the development of the Indonesian press. My argument 
here, which I expand upon below, is that the birth of the Indonesian press is deeply 
enmeshed with the emergence of social movements in the early 1900’s that have gave 
rise to the specific identity the Indonesian press comes from.. This identity, in a 
developed form in 1999, shaped the way the Indonesian press perceived the East 
Timor crisis.
The historical context will show how since the beginning, the Indonesian press have 
been involved keenly with the development of Indonesian society. The Indonesian
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press also turned out to be a breeding ground for independence movement leaders. 
The Indonesian press started as a colonial press, under Dutch control. The Dutch 
colonial government created the first newspaper -  Bataviasche Nouvelles in 1744 -  
and in 1746 it was closed263.
Later, a new newspaper was bom: Bataviasche Kolonial Courant. When the Dutch 
East Indies (Indonesia’s name under Dutch colonial power), was taken over by 
British Empire, the name was changed into: Java Government Gazette. After the 
colony returned to Dutch the name was changed again into: Javasche Courant264. 
Being part of the colonial press, the contents of the early newspapers were either 
conveying the messages from the colonial government or politically neutral articles. 
The Dutch colonial government explicitly forbade mass media, including newspapers, 
to publish anything that undermined Dutch colonial power.
In the beginning of their rule the Dutch Colonial government26' did not allow any 
private publication to exist even if it belonged to a Dutch citizen. When W. Bruining, 
a Dutch national, brought the first printing machine to Indonesia, the Dutch colonial 
government immediately moved to prohibit him from using the machine. Indeed he 
was offered a bribe to return immediately to Holland. Only in 1851, Bruining was 
successful in publishing in Indonesia (known as the Dutch’s East Indies at that 
time).266
Entering the 20th century, increasing criticism from within Dutch society about the 
nature of Dutch rules in the colonies saw greater hostility from the nascent press
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towards the Dutch Colonial government. The movement, known as 'ethical policy’ 
demanded that the Dutch Government erase its repressive policies in the colonies, 
drawing on an argument of common humanity." This movement not only existed in 
Holland, but also in Dutch colonies and in particular throughout Indonesia268. In 
retaliation, the Dutch Colonial government created Haatzaai Artikelen, or the 'hate 
articles law’ that prohibited the spread of Ties and hatred’ towards the colonial state.
The Haatzaai Artikelen was introduced first in Wetboek van Strafrecht van Ned-Ind 
(1935) and was set to become the foundation for limiting press freedom in Indonesia 
for almost a century later under Soeharto’s New Order." The essence of the hate 
articles legislation was the prohibition of any acts that might be considered as 
working against the government. This law shied away from legally defining what 
might constitute an act of 'hate’, giving the government ample leeway to anticipate 
threats to its rule. During the New Order regime for instance, the law was used to 
close down theatre plays — such as some of the plays by Teater Koma (KOMA 
Theater): Opera Kecoak (The cockroach Opera).270
Under the New Order, the ‘hate law’ became one of the infamous laws, as what was 
known as ‘the subversive law’. The subversive law drew its essence from the Haatzai 
Artikelen in which the any activities that might be constituted as being against the 
'legal government’ were outlawed. The activities included among other things; any 
kind of activities that can be considered to be offending the government and its 
officials. The subversive law also carried an extreme penalty: death for offenders.
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During the New Order regime, the subversive law became the most famous and most 
hated laws in Indonesia. The law was used repeatedly by the security apparatus to 
stop any kind of activities that they considered to be ‘against the legal government’. 
Again as the law was specifically not well defined. Activities encompassed anything 
from street demonstration to theatre plays. The victims of the law ranged from 
political activists, to artists. This law was a law designed to not to have boundaries.
Indonesian independence movements burgeoned from the very arrival of Dutch 
power in the 16 century. All movements were relying on armed struggle and all 
failed. There were a few independence movements that cost the Dutch colonial 
government dearly, such as the one in Aceh and the rebellion by Prince Diponegoro 
in central Java. Both movements took a heavy toll on the colonial army but eventually 
both were put to rest, kneecapped by the arrest of movements prime leaders.
But the beginning of the 20th century, the independence movements came equipped 
with a fresh strategy for freedom. The new approach was with weapons, education 
and a higher level of political activity. Within Dutch society, elements started to 
question the colonial hard line policy of the Dutch central government, particularly its 
action towards the people in various colonies including the Dutch East Indies 
(Indonesia) -  these movements were called Ethical Policy?11 Among the people 
questioning Dutch government policy was E.F.E. Douwess Dekker, who came from 
the Dutch middle class. Douwes Dekker became interested in life in the Dutch 
colony, particularly Indonesia. He went to work and live in Indonesia to the extent
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that the experience made him realize colonial policies had created a life of enormous 
hardship for the indigenous population.272
Douwes Dekker proposed that the Dutch government should review their colonial 
policy. He brought his ideas to the Dutch parliament, which not surprisingly gained 
very little support. He was not to give up his ideas.
In 1907, Douwes Dekker took up the post of editor at the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad. 
Consumed by a hostility towards the Dutch Government in general, Dekker was very 
critical of anything related to official power. Dekker’s struggle was not confined 
solely to media. In 1912, with Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Suwardi Surjaningrat (or 
often known as Ki Hajar Dewantara), he created The Indische Pcirtij -  the first 
Indonesian political party that aimed to gain independence for Indonesia.273
Douwes Dekker was not the only pro-Independence movement leader that used the 
media (newspapers) as his base. H.O.S. Cokroaminoto - the founder of Syarikat Islam 
and Haji Agus Salim -  founder of Taman Siswa were among a few editors and writers 
who were active in the newspaper community.
Pre-republic press can be categorized primary by ownership:274
• Newspapers owned by Dutch nationals. This included those owned by 
individuals who had Dutch and Indonesian parents -  they were still 
considered Dutch nationals, though in reality this may not have been the case.
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• Newspapers owned by Chinese people. This also included those that were 
owned by Chinese people who had mixed parents.
• Newspapers owned by Indonesian nationals.
Ethnic divisions in ownership lended each paper an individual style. Dutch owned 
newspapers serviced the primarily the Dutch expatriate communities mostly residing 
in urban areas throughout Indonesia. In terms of content, news stories met the needs 
the interests of Dutch communities and the Dutch colonial government (directly or 
indirectly in terms of being a sort of ‘official media’). Some newspapers took a 
critical stance towards the Dutch colonial government.
Chinese immigrants arrived around the 11th Century as there were many Chinese 
traders that came to trade in South East Asia including Indonesia275. However only 
later, in the 20th Century, were there dedicated schools for the Chinese community. 
Chinese newspapers were originally created to serve the interests of Chinese 
communities. As the majority of Chinese living in Indonesia at that time were 
originally from China, it was understandable that the orientation of the newspapers 
focused heavily on the Chinese mainland.277
The lack of dedicated schools had a visible impact. Until the 20th Century, there were 
very few educated Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. The birth of the Tiong Hoa Hwee 
Koan organization was soon to rectify the situation. Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan was an 
organization aimed to improving the living conditions in all aspects for Chinese, 
though its focus was mainly on education.
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In 1910, the conditions were conducive to create the first Chinese newspapers in the 
Dutch East Indies.“78 The first Chinese newspaper was Li Po which sought to 
preserve Chinese culture and the connection with mainland China.279 Despite their 
concern to maintain Chinese culture, the fact that the newspapers were written in 
Bahasa Malayu gave them a significant role in inspiring a pan-Dutch Indies 
nationalism. The use of the Malay language was not simply coincidental. The 
Indonesian bom constituency of the papers frequently could not speak the language of 
the Chinese mainland.
Ethnic Chinese Indonesians adopted Bahasa Malay due to it being the major 
language spoken by the majority of local Indonesian people at that time, paving the 
way for a common link between different ethnic groups that lived throughout the 
Indonesian archipelago. The Chinese press played a very important part in developing 
the Indonesian press. One important step was the use of the Malay language. 
Moreover, the initial indigenous Indonesian press pioneers used the Chinese-Malay 
press as a model for their own press.
3.4. The Indonesian Press.
One of the main features of the Indonesian press, ever since its inception, is that it is 
pluralistic. The press have retained a strong sense of independence while also being 
nationalistic280.
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In the early part of the 20th century, the Dutch colonial government realized that a 
new kind of independence struggle was emerging. Keen to protect its interests the 
Dutch colonial government did its best to suppress the emerging and inevitable threat.
Local Chinese, realizing they had little in common with Dutch society and a limited 
link with their ancestral land of China, choose to be associated with the local 
Indonesian people. Through this association the Chinese Indonesian press was set to 
become the foundation of the Indonesian press - partly because most Chinese 
Indonesian newspapers employed at least one Indonesian editor reporter. This 
provided Indonesian editors and reporters experience and expertise in journalism.
Douwes Dekker documented that between 1861 and 1907 there were 33 newspapers 
using the Malay language. Out of that number, 14 were Indonesian newspapers, 
almost 50% of the whole Malay language newspapers at that time.281 Being a part of 
the Indonesian independence movement, Douwes Dekker was biased towards the 
Indonesian side. According to Dekker, Malay language newspapers created by 
Indonesians had a higher standing in the community compared to the others, in 
particular those created by the Dutch colonial government.
The Indonesian independence movements soon attracted the attention of the local 
media. Boedi Oetomo -  Indonesia’s first indigenous organization aimed at voicing the 
needs of the indigenous Indonesians -  while Dutch language newspapers such as De 
Locomotief Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad and Jong Indie regularly published mainstream 
news. This situation was soon to be realized by the Dutch Colonial government,
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which responded by counteracting, creating pro-government Malay language 
newspapers and giving support to newspapers that were considered moderate in order 
to counteract the growing independence movement.
In 1911, another major indigenous organization was established -  Syarikat Dagang 
Islam (Islamic Trade Association) by Tirtoadisurjo, a leading press publisher/editor 
with Haji Samanhudi and H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. A year later the organization name 
was changed into Syarikat Islam (Islamic Union - SI).282
Tirtoadisurjo was considered as the pioneer of the Indonesian press. He was a 
government employee who decided to leave the job to become a journalist. By 1903 
he established the first newspaper (in Malay language) to be set up and run by 
indigenous Indonesians. Some of his newspapers are Soenda Berita (Sunda News) 
and Medan Prijaji (Royals of Medan).28j
Within a decade the Syarikat Islam had become a leading indigenous organization 
with a claimed membership of 2 million in 1919. It also created several newspapers, 
the significant one being Oetoesan Hindia (Representatives of Indies), founded in 
1913. Unfortunately due to lack of advertising income, the newspaper was closed in 
1923.284
Oetoesan Hindia became a medium for local Indonesian leaders to reach out to the 
local population. Some of the writers for Oetoesan Hindia included: Oemar Said 
Tjokroaminoto, Abdul Muis, Haji Agus Salim and Surjopranoto. In 1920, the Partai
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Komunis Indonesia (PKI -  Indonesian Communist Party) was bom. Within five 
years, PKI became a prominent power within Indonesian society. Part of the PKI 
appeal was to the lower classes and particularly the Javanese abangan (lower class 
people who weren’t part of a particular religious belief and who mostly practiced a 
mixture of religious and traditional beliefs).283
The influence of the PKI also reached the press industry. By the end of 1926, it was 
recorded that around 20 newspapers were owned or affiliated to the PKI. These were 
impressive figures as there hadn’t been any indigenous Indonesian political power 
that achieved that level of saturation.286 The PKI revolution of 1926 brought a halt to 
their burgeoning media empire. Little has been mentioned about the PKI publication 
after the rebellion and what fate was brought to the people that run them like the 
journalists.
The nationalist movement was marked by the creation of the Indonesia Merdeka 
magazine in 1924. Indonesian students living in the Netherlands created Indonesia 
Merdeka in secrecy. Through this magazine, for the first time, the word Indonesia 
was used in public.
Indonesia Merdeka was published by a new political power -  Perhimpunan 
Indonesia. Perhimpunan Indonesia like the Indische Partij, sought to move towards 
an independent Indonesia. Indeed, the leader of Perhimpunan Indonesia was 
Mohammad Hatta -  who later with Soekamo proclaimed Indonesia’s independence in
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1945. Hatta also became Indonesia’s first prime minister as well as serving as vice 
president.
In the early part of the 20th century, the leading political party fighting for Indonesian 
independence was Indische Parti/. Being a clear opponent of the Dutch colonial 
government, Indische Partij was soon disbanded and leaders of the party were sent to 
exile in the Netherlands. Despite this, leaders of Indische Partij were still able to 
promote and distribute their ideas through mass media publications such as Hindia 
Poetra and Delndier.
Little has been recorded about the relationship between the Indonesian Independence 
movements and the Indonesian press, except that between 1928 and 1940 there were 
33 newspapers and 11 of them were under a political party: PARINDRA -  Partai 
Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Library)287.
PARINDRA was created in 1935 by a fusion of former Boedi Oetomo and other 
Javanese activists with Dr Sutomo and Muhammad Husni Thamrin as the leaders. 
PARINDRA’s aims from the outset were the eventual independence of Indonesia 
from Dutch colonial rule.
Early in World War 2, a Japanese delegation came to Indonesia. Their aim was to 
gamer support for the Japanese Imperial power (Japan hadn’t formally entered World 
War II at that time). By June 1940, Japanese leaders were openly talking about 
liberating Indonesia from the Dutch -  a move hailed by Indonesian leaders.“
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In September 1940 a Japanese delegation came and met Indonesian leaders as well as 
the Indonesian press. For the Indonesian press, the arrival of these guests was 
significant as they also provided financial support to the Indonesian press by placing 
advertisements in the Indonesian press.289 When the Japanese Imperial forces arrived 
and defeated the Dutch, an important chapter in Indonesian history began.
Japanese Imperial forces combined strategies to gain support from Indonesians whilst 
maintaining control over the the conquered areas. The Japanese strategy can be 
outlined as:
• The erasure of all Western influence in Indonesian society. This was achieved 
by prohibiting the use of the Dutch language.
• Utilizing support from local administrators as well as local leaders.
• Mobilizing Indonesian people for the war effort. This ranged from creating 
trained militias to concerted efforts to exploit using Indonesian natural 
resources.
For the Indonesian press, the Japanese occupation brought mixed results. On one side, 
the Japanese Imperial force controlled all aspects of life in Indonesia, including the 
press. Such tight control meant that press freedom was scant flexibility for the local 
press in heavily tenured terms.
On the other side, the Japanese occupation had positive affects. First was that 
Japanese rule allowed greater opportunity and even training for local Indonesians in
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running and managing press operations. This was non-existent during the Dutch 
colonial regime.
A second positive aspect under Japanese occupation was that the usage of Dutch 
language was totally prohibited. The restriction in turned allowed for the for the 
Malay language to flourish as a national common language.
During the Japanese occupation, only eight Indonesian language newspapers and five 
Japanese newspapers were recorded in Indonesia.290 This was a big reduction from 33 
Indonesian newspapers in 1940. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that it 
was during the Japanese occupation that many Indonesian press workers had received 
training in the opportunity to run a newspapers. This was to have a long lasting effect 
on the Indonesian press.
3.5. H istorical im pact o f  contem porary Indonesian newspapers.
Almost all the Indonesian independence movement leaders were involved with the 
press, to name a few: Soekamo, Suwardi Suryaningrat, Haji Agus Salim, H.O.S 
Cokroaminoto and Ki Hajar Dewantara.
There are several important points to be noted here with respect to the early history of 
the Indonesian press. First the rising and persistent sentiment of Indonesian 
nationalism. Second, the growing importance of the role of the middle classes with
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academic backgrounds in Indonesian society. Third, the use of Malay or Malay 
language as the common language (.Lingua Franca).
Today the notion of a nationalistic Indonesian print media has never been wholly 
eradicated. News media like Media Indonesia and Republika very obviously defend 
the nationalistic ideas particularly on a united Indonesian country despite having 
different kind of audiences (young, educated and urban for Media Indonesia. 
Religious, lower-middle class and educated for Republika). But the issue of 
nationalism within the Indonesian press is related to more than just a sentiment 
towards history. As the case of many former colonies like Indonesia, history is 
something that is not merely learned as knowledge but is also embedded in the culture 
and belief.
For Indonesian schools and particularly public schools, it is compulsory for students 
to attend the flag raising ceremony once in a week.291 The ceremony was designed to 
closely imitate the ceremony on August 17th, 1945 when Indonesia proclaimed its 
independence" . During the original proclamation ceremony, the proclamation was 
followed by a flag raising ceremony. This is replayed weekly in Indonesian schools.
It is interesting to note how today after almost a century, the idea of a print media 
promoting nationalism is still strong. There are several possibilities to explain this: 
firstly, the way the news media has developed. Secondly the way Indonesian society 
was developed within the idea of ‘gaining independence’. Thirdly, the fact that there
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have always been perceived possible external threats to Indonesia creating the need
♦ • 7 Q 1for nationalism.
The first point described earlier was how the Indonesian media, in particular print 
media was bom and developed as a means of struggle for independence. This was 
also based on Indonesian society, which upheld the idea of earning independence 
through armed struggle.
The media itself tended towards the self perception that they were agents of freedom,
voicing notions of freedom to the people. During the regime of the New Order, this
role was heavily oppressed yet the regime failed to fully destroy the idea. Angela
Romano described that during the New Order regime, the major motivation for the
Indonesian citizens to join the press ranks was to make a difference in the struggle:294
All respondents were asked how and why they had become journalists; an innocuous question 
revealed what they thought the field o f journalism could offer them and what they could offer 
to journalism and society. The most commonly nominated reasons for becoming a journalist 
was a sense o f duty to help society by aiding the suffering, redressing social inequities and 
building democracy.293
The argument above is in line with the general description in Chapter 1 and 2 
regarding the press in Indonesia as supporters of the development process. Some 
critics have said that this is part of a propaganda process of which the developing 
countries’ government is trying to reassert its grip on power by using the issue of the 
development as the main excuse. Within this context, development is a sacred 
ideology that must be defended at all cost.296 A classic example is what former
President Soeharto said regarding the role of the press:
Since it occupies such an important position, the press has an enormous impact in all sectors 
such as politics, the economy, the socia-cultural environment whether it does or does not fulfil 
its role and responsibilities. A successful press will accelerate efforts to achieve national
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targets while a press which does not fulfil its role will no doubt delay the attainment o f 
identified targets. It is precisely this realisation on the part o f the press that has caused it to 
urge us to support the slogan: ‘positive interaction between the press, the government and the 
people’ as stated in the Main Guidelines o f State Policy (GBHN).297
For developing countries such as Indonesia, the issue of development is a central 
issue -  between giving prosperity to the people versus some aspects of the human 
rights. Peter Berger described this as an issue between achieving prosperity and the 
price that has to be paid for that prosperity. Berger argues that no matter what kind of 
system or ideology is used, the price in achieving prosperity will be significant.298 
Even prominent Indonesian journalist and media tycoon, Jacob Oetama agrees that 
within the Indonesian context, the press is part of the bigger process of national 
development.299
But Jacob Oetama also stated that besides promoting development, the Indonesian 
press should act as a promoter of democracy. Thus, economic development in terms 
of economy must also be followed by the development in the political area. This 
democratic and economic development must be promoted equally and at the same 
time in order to create a balanced society.300
Similar to the time under examination in this thesis, Indonesia’s society in 1999 was 
in turmoil. In June 1999, for the first time since 1955 Indonesia had a fully open and 
democratic election. In a year before that, through a bloody conflict the New Order 
regime was pushed to an end after 32 years. Soon after the fall of the New Order, the 
new Indonesian government quickly asserted that the role of the press was pivotal to 
the advancement of Indonesian society. The result was a series of changes from
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deregulation of press law to a final end to the Information ministry in 1999, as it was 
deemed to be ‘irrelevant’ by the government of the day.301
On the other hand, the Indonesian press in 1999 contributed to furthering the chaos in 
society at the time. The press was often involved with (allegedly) misreporting news, 
having poor reporting quality and generally poor levels of professionalism. They were 
even accused of writing positive news articles for officials and politicians.302
During the East Timor crisis, in parallel with the escalating tensions, the external 
condemnation of Indonesia escalated. The condemnation came in different forms. 
Some came from diplomatic sources stating the exact editorial never reached the 
public and those that did, usually came out as a mere summary by the press.
The most damaging kind of condemnation was public outrage towards Indonesia, 
conducted by foreign nationals in their own countries. Images (both still pictures and 
television footage) showed aggressive protest banners and were often followed by the 
burning of effigies or the Indonesian flag, and these were quick in grabbing the 
Indonesian public’s attention.
These actions were widely publicized by the Indonesian news media. The impact of 
such a publication was a growing anger towards what was regarded as foreigners’ 
involvement in Indonesia’s internal problems. This hit the trigger for strong 
nationalistic sentiments within the Indonesian public -  in particular there was reaction 
to the burning of flags.303 All these pressures, publicized by the Indonesian media
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were seen not just as a pressure upon the Indonesian government but the general 
public. This created a perception that Indonesia was being 'attacked by foreign
countries’.
Some editors openly expressed their disappointment over the foreign pressures
towards Indonesia. Toeti Adhitama, Assistant editor at Medici Indonesia explained.
In the case o f East Timor. There indeed was a dilemma. We feel annoyed that the East 
Timorese want to separate from us -  after we had considered them one o f us for so long. But 
it’s still hard to sit idle when we see East Timorese, trembling with fear, made to squat with 
their hands on their head and guarded by large Australians who enthusiastically point the 
muzzles o f their weapons at those helpless people.304
Research undertaken by the AKSARA Foundation has shows how the Indonesian 
print media generally were experiencing these serious dilemmas (AKSARA, 2000). 
Some newspapers deliberately presented views that strongly favoured Indonesia, even 
if that meant promoting the official Indonesian government (as well the military) line 
about what actually happened in East Timor.
3.6. Indonesian Press Sum m ary.
The Indonesian press have a unique position within Indonesian society. Not only has 
it evolved with and reflected the social structure of Indonesia but it also plays a 
significant part in Indonesian history.
Since its conception, the Indonesian press has played a significant role in Indonesian 
independence movements. It has nurtured and sheltered almost all Indonesia’s early
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leaders, such as Tjokroaminoto, Ki Hajar Dewantara and Soekarno. Some members 
of the early Indonesian press were a medium through which these leaders would 
ignite the independence movements in various areas throughout Indonesia.
These efforts were evident in the response from the Dutch colonial government, 
which sought to ban and arrest members of the press considered to be ‘anti-Dutch 
government’. Product of such repressive a regime -  Haatzai artikelen continue to 
exist in modem Indonesia.
Haatzai Artikelen or the ‘hate article/law’ was used by the Indonesian government up 
to 1998 to control and even ban elements of the Indonesian press305. Only during the 
government under President B.J.Habibie (May 1998 - August 1999) and President 
Abdurrahman Wahid (1999 -  2001), was the law was abolished.
To some extent, the Indonesian press also reflects the Indonesian society. It prides 
itself as part of the independence movement, reinforcing the notion of Indonesian 
nationalism. Like many other examples of the press in developing countries it also 
has problems: high levels of competition with increasing media entering the sector ; 
low quality management307 and increasing challenges in reporting from within a 
dynamic Indonesia while maintaining the quality of reporting.308
Angela Romano also described the general condition of Indonesian journalists, in 
particular during the New Order regime (1966 -  1998) as lowly paid, with a low 
bargaining power (due to the lack of workers unions), unclear minimum professional
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requirements and lack of work protection.309 In 1999, the situation was not much 
different with the economic crisis forcing many publications to stop production, some
'J 1 A
before they were able to circulate a first edition. I remember at the time my first 
month in the Indonesian Observer (August 1998). I had no desk and no basic 
equipment, such as tape recorder or a film. And this was a major development 
compared to the conditions I was used to during my time with the SWA magazine 
(1994 -  1997).311
Some media groups such as Kompas or TEMPO were able to give their employees
more job security and financial rewards. Kompas, as part of the GRAMEDIA
publication group, was able to give scholarships for the children of employees. This
was described by a graduate from University of Mercu Buana -  Berto Wedhatama:
My father’s employer (K o m p a s ) is paying my tuition fees, from primary school to university. 
Even as I’m about to graduate (from university) now, I am still under their suppoiT1-.
Unfortunately such conditions remain the exception within the Indonesian media. 
Smaller media instances were not able to pay their staff a proper salary, thus 
rendering reporters vulnerable to bribery. These are a small sample of the challenges 
that the Indonesian media (including their newspapers) faced during 1999. These 
conditions inevitably affected the reporting of the East Timor crisis in 1999.
3.7. The A ustralian Press.
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In this section relating to the Australian press, I will not deal with press history, rather 
I will focus on the issues that shaped the Australian press in its culture of perception, 
in particular the way it perceived Indonesia and East Timor.
The Australian press started as part of the colonial press. The British colonial 
government established the first publication, a newspaper in Sydney.313 Soon, private 
publications were flourishing in line with the expansion of European colonies in 
Australia (Lloyd, 1999). But unlike the Indonesian press, there was a clear effort to 
distinguish between the private and independent press and the one created by the 
British colonial government. The Australian press of the day aimed to serve a single 
homogenous society based in the colonial outposts throughout Australia.
A study of relevant literature shows that there is a significant amount of scholarly 
analysis of the Australian press in relation in the context of the Australian and 
Indonesian relationship (Kingsbury, 2000, Romano, 2000, Tiffen, 2000, Knight, 
2000).
All of these newswriters have sought to approach the Australian-Indonesian press 
relationship314 giving an overview of Australian and Indonesian press and political 
systems315, and the general complexities due to the social and political differences 
between Australia and Indonesia.
In this context I shall use the description by Rodney Tiffen to explain the major traits 
of the Australian press. The Tiffen description offers the most concise and yet at the
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same time, a comprehensive explanation and description of what constitutes the 
Australia press. Another important issue is that Tiffen originally wrote his description 
of the Australian press while he was comparing it to the Indonesian press.
In Chapter 1 and 2, I have sought to explain that the Australian press is part of the 
free or liberal press. But that description was just an ideal, it does not provide the 
intricacies requiring more explanation as to why such a system follows certain 
indicators. So from this point to the end of this chapter, I will try to explain how the 
Australian press and the press system it adopted can have a different perspective to 
the Indonesian press in looking at the East Timor crisis in 1999.
The Australian press evolved from the early colonial press into the modem press that 
it is today while mirroring the thoughts and traditions of Australian society. As 
Australia is a follower and a strong proponent of western liberal democracy, the 
Australian press mirrors that aspect.
The modem Australian press has significantly different traits to that of the Indonesian 
press. The differences are wide ranging from those of a cultural nature to those 
peculiar to the functions of each press system. In some discourse on the subject, there 
is evidence that the Indonesian press are actually behaving and striving for a much 
better standard of journalism than its Australian counterpart. By doing so, the 
Indonesian press is significantly ‘punching above its weight’ and emulating a modern 
and complex system with a journalism standard higher than what the Indonesian press 
is usually attributed.
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Rodney Tiffen argues that the Australian and Indonesian press have their respective 
differences within the actual press system and practice rather in cultural aspects.316 
Tiffen argues that there is not enough evidence to say that culture is the source of 
difference between Australian and Indonesian presses:317
Culture offers a seductively embracing means o f explaining anything. In politics, it figures as 
the most prolific residual explanation: “The fatal attractiveness o f the political culture 
approach is that may be made to explain too much’. So before proceeding further, the limits 
and difficulties surrounding a cultural explanation o f the conflict between the New Order 
regime and the Australian media need to be established. Two qualifications are fundamental:
• There is not one embracing, consensual contemporary Indonesian culture.
• The roots o f  conflict were more political than cultural.
Before we continue, we need to understand that most of the literature on this area was 
written in the context of the time when the ‘New Order’ regime was still in power 
throughout Indonesia. Indonesia in 1999, during the East Timor crisis, was a different 
Indonesia than the time of the New Order regime. The Indonesian press in particular, 
had finally earned its long sought freedom, with Habibie putting press freedom as his 
first priorities. These changes were set to be further strengthened with the new press 
law: Law No. 2/1999.
Tiffen argues that Indonesia in the late 1990’s was significantly different than what 
traditional cultural followers and commentators would have foreseen for Indonesia. 
This was particularly true if one was to employ pre-World War 2 ethnographic 
descriptions from Margaret Mead or Indonesia’s Clifford Geertz319. Clifford Geertz 
was able to map the social demographics of Javanese society and his work remains 
true for many foreigners today.
122
Tiffen was correct to warn that the cultural aspect was very complex and should not 
be used in a simplistic manner to explain the current condition of Indonesia (in 1999 
in particular). However I disagree with his point regarding Geertz in that much of 
what Geertz said about traditional Javanese culture and society is very relevant in 
analysing Indonesian society, even during the East Timor crisis in 1999.
The differences between the New Order regime’s definition of a press system and that 
of the Australian press system can be described in the following points:
• Strong authoritative political centre versus an adversarial orientation;
• An ethic of restraint and caution versus an ethic of disclosure and 
assertiveness;
• Maintaining public facades versus penetrating private realities;
• Tolerance for patrimonial prerogatives versus an emphasis on due process 
checks and balances;
• Nationalist sensitivities versus assertion of universal ethics.
Within Australian society, power over that society lies in an ability to share and 
spread power evenly to create a sense of balance.320 The Western liberalism system 
such as the one in Australia is based on the notion that power should not be 
centralised upon single party lines.321 The central thought is that pluralism and 
diversity of power will instil a balance of power and will result in a balanced strength.
The concept of balance through the process of checks and balances is important, as 
when it’s unaccounted for, power will corrupt.322 Therefore, the foundation of the
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Western press is a self-preserving image that they are the serving the interests of
society. In order to best serve the society, the press should promote disclosure and 
discussion.
Judith Lichtenberg argues over which one is more important: freedom of the press or 
freedom of speech.323 Western press, as Tiffen argues is construed under the noble 
role of preserving basic human rights -  and one of these rights is the freedom of 
speech. But Judith Lichtenberg argues that such a view is actually misleading, in that 
the basic human right is not about the freedom of speech but about freedom of 
expression.324 To be able to express oneself freely without fear of persecution, as long 
as the expression itself does not violate another’s rights, is a core value. Freedom of 
speech as championed by the press as simply a part of freedom of expression.
Lichtenberg argues that problems will arise if we were protecting the freedom of 
speech rather than the freedom of expression. In freedom of expression the rights of 
the individual are protected, as long they do not violate the rights of others. Freedom 
of speech, or in the form of freedom of press, basically guarantees that anyone can 
say anything they want. Problems will arise in reality as mass media, bounded by 
their obligations to their employers and profit, the available space, and their own 
political interests may not be able to present all expressions or in this case opinions 
from disputing parties. Thus protecting the freedom of speech or the freedom of the 
press instead will limit freedom of expression.
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Within such a concept, the thinking that the Australian press is engaging in a noble 
act in presenting an adversarial orientation, may in fact lead to a promotion of one 
view only. A recent example is the question I had from an Australian journalist 
covering Indonesia in 1999.323 He said that when questioning Indonesian officials 
accusing them of corruption, the Indonesian official merely smiles and is not seen as 
shaking with fear as might be expected to happen in the west. This Australian 
journalist argues that if such things happened in Australia, the official would be 
trembling or reacting with fear. My answer was that in Indonesia, one has to deal with 
a litany of accusations including those on corruption, if they were holding an 
important position. Furthermore I explained that at that time, public officials only 
answer to their superiors not to the public. The Indonesian press often reports such 
allegations against public officials, but unless there is a political willingness from the 
official’s superior, then it would not lead to much further action326.
In my opinion, such an adversarial orientation, as noble as it may be, could turn into 
problem of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. The news media is right to be a 
watchdog, but this situation could turn against the media itself as without sufficient 
safeguards, the media could become a promoter or proxy for certain political 
interests, including its own.
Under the Australian system, political balance makes under the auspices of openness. 
The public in the Australian system have the ability to replace any unwanted
• • 327politicians and rulers and this is the most basic means of downward accountability. 
Thus, political responsibility as well as the public’s attention will be focused on the
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leaders. Personal attack is not only allowed but is also the norm of the political
• 328circus:
Not only is blame personalised, but personal denigration becomes the common currency o f  
political rhetoric, reaching far beyond the debating o f  policy differences. Personal vitriol has 
long been the common discourse. We are not shocked that during the 1980 election Deputy 
Prime Minister Anthony called Opposition Leader Hayden a ‘sissy’, that in 1984 Opposition 
Leader Peacock called Prime Minister Hawke a ‘cheap little crook’, or that in 1987 Treasurer 
Keating called Opposition Leader Howard a ‘wimp’. Indirectness is hardly in evidence.
With both the political opposition and the media there is a strong adversarial attitude, which 
some have claimed extends into a ‘tall poppy’ syndrome, which takes delight in cutting the 
leaders down to size. The methodology is one o f gathering reactions and balancing 
viewpoints, highlighting the extent o f contention. Sometimes, especially when a leader is 
succeeding politically, there is deference and ready acceptance o f official viewpoints, but 
more often the tone is o f  impartial detachment verging into judgemental moral superiority/29
The last sentence highlighted the point here that with such strong conviction of the 
role of the press in Australian society, the Australian press can fall into the trap of 
assuming the role of a superior moral judge.
Orientalism is worth examining in this context - a concept derived by Edward Said in 
his renowned book: “Orientalism”330 - where Said argued that the Orient (the society 
outside the western world -  referred to here as Islamic and Asian societies) and 
Occident (the western world) worked as oppositional terms, so that the "Orient" was 
constructed as a negative inversion of Western culture.
The Orient, according to Said, is perceived as inferior to the West and this is 
reinforced with cultural perceptions within the Western society (Said, 2003). Of 
course such a perception stirs controversy especially within Western societies but it is 
worth noting that in Indonesia, the term: ‘Orientalists’ has been used to describe a 
person who perceives Islam negatively.332 I shall visit Said’s theory again in the later 
part of this thesis.
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A second point that Rodney Tiffen makes about the main traits that the Australian 
press differentiates from the Indonesian press is the ethic of disclosure and 
assertiveness. In contrast with the press in South East Asian countries, the Australian 
press puts emphasis upon a culture of confidence, in the belief that openness, 
whatever its short-term consequences will ultimately be beneficial.333 The result is a 
press that can be perceived to be assertive but in a different context, may be viewed 
as arrogant. Tiffen explains:
In most normal circumstances, Western journalism displays a culture o f confidence, an ethic 
o f disclosure, in the belief that openness, whatever its short-term consequences, will be 
ultimately beneficial. This produces not only an impatience with secrecy and a reluctance to 
acquiesce to others’ desire to suppress information, but develops into an assertiveness o f the 
prerogatives and a directness-cum-sensationalism in presentation.334
The core of this value comes from the belief that it is the role of the press to present 
truthful facts to readers. The Western media believes that their actions are based upon 
their institutional purity. But this is exactly where critics, especially from a complex 
society such as Indonesia, perceive the Western press as driven by a sensationalistic 
goal; that the Western press is often irresponsible over the way and the consequences 
of the news they report; and as former Indonesian Ambassador Wiryono saidf35 the 
western press is arrogant and boastful.
As Tiffen argued, this aspect leaves the Western press susceptible to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy driven by its own arrogant condition. The Western press thus becomes 
trapped in a self image of nobility. In reality, it not only runs the risk of being 
perceived as ‘arrogant’ but as Chomsky argues3j6 - the Western press could be
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manipulated by parties (such as the media owners themselves, government and 
related big business) that have the control over the press.
The third point that Tiffen made of the Australian press is its tendency to penetrate 
private realities. To some the trait of a liberal democracy as described before is a 
sense of assertiveness and openness, where everybody is perceived to be equal and 
the leaders are openly answerable to the public. In this sense, for the political actors, 
there will be a limited private sphere as they are now under public scrutiny as the 
‘public figure test’ in the USA. The press in this context is acting on behalf of the 
public in watching and scrutinising the political actor’s actions, either in public or in 
private.
As described earlier, in Australia, the life of the politician is a relatively public one. 
For Australian politicians, their public and private life is in the same sphere where the 
press tend to report everything. One example was of the former Federal Opposition 
leader Mark Latham, where the press often reported on his private life, such as how 
Latham had hit someone in a brawl, many years before he became a top politician.
This kind of ‘professional’ bravado was non-existent in Indonesia during the New 
Order regime. Not only does Indonesian culture generally look down on such 
behaviour defined locally as a ‘smear campaign’, but to do so to public officials is 
against the law and carries the maximum sentence of death. The fall of the New Order 
regime broke much of the cultural and institutional chains in the Indonesian press and
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by 1999 some of the newspapers and tabloids were openly practising the 
sensationalistic journalism that we know so well in the west.338
The fourth point that Tiffen made is an emphasis on due process, checks and 
balances. As described earlier, the Australian press deriving from the Western liberal 
culture believes that the fair and democratic foundations of society exists within the 
division of power. Power, should be distributed evenly and not be invested in a single 
institution or person. Part of the division of power is an emphasis on due process. It is 
the system that counts and not the individual.
As such, the Australian press puts an emphasis upon the open description of events, 
in which the propriety of processes easily becomes a more pronounced point of 
reference than the substance of policy, except insofar as substance is reflected in the 
unfolding controversies surrounding official actions.339 But again, without a proper 
safeguard, the press can be all at once the police, the judge and the jury - therefore the 
Australian press puts much emphasis upon their own code of ethics.
The fifth point that Tiffen made regarding the Australian press is the assertion of 
universal ethics. The Western press, including the Australian press, are strong 
believers in open borders and especially in the universal application of human 
rights.340 For the Australian press, stories of human rights abuses or the plight of 
humanity always attract wide attention from within the Australian public. One 
example is of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989:
In Australia, for example (although not always consistently) a strong emotional response to
humanitarian issues beyond our borders. The outrage and the sorrow that were widely
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expressed in so many ways following the Beijing massacres in 1989 were a dramatic 
illustration o f a tendency that no doubt complicates the lives o f our diplomat341.
A similar issue as above was when there were Australian lives involved in the story,
suddenly the issue of human rights is projected beyond Australian soil. The classic
example is when the Sari club and Padi pub were bombed in 2002 in Bali.
Immediately the Australian media picked up the story as the media knew that Bali at
that time was the top destination of Australian tourists and the two targets were well
known to Australian tourists. So there was a big chance that there would be
Australian victims. The media was not to be disappointed.
I was watching television that night, taking a break from doing my research. Just around 
1.30AM (Sydney time) I send a couple SMS to my wife who was working at that time in Bali. 
She replied back to me accordingly, it was around 11.30 in Bali. Suddenly there was an 
announcement in the television that there was a bombing in Bali. The announcer only said 
that they expected to many casualties as the target were club and pub full with people.
Soon after that, a friend o f  mine called me saying the same news. Immediately I contact my 
wife again and she confirmed that she felt a massive blast even where she lived on the other 
side o f Bali. For a week all the Australian media from television, radio and print media were 
full o f  headlines o f what is known now as the first Bali bombing.
After the shock subsided, the media immediately picked up the frames that Australia 
is now a target of terrorist sleeper cells and that the Bali bombing was a direct attack 
on Australia. All sorts of theories emerged, such as a small nuclear bomb blew up the 
club and pub, as at that time the response from Indonesian security officials was very 
slow and with sketchy details. It took months for the officials to be able to publicly 
confirm that there were several bombs that blew up that night and it took several 
years to admit that there was more than one suicide bomber at that time.
The Australian media was almost unanimous in agreeing that the terrorist attack in 
Bali was aimed at Australia and Australians. It seems that the Australian media
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refused to accept the confession of the Bali Bombers, such as the leader -  Imam 
Samudra, that the terrorists’ main target was American and British tourists. Imam 
Samudra himself admitted that he couldn’t tell the difference between an American 
and an Australian.
When the terrorists were finally arrested, one by one, the Australian media were not 
shy in airing opinions from the public insisting that the terrorists be sentenced to 
death. When Bali’s court finally sentenced most of the terrorists to death, the media 
shows the emotional response of support from the Australian people particularly 
those who lost their relatives or friends in the bombing.
Ironically, in 2004 a young female beautician named Schapelle Corby was arrested in 
Bali airport. The customs officials in Bali airport found four kilograms of cannabis in 
her surf bag. The same media circus started again but with a different twist. This time, 
as the main perpetrator was an Australian, the frames was absolutely different so the 
medias stance during the Bali bombing. From the emotional support for Schapelle 
Corby’s innocence (when asked why people believed in her story, many including my 
friend said that Schapelle Corby has innocent eyes); theory that she was framed by an 
international narcotics mafia working in Australian airports; to the story that even if 
she did bring in the cannabis it is not a big crime.
The irony was that the Indonesian police in Bali and at the Bali court, hailed as heroes 
during the previous terrorists trials, were now the target of the mockery and 
vengeance of the Australian press and public. One radio talkback personality in
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Sydney made a mockery of Indonesia President’s skin colour as the colour of 
monkey.342 These examples are important to show how Australian press sometimes 
follows their own prejudice, as described by Tiffen and Said above. This begs the 
question as to whether the Australian press is upholding the idealism they aspire to to 
or has that very nobility, blinded them to their own prejudice -  justified as they 
believe they represent a higher moral ground.
3.8. Media ownership and reporting preference
As discussed earlier, modem Indonesian media have a totally different history 
compared to their Australian counterpart. This caused significant differences in how 
the media perceived an event as the history of the media and its society construct 
different perception on similar issue. The major reason, as described earlier in 
Chapter 1 is human always react and perceived events that happen in front of them in 
relation of their previous experience.343
Another probable factor is media ownership. As described in Chapter 1, Australian 
and Indonesia media came from two different press systems. Australian press with 
their liberal press system and Indonesian press with their developing press system. 
The difference in the press system will significantly affects the way the media
344operates and the outcome of their reports.
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Within Indonesian press system, in particular during the New Order era, control is 
done through proxies rather than direct control. Direct control does happened 
occasionally but normally it only happened in extreme cases. Below is a greater 
explanation in how the Indonesian government control the media (during the New 
Order) and in comparison with Australian media.
During the New Order, Indonesian government imposed a strict control to the media 
using several methods. First is the supply of the papers. Papers for the press industry 
was still imported and the importation was strictly controlled by the government. 
Second was through the establishment of Indonesia Newspapers Publishers 
Association (SPSI). This association was controlled by placing several government 
officials as part of the top leadership.
The third method is by requiring journalists to become members of journalists 
association (PWI) that again was controlled by the government. All media leaders are 
required to be a member and without one they can not hold any top position in the 
media. Again the government controlled the association by placing their own people 
as the leader. The clearest example is the status of ANTARA which is a state new 
agency. ANTARA journalists when traveling on assignment may use government 
official passport (nick named as ‘blue passport’ due to the colour of the cover). 
Putting the ANTARA journalists in similar position as government official.
The most feared method of control is by revoking the press license. All media in 
Indonesia during New Order regime are required to have a press license. In fact this
1
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applies mostly to print media as private broadcast media are not allowed to make their 
own news reports. If a media is considered to have breached the ‘code of conduct’, 
the government then can revoke the press license effectively eliminating the media.
Most damaging part of this method is the fact of losing the license also means the loss 
of income for the employee of the media itself. This include non editorial staff as well 
as the editorial team, meaning they are out of work. Unfortunately for most 
Indonesians, being out of work is one of the worst reality of life that they would 
prefer to avoid as far as they can.345
The last press licenses revocation was in June 1994 when the Minister of Information 
announced that it has revoked the licenses of TEMPO, DeTik and EDITOR. At that 
time, the press industry fought hard that the decision can be overturned by going 
through the court. In the end, Indonesian court decided not to overturned the 
Minister’s decision. The government itself defended their decision by saying that they 
are allowing journalists and staff from the three media to open a new ones. TEMPO 
‘successor’ named GATRA was then heavily criticized for often representing
. . . 346government statements without checking its credibility.
This does not means that the government did not tried to control the media through 
media ownership. Several newspapers with close connections with the government 
did exist such as ANGKATAN BERSENJATA and PELITA. ANGKATAN 
BERSENJATA was a newspaper closely affiliated with the aimed forces while 
PELITA was the official newspaper from GOLKAR. As such, within the press
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community they are both known to represents government position more than other 
media.
The virtue of controlling by proxy is the cost effectiveness. The government did not 
have spend money in acquiring any media yet they can control the media thoroughly. 
If there is an event that is deemed to be too sensitive to be reported, government 
officials can called all media and announced that the event is too sensitive to be 
reported. This often came at the last minute before deadline time for the media and in 
the form of telephone call. As such, the journalists then called it: “Telephone culture”. 
Failure to heed such ‘warning’ will result in warnings and the most serious warning 
came from the Ministry of Information as it carries the risk of license revocation.
In the case of the news media being analyzed here, all four have no direct ownerships 
by the government. One newspaper, SUARA PEMBARUAN was actually banned 
before by the Indonesian government. Nevertheless one, REPUBLIKA does have a 
close relationship with the government. We shall look into it below.
KOMPAS, SUARA PEMBARUAN and MEDIA INDONESIA are all privately owned 
and funded newspapers. KOMPAS, the largest and most prestigious newspaper in 
Indonesia today was founded by two former teachers: Jacob Oetama and P.K. 
Ojong.347 They both have a vision of bringing quality information for the Indonesian 
people.348 As such one of the credo of KOMPAS is to educate the people, something 
that they still hold true till today.349
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SUARA PEMBARUAN is the only afternoon newspaper from all newspapers 
examined. Initially founded under the name of SNAR HARAPAN, it later changed 
name into SUARA PEMBARUAN after it was banned by the government in mid 
1980 s. In Jakarta, SUARA PEMBARUAN was number one afternoon newspaper with 
almost no close competitor. It is privately owned.
MEDIA INDONESIA was the brainchild of businessman Soerya Paloh. It came out 
first the form of PRIORITAS which was very popular during its short life in the mid 
1980 s. The popularity of PRIORITAS was the result of the differences in format and 
contents compared to other newspapers. It was using bold headlines supported by 
often dramatic colour photographs. But what is most interesting is their content which 
is often very critical politically towards the government. As expected, PRIORITAS 
did not last for long as the government quickly revoked its license.
In 1988, PRIORITAS came back in the form of MEDIA INDONESIA. It uses the 
same format as PRIORITAS and in the beginning similar bold content as 
PRIORITAS was. This style of content did not last for long as MEDIA INDONESIA 
quickly revised its content to become somewhat ‘tame’. Nevertheless it was very 
popular among university students partly due to its low price.350 This unfortunately 
did not last for long either.351
REPUBLIKA was founded in 1992 by Yayascin Abdi Bangsa (Abdi Bangsa 
Foundation) which was supported by the Ikcitan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesian 
(Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association -  ICMI). ICMI itself was created allegedly
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to give some sort of religious support for the government in the form of collective 
support from Muslim scholars in Indonesia.
In reality many of the ‘scholars’ are technocrats or advisers working for the 
government. This made ICMI are closely associated with the government although it 
is also closer to loose membership organization rather than a political organization 
with clear goal like GOLKAR. Nevertheless, the idealistic vision of the society 
perceived by ICMI is a modern Indonesian society that incorporate religion but not a 
religious country. In other words a nationalistic Indonesia just as described in the 
state ideology of Pancasila.
Despite such proximity with the government, none of the media examined here are 
owned either partially or wholly by the government. As argued above the government 
instead opted to control the media by using proxies which in turn are a very elaborate 
and complex scheme in itself. That way, the Indonesian government could 
effectively control the media without spending funds to owned the media itself.
After the fall of New Order regime in 1998, the media mapping totally changed. 
Started with President Habibie’s policy to abolished press revocation 1999 and 
opening the door wide open for new media. It was known that within 100 days of 
taking the presidential seat, President Habibie signed approximately 150 new press 
licenses. President Habibie is effectively allowing Indonesian press to have a taste of 
liberal system.
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Australian press came from a totally different history compared to the Indonesian 
press. Historically, Australian press did not started as part of an independence 
movement like its counterpart in Indonesia. Instead it was part of the growing British 
colony that eventually opted to be an independent country while maintaining its 
historical link to United Kingdom.
Both Australian newspapers examined here, THE AUSTRALIAN and THE 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD are privately funded and owned. As such the press 
system adopted by Australia does not see that press is something that should be 
controlled by the government. The press under the free press or liberal system is an 
independent entity, ruled by law but not by the government.
As such it safe to conclude that media ownership plays little in how reportage of East 
Timor crisis in 1999. None of the media examined here are owned by their 
government therefore eliminating the possibility of they are reporting their 
government views due to the ownership. In the coming chapters this issue will be 
examined more closely.
3.9. Conclusion.
In conclusion, Australian and Indonesian press are representing two different 
societies. Australia and Indonesia have distinctly different histories, which have 
helped shape each society differently. Australia and Indonesia also have different
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cultures, political systems and values, which in turn are affecting the respective press 
systems.
It is not the intention of this thesis to judge which society has a more valid perception 
or which has the superior press. Rather this thesis is simply aiming to create a better 
understanding about the way the press works in Australia and Indonesia.
The position of this thesis is to accept social relativism and understand that each 
society is unique and each has its own complexities. The only way to understand each 
society and its respective press is to understand the context and this should be focused 
on specific events. Therefore, the next chapters (4 and 5) will be dedicated to 
understanding some of the case studies regarding the Australian and Indonesian 
newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis in 1999.
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CHAPTER 4
REPRESENTATION OF THE JOURNALIST AT RISK: 
THE MURDER OF SANDER THOENES
4.1. Introduction
Sander Thoenes332, a Dutch journalist was the only foreigner killed during the East 
Timor Crisis in 1999 making his death very significant. His death, has parallells with 
the tragic case of six foreign journalists (all working for Australian media at the time) 
who were killed during the Indonesian invasion in 1975.353 The two tragedies have 
similarities in that in both cases, the identity of the perpetrators remains unknown and 
exactly how the journalists died is still a mystery. Thoenes was not the only journalist 
who was killed in the line of duty in the East Timor crisis. Agus Mulyawan, an 
Indonesian journalist was also killed but unlike Thoenes his death did not attract 
much attention in his own country, let alone abroad
The representation of Sander Thoenes’s death has been selected for examination 
because he was the only foreigner killed during the crisis, because of the historical 
resonances of his death, and thirdly because of the wide coverage his death received 
in the Indonesian and foreign media. What is of interest here, however, is the often
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stark contrasts between reporting of the events in the Indonesian and foreign 
(Australian) newspapers.
Sander Thoenes was a 30 year old Dutch bom journalist. At the time of his death, he 
was working for the London based Financial Times and assigned to Indonesia as their 
correspondent. He was reported to have a broad understanding of Indonesian social 
and political affairs as well as being fluent in the Indonesian national language.
Thoenes arrived in East Timor with other INTERFET’s accredited journalist and 
according to fellow journalists was an unexceptional member of the press corps.354 
His death, was regarded very seriously and received wide publications everywhere 
except Indonesia:
Foreign journalists working in Indonesia before Sander Thoenes’s death often worked under 
the assumption that they were invincible. I often saw during demonstrations in Jakarta in 1998 
that foreign journalists liked to put themselves right between the demonstrators and the 
security forces. Sometimes these journalists were right in the very front line. When I asked a 
fellow journalist from M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia  about this, his answer was: ‘Those [foreign] 
journalists know that if they were to be beaten in public by Indonesian security forces, they 
can make a big case out o f itV 55
According to reports, Thoenes was last known riding pillion on a rented motorcycle 
taxi {ojek) towards the Becora district in Dili. He and his driver then came to a road 
block manned by several men. Some reports said that those men were wearing 
Indonesian military uniforms. Confronted by the road block, the driver panicked and 
turned the motorcycle away. While doing this, there were shouts from the men and 
shots were fired. Both the driver and Thoenes fell to the ground. The driver managed 
to run away but Thoenes did not. The ojek driver notified INTERFET which 
organized a search party. Thoenes body was found the next day, more or less in the
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spot where the driver left him. According to reports he had been shot and hacked to 
death.356
According to Melvin Singh, a Singaporean journalist, he was supposed to go to Becora 
district that very morning. Except the 4o j e k ’ driver that promised to take him had already 
gone, taking Sander Thoenes (which he learnt later). After the shooting, the driver Araujo 
tried to seek help but was dismissed by INTERFET troops as Araujo could not speak English. 
Later, Araujo told Melvin Singh about the incident and INTERFET were duly notified. Then 
INTERFET arranged a rescue mission which unfortunately was too late.357
The saga continues though with the question still lingering about who and what killed him. 
There were reports that he was shot and there reports that he was not shot. An Indonesian 
police officer who saw the body confirmed that he was shot in the butt but said that it was his 
observation that Thoenes was hacked to death.338
The drama surrounding Sander Thoenes’s death is the main focus of the analysis that 
follows. The analysis will show more than just differences in culture or news values 
account for the difference in representation of these events. The analysis, refracted 
through three different approaches will lead to a new understanding of how 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers operate. Due to space limitation, the articles 
analysed are not presented in full here. The full versions of the articles are available 
in appendix B.
4.2. Analysis
4.2.1. Robert Entman model of analysis.
American professor of communication Robert Entman has developed an analytic 
approach that provides a way of discovering below the surface messages and 
perspectives in news reports.359 The method Entman proposes focuses on five aspects 
of press articles which he argues give readers an understanding about how the story 
can be ‘framed’. The aspects of a frame are.360
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1. Size judgements. The amount of space and the degree of prominence given to 
the stories by the media. The importance of a story is signalled by its 
placement on the front page of a newspaper or as the lead item in a news 
bulletin. A decisive statement of the media’s belief in the ‘irrelevance’ of an 
event is its omission.
2. Agency. The usage by the media of certain words and images to suggest how 
and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed.
3. Identification. The usage by the media of certain words and images that 
encourage or discourage identification with those most directly involved in 
the media story.
4. Categorisation. The different ways in which media label events or issues. 
Different categorisations encourage us to look at events in very different 
ways.
5. Generalisation. The degree to which the media generalise from an incident or 
issue in which the event occurred or in which the issue arose.
4.2.1.1. Size and placements.
All Indonesian newspapers placed the story of Sander Thoenes on their front page. 
All of their headlines are about Sander Thoenes’s tragic fate. This shows how 
important the new reports were for Indonesian newspapers. Indeed this was probably
the first foreign journalists killed while doing assignment in Indonesia.
As far I can remember during my journalism career (since 1990), I have never heard that any 
foreign journalist was ever intentionally hurt in Indonesia during their line o f duty. It was 
common knowledge that Indonesian security, who never hesitate to beat up any journalists 
who fall into their hands, never did the same with any foreign journalist. This created a myth 
o f invincibility for foreign journalists. During the ‘demonstration season in 1998, I heard
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many stories how these tall, white journalists stood between the security forces and the 
student demonstrators. Sometimes the foreign journalist even mocked the security officers 
knowing that they would not be harmed.361
The Thoenes stories in the Indonesian newspapers are quiet long. Suara Pembaruan's 
story was 894 words, Media Indonesia's was 628 words and Republika's was 900 
words. Clearly a significant effort was made to produce the story -  these were not just 
some byline stories put in to fill the paper.
In Australian newspapers, although Sander’s death hit the headlines, none of the 
stories got to the front page. Instead they were relegated to the ‘special reports’ 
section within the newspapers. This gives an impression that though it was important, 
the incident was not regarded as critically important for Australian readers.
In term of length of the articles, The Australian was 335 words and The Sydney 
Morning Herald stories were 446 and 707 words long. In comparison with Indonesian 
newspapers, the Australian articles were quite short.
Kompas, Indonesia’s largest newspaper was the only newspaper that did not publish 
the story of Sander Thoenes’s death. This is in contrast when compared with other 
newspapers. Kompas did not even mentione Thoenes’s death until a much later date 
after his death. For a clearer comparison of the articles length, we can see Table 1.
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Table 1.
Article length
Newspapers Article Length (Words)
Kompas -
Suara Pembaruan 894
Media Indonesia 628
Republika 900
The Sydney Morning Herald 446, 707
The Australian *■> ̂  c
Table 1. shows the length of articles published regarding Thoenes’s death. This is an 
indication of the relative importance of the Sander Thoenes’ death within Australian 
and Indonesian newspapers. As noted above, Sander Thoenes’s tragic death was 
featured more prominently (in term of allocations) within Indonesian newspapers 
compared to Australian newspapers.
East Timor is always an enigma for journalists. According to Dayat Gautama, a former 
photojoumalist from T E M P O  magazine, East Timor under Indonesian rule was closed to most 
journalists. Only a handful o f journalists were allowed to enter the area; Dayat was one o f 
them. For him, the area was associated with constant danger where everyone had to be 
extremely careful with anyone they were dealing with. In his own words, Dayat described 
East Timor for journalists: “Who says it [East Timor] is a tourist area?”
Prior to the referendum the attacks on journalists were known to intensify and at the same 
time the numbers o f  international journalists present was increasing. Two Indonesian 
journalists, one working for R e u te r s  and another for K o m p a s  were shot and seriously injured. 
The photojoumalist from R e u t e r s , Bea Wiharta, was known within the (Indonesian) 
journalists as a serious and careful photojoumalist. The fact that he was attacked and injured 
really brought up the sense o f  danger in East T im or/62
The sense of danger in reporting in East Timor was very real -  at least for Indonesian 
journalists. East Timor was described above was a ‘closed’ territory for years 
meaning no outsiders let alone journalist can enter the area without permission from
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the military. Only a handful of journalists were allowed and they were carefully 
selected by the military. But this didn’t dampen the interest of the Indonesian public 
on East Timor. The death of Sander Thoenes was a tragedy. But for Indonesian 
journalists who used to cover the area, it was part of the risk of reporting in East 
Timor. The fact that it happened merely confirmed the realisation that East Timor was 
a very dangerous area.
4.2.I.2. Agency.
Agency reports refer to the issue of who may be considered responsible in a particular 
event. Indonesian newspaper articles stated that Sander was last seen alive when 
being chased by ‘men in uniform’.363 The implication is that it was Indonesian 
soldiers (TNI) that chased and killed Sander Thoenes. Nevertheless TNI officials 
strongly rejected the accusation that TNI was involved in Thoenes’ killing. Some 
Indonesian officials even said that INTERFET should be considered responsible as 
INTERFET was de-facto responsible for the security in the territory.364
In general, however, Indonesian newspapers took the view that Sander Thoenes’s 
death was due to the risk of working in a conflict area. This was highlighted by a 
statement from INTERFET commander -  Major General Peter Cosgrove. Cosgrove 
was quoted by Republika365 and Suara Pembaruan366 on September 22 and 23, saying 
that East Timor is still a dangerous area despite the arrival of INTERFET.
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Republika in its headline and article strongly asserted that INTERFET was 
responsible for the death. In its article Republika quoted Ja’far Assegaff, a former 
member of the Indonesian Press Council, who said that as INTERFET was the party 
holding the mandate for maintaining security in East Timor, it was responsible for 
Thoenes’s death.367
Besides Assegaff\*Republika also cited other Indonesian press officials who attributed 
responsibility to INTERFET.368 One the officials quoted is Pami Hadi, Republika's 
own chief of editor. Nevertheless, Republika did not mention Pami Hadi as its own 
Chief of Editor in the article. Republika also mentioned the last accounts of Thoenes’s 
death, quoting from the ojek driver that Thoenes used. The driver stated that Sander 
Thoenes’s killers were people wearing Indonesian Police uniforms. Republika was 
the only newspaper that claimed the people who stopped and shot at Sander Thoenes 
were wearing Indonesian Police uniforms/69
Suara Pembaruan in its headline stated that a foreign journalist was killed by slash 
wounds.370 The killers were identified as ‘Men in military uniforms’, again based 
upon the statement by the Ojek driver -  Mr Araujo.
Among Indonesian journalists covering the chaotic period of 1998 -  1999, life on the street 
was always high with risk. A peaceful demonstration could lead into serious trouble. A 
student o f mine who was doing an internship with T h e I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r  went to cover a 
demonstration in the Proclamation Monument in Central Jakarta. Soon he felt that his 
presence was not welcome by some o f the demonstrators. The student was also aware that 
many o f  the demonstrators were carrying sharp weapons like spears and machetes in public, 
and that’s when he decided that he should leave.
As he was leaving, suddenly he felt he should stop. He stopped for a second and as he was 
about to start moving again, he saw a spear land right in the spot where he would be if he had 
not stopped before. Had he kept walking, he would have been seriously injured or even 
dead/71
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Australian newspapers squarely blamed Indonesian military for the incident. Their 
reports were that Sander s killer suspect/s were wearing Indonesian military 
uniforms(Murdoch, 1999a, Williams, 1999, Greenlees, 1999).372 Some article even 
portrayed this incident as part of a systematic campaign to intimidate journalists and 
the Indonesian public as a way of maintaining power for the ruling elite in 
Indonesia. Though their articles implicated the Indonesian military, Australian 
newspapers did not mention any comments from Indonesian military. Australian 
newspapers did not quote any statements from INTERFET regarding Sander death.
Table 2.
Agency -  Who is responsible?
Newspapers Placement of responsibility (Perpetrators)
Kompas (No articles mentioned Thoenes death)
Suara Pembaruan (September 22) Six men in military uniforms.
Media Indonesia (September 23) Unknown parties.
Republika (September 23) Men in Indonesian Police uniforms.
The Sydney Morning Herald
(September 23 and 25)
Killers dressed in Indonesian military 
uniforms (TNI?).
Although militias sometimes wear bits of 
uniform, Mr Araujo has no doubt these were 
Indonesian troops (TNI).
The Australian (September 23) Men in Indonesian military uniforms (TNI?)
Table 2. shows the agency using the agency report in general,, almost all (except 
Republika) agreed with the allegation that Sander Thoenes was killed by men in 
uniform, most likely Indonesian army uniforms.374 These statements attribute the
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responsibility directly towards Indonesian military (TNI), which was flatly rejected 
by the TNI.375
The death of Sander Thoenes brought public attention to the working conditions for
journalists in East Timor. The emphasis on the dangers that Sander Thoenes faced as
a foreign journalist (eventually leading to his death) was disproportionate compared
to the dangers Indonesian journalists faced.
During the East Timor crisis, Indonesian military (TNI) and Indonesian Police (POLRI) were 
clearly being blamed for the chaos before and after the referendum. Before the involvement o f 
Australia and INTERFET, I think most Indonesian will agree that TNI and POLRI had been 
responsible for many bloody incidents like the Tanjung Priok incident in 1985 where armed 
troops opened fire to a mass o f  demonstrators at the port o f Tanjung Priok.
For the foreign journalists in East Timor, perhaps for the first time in Indonesia they were 
ever threatened by armed mobs and at the same time the military and police failed to protect 
them as they should. I can understand how frustrated the foreign journalists were about that 
experience. But such experiences were a common thing for Indonesian journalists working in 
the field. Prior to the referendum, two Indonesians journalist (one, Bea Wiharta, was working 
with R e u te r s ) were shot and seriously wounded. Their plight was not even mentioned in any 
o f foreign reports at that time.376
For Indonesian journalists working in Indonesia, risk was part of the reality. Unlike 
their foreign counterparts, there was very little they could do if they ever fell victim to 
the volatile sitatuation (i.e. got beaten by the mob or by the security forces). Since 
1998, the security forces have tried to improve their standard procedures in dealing 
with demonstrators and journalists, but back then the situation was dangerous for 
anyone.
4.2.I.3. Identification.
In Australian newspaper reports, Sander Thoenes was humanized in the way he was 
represented. For Australian journalists, Sander Thoenes was part of a ‘family’ of
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foreign journalists doing their job in a foreign land. An example is from the article
• ^  77written by Don Greenless:
He was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock o f blond hair, seated astride a 
motorcycle speeding along Dili's seafront.
Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill o f  journalistic 
adventure.
It came to an end on the dusty verge o f  a road in Becora, one o f Dili's many bloodstained 
neighbourhoods.
When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn't easy to recognise.
This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet 
through his head and an ear severed by a knife -- a gruesome memento for the killers.378
All Australian newspapers reports here are characterised by using first person
approach and deliberate use a very personal point of view. Such an approach is valid
as the newspapers perceived that their audiences wanted to know what happened in
the field as if they were there themselves. This is explained by Rodney Tiffen:
In saturation media coverage, every fresh development is reported breathlessly in an over­
heated and competitive tendency to exaggerate the significance o f the most immediate 
happenings. The huge human stakes brought great emotional swing with each new 
developm ent/79
The death of Sander Thoenes is perhaps like a sword with two edges. On one hand it 
provides the western media (including Australia) with a dramatic actualisation of just 
how dangerous were the conditions in East Timor. This dangerous reality fits in really 
well with the frame of urgent humanitarian crisis that was heavily promoted by 
western media including Australia. So it fuels an already explosive situation for the 
journalists that were covering East Timor, and competition for a more dramatic news 
angle. On the other hand, the death of Sander Thoenes, was a sharp reminder of how 
dangerous and real was the danger there. It was a tragedy that such a promising young
journalist had to die in such conditions:
The death o f Sander Thoenes was to bring long lasting effect. My close friend, Melvin Singh
who was working for T h e  N e w  P a p e r  -  Singapore told me that because he knew the details of
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Sander Thoenes’s death, the Dutch government contacted him years later as they were making 
inquiries o f  how Sander Thoenes was killed. An Indonesian prosecutor told me in January 
2006, that Sander Thoenes case is still an open case within Indonesian Prosecution office.380
In contrast to Australian newspapers, the death of Sander Thoenes was portrayed by 
Indonesian newspapers in a formal, detached and impersonal manner. The description 
was of a very close associate, a close friend, a well liked colleague. There was no 
personal description of Sander Thoenes in any of Indonesian newspapers. The only 
description was of how his body looked when it was found. It was an impersonal 
description of the kind that marked regular criminal reporting within down-market 
newspapers in Jakarta.381
Such descriptions (of what and where the wounds were) are not unusual for
Indonesian newspapers. Crime stories are very popular with the Indonesian public. In
fact one of the most popular newspapers in Jakarta is Pos Kota whose front page is
practically filled with crime stories -  every day.
P o s  K o t a  used to be an anomaly among newspapers published in Jakarta. P o s  K o t a ' s  front 
page is full o f  various criminal stories that happened in Jakarta. Usually, the most gruesome 
and horrific case is used as a headline such as when a family was butchered or seven 
criminals were killed by police. It was also cheap, just around one fifth the price o f K o m p a s  -  
the leading newspaper. Nevertheless, P o s  K o t a ' s  popularity is without doubt, it was more 
popular in Jakarta than K o m p a s .  Surprisingly, though they might not admit it, many of  
Jakarta’s middle class society buy and read P o s  K o t a  regularly/82
Crime stories for Indonesian public, though very popular, were often presented in 
subdued form. There are certain ethical principles that dictate how a crime story can 
be presented. The victim of a sex crime, for example, must not be identified. There 
should be no clear picture of gruesome murder victims and the like. In reality the 
application of the ethical principles depends on the media itself. As a guideline,
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Tempo magazine, the leading news magazine in Indonesia, believes that any bad news 
should not be amplified by bad presentation.
By describing Sander Thoenes’s lifeless body, Indonesian newspapers seemed to
portray him as just another victim of violent crime. Violence is nothing new for
Indonesian public. Ever since the former President Soeharto stepped down in 1998,
Indonesia has been marred with violence -  from criminal violence to daily
confrontations between protestors and the authorities.
I know this seems absurd for a foreign journalist, but death is a daily fact that is also a hard 
news currency in Indonesia. I remember that T E M P O , the leading news magazine, in 1990’s 
required their trainee journalist to familiarise themselves with the city morgue. A female 
friend o f  mine from the university told me a story how she was called close to midnight by 
her editor in T E M P O  and asked to report on an expat who had just committed suicide. As she 
was not carrying a camera at that time, she was told to explain in details how the corpse 
looked using the public phone in the m orgue/84
In the end, Sander Thoenes was represented as just another casualty of the conflict. 
The fact that he was a foreigner was the most signifcant aspect. This fact was 
highlighted in all Indonesian articles -  using the term 4 Wartawan asing' which means 
foreign journalist. The term 4Asing’ here means ‘foreign’ but it also means ‘outsider’. 
By using such a description, the Indonesian newspapers highlighted the fact that 
Sander Thoenes, like the rest of foreign journalists was an ‘outsider’. The (informal) 
attributive meaning here is these people (foreign journalists) are outsiders involving 
themselves with Indonesian affairs. Combined with the description how Sander 
Thoenes’s body looked, the Indonesian articles conveyed a message that this 
‘outsider’ died as an outcome of his involvement in Indonesian affairs. As violence 
has become a fact of life in Indonesia, Sander’s death was represented as the logical 
consequence of the risks that he took.
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4.2.1.4. Categorisation.
Australian newspapers tend to portray Sander’s death as tragic and explicitly put the 
blame onto the Indonesian military (TNI). One article even goes further, arguing that 
Sander’s death was part of an ongoing intimidation campaign. The implication was 
that this criminal act shouldn’t go unpunished.38̂
Both The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald highlighted the gruesome 
details Sander Thoenes’s death such as the ‘cutting of his ears as souvenirs’.386 The 
meaning from the articles is that this was a very violent and sadistic killing. Here is a 
sample article from Don Greenless of The Australian:
When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn't easy to recognise.
This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet 
through his head and an ear severed by a knife — a gruesome memento for the killers/87
Indonesian newspapers framed Sander’s death as a tragic incident but inevitable, as 
the situation on the ground was really dangerous for everybody. All newspapers 
repeatedly quoted Indonesian and INTERFET officials stating that East Timor is still 
a very dangerous area. Therefore anyone there, including journalists, were taking a 
big risk, and that risk might include falling victim to violence.
Indonesian newspapers also framed Sander Thoenes’s death and the risk of working 
in East Timor with reports that Indonesian journalists had received death threats 
allegedly from pro-Independence supporters. Such threats were deemed serious
* 388enough to warrant the evacuation of all Indonesian journalists.
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Framing East Timor stories in this way creates the impression that East Timor was a
very dangerous place, especially for journalists. Being there meant taking a huge risk 
upon oneself.
A friend (Indonesian) who worked for the A s s o c ia t e d  P r e s s  in Jakarta loved to teased Dayat 
(former photojoumalist from T E M P O ). ‘He (Dayat) is so morbid, he always carried two dog 
tags — one around his neck and another in his ankle, whenever we went to East Timor’, said 
my friend. Such is the reality that journalists took when reporting in East Timor.389
Every year, many journalists in Indonesia became victims of violence. Often it 
happened during assignments where they were simply at the wrong place at the 
wrong time, ending being beaten up by mobs or by security officials. Various press 
organisations (including the media themselves) tried to raise the issue but many 
Indonesian journalists still fallen victims.390 Interestingly, the risk of doing 
journalistic work in Indonesia was dismissed by Australian academic’s Angela 
Romano as she noted in her book:391
Complaints about press freedom were connected with a twofold cord o f dissatisfaction that 
the news industry was weak against the institutions o f power and there were few avenues of 
protection for journalists against physical threats. Many engaged in melancholy reflections on 
the small but real possibility o f bashing, torture or other persecution. They saw the 1996 
murder o f  Yogyakarta journalist, Fuad Muhammad Syarifuddin - apparently in relation to his 
investigation o f bribery that was linked to the first family - as symbolic o f the dangers that 
they and their colleagues might encounter/92
Given such realities, it is understandable that Indonesian newspapers represented the 
deatch of Sander Thoenes, a fellow journalist, simply as a victim of a generally 
chaotic situation. In other words, as gruesome Sander Thoenes killing may be, his 
death simply was a tragic outcome of working in an environment such as East Timor.
For Australian newspapers, in particular the journalists who are like Thoenes, 
foreigners assigned to foreign lands, the representation was of a fatal tragedy. For
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these journalists, the loss is of a friend and a fellow journalist, and the factor of 
friendship may have affected their perception and representation of Sander’s death.
4.2.I.5. Generalisation.
Australian newspaper accounts of Sander Thones’s death generalize in a way that 
they link his death to other factors tied to the political situation at that time. First, the 
Indonesian military and the pro-integration militias are portrayed as the culprits of the 
violence in East Timor. Second, Sander’s killing is represented as not an isolated 
incident but part of a power struggle scheme in Indonesia.
The Australian media and Government apparently believed that violence in East 
Timor after the referendum was conducted by pro-integration supporters as presented 
by Murdoch393; Murdoch394; Hewett395; Crouch396; Lagan; Collins and Reed397. Pro­
Integration supporters including the militias, were allegedly created, trained, armed 
and controlled by the Indonesian military. This leads to the assumption that the 
Indonesian military allegedly is technically and morally responsible for the violence. 
As we have noted, Sander Thoenes was last seen being chased and shot at by a group 
of men, supposedly wearing Indonesian military uniforms. This information, vague as 
it was, helped to frame what the Australian media and government believed about 
who was responsible for all the violence.
The Sydney Morning Herald published a story portraying Sander Thoenes’s death as 
part of an ongoing campaign of intimidation. It connected Sander Thoenes’s killing
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with violence in other areas such as Irian Jaya and Aceh. The article also connected 
the killing to the continuing demonstrations outside Australian embassies and 
consulates.
Such descriptions gave the impression that there is an ongoing ‘campaign of 
intimidation’ in different areas in Indonesia. The aim of such campaigns, which were 
conducted mostly by the military, was to maintain the status quo. The status quo was 
created when former President Soeharto left power in 1998. Since then a power 
struggle was continously fought by various factions within Indonesia. The article 
argued that in these circumstances it was in the interest of the military to keep its 
interests covered. The article also pointed out that ‘human cost’ is nothing in this 
power struggle.398
His death, some believe, was part o f the bigger picture he had been talking about with friends: 
the use o f terror, intimidation and the provocation o f violence to promote the political 
interests o f the Indonesian military and to maintain the status quo.
What killing Sander, one o f  the most qualified and insightful members o f the Jakarta-based 
foreign press corps, achieved was to frighten other journalists seeking the truth about the 
Indonesian military and the militia's brutal role in East Timor over the past weeks.
But his death was just part o f  an ongoing fear campaign to demonstrate that despite the 
democratic face o f the post- Soeharto Indonesian Government, the authoritarian forces o f the 
military still hold the real power and they have no intention o f letting it go.J"
Indonesian newspapers took a different view which may be represented in this way: 
first, INTERFET should be held responsible for Sander’s death as INTERFET was 
responsible for security in East Timor.400 Second, as tragic it may seem, Sander’s 
death was the result of the risks of being in conflict area such as East Timor.401
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The Indonesian military (TNI) also rejected the allegations that they were involved 
with Sander Thoenes’s killing. TNI spokesman, Major General Sudradjat stated that 
TNI was not involved with the killing.402 In the end, an impression of ‘TNI versus the 
world’ could not be avoided.
Following the discussion and analysis above, there are several tentative conclusions 
that can be drawn from analysis using Robert Entman’s model. The conclusions are:
• The Robert Entman model does provide a systematic approach in analysing 
frames. Though the emphasis may be in quantifying the data, this model has 
allowed for a more systematic model of analysis.
• From this model, a new picture regarding Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers reports on East Timor (in this case focused on Sander Thoenes’s 
death) has emerged.
• Australian and Indonesian newspapers seem to present their reports based 
upon their different understanding and representation of the situation. The 
understandings are derived mainly from the experiences of the members of 
the press (the journalists) as members of their own society (Australian or 
Indonesian).
• The reports were framed close to the frame that was thought to be best 
understood by each society. As the two societies are inherently different, the 
reports and frames were different as well.
Robert Entman’s model, although systematic, is, however, not considered adequate 
enough to generate a thorough understanding of Australian and Indonesian media
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practices during East Timor crisis in 1999. Thus, it is deemed necessary that further 
analysis is conducted using a more comprehensive approach. As such, the next 
analysis is based upon the model from Peter White, which relies on a completely 
different approach in analysing the news.
4.2.2. Peter White’s model of analysis.
Peter White’s analytical model depends on linking semantic elements of 
newsworthiness in news reports.403. He argues that within the narrative of news 
reports lies a hidden message.404
According to White, newspaper reports on the East Timor crisis fall into the ‘hard 
news category. White defined ‘hard news’ as reports that are typically associated 
with eruptive violence, reversals of fortune and socially significant breaches of the 
moral order.405 White argues that by analysing the generic structure, a mode of textual 
organisation unique to mass media which gives ‘hard news’ its textual 
distinctiveness, the hidden meaning can be uncovered.406 Thus in White’s opinion 
‘hard news’ is no longer an ‘objective, neutral and impersonal’ mode of meaning 
making. Instead, ‘hard news’ reports acts to construct and naturalise a model of 
political stability, morality and normalcy.407
There are two points to be analysed here based on White’s method: newsworthiness 
and the voice of the ‘hard news’ reporter. Newsworthiness is based upon how much 
the story shows a breach of normalcy, morality and social order. The second element
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for analysis is what White refers to as ‘the voice of the ‘hard news’ reporter’. White 
argues that the myth of ‘hard news’ reports being always identical with ‘objectivity’ 
and neutrality is not true. News reports are human artefacts. Historically situated 
reporters are very much influenced by various factors such as their culture, political 
values and morality.
Therefore even when the reporters are writing the hard news as it unravels, the 
reporters whether knowingly or unknowingly are influenced by many factors ‘beyond 
the simple facts’ of the event if we put it that way. Thus, news reports, even if they 
are ‘hard news’ reports, will be based on how the reporters perceived the situation. In 
other words, the reporters will always reports news as they ‘see it’.
4.2.2.I. Newsworthiness.
According to White, breaches of normalcy or social order can be classified into three 
categories: aberrant damage, power relations and normative breach. Aberrant damage 
relates to physical damages such as the tsunami disaster of 2004. The more physical 
damage the more newsworthy the event.408
Power relations are linked to anything that is ‘unusual’ in the world of politics, and 
political scandals are a ready source of interest. Again the more unusual the event, the 
more news worthy the event. The last category is a normative breach which relates 
with any breach with established norms, values or culture (White, 1997). White 
demonstrates in his paper that the three categories are not mutually exclusive. There
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are many events that may contain the elements of two or more categories. An 
example is the reports on Tsunami disaster in Aceh on December 26, 2004, where the 
enormity of the physical damage caused by the tsunami led over time to political 
scandals associated with the misuse of aid funds and scandals associated with 
paedophile gangs preying on displaced children.
Furthermore, the Aceh tsunami disaster news items can easily be categorized as 
aberrant damage due to the level of destruction that was caused. But as the events 
unfolded, there are stories about the Free Aceh Movement continuing rebellion in the 
same area. The rebellion stories lent the disaster a political side and even a normative 
breach as stories of the ongoing conflict came out. Therefore in this thesis, White's 
categorisation will be use as a directive rather than mutually exclusive categorisation.
During East Timor crisis in 1999, both Indonesian and Australian print press treated 
the issue as a very important issue. In total, Indonesian newspapers published 917 
articles within the time frame of this study.409 This is compared to 763 articles 
published by Australian newspapers during the same period.410 Arguably the number 
of articles published shows the relative importance of the crisis to both sides. On 
average, Indonesian newspapers studied, published around four articles per-day, and 
Australian newspapers published around six articles daily. The numbers may look 
relatively small especially for Indonesian newspapers. Nevertheless it is important to 
remember the context here. We can re-state the average as an article every day over a 
two month period. The point here is that the numbers show a continuing pattern of 
interest by the newspapers regarding a specific issue.
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The issue itself had significance beyond Australia and Indonesia. The East Timor 
crisis is a crisis beyond the boundary of East Timor itself. The crisis brought in 
various countries as the UN was officially involved. In summary, the general issue of 
East Timor in the context of Indonesia’s interest and Indonesia’s relations with other 
countries are newsworthy enough. In this analysis, however, drawing on Peter 
White’s theory, the focus of newsworthiness is not linked to generalities. What this 
research will focus on is the newsworthiness of specific issues raised by certain 
articles. In the topic of Sander Thoenes’s death, the issue here is why Thoenes’s death 
was considered newsworthy enough to be covered in the manner outlined above.
White argues that how the press choose certain issues is not a random process, but is 
related to how society works.411 White argues that there is a persistent general norm 
of how and why certain issues will be valued more ‘newsworthy’ than other issues “. 
As a general guide, White emphasises that the factor that may raise the value of the 
story is related to how much the story shows a breach of normalcy, morality and 
social order. It is important to note here that White, like Entman, believes that news is 
part of the social construction of reality. His method provides a way of getting below 
the skin of ‘ordinary’ news reports to show how the reports can be analysed as part of 
a process of creating social reality.
To return to the case under consideration here, each article will be analysed in terms 
of what it was that made the issue newsworthy within that article. The main rationale 
is that although each newspaper may have a different standard of newsworthiness, the
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fact that they choose this issue shows a similar interest. But paradoxically, the 
similarity of interest is probably no indicator of overlap between the papers. This 
analysis aims to show just what aspect of Thoenes’s death it was that really raised the 
interest of all newspapers.
4.2.2.1. The Australian Articles.
At a glance The Australian reports seem to focus on the core of the tragedy -  the
death of Sander Thoenes. Thoenes’s death was described as ‘tragic’. The reporter
portrayed the ‘tragedy’ in a wealth of personal detail, drawing attention to the
journalist’s youth and bodily presence.413
He was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock o f blond hair, seated astride a 
motorcycle speeding along Dili's seafront.
Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill o f journalistic 
adventure.
It came to an end on the dusty verge o f a road in Becora, one o f Dili's many bloodstained 
neighbourhoods.
When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn't easy to recognise.
This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet 
through his head and an ear severed by a knife — a gruesome memento for the killers.414
The details serve to portray the tragedy as how the reporters see it. Most readers 
probably never heard of Sander Thoenes before. Now the reporter here tried his best 
to describe Thoenes in detail. The reporter gives attention to the contrast between 
Sander’s vitality before his death, and his cruelly mutilated body when he died.
White argues that newsworthiness is related to the social order.413 If the issue reported 
is related to breaches or normalcy, social order or law -  then the more newsworthy 
the story will be. In this story Thoenes was described by the reporter as a young,
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bright and Caucasian journalist who died in the line of duty. The emphasis on the 
details was not without its cultural associations or reasons. The focus on the before 
and after reminds us of the broken column monuments in many Australian towns 
which signify young men ‘cut down’ before their time in war.
The article above presents a breach of the first type: Thoenes was a Caucasian
journalist. Being a foreigner, physically and mentally he stood out and his sheer
presence fits with White concept of a breach of normalcy. How can a European man,
a foreign journalist and someone who has no direct interest with the chaotic situation,
become a victim of this conflict? The description was presented in the first sentence:
He was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock o f blond hair, seated astride a 
motorcycle speeding along Dili's seafront.
A second breach is related to the assumption that he was murdered -  someone 
deliberately killed him. A murder, any kind of murder is a fundamental breach of law. 
Even then, Thoenes’s death is represented as a kind of double tragedy as Thoenes was 
cut down doing what he was professionally engaged to do:
Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill o f journalistic 
adventure.
The sentence above emphasises that he was a journalist killed while doing his work. 
A professional journalist killed in the line of duty; a young and enthusiastic journalist 
who died while doing his job. The article continues to highlight this aspect.
It came to an end on the dusty verge o f  a road in Becora, one o f Dili's many bloodstained 
neighbourhoods.
When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn't easy to recognise.
This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, had a bullet 
through his head and an ear severed by a knife -  a gruesome memento for the killers.
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The paragraphs above describe how Thoenes looked when his body was found -  shot 
and mutilated. When a person is killed, it is a clear breach of law and social order or 
normalcy. In Indonesian law (recall that East Timor at the time was still under 
Indonesian rules), a murder is a breach of criminal law and carries the death penalty if 
proven. A murder which involves severe actions such as mutilation is considered as 
something vile. The article did not state whether Thoenes died because of shooting (it 
was said that there was a bullet wound) or due to mutilation. The emphasis on 
mutilation is to show how violent Thoenes’s death was. The death of Sander Thoenes 
here was described in detail in a way which emphasised violent death, death caused 
by very violent actions done deliberately. This is not a death caused by an accidents, 
which is already a tragedy but this is caused by people who intended to inflict 
violence to another person. This analysis reveals that the report emphasises that a 
Caucasian journalist was killed while doing his job. His death was not a regular death 
but a violent one, a very violent one in fact. Thus the death of Sander Thoenes is 
beyond normal expectations. It was a tragedy caused by very violent act.
Beyond the words, there are other points to be made. The emphasis on Sander’s looks 
which could be simply read as a general description of him as a lively person, could 
also be interpreted as marking a distinction - Sander as foreigner, a European with the 
local populations. The details in the description strongly describe him as a Caucasian, 
a European; tall and blonde. In comparison indigenous East Timorese are smaller, 
have dark skin and dark eyes as do most Indonesians.
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The physical distinction here serves as a reminder that Sander Thoenes is a Caucasian 
and a European, a foreigner in East Timor. But such reminders bring back the 
memory that Sander is part of the same race that used to colonise East Timor and 
Indonesia, the Caucasian European. Presenting such details can be seen as an act of 
orientalism, reminding that Europeans used to rule this area and now one of them has 
fallen victim to their former subordinates.
Edward Said argues that the term and description of ‘Orient’ or the east and eastern 
societies, is the opposite term of ‘Occident’ which refers to the Western society.416 In 
this context, the description of Sander’ physical traits and his origins was highlighting 
the facts that Sander came from a different society and race, a race that less than a 
century ago used to colonise the very same area. Now this man from the former 
colonizer country was found brutally murdered, re-emphasises prejudices about the 
barbarism that is still apparently part of the former colony.
This interpretation of the article is based upon the idea from White that a news story 
often reflects the society’s perception of normalcy.417 For the news media, the bigger 
the breach of the normalcy, the better it will be as news. Applying that concept here, 
the description of Sander as a tall, white, blonde European reflects more than physical 
traits, and goes beyond describing how the body looked after it was found. It can be 
read as a constructed message saying that a person coming from high standard of 
civilisation was cut down by a brutal and barbaric act.
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Read this way, the report seems to suggest that Sander Thoenes did not deserve the
brutal end partly because he was part of the European race. The article was not meant
to be racist by any means, but the implied meaning derived from the emphasis on the
physical presence of Sander reflects heavily on the concept of orientalism. Again, in
orientalism as Edward Said asserted, the Western perception of Eastern society and
culture derived from its own fallacy of a superior society and culture.
Being a fellow journalist, I feel sad with the tragic death o f Sander Thoenes. First time I heard 
about it was when I was monitoring the news agencies (while working for T h e I n d o n e s ia n  
O b s e r v e r ) .  For Indonesian journalists, a fellow journalist in the field a mix between 
competitor and brothers in arms. So hearing about the death o f one o f us, is a big tragedy for 
us.
Nevertheless, I still can not understand even today, why the death o f Sander Thoenes can be 
so important, while other Indonesian journalists who had similar tragic fate in East Timor 
such as Agus Mulyawan, did not received similar attention in the media. Reading how the 
Australian media described Sander as a fellow Caucasian made me wonder if the old beliefs 
in Indonesia about westerner being always more important than an average Indonesian is still 
true or not.418
4.2.2.2. The Sydney Morning Herald Article
The Sydney Morning Herald described Sander Thoenes’s death as tragic but as part of 
greater conspiracy done by militias and Indonesian military. Indeed The Sydney 
Morning Herald story was more direct in naming Thoenes killers.
Several days before he was killed in East Timor, Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes discussed 
concerns he had about the black operations being conducted behind the public face o f the 
Indonesian Government and military. He was concerned about the violence and death that a 
power struggle among the Indonesian elite would bring to East Timor.
His own life ended tragically on the outskirts o f the East Timorese capital, Dili, his killers 
dressed in Indonesian military uniforms, his young body mutilated by his killers.
His death, some believe, was part o f the bigger picture he had been talking about with friends: 
the use o f terror, intimidation and the provocation o f violence to promote the political 
interests o f the Indonesian military and to maintain the status quo.
What killing Sander, one o f the most qualified and insightful members o f the Jakarta-based 
foreign press corps, achieved was to frighten other journalists seeking the truth about the 
Indonesian military and the militia's brutal role in East Timor over the past weeks.
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But his death was just part o f  an ongoing fear campaign to demonstrate that despite the 
democratic face o f  the post- Soeharto Indonesian Government, the authoritarian forces o f the 
military still hold the real power and they have no intention o f letting it go.
What East Timor represents to the Indonesian military is an unacceptable international 
humiliation. To that end public opinion in Indonesia is being manipulated to criticise 
Australia's role in the peacekeeping force and sow fear among Australians in Jakarta and other 
parts o f  Indonesia.
The attackers, allegedly Indonesian soldiers, who murdered Sander Thoenes cut his ear and 
took it away as some sort o f  bizarre souvenir.
The 30-year-old Dutch journalist thought it was safe enough to take a ride late on Tuesday on 
the back o f  a motorbike through the Dili suburb o f Becora, a one-time independence 
stronghold that is now a wasteland.
We all had a false sense o f  security, after seeing hundreds o f  heavily armed Australian troops 
arriving in the devastated capital o f East Timor, and hearing from INTERFET commander 
Major-General Peter Cosgrove about the co-operation o f the Indonesian military, or TNI.
The Sydney Morning Herald did not portray Sander Thoenes as a Caucasian journalist 
as prominently as The Australian, but only identified Thoenes as a Dutch Journalist. 
In this article he was portrayed as a journalist killed in his line of duty as a result of 
some sinister political conspiracy.
What is considered as newsworthy here first is Thoenes’s death. The Sydney Morning 
Herald article clearly saw his death as a tragedy, but there is more to Sander’s death 
than this because it was a violent, deliberate act of murder. The second newsworthy 
aspect is Thoenes’s death is allegedly caused by a political conspiracy.419 Thoenes 
was killed because certain people wanted to keep their interests in East Timor. From 
this point of view, Thoenes’s death breached all aspects described by White:
normalcy, social order and political ethics.420
Several days before he was killed in East Timor, Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes discussed 
concerns he had about the black operations being conducted behind the public face o f the 
Indonesian Government and military. He was concerned about the violence and death that a 
power struggle among the Indonesian elite would bring to East Timor.
His own life ended tragically on the outskirts o f the East Timorese capital, Dili, his killers 
dressed in Indonesian military uniforms, his young body mutilated by his killers.
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The attackers, allegedly Indonesian soldiers, who murdered Sander Thoenes cut his ear and 
took it away as some sort o f bizarre souvenir.
The 30-year-old Dutch journalist thought it was safe enough to take a ride late on Tuesday on 
the back o f a motorbike through the Dili suburb o f Becora, a one-time independence 
stronghold that is now a wasteland.
We all had a false sense o f  security, after seeing hundreds o f  heavily armed Australian troops 
arriving in the devastated capital o f  East Timor, and hearing from INTERFET commander 
Major-General Peter Cosgrove about the co-operation o f  the Indonesian military, or TNI.
The Sydney Morning Herald report, like the The Australian article, emphasised 
Sander’s violent death, and confirmed the kinds of wounds found on his body.421.
4.2.2.3. Media Indonesia article
Media Indonesia presents Thoenes’s death in a more complicated manner. Thoenes’s 
death, though mentioned in the headline, was not elaborated clearly in the body of the 
article.
Situasi Dili semakin Tegang -  Wartawan ‘The Financial Times’ Dibunuh.
(Situation in Dili is tense -  ‘The Financial Times ’ journalist killed)
Media Indonesia -  September 23, 1999.
In anticipation o f such situation all journalists that were working in Dili were evacuated to 
KOREM haeadquaters, especially after there was threat to the dozens o f Indonesians 
journalists still in Dili that they will be killed following the death o f foreign journalist, 
Sandler Toenes { s i c ) ,  30 from the The Financial Times. After being threatened, all Indonesian 
journalists that worked in Dili will be lifted out to Jakarta via Kupang.
From Jakarta, the reaction o f the death o f the foreign journalist immediately received various 
comments from different sides. Miniter o f Defence/TNI Commander General Wiranto said 
that he had not received the formal reports o f death o f a foreign journalist in East Timor.
“Ive heard about the news and I shall check who is involved, why and how it happened. Of 
course we have to wait for reports,” he said before attending a limited cabinet meeting at Bina 
Graha, Jakarta, on Wednesday.
Meanwhile the head o f TNI information center, Major General Sudrajat said that the 
allegation o f the involvement o f TNI personnel’ in the murder case o f the journalist -  Sander 
Thoenes in East Timor, is an unfair allegation, tendentious, had no foundation and was a 
provocative action.
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“Armed Forces’s spokesman Major General Sudradjat said that the accusation about TNI 
personnel’s involvement in the death o f  Sander Toenes in East Timor is an unfair, tendentious 
accusation, has no foundation and is a provocative act,” said the TNI spokesperson to 
reporters at the TNI headquarters in Jalan Merdeka Barat, Wednesday evening.
Then who is responsible for the death o f  the journalist in East Timor, is it TNI or INTERFET? 
A few senior journalists in Jakarta that were contacted by A N T A R A  on Wednesday said the 
international troops for East Timor (INTERFET) are responsible for the security o f all 
journalists that are doing their journalistic work in East Timor. This is because the UN 
sanctioned troops are in control now o f  the security in the area,
“As an international force, INTERFET should have protected the journalists in area o f armed 
conflict,” said Dja’far Assegaf, C hief o f  Editors at the M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia  daily.
A similar opinion was voiced by Pami Hardi, General Manager o f  ANTARA news agency 
and the R e p u b l ik a  daily. The former secretary general o f  PWI asserted that INTERFET 
should give maximum protection so all journalists regardless o f  their nationalities, can do 
their journalistic work safely.
Professor Loebby Luqman, a criminal law expert who is close with journalists also made a 
similar comment. Loebby asserted that INTERFET should be responsible for the security 
situation including giving protection to journalists who are doing their duty in the armed 
conflict areas. This is because the control o f  East Timor is now fully under the Australian led 
international force.
Meanwhile, the Head o f  the National Human Rights commission, Marzuki Drusman, hoped 
that the stabilisation actions that now are being conducted by the international force should 
have created justice and equality to all Indonesian citizens in East T im or.422
The Media Indonesia article did not mention how Sander Thoenes was killed -  unlike 
the Australian newspapers. Instead, Media Indonesia put more emphasis on the 
political discourse regarding who was responsible for Thoenes’s death.
Within White’s theory, the questioning of who is responsible still comes within the 
concept of normalcy or social order breach. Nevertheless, the emphasis in the article 
is not on who is directly responsible but more on who is ‘politically’ responsible.
The article quoted several Indonesian press officials who stated that the responsibility 
for Thoenes’s death lies with INTERFET. This contradicts the Australian newspaper
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articles that put the blame on the perpetrators who were (allegedly) men in Indonesian 
military uniforms.
An important note as part of newsworthiness is the term used in the headline: 
4Wartawan Asing\ ‘Wartawan asing’ means ‘foreign journalist’ in Indonesian 
language. But it is significant that this term was used in headlines and yet was not 
elaborated in the article. The point here is that the article simply wanted to state a 
foreign journalist was killed. This is the significant part of the article -  the 
newsworthy part. The fact that the article did not elaborate more in the body of the 
article indicates that the main message was simply that a foreign journalist was killed 
in East Timor.
4.2.2.3. Republika article.
The Republika daily perceived the newsworthiness of Thoenes’s death again as the 
death of foreign journalist but also placed the responsibility for the death on 
INTERFET. Within the article, Republika published details of the wounds found on 
his body.
The pressure is on for the INTERFET to take responsibility for the death o f British newspaper 
-  T h e  F in a n c ia l  T im e s  ’ journalist, Sandler Thoenes (sic). The 30 year old Dutch Journalist 
who has been assigned in Jakarta for two years, was found dead in Becora village, Dili. 
Declared missing since Tuesday (21/9), Thoenes’s body was found yesterday in bad condition 
with slash wounds in the heads and other parts o f his body.
The death o f Thoenes has sparked acts o f  revenge from the pro-independence group. 
Yesterday, around 10 Indonesian journalists had reportedly being threatened to be killed by 
the pro-independence group.
The death o f Thoenes was confirmed by the F in a n c ia l  T im e s  ’s  Public Relation manager, 
Anoushka Healy. She expressed their deep condolences for the tragedy that killed their 
correspondent. “We feel very surprised and shocked. Especially after we heard the statement 
from the witnesses that said that Thoenes was deliberately shot to death”.
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Anouska admitted that she can not comment more about this incident. “We”, she said, “are 
still gathering further information on how Thoenes was killed. After that, we will make the 
decision on what are we going to do. Are we going to send condemnation to Indonesian 
government or take other steps”.42j
Within the headline, Republika use the term ‘wartawan asing’ in referring to Thoenes. 
When a foreigner is killed during a conflict in Indonesia, obviously it becomes 
something beyond normalcy or social order.
4.2.2.4. Suara Pembaruan article.
Suara Pembaruan, like the other newspapers perceived Thoenes’s tragic death to be 
the main issue. The headline stated directly that a Financial Times journalist was 
killed with slash wounds. The headline, like the headline of other Indonesian 
newspaper reports, clearly shows that the newsworthy issue here is the death of this 
journalist. Nevertheless, unlike the other two newspapers (.Republika and Media 
Indonesia), Suara Pembaruan did not use the term “Wartawan Asing” in the 
headline.
Headlines which included the phrase ‘Wartawan Asing’ made the foreignness of the 
journalist the key point. The term foreigner is deliberately used to show that the 
person killed -  the victim, is not a local -  not an Indonesian (the East Timorese at that 
time were often considered as ‘Indonesian’ by general public). By emphasizing the 
‘foreign’ aspect in the article, the other Indonesian newspapers created the impression 
of the involvement of outside parties. In Sociology the term use is: ‘Us’ and Them . 
‘Us’ refers to anyone considered as part one ‘our group’ -  part of one s society.
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Them refers to those who are outside our group’ — anyone who does not belong to
our group.
Suara Pembai uan s usage of the unqualified term ‘Wartawan’ in its article shows a 
different perception compared to other Indonesian newspapers. Without emphasizing 
the word Asing , Suara Pembaruan placed more emphasis onto who is this person 
that was killed in Dili — by implication signifying that it was just another ‘wartawan’ 
or journalist.
The Commander o f  the Military Emergency area in East Timor, Major General Kiki 
Syahnakri when asked by journalists acknowledged the killing o f that journalist, said “It is 
correct that there was one journalist who was killed on Tuesday night. That journalist was 
killed by slash wounds”.
Indeed the Suara Pembaruan clearly identified who Thoenes was. The name and the 
nationality of Sander Thoenes clearly shows that he was not a local (Indonesian). So 
it was clear that he was a foreigner and yet Suara Pembaruan did not choose to 
highlight that in its headline.
4.2.2.5. The ‘voice’ of the reporter.
The second variable in White’s model is the ‘voice’ of the reporter. Inevitably during 
the writing of the news report, the ‘voice’ of the reporter will be ‘heard’ or will be 
visible in reports.424 This ‘voice’ is actually the ‘subjective’ perception of the reporter 
which is inscribed and transferred into the news reports. The thinking behind this 
concept is that news reporting is not about an objective perception. Instead it is 
ultimately the subjective perception of the reporters that are later transferred into 
news reports.
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In this section the analysis will be focused on the ‘voice’ of the reporter itself in 
presenting the news of Sander Thoenes’s death. The aim is to see how the reporters 
position themselves within the news reports that they produced. Thus, we hopefully 
can see how the reporter is reflected in reports of the incident.
The reports of the Indonesian journalists were significantly detailed and thorough 
although the specific details of the incident were not as detailed as in the Australian 
newspapers articles. The immediate perception, as we discovered using Robert 
Entman’s model of analysis, is of a tragic incident but nothing more than a common 
criminal incident. In their reports the Indonesian newspapers researched in this study 
presented Sander’s death through the commentaries of Indonesian public officials. 
The articles are reproduced here again for convenience with the officials identified in 
bold.
The Commander of the Military Emergency area in East Timor, Major General Kiki 
Syahnakri when asked by journalists acknowledged the killing o f that journalist, said “It is 
correct that there was one journalist who was killed on Tuesday night. That journalist was 
killed by slash wounds”. S u a r a  P e m b a r u a n .
The commander o f  military emergency in East Timor Major General Kiki Syahnakri 
confirmed the death o f  The Financial Times journalist. But he could not explain the caused o f  
the death. Kiki rejects the foreign press reports that Thoenes died after armed contact between 
TNI and armed gangs. -  R e p u b l ik a .
Armed Forces’s spokesman Major General Sudradjat said that the accusation about TNI 
personnel were involved in the death o f  Sander Toenes in East Timor is an unfair, tendentious 
accusation, has no foundation and a provocative act.
From Jakarta, the reaction o f  the death o f  the foreign journalist immediately received various 
comments from different sides. Minister of Defence/TNI Commander General Wiranto 
said that he has not received the formal reports o f  death o f  a foreign journalist in East Timor. 
-  M e d i a  I n d o n e s ia .
In the Indonesian newspapers, the ‘voice’ of the reporters was considerably 
‘detached’ or impersonal. As shown in the Entman analysis, there was no personal
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identification by Indonesian reporters towards Thoenes. Indeed, Thoenes was 
identified as a fellow journalist but there was no emotional sign from Indonesian 
reporters in reporting Sander Thoenes’s death. As it was described earlier, Sander 
Thoenes’s death was represented as a criminal case which might be expected in a 
conflict area such as East Timor in 1999.
Australian newspapers perceived Sander Thoenes’s death in a different way from the 
Indonesian newspapers. Australian newspapers, both The Australian and The Sydney 
Morning Herald, presented the loss of Sander Thoenes as a personal loss. Both 
newspapers, fondly described him in intimate detail, revealing a level of closeness 
that might exist among friends.423
The Australian article details Sander Thoenes’s physical characteristics which were 
later contrasted with the description of his lifeless body. Even more moving is the 
impression created that the reporters from The Australian and The Sydney Morning 
Herald knew Sander Thoenes personally as they were all stationed in Indonesia.
In such a context, it is understandable that the dominant tone of The Australian and 
The Sydney Morning Herald articles was sadness, tragedy and anger. Sander Thoenes 
was a friend and colleague of these Australian journalists. His death was very sudden 
and violent which motivates the strong sense of sympathy among his friends and 
colleagues.
In early in the year 2000, my faculty had a guest from Russia. A professor in communication 
was visiting Indonesia in cooperation with an NGO -  INTERNEWS. After the public lecture, 
the professor was having a chat with the faculty staff including me. His first question was 
about Sander Thoenes.
174
Apprarently this Professor knew Thoenes personally back in Moscow when Sander was 
assigned there. Now in Jakarta, this professor made it his personal mission to ask around 
whether anyone knew why and how Sander Thoenes was killed. At that time, I didn’t tell him 
that my close friend, Melvin Singh had known Sander Thoenes and knew a bit about the 
circumstances o f  his death.426
Sander Thoenes was young journalists with apparently many friends. His death was a 
great loss. But the way his death was presented brought out the differences between 
Australian and Indonesian representation of events. For the Australian newspaper 
journalists, Sander Thoenes was a close friend and a colleague.427 His death was a 
personal loss for the journalists and it was presented as such. Along with the loss, 
comes the anger and that may be what provided the background to why the Australian 
papers tended to immediately accuse the Indonesian military as being the responsible 
party for Sander Thoenes’s death.
For the Indonesian newspaper journalists the issue was different. The situation in East 
Timor in 1999 was of a conflict area where the risk to one’s life was real, and that 
also applied to journalists. While many foreign journalists were threatened or even 
beaten by the pro-integration supporters, many Indonesian journalists were also 
seriously injured in shooting incidents. Indonesian journalist Agus Mulayawan was 
killed approximately at the same time of Sander Thoenes’s death. Nevertheless, 
Agus’ death was not reported in any Australian newspaper.
Sander Thoenes death for Indonesian journalists was a tragic incident but understood 
as part of the risk in reporting in East Timor during such volatile conditions. The 
voice of the Indonesian reporter was an impersonal, official report of a murder. The 
tone employed was very similar to plain murder reports in Indonesian newspapers.
175
The only thing that made Thoenes’ death significant was the fact he was a foreigner, a 
foreign journalist.
At the end of the day, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented their own 
perception of Sander Thoenes’s death. Both country’s newspapers represented the 
events in ways that reflected their knowledge, personal relations, involvement or 
distance from Thoenes. But in the end, the reporters’ voices represented reality in 
ways that reveal differences between Australian and Indonesian reporters’ culture, 
values and standards.
4.2.3. Gadi Wolfsfeld’s analytic model.
As described earlier in this chapter, the analysis here will be conducted relying on the 
model devised by Gadi Wolfsfeld. Wolfsfeld, like Entman and White relies on the 
concept of ‘framing’ in news reports. The main difference is the context of the frame 
itself in which the frame is being analysed.
In Wolfsfeld’s model of analysis, news is part of the bigger context of political 
conflict.428 Woflsfeld argues that during political conflict, where two parties are 
fighting over influence over the general public, the news media functions as the main 
arena.429 What Wolfsfeld means is that news media become center stage, the main 
venue where conflicting parties attack and counter attack each other in order to win 
political power over the public.430
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During the East Timor crisis in 1999 as researched in this thesis, what happened was 
exactly what Wolfsfeld described: two parties (Australia and Indonesia) were fighting 
over political influence through the news media. In the context of this thesis, 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers can be understood as the main arena where 
conflicting parties from Australia and Indonesia continue to fight for political 
dominance. This part of the analysis is to examine how and who benefits from the 
political conflict played out in the media, with particular reference to reporting of 
Sander Thoenes’s death.
In Chapter 2, it was suggested that Wolfsfeld’s model is marked by two basic 
questions: who are the good guys and how were similar issues covered in the past? 
The two questions are basic guides against which the frames can be analysed. That is 
what this part of the analysis is going to do. But unlike the previous part, there will be 
no singular analysis of each newspaper; instead the analysis will be conducted in 
unison.
Answering the first question: who are the good guys, we need to refer back the 
content of the articles. For both Indonesian and Australian newspapers, at a glance, 
the good guy is similar: Sander Thoenes. Sander Thoenes is hailed as a victim of a 
bloody conflict, something perhaps surprisingly, on which both Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers agree. But there the similarity stopped.
Australian newspapers, as shown during the previous analysis, tend to portray Sander 
Thoenes as a martyr, a hero among foreign journalists. Sander Thoenes was perceived
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as a close friend and valuable colleague, and his death was a major loss. Sander’s 
death was also portrayed as the cynical evidence of a cruel covert campaign by 
Indonesian military in East Timor.
Indonesian newspapers perceived Sander Thoenes’s death as a tragedy but, 
represented it as part of the risk of reporting in a conflict area. Sander’s death was 
understood as similar to other numerous reported deaths during the time -  mostly 
East Timorese. Sander’s death was regrettably, nothing more than one more criminal 
act that happened in East Timor at the time. Thus it was reported as it is -  a criminal 
act.
Speaking with foreign journalists like Ben Bohane and Melvin Singh, I never ceased to be 
amazed on how these people have challenged death in some o f their assignments. But as a 
journalist, when you are on assignment, we often ceased to think about anything else but our 
task at hand. The late Mark Worth, during one o f his reports about the conflict in 
Bougainville, PNG -  was shot at. He had the shooting, including the sound o f the bullet 
passing through very near his head, in his footage which he ended up using in his 
documentary. It really adds to the reality o f  working on the field.
But for most Indonesian journalists, we know that we were badly covered by our employees, 
if we were covered at all. My newspaper, T h e  I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r ,  did not cover me for 
doing field reporting. Meaning if  something happened to me, it will be fully my own risk 
while the risk is very real. A colleague o f  mine, Sayuti o f M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia  was shot in the 
stomach during riots in 1998. He managed to drive himself to the nearest hospital only to 
collapse right in front o f  the emergency unit. Hidayat (former T e m p o )  told me that after the 
shooting, Sayuti was quite traumatised.4̂ 1
Covering conflict areas in Indonesia is always difficult. Unlike other areas in the 
world, conflicts in Indonesia are often horizontal conflict, meaning conflict between 
different local groups. Also, these horizontal conflicts are often very bloody. For most 
Indonesian journalists, working under such conditions and without proper legal and 
financial protection are the conditions they have to endure almost everyday. The 
presence of numerous media observers after the fall of New Order regime highlighted
. . . • 432
those hazardous conditions, but violence towards Indonesian journalists continues.
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In defining the good guys, both Australian and Indonesian newspapers agreed that 
Sander Thoenes was the good guy. But in terms of how the good guy was 
represented, the similarity stopped. There are two contradicting general frames 
promoted here. Australian newspapers presented a frame of tragedy. Sander 
Thoenes’s death is a tragic result of a sinister conspiracy. On the other hand, 
Indonesian newspapers were promoting a frame of emergency condition: the situation 
in East Timor had escalated beyond control and now a foreign journalist was killed. 
So for the Australian newspapers, Sander’s death was due to deliberate action. For 
Indonesian newspapers, Thoenes was simply at the wrong place and at the wrong 
time.
Now we will try to answer the second question of the Wolfsfeld model; how was this 
story presented in the past? For Australian newspapers, the closest event to Sander 
Thoenes’s death involved five journalists working for the Australian media who were 
killed in East Timor in December 1975. During Indonesia’s invasion, the five 
journalists were killed when they were trying to cover the invasion in the town called 
Balibo. Like Sander Thoenes, the details of these journalists’ death were sketchy and 
the perpetrators were never fully known.433
Indonesian newspapers did not make any reference to any previous incident in their 
reporting. This does not necessarily mean that violence against Indonesian journalists 
had never happened before. Hendro Subroto, a journalist for Indonesia’s state 
television, TVRI, was seriously wounded from gun shots during the Indonesian
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invasion in 1975. In 1999, prior to the referendum, two Indonesians working for
different news media were shot and seriously injured. But again, Indonesian
journalists may perceive the situation differently.
Australian journalist, Ben Bohane told me that for independent journalists like him, covering 
conflict areas is full o f  risk. The key issue is how to minimize the risk while maintaining their 
independence. During the East Timor crisis in 1999, Ben deliberately entered East Timor 
without organising credentials with the INTERFET. For him, working independently which 
means living among the locals, gave him more security than embedding himself with 
INTERFET.
Nevertheless, Ben conceded that the mainstream Australian news media needed the protection 
and support o f the INTERFET. For instance the television journalists may need access to 
electricity and satellite links provided by INTERFET. Independent journalists like Ben were 
required to send their stories according to a much less demanding schedule which in turn 
allowed them to be more independent.4̂ 4
From Wolfsfeld model, we can see that Australian and Indonesian newspapers 
promoted different frames. The frame promoted by Australian newspapers was in line 
with the general frame promoted by Australian newspapers: an emergency situation 
existed in East Timor due to Indonesian military campaign, and required Australia to 
come and rescue the East Timorese. Thus Australian newspaper reports about Sander 
Thoenes’s death were consistent with the general perception and representation of 
Australian newspapers regarding East Timor crisis in 1999. For the general frame and 
more in depth analysis regarding it, please see Chapter 6 and 7.
Indonesian newspapers promoted a different frame; simply tragedy. This is also 
consistent with the general frame on the East Timor crisis in 1999 as promoted by 
Indonesian newspapers: the chaos and destruction is regrettable but such is the reality 
of this conflict. This frame is similar to the frame promoted by the Indonesian 
government that the East Timor crisis is simply a tragedy and all the destruction was 
due to a horizontal conflict between factions and groups in East Timor.
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The frames promoted by Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding Sander 
Thoenes’s death are thus consistent with the general frames promoted by Australian 
and Indonesian governments about the conflict in East Timor. This means that the 
newspapers from both countries were actually in line with official frames promoted 
by both governments. Sander Thoenes’s death was, in the end, just a means to 
reinforce a version of events which was in line with official framing of the conflict.
Nevertheless, this does not conclusively mean that Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers were acting simply as the mouthpiece for their own governments. The 
deeper frames contained within the reports may suggest something else. For instance, 
the Australian media were often accused by the Indonesian government of taking a 
partisan or adversarial position towards them.4j3 The Australian media on the other 
hand, perceived the Indonesian government as uncooperative and very closed. On top 
of that the general tendency of news media to focus on negative aspects of events 
(being newsworthy) amplified the animosity between the Indonesian government and 
the Australian media in general. Barry Lowe writes about what he described as ‘the 
Australian media’s construction’.
But [the Australian media’s] construction o f Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is 
weighted heavily on the downside o f  life in the life o f  those countries. It describes these 
countries as appearing to falter in their quest for modernity, prosperity and brutality, danger 
and disappointment. The negative news focus may be partly the result o f  habit. Insurgency, 
disasters, repressive politicians and sleaze have been loud themes in International news media 
coverage o f  South East Asia for decades. It seems difficult for media gate keepers to refocus 
on other issues. The innate conservatism o f  news production practice determines that they 
keep doing things the traditional way, until they are confronted with compelling reasons to 
look for new issu es.4j6
Thus in the end, what the Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented in their 
reports may have reflected the deeper perception of both countries of each other. It
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was what we might call the PR or framing agility of both governments that made their 
official perception of the East Timor crisis in 1999 influence newspapers perceptions 
of events.
5. Conclusion.
The death of Sander Thoenes was a tragedy and this view is shared by both 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers covering his death. But that is as far as the 
similarities go. Australian and Indonesian newspapers contextualised or framed 
Sander Thoenes’s death in different ways. Australian newspapers perceived 
Thoenes’s death as tragic and part of a covert military campaign. On the other hand, 
Indonesian newspapers perceived Sander’s death as tragic but part of the risk of 
working in conflict area. Subsequently these two different perceptions resulted in 
different frames being promoted by Australian and Indonesian newspapers. 
Surprisingly the frames promoted were in line with official frames promoted by 
Australian and Indonesian government about the crisis in East Timor.
In the next chapter, we shall delve more deeply into the frames analysis and what was 
being promoted by Australian and Indonesian newspapers during East Timor crisis. It 
is felt that the analysis in this chapter based on a single but significant case alone is 
not solid enough to make a thorough conclusion. Therefore further deliberation is 
needed.
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CHAPTER 5
REPRESENTATION OF MEDIA IN POLITICAL CONFLICT: 
THE CASE OF BORDER CROSSING
5.1 . Introduction.
The issue of possible border crossings between Indonesia and East Timor during the 
East Timor crisis is one of the most sensitive issues during the crisis. Sovereignty is 
always a very sensitive issue for most Indonesians especially for those who lived 
through the war of independence between 1945 to 1949. Most Indonesian who 
experienced the war had witnessed a very bloody conflict that had resulted in their 
country’s Independence.
After independence, sovereignty was still an important issue. Almost immediately,
Indonesia had to face a number of rebellions in various areas such as PRRI in
Sumatera, PERMESTA in Sulawesi and RMS in Maluku. The response for it was
swift military actions though at the same period Indonesia was still having serious
political and economic problems. A former army general, Santoso said:
We (Indonesia) had so many rebellions at that time (between 1945 and 1960’s), we (the army) 
dealt with every one o f  them. We (the army) did not even tell the President. Gatot Subroto 
(the ch ief o f  the armed forces at the time) took the initiatives (in swiftly dealing with the 
rebellions).4j7
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Indonesia’s first president, Soekamo was a strong proponent of protecting Indonesia’s 
sovereignty. Soekamo dubbed as the “Mad Doctor”4̂ 8 in Western Countries, did not 
hesitate to do whatever he deemed necessary to defend Indonesian sovereignty. In 
January 1965 he pulled Indonesia out of the United Nations439, declared a 
confrontation with Malaysia in 196 3 440 and challenged the last Dutch bastion in 
Western Papua in 1961.441 The sentiment for Indonesian sovereignty does not solely 
belongs to Soekamo.
My father, a retired army officer who have fought the independence war, always proudly 
remembered how he fought the war. For instance once he took me to a river in the middle o f  
the city o f Surabaya, in East Java and showed me the spot where he exchanged fire with 
British and Dutch troops in November 1945 across the river. Then he took me to the small 
alleys where he was chased by British and Dutch troops later and how bullets were passing 
through near him. I remember seeing the fire in his eyes when he told me the story. 442
After the fall of Soekamo in 1965, the idea of sovereignty continued. The new
president, Soeharto, though much more cautious than Soekamo, kept the idea of
sovereignty alive. During his rule, a systematic ideological system was implemented
and fiercely promoted -  based upon the nation’s ideology: PANCASILA. The central
concept of this ideology is that the idea of united Indonesia is a fact that cannot and
will not be changed at all cost. Soeharto even directed a more elaborate effort to
‘promote’ the PANCASILA as state ideology.
When I entered the University as an undergraduate student in 1988, it was compulsory to all 
new students to go through a month long indoctrination process called: P4 ( P e d o m a n  
P e n g a m a la n  d a n  P e n g h a y a ta n  P a n c a s i la  -  Guides to implement and understand the 
Pancasila). This process went from Monday to Saturday, from 8 AM I till 5 PM. Any one who 
missed a class should have a strong excuse (i.e. seriously ill) otherwise they would be failed 
and they can not enter their university classes.
The P4 classes itself was not too bad as we managed to have fun as young students do but the 
message o f the P4 is clear: Pancasila and the unity o f Indonesia is a fixed price that one can 
not defied.44j>
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Like his predecessor, Soeharto was a proponent of using swift military action in 
relinquishing any signs of rebellions. The actions were often very swift and often 
caused the military to be accused of human rights violations. The military defended 
their action by saying that they’re simply protecting Indonesian sovereignty. As in the 
military term: Either you are a friend or you are an enemy. It is a fact of the history 
that the almost all armed rebellion leaders were killed. Muso, Kahar Muzakar, 
Kartosuwiryo, Aidit to Imron (leader of Laskar Jihad that accused of terrorism and 
hijacking in 1980-1981) were killed or executed. Indonesian government do not 
tolerate any separatist movement in any form.
The issue of East Timor as discussed in earlier chapters is a very complex issue. For 
common Indonesians, many never understood why East Timor became part of 
Indonesia. For those who were bom in the 1970’s, all they knew was that East Timor 
was always part of Indonesia. For the military, the cost, in particular the human cost 
made it imperative that East Timor should always remains a part of Indonesia.444
Within the Indonesian society, perhaps the military is the main party that have the 
largest interest with East Timor. Thousands of Indonesian soldiers have died in 
invading East Timor and the continuing conflict that lasted for another 24 years. 
Some officers have married with local women and some have business interest there, 
such as coffee plantations. Former TVRI journalist, Hendro Subroto who followed 
Indonesian military invasion back in 1975 described his trip back to East Timor, 19
years later almost in a romantic tone almost in Hemingway style:
After I had breakfast at the turismo hotel, I went for a stroll exploring the Avenida Marchal 
Carmona which lay parallel to the beach, stretching all the way from the eastern side to the 
Avenidad Amaral on the extreme western side o f  the city o f Dili. Along this road, one could
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see plenty o f  old buildings and a couple o f  monuments built in the style o f Portuguese 
architecture.445
Hendro Subroto’s position is unique as he was among the few Indonesian journalists 
allowed to follow the Indonesian military movements during the invasion in 1975. 
Hendro was even allowed to document (though not published at that time) the details 
of Indonesian military infiltration to East Timor prior to the invasion in December 
1975. His account, published in his book: “Eyewitness to Integration of East 
Timor was dubbed as the best account by Indonesian civilians regarding the 
invasion. But his closeness to Indonesian military made him perceived as betraying 
his role as journalist.447 Hendro even described how during a fire fight with 
FRETILIN in 1975, he picked up an AK-47 rifle and almost used it to shoot back at 
the FRETILIN but he decided not to in the end.448 Still, he admitted that he helped 
Indonesian soldiers by re-filling rifle magazines.449
The Indonesian military despite all the accusations of corruption and human rights 
violations never forgot their role: to protect the integrity of Republic of Indonesia. 
This role was a role they played well especially after the fall of New Order regime in 
1998. Indonesian military since then have become more proficient in showing their 
‘role’ as guardian of Indonesia but sometimes it was played with a political 
background. A sample of how Indonesian military used their original role to 
strengthen their image happened during an armed show off between Malaysia and 
Indonesia in 2005.
In February 2005, a legal disputes with Malaysia over border demarcation in 
Kalimantan leads to deployment at least seven major warships, a battalion of Marines
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and a flight of F-16 fighters to the disputed area. Such deployment was the most 
serious border issue that Indonesia had since the East Timor crisis. But unlike what 
happened in East Timor, the Indonesian military were in a totally different stature: 
they were protecting what they declared as a legal border of Indonesia against claims 
made by Malaysia. Indonesian media in this ‘crisis’ shows a more assertive position, 
supporting the Indonesian military. An article read as below:
Besides preparing warships and F-16 fighters, Indonesia is also sending marines to Tarakan, 
East Kalimantan following the increased o f  tension in the sea border o f  East Kalimantan and 
Malaysia.
Kompas’s sources said that C-130 heavy air lifters from 31st Squadron based in Halim 
Perdanakusuma Airbase, on Saturday night (5/3) have lifted a company o f 1st Marine Infantry 
brigade from Surabaya.
According to the source, the marines will be deployed in the front line o f Indonesian -  
Malaysian border, such at Nunukan, Tanaj Mera, Tara and Tarakan.430
During the East Timor crisis in 1999, the dimension of sovereignty did not only exist, 
it became a strong issue -  at least from the Indonesian side. Never since the 
independence war had fully armed foreign troops come into an area where Indonesia 
still claim as its territory.
As in previous chapters, the analysis of the issue here is based upon three approaches. 
The approaches or models are from Robert Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld 
as described in Chapter 2 and put into practice in Chapter 4 and 5. All are based upon 
framing approaches though each presents a different angle of view. On top of the 
three models of analysis, grounded theory is used throughout to give the findings the 
necessary depth beyond the obvious findings. For more details and explanations of 
the methods used, please refer back to Chapter 1 and 2. All articles analysed are 
available in full version in Appendix C.
187
5.2. Analysis.
The first analysis uses Robert Entman.model. Entman stated that critical textual 
choices that framed the story can be revealed by comparing media narratives.451 
Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably.452 
This is due to the fact that many of the framing devices can appear as ‘natural’ 
choices of wordings.
The usage of language in reporting the event is like a vessel carrying the message but 
in this case, some messages were designed specifically to convey a more subtle but 
still a very important message. The choice of different wordings used in different 
articles were consistently chosen to depict similar phenomenon. Thus, the choices of 
words were actually reinforcing the particular frame.
Entman described his methodology that frames can be analysed using a series of 
aspects.433 The aspects -  five of them do not necessarily have to feature in each 
article. Also it is not necessary that for the aspects to be equally important. The
454aspects are:
1. Size judgements. In this thesis it will referred as relative importance of news. 
It refers to the size of the related articles in term of words.
2. Agency. The usage by the media of certain words and images to suggest how 
and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed.
188
3. Identification. The usage by the media of certain words and images that 
encourage or discourage identification with those most directly involved in 
the media story.
4. Categorisation. The different way in which the media label events or issues.
5. Generalisation. The degree to which the media generalise.
5.2.1. Analysis using Entman model.
5.2.1.1. Relative importance of the news.
The relative importance of news here is what Entman said was the size and 
placements of the story. Newspapers placements are not similarly equal. Each 
newspaper has their own standard of placements often related to the importance of the 
news itself.
The Australian’s story is 419 words long. The Sydney Morning Herald's story is 446 
words long. Republika's story is 593 words long. Suara Pembaruan's story is 381 
words long. Media Indonesia's story is 377 words long. In the table 1 below, we can 
see the length of the articles that covered the border crossing issue within Australian 
and Indonesian newspapers.456
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Table 3.
Relative importance of the issue -  in term of article size (in words).
Newspapers title Article length 
(excluding headers)
Length of reference to 
actual statement.
The A u stra lian 419 85
The S ydn ey  M o rn in g  H era ld 464 77
R epublika 593 157
Suara P em baru an 381 22
M edia In don esia M l 226
K om pas - -
From the table above, Republika published the largest article compared to other 
newspapers. The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian ranks second and third. 
Suara Pembaruan is forth and Media Indonesia published the smallest article.
In Entman’s frameworks, the size of the article reflects the importance of the story. 
Republika with the largest article seems to portray the issue as more important than 
other newspapers. Yet, Republika seems to be on its own here. Three others 
Indonesian newspapers did not publish the story as ‘big’ as Republika. Kompas as the 
largest newspaper in Indonesia did not even publish the story at all.
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On the contrary, referring at the size of their articles, both Australian newspapers The 
Sydney Morning Herald 8c The Australian put the issue in the relatively similar 
importance.
The analysis above is regarding the general size of the articles excluding the 
headlines. It can be argued that the size of the articles can show the importance of the 
story. Nevertheless, in order to get a more substantial meaning of the frame, a more 
in-depth analysis is needed.
Using Entman’s concept of size, then it would necessary to see how the media portray 
the actual issue — John Moore’s statement. Entman believes that the subtle meaning 
often lies beneath the mass of words. Removing the masses will reveal the actual 
message of the frames.
In reference to the actual issue -  John Moore’s statement, there are variations 
between media.
5.2.1.2. Agency.
Entman refers to agency as the usage by the media of certain words and images to 
suggest how and where responsibility of an event being reported should be placed437. 
This is often the attribute of the headlines as the role of the headline is to present a 
short description of the news articles. Headlines also function as a means to attract the 
audience or in this case the readers into reading the article. In the Table 2 below we
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shall see about the headlines of the related articles regarding the border crossing 
issue.
Table 4.
Newspaper headlines.
Newspapers Headlines
The Australian Blunder escalates tensions — Defence Minister warns 
troop may cross Timor border.
The Sydney Morning 
Herald
We’ll Hunt Down the Militias.
Republika Kapuspen: TNI akan Hadapi Interfet Bila Masuk 
Timor Barat (TNI Spokesman: Interfet will face TNI if  
enters West Timor).
Suara Pembaruan PM Howard: Pasukan Multinasional Tidak Akan ke 
Timor Barat (PM Howard: Multinational troop will 
go to West Timor).
Media Indonesia Akankah Tentara Interfet Masuk Wilayah Indonesia? 
(Will Interfet troop enter Indonesian territory).
Kompas
— ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The main frame of this issue is the statement made by Australian Defence Minister, 
John Moore. On September 29th, John Moore made the statement that: ‘Australian-led 
peace force might cross the East Timor border in “hot pursuit” of militia’.
From the Table 4, the headlines in the newspapers depicted agency reports in ways 
bolstering the respective frames. Four newspapers: The Australian, Republika, Suara 
Pembaruan and Media Indonesia specifically mentioned the possibility of 
INTERFET troop entering Indonesian territory (the Western side of Timor Island). 
The Sydney Morning Herald headline just mentioned pursuing the militias without 
any elaboration.458
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The view propounded by the frames was that INTERFET troop have the legality and 
ability to enter Indonesian territory. Such an action is permitted by United Nations 
mandate and this is being pointed out by the Australian Defence Minister.
Under the mandate, UN sanctioned troops may enter another country’s territory if 
they caught up in a firefight near the border and consequently pursued the enemy. 
Australia as the leader of INTERFET is showing their resolution in following UN 
mandate.
From table 2, The Australian Headlines clearly define the agent as the Australian 
Defence Minister. The Defence Minister warned of the possibility of (INTERFET) 
troops crossing the Indonesian border. The statement was acknowledged to have an 
effect to Indonesia. It raised the tensions between Australia and Indonesia 
immediately.
The Sydney Morning Herald report was not conclusive. It started with a resolution in 
pursuing the militias. Only when the first paragraph is read, it is clear that the agency 
is ‘The Australian led force’. In this case the force may cross Indonesian border in 
order to pursue the militias.
Republika's headline again implies that the agency -  INTERFET, will face 
Indonesian troop if it crosses the border. Nevertheless the headline can be said to 
have two agencies: INTERFET and TNI. As in the Australian newspapers,
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INTERPET is the party that will cross the border. TNI is the party that will be 
opposing the INTERFET if the latter actually crosses the border.
Republika's headline is an active sentence. It was stated in the first person form. It 
also carries an ultimatum message. There is little doubt coming from it: If the 
INTERFET cross the border, then TNI will face them. The implication is that there 
will be armed confrontation.
Suara Pembaruan headline carries a different message. Here PM Howard was quoted 
stating his assurance that INTERFET will not cross the border into Indonesian 
territory. In the Republika headline the agency is again the INTERFET, presented in 
the active voice -  direct quotation style, thus leaving little doubt regarding the 
message.
From a glance the messages of Republika's headline seems to be contradicting the 
previous articles. Nevertheless it actually reinforced the notion that at some point 
there was a possibility that INTERFET would cross Indonesian border.
Media Indonesia presented its headline in a question form. This way it seems that the 
possibility of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory is a simple rhetorical question 
defined here as a question sentence that is asking for the sake of asking and not 
implying anything concrete. Like the other articles, the agency from the Media 
Indonesia headline is the INTERFET. The narrative is very clear about the possibility 
of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory.
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Now we have concluded that from five newspapers, four have INTERFET as the 
agency in their headlines. INTERFET was attributed for raising the tensions by 
declaring its rights to enter Indonesia territory under certain circumstances. The 
Sydney Morning Herald was the only newspaper that did not clearly stipulate any 
agency in its headlines. Nevertheless, the first sentence in the article clearly defined 
“Australian led force” or another term of INTERFET as the agency.
The attribution of the source in this case that INTERFET will cross the border came 
from the Australian government. The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
Republika and Media Indonesia identify the source to be Australian Defence Minister 
-  John Moore. John Moore in his statement date 29/9 declared that INTERFET has 
the right to pursue any attackers beyond the border — if they are attacked.
Suara Pembaruan did not attribute John Moore as the source of the debate. Instead it 
named PM Howard as the source of its article.
5.2.1.3. The Identification.
From the newspapers reports, the identity of the possible perpetrator, INTERFET was 
often mixed with Australian troops. The Australian military as a whole was portrayed 
as being identical with INTERFET, thus eclipsing the facts that INTERFET had 
personnel from different countries.
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In The Australian, the headline and the article clearly refers to John Moore in his 
capacity of Australian Defence Minister. Another attribution is what is called: 
“Australian-led peace force”.439 There was no single mention of INTERFET. All 
references of tension and conflict directly refer to tension or conflict between 
Australia and Indonesia.
The Sydney Morning Herald also identifies INTERFET again as an “Australian-led 
peace force”. It also attributes the source as John Moore. The term 'peace force’ is to 
underline the goal of the deployment of the troops -  maintaining peace and order in 
East Timor. But the term also presented as a deliberate emphasis that what the 
international troops do, led by Australian troops is for a noble cause that is to create 
peace.
Such emphasis upon the nobility of the troop’s goal is very apparent only within 
Australian newspapers. The term also emphasis another thing: ‘Australian led’. This 
emphasis strongly upon the fact that international troops (INTERFET) are led by 
Australia. Indeed Australia provided almost 40% of the 11.000 troops sent to East 
Timor, the largest contingent. INTERFET itself was also lead by an Australian 
General, Peter Cosgrove.
The facts presented above show that the Australian newspapers were underlining the 
facts that bring strong positive sentiments to Australia. The sentiments created here 
are obviously very high, a showcase of another achievement by Australia. The issue 
that arises was like simple physics. If something increases something else will
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decrease. In this situation the high sentiment of Australia’s achievement was
considered to be created at Indonesia’s expense bringing more negative attention to 
Indonesia’s failure in East Timor. The repetition of Australian claim of achievements 
in particular within the Australian media, became like a loud booing for the losing 
party in a competition. As an Indonesian and journalist the effect was visible for me 
as I remember the mood due to the news reports simply widened the cultural gap 
between Australia and Indonesia.
In T h e  I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r  there were several foreigners working as copy editors. Almost all 
had their opinions towards what was going on in East Timor, but none was so outspoken in 
expressing their opinion than a male editor from Australia. One night, out o f the blue he 
brought out a map o f  East Timor and started slugging Indonesia about its role in East Timor. 
It happened in the news room and no Indonesian staff were happy about the way he expressed 
his opinion which was very direct and rude by Indonesian standards. Finally a senior editor 
answered his remarks by saying: ‘At least we didn’t do what you did. What do Australians 
really know about East Timor, actually?’ 460
Almost all Indonesian that I spoke to about East Timor were genuinely surprised that the East 
Timorese decided to be separate from Indonesia. What made things worst was that it 
happened when Indonesia was at its lowest point since 1965. Common Indonesians suddenly 
lost their sense o f  hope. People were living from day to day, simply to survive. On the other 
hand, we are not happy with the way Indonesian military treated Indonesian people. Simply 
look at what happened with the Trisakti students in May 1998 and the aftermath to see that 
most Indonesians do not like the way the military behave. But when Australia loudly 
expressed its views and later supported the independence o f  East Timor (through the media), 
for me this is a vindication that Australia has a latent interest with the independence o f East 
Timor.461
Thus the identification of the articles regarding the Border crossing issue, simply 
reinforced popular beliefs within Australian and Indonesian societies. For the 
Australian society as described above, the military mission to East Timor is of a very 
noble cause — maintaining peace, saving the innocent East Timorese from Indonesian 
oppression and making sure that East Timor got the independence they have fought 
for. Unfortunately, such emphasis brings a different perception within Indonesian 
society. Instead Australia was perceived as a loud and nosy neighbour (at least) or 
actually having a role with the separation of East Timor from Indonesia.
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In chapter 6 and & 7, I shall dwell more on this issue by analysing who did the 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers use as sources. The aim was to see if 
newspapers from Australia and Indonesia were actually reinforcing the popular 
beliefs of their own society rather than fully focusing upon the issue.
One thing that struck to this day was how different Australian and Indonesian perceived the 
events o f East Timor crisis in 1999. Some o f  my Australian friends believed that most 
Indonesian were deceived by Indonesian military and we (Indonesians) could not see that 
what Australia do was the right thing. On the other hand, most o f  my Indonesian friends said 
they knew what the military did in East Timor as they can see what the Indonesian military 
did in the other areas. But they said they can not accept Australian involvement at that time 
which they think as intrusive.
As a journalist, reading the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports on East Timor 
crisis in 1999 gave me a strong headache initially. During the peak o f the crisis, I read too 
many reports from news wires (in T h e  I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r  news room) from abroad that 
blatantly blamed Indonesia for the crisis. One article from R e n te r s  for instance claimed that 
Indonesian military must have dumped thousands bodies o f  victims o f the conflict to the sea 
based upon two things: the sea is near and the journalists could not found what the rumour 
said that the streets in East Timor were littered with dead bodies. My thought as a journalist 
trained in Australia was: where did the professionalism, accuracy and balanced reporting 
goes?
For fairness, Indonesian news media in particular A N T A R A  was often reserved as last resort 
news sources as often their reports are not in good qualities, to say the least. Often we 
basically have to re-write the news from A N T A R A  which was not to be the case with foreign 
news services (not just translating it from the Indonesian). Sometimes we think that A N T A R A  
was quoting the Indonesian officials too much that we ran the risk o f  running propaganda if 
we published the news.462
As expected, Indonesian newspapers presented an opposite view compared to 
Australian newspapers. Republika identifies two agencies in its articles: INTERFET 
and TNI. Republika attributes the main topic of the story to TNI. To be exact TNI was 
warning the INTERFET not to cross the Indonesian border. This means that 
Republika is more inclined to support the position of the TNI in this issue. Indeed 
Republika was often dubbed as leaning towards the Indonesian government along 
with Media Indonesia in their reporting.463
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Suara Pembaruan identifies its article to the statement of PM Howard. In his 
statement PM Howard is backtracking his Defence Minister’s statement that 
INTERFET may cross Indonesian border. PM Howard declared that INTEREET will 
not cross Indonesian border. In this case, Suara Pembaruan did not appear to be 
presenting the view wholly from the Indonesian side. Instead it tried to bring the 
focus to the fact that John Howard as Prime Minister of Australia, has backtracked his 
minister’s statement.
One thing that was very apparent o f  the news reporting o f  East Timor is how imbalanced it is 
between Indonesian media and foreign media. Indonesian media has very limited sources, my 
own newspaper could not even insure me beyond the standard work insurance which means 
you are covered when you actually in the office. So if  something happened to you in the field, 
you are all by yourself. My colleague from Singapore told me that their newspapers insured 
them for thousands o f  dollars on their life insurance just in case something bad happened. But 
insurance only benefit the benefactor and so the farewell message among the journalists at 
that time was: ‘Don’t be a hero’. It was not a joke, hero here mean to have the word hero 
carved on your tombstone.
But insurance does not guarantee that a journalist can do their job properly. Indonesian 
journalists were as eager to report on East Timor as their foreign counterpart. Unfortunately 
very few news media in Indonesia can afford financially to send their journalists travelling 
even within Indonesia. When I was working at the SWA magazine, we rely on plane ticket 
that the magazine received as barter to advertising space.
On top o f  that there is an issue o f  public interest. Sure many people were interested in the East 
Timor issue. In fact T h e  I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r  was able to maintain a close contact with senior 
East Timor officials as proof that Indonesian media have strong interest on East Timor, not 
just copying what the government o f  military said. Nevertheless, the interest was initially 
buried within myriad o f  news reports regarding local politics or the economic crisis. 
Indonesian interest was unfortunately cranked up with the increased involvement o f 
Australia.464
From the identification of the news reports we can see that newspapers can merely 
reflect that mood of their society. This is apparently more evident within Australian 
newspapers which both identify themselves with Australian officials. An important 
note is that Australian newspapers may not simply amplify their government’s 
official position but the fact that what the government does is closely connected with 
the mood of the Australian people.
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The event of East Timor crisis in the end has shown how a government political 
decision’s maybe influenced by the mood of its people. This is understandable as the 
basis of democracy is power is within the people, it’s not hard to guess that when the 
pressure from the public became so strong the government will eventually give in to 
it. As example Australian government admitted that in the end they have to succumb 
to the pressure form its people to mobilize troops to restore law and order in East 
Timor. This is clear in John Howard statement on September 18:46;>
All Australians have been distressed at recent events in East Timor. Scenes o f violence and 
death, and the fear that a small, vulnerable community might be deprived o f the freedom it 
deserves, have provoked a properly sympathetic reaction.
It is not only right that Australia join other nations in supporting the United Nations in East 
Timor, it is also in our national interest to do so. Continued instability in a territory so close to 
Australia could have harmful consequences for us in the longer run.
The role o f the multinational force, which Australia will lead, is to restore peace and stability 
in East Timor, to support the United Nations mission and to facilitate humanitarian assistance. 
This will be Australia's largest commitment o f  military force abroad for more than 30 years.
We warmly welcome the participation o f  the forces o f  other nations. We know they will work 
professionally with the Australian soldiers. As in all operations o f  this kind, there is a risk o f  
casualties. However, the rules o f engagement will be such that our forces will have complete 
authority to not only defend themselves but to use appropriate levels o f  force to fulfil the mandate 
given by the UN.
As Australian troops go into East Timor, they go with the hopes and prayers o f the entire 
nation and they go in the knowledge that they have the support o f not only the Australian 
Government but the Australian people. Our thoughts will not only be with them, but also their 
families and other loved ones.
We wish them Godspeed and a safe return home.
The first two paragraph above clearly indicates that Australian Government has 
finally agreed to send troops to East Timor largely to the pressure from Australian 
society. The Australian society itself pressured the government after witnessing the 
atrocities and lawlessness as reported by the media. In the end, like in good 
democracy Australian government succumbs to the real holder of the power -  the 
people.
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5.2.1.4. Categorization.
In this incident regarding the possibility of INTERFET/Australian troops entering 
Indonesian territory, the newspapers highlighted the legal rights of the troop to do so. 
The newspapers also tend to have a blurry distinction between INTERFET and 
Australian troop.
Australian newspapers tend to point out the mandate of the United Nations which 
gave authority for the troop to do so. The Australian Defence Minister, John Moore 
was repeatedly quoted in stating what the UN mandate authorized.
On the other hand, Australian newspapers tended to portray Interfet as identical with 
Australian troop. In all articles, the reference of ‘troop’ goes to ‘Australian troop’. 
This is interesting as John Moore himself pointed out, that the UN mandate is for 
Interfet. Interfet itself consisted of more than half-of dozen countries. This style of 
journalism can be found in all countries as every media will always want to bring the 
proximity of the news as close as possible to their readers. For Australian newspapers 
the fact that Australian troops were heavily involved with this operation should be 
pronounced expressively.
The tendency for a ‘chest beating’ or ‘se lf congratulating’ reporting existed in all media from 
different countries. At home I was not able to stand more than five minutes listening to Fox 
N ew s that my mother listened to so attentively. For me, Fox News is no more than the ultra 
nationalistic public relations o f  the Bush Administration. In Indonesia, the reporting of 
Hendro Subroto as illustrated earlier shows how the closeness between journalist and the 
military can cause serious issues about the quality o f  the journalism mostly in term o f the 
independence o f  the journalist itself.466
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In a more serious issue, soon after the closing o f  T E M P O  magazine in 1994, the government’s 
sanctioned magazine G A T R A  released a story how allegedly a well known Catholic priest 
from Yogyakarta was suspected in a radical movement. A colleague from SWA called the 
magazine and complained about the reporting. I remember how my colleague said to G A T R A  
that as news magazine G A T R A  should be independent instead o f becoming a mouthpiece for 
the Indonesian intel.467
Indonesian newspapers perceived the issue differently. The focus instead is on the
implication if INTERFET or Australian troops ever crossed Indonesian border. As
much as the UN mandate authorized it, any armed foreign troops entering Indonesian
territory is a violation of Indonesian territorial integrity. Such action can be perceived
as a declaration of conflict. Therefore it was rightly so for the Indonesian military to
give a stem warning for any border intrusion.
In October, an Australian patrol by mistake went to the Indonesian territory o f Motain. A few 
Indonesian mobile brigade Police (Brimob) who were guarding the area gave warning shots 
into the air. Thinking that they were being shot at, Australian troops shot back to the 
Indonesian police, killing one and wounding another. This incident was quickly investigated 
and it turned out that Australian troop had used a different map than the Indonesian troops 
used.
Though the media and the diplomatic community quickly brought this issue to a halt, there 
was a story related to me years later. The story said that Indonesian military wanted to take 
revenge to the INTERFET and send some guerrillas into East Timor. The guerrillas ran into a 
New Zealand patrol and a fight ensued. In the end a private from New Zealand was killed and 
few others were wounded. Even today, I still meet with people from military or police 
background who are still bitter about the Motain incident.468
In 2005, an open conflict almost erupted between Indonesia and Malaysia over a 
disputed area in East Kalimantan. Indonesian newspapers were quick to release 
reports that the TNI had sent some of its best assets such as the F-16 fighters and 
marines to the area while Malaysia sent some of its warships.469 This is the first 
border dispute that went to this level of animosity since East Timor crisis is 1999.
Putting this two situations in perspectives, it is apparent that Indonesian military has 
shown its willingness to be involved in an armed stand off if Indonesian sovereignty 
is being threatened. Back in 1999, some of the Australian newspapers reports instead
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were presenting a view that Indonesian military in East Timor though dangerous is no
match to the Australian troops. One Australian commentator thought otherwise.
The appalling events in East Timor have evoked an almost equally appalling response from 
many in Australia. Sanity seems to have deserted them, with calls even for unilateral armed 
intervention in the crisis by our defence forces, as if  Australia could, in effect, declare war on 
a country so much our numerical superior in armed forces and population. We might perhaps 
be able to send in a few thousand troops to confront the 15,000 to 20,000 Indonesian troops 
already there, not to mention the thousands o f  militia.
Some o f  the loonier would even like to send in the F- I l l s  to bomb somebody or other.
The enormous hypocrisy o f  these human rights lawyers is once again apparent, as they 
attempt to tailor their doctrines according to their political preferences. If we can send in 
troops to protect human rights in Timor, why not in Cuba or Vietnam? Or, closer to home, in 
Fiji or Papua New Guinea?
Even if  we had the overwhelming force and resources o f  the United States this would be a 
dicey business; for us alone it would be suicidal.
The Government realises this perfectly well. But you would not think there was any sense in 
the Government's position watching or listening to most o f  the petty sabre-rattlers o f the 
media, the academy or the churches.470
Such views are not shared by other Australians. Soon after publishing this article 
above, the author of the article released another article describing how he was 
described and even accused of being ‘unpatriotic’ or a traitor by other Australians. 
The important note here is not about the message but about the fact that when a 
society believes upon something, anything contrary will be perceived as breaking the 
norm and will result in social control. In this case, the Australian society generally 
believes upon what they think happened in East Timor and the position of their 
government. When Paddy McGuinnes presented his opinion, he was perceived as 
somebody that was against the society.
In Indonesian newspapers as stated earlier, the position was different. Indonesian 
newspapers tend to see the border breach as the final declaration of war between 
Australia and Indonesia. This was preceded by Australia’s involvement in East Timor
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which climaxing in Australian troops being sent to East Timor. But the bottom issue 
is clear for Indonesian newspapers: is Australia going to risk an open conflict with 
Indonesia?
Republika was probably the strongest proponent of armed conflict. Citing TNI 
spokesman Major General Sudradjat declared his stem warning that any intrusion will 
be repelled by TNI.471 This statement is very blunt and cannot be more clearer about 
Indonesia’s intention. International law outlined a clear process of handling border 
issues. But if a sovereign country’s border is being breached intentionally by armed 
troops from a foreign country, that means an invasion. Repelling an invasion will 
usually mean an armed conflict where casualties are very likely to occur.
Other Indonesian newspapers, Media Indonesia and Suara Pembaruan instead 
published the statement from PH John Howard declaring that Interfet will not enter 
Indonesian territory. PM Howard statement seemed to be contradicted with the 
statement of his Defence Minister.
What appear in Suara Pembaruan and Media Indonesia is a different focus, to the 
local Australian politics instead to the possible border breach issue. Australian 
officials were often accused by Indonesian officials of playing local politics at the 
expense of Indonesia.472 This is publicly admitted in Australia that Indonesia will 
always be an easy subject to be used to attack the Australian government by its own 
people.
JOHN Howard has acknowledged on several occasions recently that the relationship between
Australia and Indonesia is very difficult. It sure is. That's why it is important to keep the
association out o f  domestic Australian politics, insofar as this is possible. In opposition before
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March 1996, the Coalition used Indonesia as a tactic to discredit the Keating Labor 
government. Since then, Labor has attempted to use much the same stratagem against the 
Howard Government.
Obviously, there are longstanding cultural differences. Yet Indonesia is Australia's most 
important neighbour. It is also the most populous Muslim nation in the world and has recently 
become a fledgling democracy. The importance o f  the Australian-Indonesian relationship is 
acknowledged by both sides o f  mainstream Australian politics, even if  the principle is more 
likely to be embraced in office than in opposition.473
What Gerard Henderson stated above is the confirmation that Indonesia is the hottest 
currency within Australian politics. This resulted in Indonesia being used as a ‘ping­
pong ball’ among Australian politicians. For Australia who uses liberal democracy, 
such practice is a common one. Politicians in Australia often attack each other as part 
of the way to gain political power. But for Indonesia, who has different culture and 
democracy system, such way of doing things is very alien and considered very 
offensive.474
But such views about Indonesia can also be perceived as evidence that Australia is 
still perceiving Indonesia by using orientalism perspectives. Orientalism, that was 
defined by Edward Said, basically believes that many nations and societies in 
Western world still believe that they have a more superior culture and values 
compared to the developing societies/nations.475 This bias came from the long history 
of colonialism which led to master -  object relations, where the Western societies as 
the colonials perceived their colonies as objects that should follow their perceptions.
Interestingly, the issue of orientalism was not evidently discussed within the 
discourse in the Australian newspapers during the East Timor crisis. What was 
evident was that Australian society was so focused in their belief about their noble
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intention that anything else, especially those that will undermine them is not relevant. 
A fine example can be seen below.
PEACEKEEPING troops heading to East Timor will be part o f  Australia’s great military 
tradition, Prime Minister John Howard will tell the nation tonisht
In a special address to be carried on the ABC and all commercial television stations, Mr 
Howard will argue that Australia has no option but to send its soldiers to protect East 
Timorese people.476
For general Australians, such conviction is considered to be a positive thing. Being a 
tough character in public is often perceived to be part of Australian general 
characters. Which is a contradiction compared to Indonesian culture. But such 
conviction was the very fuel that was used by critics within the Indonesian 
newspapers to attack Australia’s involvement in East Timor. Ironically the term 
‘orientalism’ was not used by Indonesian critics towards Australia but the idea that 
Australia was acting a neo-colonialist bullying Indonesia was there.
5.2.1.5. Generalisation.
The possibility of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory was perceived as a direct 
threat to Indonesian integrity.
Indonesia took a strong pride in the fact that it gained and defended its independence 
through war. Such a fact was internalized with historical lessons taught in schools 
which often included visits to monuments in the National Hero’s cemetery. Every 
week, state school students have to have a flag raising ceremony. On August 17, the 
National Independence day, the whole nation watches the time Indonesia proclaimed 
its independence.
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When I was at high school which was a public school, it was ridiculous. Every week at least 
once we would have to have a flag ceremony copying the same ceremony conducted at 
August 17, 1945. If you re in classes in the morning, then you’ll have the ceremony at 7AM 
and if  youi class is in the afternoon, then it’ll be around 4 pm. These ceremonies took about 
an hour at a minimum but some went half an hour extra. Why I called it ridiculous was at my 
school we had to do it in such perfection that one o f  the senior students was actually selected 
to lead a ceremony o f  Pancasila commemoration where President Soeharto and all state 
officials were present.
At that time, attending the ceremony was an absolute necessity. You could skip classes and 
the teacher would not care much. But if  you missed a ceremony, you ran a risk to be expelled. 
We did this ceremony since elementary school and by the time we reached University, we 
could memorise almost all the content o f  the original 1945 constitution. We also had to do the 
ceremonies at the heat o f  the day or even light rains.478
Such efforts were designed to remind Indonesian people about their own history. 
Nevertheless, it is also fact that such integrated nationalistic teaching has a hidden 
message that is to legitimize the (current) regime in particular The New Order regime.
Now there was a definite threat to Indonesian integrity in the form of foreign forces 
going into Indonesian territory. Inevitably this brought up a nationalistic sentiment 
within Indonesia. While for Australia, the possibility was downplayed as a technical 
possibility -  merely stating what its troops can do legally.
5.2.2. Peter W hite approach.
In Chapter 2 and 4, Peter White’s methodology has been described clearly. White’s is 
proposing a research method based upon a linguistic approach in order to analyse the 
salient meanings within ordinary news reports. White argues that within ordinary 
everyday news reports, often there are salient or hidden messages in it (White, 1997, 
White, 2004).
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The salient meanings described by White are not a random occurrences. White argues 
that as news reports are created by humans, it is inevitable that the reports will reflect 
the person who created it. What is reflected can be the values, norms or beliefs but it 
can also contains certain messages that are deliberately created (White, 2004, White, 
1997).
Two factors are to be analysed here -  according to White’s method. The first one is 
newsworthiness and the second is the ‘voice of the reporter’479. The first factor: 
Newsworthiness refers to on how much the story shows a breach of normalcy, 
morality and social order. What is to be analysed here is how the breach of normalcy, 
morality and social order is being presented within the reports.
Within the factor of newsworthiness, there are several sub-factors. According to 
White, a breach of normalcy or social order (which constitutes the basis of why an 
event is considered to be newsworthy) can be classified into three categories: aberrant 
damage, power relations and normative breach. Aberrant damage relates into physical 
damages (i.e. tsunami disasters). The more physical the damage, the more 
newsworthy the event480.
The second aspect to be analysed is ‘the voice of the ‘hard news’ reporter’. White 
argues that the myth of ‘hard news’ reports being always identical with ‘objectivity’ 
and neutrality is not true. News reports are made by humans. Humans are very much 
influenced by various factors such as their culture, political values and morality.
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Within White’s theory, news report are not a random occurrence. Instead news 
reports are part of a social process, a process where information passed is being 
carefully selected and framed to convey specific messages whether it is immediately 
visible or a salient message.
5.2.2.I. The Australian article.
Starting from the title: “Blunder escalates tensions — Defence Minister warns troops 
may cross Timor border”, there is a suggestion of a breach of normalcy by implying 
that there were ‘blunders’ which leads to tension. Furthermore, the statement was to 
clarify with another statement that troops (possibly referring to foreign troops) will go 
across the border of East Timor.
The sentence; ‘blunder escalates tension’, implied a gross mistake had been made 
which led to escalating tension. There are two negative words in the same sentence; 
blunder and tension. Blunder actually means: gross mistakes or to move or act 
blindly481. Tension means: an act of stretching or straining482. Blunder as stated above 
shows that a mistakes has been made. The mistake here resulted in an escalation of 
tensions.
The second part of the headline clarifies the what and why the first part of the 
headline is stating a gross mistakes has been made. The second part declares that a 
defence minister has stated that (probably) his troops will go across the (East) Timor 
border. East Timor has borders with two countries: Australia and Indonesia. So the
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statement here refers to a possibility of some troops to enter either Australian or 
Indonesian territory.
Never since the Dutch colonial troops officially left Indonesia in 1949, has a foreign army 
entered Indonesia’s territory fully armed and ready for war. Indeed the legality o f East Timor 
as Indonesia’s territory is always a sensitive and questionable issue. That is probably why 
President Habibie’s proposal for East Timor referendum, though shocking was initially not 
contested seriously in the Indonesian public sphere.
But with the increased involvement o f  Australia in the crisis, the Indonesian public’s 
animosity toward Australia also sharply rose. The climax was when several shots were aimed 
at the building. In year 2000, when applying for student visa, I saw that the bullet holes still 
existed in the wall. Never had such animosity happened to any embassies in Indonesia before, 
not even to the US embassy.
In the streets it was even more dangerous to be Australian. I met this reporter from Asia Week 
who was told me a story o f  how earlier in the afternoon he was chased by a mob right in J a la t i  
J e n d e r a l  S u d ir m a n .  He was covering this demonstration when someone wanted to steal his 
wallet. He caught the culprit but the person recognised his accent. As soon as he was 
identified as Australian, he ran away chased by the mob that just minutes before were 
demonstrating. Later that evening when we had dinner with colleagues from Singapore, to the 
inquisitive restaurant staff, we said that he is Swedish, o f  course he didn’t say a word when 
someone else is around.483
To enter another country’s territory is a serious breach. The breach here is about 
another country’s sovereignty. When foreign troops enter another country’s territory 
without permission, the security and sovereignty of another country is being 
breached.
On the whole, the headlines suggest that another country’s sovereignty is about to be 
breached, either it is Australia or Indonesia. This is a very serious situation as it will 
definitely raise tension. This is exactly what made this reports newsworthy.
Within the body of reports, the possibilities of serious breaches were further 
highlighted. The first paragraph stated that tension with Indonesia is rising after the 
Australian Defence Minister stated that Australian led INTERFET troops may cross 
the Indonesian border. The statement suggests two things: INTERFET troops
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(including Australian troops) may go across another country’s border and Indonesia’s 
border may be breached.
The second paragraph Shows another breach; Indonesia has warned (Australia?) that a 
breach of its territory may lead to serious consequences. To have another country 
warning another country is a serious matter that goes beyond normalcy. Countries are 
supposed to respect each other sovereignty including their territory. Thus, this is the 
newsworthy aspect of the story -  foreign troops may cross Indonesian border.
The (possible) breach of Indonesian borders is the main issue of this article. 
Nevertheless the issue itself is complicated. The Australia Defence Minister -  John 
Moore stated that his statement showed what INTERFET troops can do within the 
mandate that they have. The mandate for the INTERFET came from United Nations 
and within the mandate is the ability to pursuit the enemies even into another 
country’s territory.
Theoretically, no one even in Indonesia will deny U N ’s authority in sending peacekeeping 
troops to East Timor. East Timor was a mess before and especially after the referendum. Two 
Indonesian journalists (one working for R e u t e r s  and the other was with K o m p a s )  was shot and 
seriously wounded prior to the referendum. Later another Indonesian journalist was killed. It 
was clear that the area was almost lawless. But what I felt that the outside world miss to 
understand is we do not appreciate to be bullied through the media and later seeing our own 
flags or people were targeted especially in Australia.
The whole o f  Indonesia itself at that time was also in a mess. In Jakarta, we were too scared to 
travel alone after dusk. One day my sister was flying back from Australia and there were four 
people that went to picked her up with one guy carrying a g o ! o k - (machete) just in case. So 
why just East Timor got the attention as if  Indonesia was able to do anything? I searched 
endlessly but found no reference o f  the trouble in Indonesia at the time o f East Timor crisis. It 
was as if  East Timor is the world’s little red riding hood and Indonesia is the big bad wolf. 
Everybody loves to be the hero and no one wanted to be the villains.
N ow  on top o f  that, when we lost hope and day to day is a survival, suddenly the news came 
that Australian or INTERFET troops may invade Indonesian territory. Within days, various 
organisations declared that if  they were allowed, they will send volunteers to Tight Australian 
troops. Interestingly, such animosity was dismissed almost entirely by Australian media.
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The article also quoted the statement from US Defence Minister -  William Cohen 
that warned the Indonesian government to comply with the UN mandate. This also 
shows another breach that is a warning by an official of a country to another 
country’s government.
The US warning here shows a pressure by a major power country on another country. 
Cohen also supported the Australian troop stance by claiming “The peace force 
needed to act in very aggressive manner to confront militia elements threatening 
violence”. This shows a controversy where a ‘peace force’ has to act ‘in a very 
aggressive manner’.
The statement from the Australian Defence Minister has created a strong controversy. 
This was shown by a warning by the Indonesian Ambassador for Australia, Wiryono. 
Wiryono warned that ‘tension is climbing like a ladder and had reached the top step’. 
The implied message was the tension has reached the top possible levels which are 
very dangerous.
The statement published by T h e  A u s t r a l ia n  is a statement o f challenge by Indonesian 
standards. To say that a foreigner is going into your house to kill someone you know in the 
house is like a direct challenge for Indonesian. One thing Indonesians do not like nor stay 
away from is a direct challenge. In the countless flag ceremonies I had as school kid was that 
Indonesia loves peace but we love our freedom. We were also taught that our freedom is 
worthy o f  our own life too. That’s why we have so many ceremonies -  to remind us that we 
should always protect our freedom at all cost. Ironically, the Indonesians already said this 
long before George W. Bush used the same concept for his war against terror.
Tension between Australia and Indonesia has been present for a long time. In the 
1960’s Australian troops was involved in campaign against Indonesian troops during 
the ‘confrontation’ era486. During that time, Indonesia under President Soekamo was
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threatening to attack Malaysia -  which was under British control at the time. Another 
important factor was Indonesia between 1955 -  1966 was strongly influenced by 
communism something that was feared by Australia (Ricklefs, 2001).
The rise of the Soeharto regime which was strongly anti communist changed the 
perspective of Indonesia becoming a communist stronghold. This was marked by US 
military support to the Indonesian military in the early 1970’s in form of military 
training and equipment487. But deeper down the fear of Indonesia growing into a 
military power never subsides.
In 2004, the arrival o f  modem Sukhoi Fighters from Russia has raised some alarms that it will 
become threat to Australia . This alarm sounds so laughable to me as Indonesia only 
purchased four unarmed aircraft, something that were widely reported in Indonesian media. 
Given that Australian media monitored Indonesian media constantly, this made me curious 
why they did not publish those facts. The bottom line is there is still inherent perception of 
threat from Indonesia within Australian society.488
The Australian article on one side may show the resolution of the Australian 
government of giving its troops in East Timor full ability to do their task. On the 
other hand it also illustrates the distrusts between INTERFET (including Australia 
and US) with Indonesia. Some Indonesian newspapers articles (also analysed in this 
chapter) shows Indonesia’s opposition of this possibility of foreign troops coming to 
Indonesian territory.
The issue of sovereignty is a very sensitive one for Indonesia. Being among few 
countries in the world that gained and defended their independence through war 
(1945-1950), Indonesia is very sensitive to the issue of sovereignty. In March-April 
2005, a border issue with Malaysia has seen Indonesia sending 9 warships, three F-16
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fighters and a battalion of Marines to a small area in Ambalat, North West of 
Kalimantan (KOMPAS, 2005d, KOMPAS, 2005a, KOMPAS, 2005c).
5.2.2.2. The Sydney Morning Herald Article.
The Sydney Morning Herald article begins with the heading: We’ll Hunt Down 
Militias. The heading carries an implied message of something (Militias) that will be 
hunted down.
In White’s model, the breach is shown within the word We and Hunt Down. The 
word We here is referring to INTERFET troops. Nevertheless, as the source of the 
statement is Australian Defence Minister, John Moore, the message could also be 
read as Australian troops will be hunting the militias. This is categorically a breach as 
the implied message is foreign troops (either INTERFET or Australian troops) will 
hunt the militias.
The term 'hunting down’ refers to the act of hunting. In the act of hunting, targets 
(usually animals) are being tracked, chase and killed. The aim of the whole process is 
kill the target. In hunting, it is inconceivable to only hurt the animal. If the hunter by 
any chance failed to kill the target, the hunter has to find the target and kill the 
wounded target (animal).
From the discussion above, the headline implies that INTERFET or Australian troops 
are going to hunt down the militias. While the term ‘hunt sometimes means to
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‘track’, the sentence ‘hunt down’ means to track and kill the target. So there is little 
doubt here that when INTERFET and/or Australian troops are out to hunt the militias, 
it meant to kill the militias.
The headline carried a strong meaning as normally what’s being hunted are animals. 
Even so, it’s not just every animal. Now within the headline, there is an implied 
message that what is going be hunted are people -  the militias. This is the 
newsworthy part of the event.
The term ‘hunt’ here really unsettled me. In Indonesia until the arrival o f tabloid newspapers 
like S u a r a  M e r d e k a , we found it taboo to use such direct expression. The only exception is for 
criminal news which usually means the police are chasing the criminals but often as well the 
criminals will end up being shot for ‘resisting arrests’ or running away. Sometimes it was a 
fatal ending for the criminal. But the mainstream news media will never use it in the direct 
way that Australian media did.
My uncle who was an army officer and a proficient hunter, always said to me that when you 
are hunting you must never stop until you kill your target. There is no other outcome from 
hunting other than: fail to find the target or success in killing your target. But the target in 
hunting I know is animals and not humans.489
Within the first paragraph, came another contradiction which according to White is 
part of what make the news newsworthy. The paragraph described that Australian led 
force (INTERFET) may attack the militias within Indonesian territory if Indonesia
did not prevent them from attacking (into East Timor).
The Australian — led force in East Timor might cross Indonesia’s border in ‘ hot pursuit if 
Indonesia allowed Timorese militias to launch attacks from its territory, the Defence Minister, 
Mr Moore warned yesterday.
The implied message can be seen from several words. The first one is the words are. 
‘cross Indonesia’s border’. This clearly means that the ‘force — a fully armed force 
are going to cross another country’s border. This is will be a breach of a country s 
sovereignty and may be seen as a declaration of war.
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The second word is: ‘warned’. Warned which came from the word warning has a very 
serious connotations (Delbridge and Bernard, 2000). The word warning is synonym 
with an ultimatum -  a threat that will be taken if the other party failed to follow what 
the others wanted. Therefore, the message is clear: Australian troops will attack the 
militias in Indonesian territory. The same message was presented again within the 
second paragraph.
Expressing concern at a build-up o f  militias in Indonesian West Timor, Mr Moore said the 
mandate given to the international force Interfet under Article 7 o f the United Nations charter 
authorised such interventions. This allows raiders to be chased to their hideouts across the 
border.
The second paragraph shows a ‘tone down’ or a softer version of the previous 
paragraph. The usage of words such as: concern and authorized carries the same 
meaning but in more ‘softer’ tone. The word concern shows a level of seriousness but 
more into the level of thinking but not action. It merely shows that somebody is 
seriously thinking about something.
The other word showing a different tone is the word: authorized. Authorized as a 
word means: to be given some level of authority or legality to conduct something 
out490. For example, the police as law enforcers are given authority to enforce the law 
which includes arresting anyone found to be breaching the law.
Another example of the usage of the term; authority is for the term ‘armed forces . 
This means a force that was authorized to carry weapons (thus they are armed). The 
key concept here is that authorize is synonymous with the term ‘legal . Thus the 
usage of word ‘authorized’ in the second paragraph implies that the Australia-led 
(INTERFET) force has the legal power to cross the Indonesian border.
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There is another important point within the article. In the Entman analysis, the article 
has identified Australia. The term: 4 Australian-led force’ could mean a force that was 
led by an Australian (which in fact it was) but could also being seen as a force led by 
Australia (as a country). Within either term, the central point is the word: ‘Australia’.
The salient meaning from the term: ‘Australian-led’ can be defined as bringing 
Australia as the central player -  or in Gadi Wolfsfeld’s term: ‘the good guys’. The 
connotative meaning or salient meaning thus can be expanded into: ‘A force led by 
Australia (the good guys) is going to hunt down the militias (the bad people)’.
From the description above, anyone who is familiar with Western culture 
personification may remember the scenes in old Western movies where the American 
cavalry are chasing either bandits or Indians. Within such movies, the American 
cavalry was often portrayed as the ‘ultimate’ good guys’ who are defending the 
‘helpless’ civilians (often immigrant farmers) again the villains -  i.e. Indians or 
bandits491.
The last sentence of the second paragraph shows the final perception: ‘...raiders to be 
chased to their hideouts’. Raiders here carry the connotation of the bandits or Indians 
in the Western movies. In those movies the ‘bad guys’ often have their camps in 
mountains (bandits) or a bigger camp in a remote area (Indians). The cavalry (the 
good guys) then have to ‘raid’ those camps to destroy the ‘bad guys .
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The last sentence can also be interpreted with a different meaning. In the first 
paragraph and in the headlines, the key term is ‘hunt’ from hunting. In the second 
paragraph another word is used: ‘hideouts’. Hideouts normally refers to animals’ 
‘homes’ but as animals do not have ‘homes’; instead they have their ‘hideouts’.
From White’s perspectives this is a breach. When humans are being deliberately 
portrayed as close to animals, it is a breach of humanity. How can humans, despite 
their shortcomings be described as ‘hunted animals?’ In retrospect, the salient 
message is: ‘The Australian led force (INTERFFET) is going to hunt their target — 
the militias in their hide outs”. This can be re-interpreted as: “The good guys are 
going hunt and kill the bad guys -  like a hunter kills its prey (animals). This is a fully 
legal action condoned by the United Nations”.
The rest of the article brought more reinforcement for the idea of ‘good guys’. The 
rest of the story described the ‘strong support’ from US towards Australia. The 
support here comes in two different aspects; political and military. In terms of 
political support, US is supporting Australia in pressuring Indonesia to stop the 
militias’ attack.
5.2.2.3. Indonesian newspapers articles
Within the Indonesian newspapers the issue of border crossing and national pride is 
the most visible issue. All three newspapers presented an almost uniform view, if
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INTERFET cross the Indonesian border, Indonesian integrity will be breached. For 
Indonesians such breach is a very serious threat to Indonesian integrity.
In line with Peter White's model, the Indonesian newspapers articles are focusing on 
what they believe to be a breach. The breach perceived here is the breach of 
Indonesian territory by a foreign force (INTERFET).
As described in earlier, the issue of nationalism is a very sensitive issue for Indonesia. 
A senior Indonesian journalist, Komelius Purba described nationalism as Indonesia's 
primary commodity492. Purba also argues former President Habibie decision to give 
East Timor choice to be part of Indonesia or not is actually a very nationalistic 
action493.
“Narrow-minded nationalists may condemn his decision to end the country's occupation o f  
East Timor by allowing a referendum there a few months before his term ended. But he 
perfectly carried out the 1945 Constitution's mandate that Indonesia should help other nations 
liberate themselves from imperialism and colonialism’'494.
Nationalism or nationalistic pride as described above is a very important factor in 
analysing Indonesian society. Angela Romano argues that the very foundation of the 
Indonesian political system is created upon a belief that the state should be central49' . 
The Indonesian founding father -  Professor Soepomo argues - took his inspiration 
from the Hegel concept of organic/integralistic system. .
He (Soepomo) found the organic system appropriate to ‘authentic’ Indonesian consciousness, 
community spirit and social institutions497.
This organic conceptualization specifically rejects individualism and the idea o f social 
contract’ as the basis o f  protecting individuals. Soepomo went so far as to argue -  admittedly 
with limited success — that the Constitution should not contain safeguards o f human rights and 
civil liberties498.
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Soepomo’s view was later reinforced by the Indonesian struggle for its independence 
and freedom from foreign interventions. From 1945 until 1949, Indonesia was 
physically fighting foreign military intervention from the allied troops to former 
colonial power- the Dutch. Through the bloody struggle, the sense of nationalism was 
hardened.
5.2.2.4. The headlines.
REPUBLIKA presented a clear of normalcy within its headline. The title of the 
headline was: Kapuspen: TNI akan Hadapi Interfet Bila Masuk Timor Barat -  (TNI 
will face Interfet if it enters West Timor: TNI Spokesman).
From the headline there are two breaches presented. The first one is the breach of the 
Indonesian border. West Timor is a de-facto an Indonesian territory. If foreign forces 
such as INTERFET are going to cross the border without permission that means a 
breach to Indonesian territorial integrity.
The second breach presented in the REPUBLIKA headline is that TNI is going to face 
INTERFET. A normalcy for any countries in the world is to have peace. When armed 
forces declared they are going to face an outsider (armed) force that could mean 
armed conflict. Conflict is the opposite of peace thus the statement of TNI spokesman 
is definitely a breach of normalcy.
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The third breach is the tone of headline statement itself The words: akan hadapi (will 
face) carries a very serious meaning. Within the Indonesian language, such formal 
words spoken by an authoritative person means a threat. The statement by the TNI 
spokesman is a strong warning at least and at worst it is a threat. The threat here is 
directly towards INTERFET; enter Indonesian territory and they will have to face the 
TNI.499
In its headline, SU A R A  P E M B A R U A N  presented a similar issue with 
R E P U B L IK A . The headline said: PM Howard: Pasukan Multinasional Tidak 
Akan ke Timor Barat (Multi national force is not going into the West Timor:
PM Howard).
SUARA PEMBARUAN headline implies a few breaches just like REPUBLIKA. The 
first breach is Australian PM, John Howard giving a statement about the 
multinational troops entering another country’s territory. This is a breach of normalcy 
as the head of a country normally only speaks of things under their jurisdiction. 
Multinational troops (INTERFET) are UN sanctioned and logically will be under the 
coordination of the UN. By saying he is speaking on the behalf INTERFET, Howard 
suggests that INTERFET as a whole is part of Australian armed forces which is 
legally under PM Howard.
The second breach within the SUARA PEMBARUAN headline is; a multi national 
force is going to enter Indonesian territory (West Timor). Similarly with 
REPUBLIKA headline, any sovereign country in the world is entitled to sovereignty 
of its own territory. When a foreign (armed) force is going to enter another country s 
territory, it is a breach of normalcy.
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The MEDIA INDONESIA headline also presents a breach. The headline says: 
Akankah Tentara Interfet Masuk Wilayah Indonesia (Are INTERFET troops going to 
enter Indonesian territory)? The breach is clear; INTERFET is presumably going to 
enter Indonesian territory. Being a foreign force mandated only to East Timor, by 
entering the Indonesian territory, INTERFET is committing a breach.
The summary from the headlines is all Indonesian newspaper articles are presenting 
breaches within their headlines. Of all issues presented, a single issue is presented by 
all newspapers; the possibility of INTERFET going into Indonesian territory. For the 
Indonesian newspapers, this is a breach for their country’s territorial integrity. It is 
also a breach that incites strongly Indonesia’s nationalistic pride.
5.2.2.Ó. The body of the articles
REPUBLIKA opened its article with a statement from the TNI Spokesman, Major 
General Sudradjat. General Sudradjat stated clearly that if INTERFET is going to 
enter Indonesian territory without permission, INTERFET will face the TNI. The first
two paragraphs described General Sudradjat statement:
Indonesian armed forces (TNI) will take stern actions if they face the INTERFET. According 
to TNI Spokesman Major General Sudradjat, if the Australian-led multination troops enteied 
Indonesian territory in West Timor without permission, TNI will react.
“We are not going to let the INTERFET enter Indonesian territory without permission and if 
that happen, they are going to face the TNI because they have breached Indonesian 
sovereignty,” said Sudradjat yesterday in Jakarta.
T e n ta r a  N a s i o n a l  I n d o n e s ia  (T N I)  b e r s ik a p  t e g a s  m e n g h a d a p i  In te r fe t .  M e n u r u t  K a p u s p e n  
H a n k a m /T N I  M a y je n  T N I S u d r a d ja t ,  b i l a  p a s u k a n  m u l t in a s io n a l  y a n g  d ip im p m  A u s t r a l ia  itu  
m e m a s u k i  w i la y a h  t e r r i t o r i a l  R 1 d i  T im o r  B a r  a t  t a n p a  iz in , T N I a k a n  m e n g h a d a p in y a .
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“K i t a  t i d a k  a k a n  m e m b ia r k a n  b i l a  I n t e r f e t  b e n a r - b e n a r  m e m a s u k i  w i la y a h  T im o r  B a r a t  ta n p a  
i z in  d a n  a p a b i l a  i  tu  t e r ja d i ,  m e r e k a  a k a n  b e r h a d a p a n  d e n g a n  T N I k a r e n a  te la h  m e la n g g a r  
k e d a u la ta n  R l ,  ” k a ta  S u d r a j a t  k e m a r in  d i  J a k a r ta .
In the first paragraph, the breach was clearly described by General Sudradjat as a 
possible breach of Indonesian territory by the INTERFET. For TNI, their main role 
was to protect Indonesia from all threats including threat to its territorial integrity. To 
have any foreign armed force to enter Indonesian territory without permission is a 
threat to Indonesia — it’s a duty for the TNI to act against the threat.
SUARA PEMBARUAN started its article referring to the possible breach of the
Indonesian territory. It quoted PM Howard’s statement acknowledging the possibility
of INTERFET entering Indonesian territory but also downplaying the actual
possibility of that actually happening/''00
In order to reduce the tension with Indonesia, Australia’s PM John Howard on Friday tried to 
reduce the reports regarding multinational force action that will pursue the militias to West 
Timor.
To calm Jakarta, Howard to SAW radio stated: “I don’t think that will happen, because we are 
focusing our attention in East Timor and not going to insult Indonesia’s dignity”.
D a l  a m  u s a h a  m e r e d a k a n  k e t e g a n g a n  d e n g a n  I n d o n e s ia ,  P M  A u s tr a l ia ,  J o h n  H o w a r d , h a r i  
J u m a t  ( 1 /1 0 )  b e r u p a y a  m e r e d a m  p e m b e r i t a a n  m e n g e n a i  t in d a k a n  p a s u k a n  m u lt in a s io n a l  
y a n g  a k a n  m e n g e ja r  m i l i s i  h in g g a  k e  T im o r  B a r a t .
G im a  m e n e n a n g k a n  J a k a r ta ,  H o w a r d  k e p a d a  R a d i o  3 A  W  m e n g u n g k a p k a n , “S a y a  k ir a  h a i  itu  
t id a k  a k a n  t e r ja d i ,  k a r e n a  k i ta  m e m u s a tk a n  p e r h a t i a n  d i  T im tim  d a n  t id a k  a k a n  m e n g h in a  
m a r t a b a t  I n d o n e s i a ”.
SUARA PEMBARUAN’s opening paragraph shows the perceived breach; Multi 
national troops (INTERFET) are going to pursue the militias to Indonesian territory. 
Nevertheless, what is important to note is the tone of language in how the breach is 
being reported.
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REPUBLIKA opens its reports with a direct quotation from TNI spokesman -  giving 
direct warning/threat to INTERFET not to breach Indonesian territory. SUARA 
PEMBARUAN is the opposite. SUARA PEMBARUAN opens its report with a 
quotation from John Howard softening his tone about the possible pursuit. Even 
more, SUARA PEMBARUAN is emphasizing the words: “reducing tensions”.501
The words above are an important indicator on what the emphasis is of the SUARA 
PEMBARUAN article. The word ‘reduce’ is deliberately used to propose efforts to 
defuse the increasing tensions between Indonesia and Australia. It is also important 
because within Indonesian culture, humility is highly appreciated. Therefore, a sign 
that Australia is willing to lower its tone is an important gesture.
In the REPUBLIKA report, the main idea is clear; it is about a threat from external 
force and TNI is responding by giving another threat. SUARA PEMBARUAN placed 
the emphasis on the peaceful aspect of this incident. SUARA PEMBARUAN 
deliberately avoids focusing on the breach up front. Instead it tried to show efforts to 
avoid the breach.
Media Indonesia also adopted a similar position with Suara Pembaruan. Within the 
first two paragraphs, Media Indonesa reports the same breach -  a possible breach of
Indonesian territory, but within a more ‘softer’ tone.502
Will the International force for East Timor led by Australia cross to East Nusa Tenggara 
(NTT) in order to chase the East Timor pro integration militias? It seems that the possibility is 
still open.
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Australian Defence Minister, John Moore yesterday did not rule out the possibility that 
INTERFET will run missions to chase and destroy East Timor’s militias that are hiding in 
NTT or West Timor according to Western term. But he assured that such actions will be very 
limited.
A k c m k a h  P a s u k a n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  u n tu k  T im o r  T im u r  ( IN T E R F E T ) p im p in a n  A u s t r a l ia  
m e n y e b e r a n g  k e  N u s a  T e n g g a i  a  T im u r  (N T T )  u n tu k  m e n g e ja r  m i l i s i  T im tim  p r o in te g r a s i?  
S e p e r t i n y a  t i d a k  t e r tu tu p  k e m u n g k in a n  k e a r a h  s a n a .
M e n te r i  P e r t a h a n a n  A u s t r a l ia ,  J o h n  M o o r e ,  k e m a r in  t i d a k  m e n g e s a m p in g k a n  ln te r f e t  a k a n  
m e n y e le n g g a r a k a n  m is i  m e n g e ja r  d a n  m e n g h a n c u r k a n  m i l i s i  T im tim  y a n g  s e m b u n y i  d i  N T T  
a ta u  T im o r  B a r  a t  m e n u r u t  i s t i la h  B a r  a t. T a p i  ia  m e m a s t ik a n  a k s i - a k s i  y a n g  b e r k a i ta n  d e n g a n  
itu  a k a n  s a n g a t  t e r b a ta s .
Media used a question form in presenting their frame which compared with the report 
from Republika is much less ‘threatening’. In an Indonesian daily context, a direct 
challenging tone usually means a direct challenge thus it is usually a format that is to 
be avoided in reporting503. But this convention changed with the fall of New Order 
regime in 1998. Many political publications, especially those taking the tabloid 
format are openly using the challenging tone. This is in line with the new paradigm 
within these type of publication that they are now can act openly as the opposition of 
the ruling elite.504
By presenting its main frame in a less direct form, Media Indonesia seems to try to 
present such a sensitive issue in a more subtle way; something that is surprising 
knowing that during the East Timor crisis, Media Indonesia was often perceived to be 
promoting more nationalistic frames compared to the other Indonesian newspapers 
except for Republika.505
The softer tone of Media Indonesia is not just visible within the first paragraph but 
also evident in the following paragraph:506
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Australian Defence Minister, John Moore yesterday did not rule out the possibility that 
INTERFET will run missions to chase and destroy East Timor’s militias that are hiding in 
NTT or West Timor according to Western term. But he assured that such actions will be very 
limited.
Media Indonesia is clearly presenting the possibility of the breach of Indonesian 
borders by INTERFET troops as stated by Australian Defence Minister, John Moore. 
But the way Media Indonesia presented the frame in this paragraph is similar to the 
first paragraph; it is of a threat from Australia which is still just an argument -  not yet 
a direct threat. Unfortunately as subtle as it is, for most of Indonesians, the issue of 
Indonesia’s integrity and freedom is something almost sacred. Such arguments of a 
possible threat, especially spoken by a senior defence official that comes from a 
country that was seen as ‘unfriendly’ to Indonesia at the time is something to be taken 
very seriously.
In my personal experience, as for many Indonesians, our concern the during East Timor crisis 
was o f  how far this crisis will go. Being a journalist and educator at that time, I know from 
personal knowledge that Indonesian rule in East Timor caused much sufferings and pain to 
both the East Timorese citizens and the personnel o f the armed forces stationed there. In fact 
the news for the service personnel was not good news. I kept hearing stories o f how thousands 
o f soldiers had been killed and often they were not just killed, they were butchered.
So my feelings towards the crisis was a mixed one. I remember that on the September 4th, I 
was woken at 6AM (Jakarta time) by my editor in Singapore507. My editor wanted me to write 
an article about what Indonesian public felts about East Timor choosing to reject the 
Indonesian offer o f  special autonomy. I ended up writing a story that quotes a former 
Indonesian army general that basically said that we, Indonesians, are sad that the East 
Timorese rejected our offer but we can understand their reasons. That story was illustrated by 
a friend o f  mine who made a similar cartoon
What most Indonesian felt at that time was surprise but also relief that hopefully this
would end perceptions of Indonesia trying to hold East Timor at all costs. The mood
on the fateful Saturday morning was very depressing but there was no anger, yet. The
same sentiment also presented by Mrs Toeti Adhitama, an editor in Media Indonesia.
In the case o f  East Timor, there indeed was a dilemma. We feel annoyed that East Timorese 
want to separate from us - after we had considered them one o f us for so long, ut it s s i
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hard to sit idle when we see East Timorese trembling with fear, made to squat with the hands 
o f  their head and guarded by large Australians who enthusiastically point the muzzles o f their 
weapons at those helpless people.509
The sentiment from Mrs Adhitama above in many ways represents the feelings shared 
by many Indonesians at that time. Many Indonesians, remembered well that 
Indonesia, just about 50 years earlier was at war against its former master -  the 
Dutch. For those who had not lived in these times by themselves, there were abundant 
Indonesian war movies that almost presented the same story: how the Indonesian 
freedom fighters fought against the more powerful, stronger, taller and brutal 
enemies. The problems in these movies are that the victims are always dark skinned, 
peasant looking Asians and the enemies are the tall and bulky white soldiers. Often 
the enemies were represented as ruthless and sadistic. So the frames of ‘fight against 
oppressions from westerners’ were abundant even before the East Timor crisis in 
1999. When the INTERFET arrived in East Timor, such frames against the image of 
foreign white soldiers, were readily available.
What many Indonesian realised but somehow was not fully represented in the 
analysis here is that we also knew that East Timorese were suffering as badly as 
ourelves (at least) in the hand of New Order regime. I remember one story that I often 
heard from various people, from a fellow lecturer in my office to a security guard at 
the Indovision building510, was how for every single Indonesian soldier killed in East 
Timor, it was common to have a whole village destroyed -  I never asked what 
happened to the villagers.
During a conversation with an Australian journalist, Ben Bohane, I came to an understanding 
how for an Australian journalist, East Timor was just another game. It was just an assignment 
but possibly one that will boost one’s career. So every journalist that went there was in a race 
to find ‘gold mine’. But soon it was apparent that not much was left to report other than the 
trail o f  destructions. On top o f  that, the parent organisation in Australia requires news stories
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daily regardless o f  whether there was actually any news worthy events at all. So the pressure 
was very high.511
But one thing was available: violence -  or what was left o f  it. Melvin Singh, a journalist from 
Singapore showed a photograph o f  a well. He asked me how many bodies could I see? I said I 
saw just one. He said it is correct. But soon after Melvin took the picture, a group o f foreign 
journalists came and they started to count how deep the well was and how many bodies 
should be there. Their count was thirty bodies. Later jokingly Melvin said when the news 
arrived at R e u t e r s  office in London, the number was a hundred. I was laughing until I saw the 
news report in R e u te r s  mentioning the numbers above.
Back in Australia I was taught that it was better to be careful than sorry for publishing a 
wrong story. But listening and seeing such things happen like that, made me wonder about the 
accuracy and objectivity o f  modem news media. The man in the well was later identified as a 
pro-Indonesian militiaman instead o f  pro-independence that was alleged by foreign media 
merely due to the fact that the well was in Bishop B elo’s house — a well known independence 
activ ist.512
At the same time that East Timor was ravaged by violence, an almost similar situation
happened in Indonesia. Particularly in Jakarta, the situation was very explosive since
May 1998. As Jakarta residents, we lived in deep fear but also knew that the only way
to came out of this fear is to move on with our daily lives.
We kept listening to the radio all the time. Radio was the best source o f news within a very 
unstable place like Jakarta. Mostly we listened to where (if  any) riots were happening. But we 
also waited, if there was any significant news about the politics as well. Most important was 
to know which road was not safe to travel to. You don’t want to be caught in the middle o f  
riots on the road or worse massive robberies on the road which was almost the norm o f the 
day at that time51j.
The Indonesian security apparatus was often overwhelmed at that time. There was 
almost no security guarantee. The only guarantee was to leave Indonesia, like many 
people did in the early days of riots in 1998514. I remember one day in October 1998 
just a few hundred metres from the heavily guarded state parliament complex, 
hundreds of people blocked the main road and demanded passers-by to give their 
valuables.
Even when the security apparatus were available, their behaviour was unpredictable. 
In squashing the demonstrators, the troops and police officers often simply squashed
228
anyone in their sight. Hundreds of people, either students demonstrating, people who 
just joined for the fight or innocent bystanders were often victims, being beaten badly 
or worse, being shot at. A description of how bad it was when the security apparatus 
was squashing the demonstrations can be described here from the accounts of my 
students:
(i) Everything was in chaos. People were running away and screaming. Shots were fired 
everywhere. I saw someone hit by bullet in front o f me. I was about to charge and help that 
man when I heard: ‘Zzzzing’ sound passed near my head. It was a bullet. Immediately I 
stopped my intention and instead hid behind a tree. When I looked behind, I saw a Red Cross 
team which was also pinned down by the shootings.515
(ii) I was taking pictures when the troops and police attacked the demonstrators. Everybody 
ran away in all directions. I found m yself hiding under a police truck. It was a bad place to be 
as 1 could hear the police and troops taking people to the truck and beating them really badly. 
I have no doubt what my fate would be if  I got caught.516
(iii) We were buying foods from the street vendors. Everybody including the troops seemed to 
be calm. Even the troops were sitting enjoying their meals. Suddenly there were military 
trucks passing by, and we heard shots. Instinctively I ran away; that was when I saw this boy, 
about ten years old lying in the street. His body was covered with blood and rice. He looked 
scruffy, maybe a street kid. Without thinking I just pulled him up and took him to the nearest 
hospital -  we were practically just in front o f it. But before I got to the hospital, the boy 
moaned and then he died. My shirt and jeans were covered by his blood.517
The accounts show how the Indonesian security apparatus was often accused of 
heavy handedness in dealing with the security situation. But in all fairness, the 
security situation was also in chaos. Indonesia faced a dilemma; on one hand we 
wanted security to be rectified but on the other hand, the cost of maintaining security 
is very high.
Returning to the Media Indonesia frame of the possible breach of the Indonesian 
border by INTERFET troops, we can see the complexity from the Indonesian side. 
On the one hand, many Indonesians were surprised that East Timorese wanted to 
become independent after years of being supported by Indonesia. But the reports of 
violence in East Timor were simply repeating the same news from all over Indonesia
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at that time. Now, suddenly a senior defence official from a neighbouring country 
said that his troops, though under UN mandate, can and will breach the Indonesian 
border in order to destroy pro-integration militias.
For a media whose reports regarding East Timor crisis has been largely negative
*518towards Australia , Media Indonesia reports on the border crossing issue is 
surprisingly one of restraint. Unlike Republika, Media Indonesia did not deliberately 
show a reaction of defiance. Instead, Media Indonesia presented the issue in 
impersonal and a matter of fact’ format. In general, this report is a sharp contrast to 
the frame of confidence and can almost be described as ‘chest beating’ reports by 
Australian newspapers.
In conclusion, the textual analysis based upon Peter White’s method shows how the 
Australian and Indonesian press not only perceived the East Timor crisis differently 
but also presented a different perception of reality to their audiences. Both Australian 
and Indonesian newspapers presented the issue by using languages and terms 
available at their disposal. In the end, the frame created and the way it was presented, 
was basically aimed to present what the newspapers perceived to their own audiences.
5.2.3. Gadi Wolfsfeld approach
The third methodology used in this thesis is the one devised by Gadi Wolfsfeld' . 
Wolfsfeld argues that media is playing the role of the arena in the modem day
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competition among political adversaries. The adversaries are political power in all 
forms in particular governments (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Wolfsfeld, 2003b).
The Media, is more than just a passive spectator. In previous chapters it has been
discussed how the media actually created the social construction of reality. This
reality is a subjective view of the world shaped by current knowledge and culture.
«
In Wolfsfeld’s theory, the central issue is about how various parties (or what he 
defined as ‘antagonists) are competing in defining the reality. Wolfsfeld argues that 
the media act as a generator of reality, that any parties with political interest will try 
their best to influence the media. The goal is to control the perception of reality.
The significance of controlling the perception of reality is the ability to steer people’s 
minds because people have a limited capability of gathering information regarding 
the world surrounding them. They rely on secondary sources -  in which the media 
play a very significant role. The information gathered is needed to help people make 
an informed decision regarding various issues most importantly -  their life.
In democratic societies, theoretically the power lies with the people. But there is an 
important condition, that is that the people should have full access to information in 
order for them to make a correct decision such as choosing a political leader or the 
future of their society. This as what Alvin Toffler said: “Those who control the 
information can control the society”. Anyone who can control the media can
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influence the mind of the society. Davis gave a definition of social construction of 
reality/''20
Social construction o f reality theory is grounded on the premise that we live in a 
fundamentally ambiguous social world — a world in which persons, objects and actions have 
no inherent or essential meaning. If meaning is not inherent, then it must be created — imposed 
is limited by and relative to the context in which meaning is generated. Moreover, because 
action in situations is inevitably structured by groups that dominate those situations, those 
groups enjoy an inherent advantage in determining the meaning derived from action in 
situations.521
Ciaran McCullagh argues that sociologically, there is nothing wrong with how 
‘reality’ is being constructed by media reports. The main issue is whether the 
information being passed is free from any distortion or refraction. The ‘window’ (or 
the media in his term) should allow the society to view the world as it is.522
Wolfsfeld theory argues that the ‘window’ is not a static entity. The ‘window’ is like 
a living form, it follows the changes in its environment. The main idea is that media 
can only be effective if they can adapt themselves with the society in which they are 
based. Media, are successful if they can connect with their culture, values and 
political frames within their own society/“
Media is not an independent entity. Within the political conflict discourse (as 
Wolfsfeld argues), media present its stories always within the boundary of cultural, 
structural and political symbols known at that time.524 Media also plays a pivotal role 
in defining the way the conflict525 can help the outcome by gaining supports for the 
contestants. The winner, according Wolfsfeld is the party that most successful in 
gaining political support (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Wolfsfeld, 2002, Wolfsfeld, 2003b, 
Wolfsfeld, 2003a). Wofsfeld made his model based upon years of research in the way
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media presented the Israeli -  Palestinian conflict, in which Wolfsfeld argues that 
Palestinian has the upper hands in term of media supports.526
Back to the media over East Timor crisis, from the analysis based on Entman’s and 
White s method we can see how both Australian and Indonesian newspapers were 
trying hard to promote their own perspectives over the issue. Australian newspapers 
were trying to present frames of a tough stance, resilience and determination in 
providing security in East Timor even though it may cause conflict with Indonesia. 
Indonesian newspapers, at that time already in defensive position due to pressures and 
condemnations from the world on Indonesia, are presenting frames of defiance.
The Sydney Morning Herald presented a frame of a blunder -  a mistake. The mistake 
here is of the statement from Australian Defence Chief, John Moore of the possibility 
of INTERFET troops crossing the Indonesian border in order to destroy the pro­
integration militias. The Sydney Morning Herald perceived that such a statement was 
simply increasing the already high tension between Australia and Indonesia. 
Australia’s image in Indonesia, according to The Sydney Morning Herald had already 
suffered setbacks due to Australia’s pressure to Indonesia over East Timor issue and 
in particular the fact that Australia led the UN’s sanctioned force -  The INTERFET, 
to East Timor.
Nevertheless, The Sydney Morning Herald also acknowledged that the Australian 
government believed very deeply in the ‘justness’ of the INTERFET mission -  
including the possibility of a force crossing the Indonesian border. In The Sydney
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Morning Herald position, such a statement will draw serious consequences from 
Indonesia.
The Australian presented a different frame compared to The Sydney Morning Herald. 
The Australian presented a frame of confidence that as the previous analysis shows an 
almost ‘chest beating’ kind of confidence. The Australian not only perceived the 
statement by John Moore as justifiable but also believed that such action was 
necessary. In White’s method of analysis, we have seen how the choices of words 
presented a very strong view and opinion. In particular the words: ‘hunt down’ -  is 
from the term ‘hunting down’. The problem with such a term used here is the term 
used for animals being hunted. Yet, in this context the intended targets were pro­
integration militias, which are humans.
Thus the frame from The Australian is of confidence that Australian troops as part of 
INTERFET will hunt down the pro-integration militias as a hunter hunting down 
animals. Such a frame is very strong. It shows resolution, a strong will and a clear 
warning from a very authoritative source. As described earlier, there can not be any 
other meaning than that it was a direct threat.
Going back to concept of framing by Wolfsfeld, frame is just a way of 
communicating during a political contest.527 Frame is a means of a political war 
where contestants try as hard as they can to win the right to give meaning to specific 
situations. The aim is to gain the public support of as many contestants as possible.
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But nothing is constant in this contest. Every contestant has to be on their toes all the 
time. A winner can become a loser if they are not careful.
The statements by The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald are statements 
representing the interests of certain political players within the East Timor crisis. In 
order to analyse and understand them, Wolfsfeld has devised two options: who are the 
good guys and how was this issue covered in the past?
For the first question, the answer is for Australian newspapers, the good guys are the 
Australian troops though it was publicly announced as INTERFET. As shown in 
Entman’s method, the identification and generalisation is clear. Australian troops are 
INTERFET and INTERFET is Australian armed force, at least in Australian 
newspapers. The impact is the Australian public were given an impression of the 
power and might of the Australian force. Australia is full with resolution and ready to 
go to war with Indonesia if it’s necessary.
Such a strong frame is serving a limited contestant: Australian politicians. Sending 
the troops to East Timor was a huge gamble by the Australian PM for his political 
career. If the mission failed, then his political career could be in danger. But he knew 
if he succeeded he would be able to reap a popular support from Australian people. 
But at that very moment, the animosity of Australian people towards what happened 
in East Timor was so high (as reflected in the number of articles) that it was doubtful 
that Australian government would do anything otherwise.
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Sending the troops was a positive step, politically for Australian government. But still 
fresh in the mind of the western society was the US failure in Vietnam War. As a US 
ally in the War, Australia was fully aware of the power of public opinion, so it was 
imperative that Australian government should create a strong message to the 
Australian people. This is exactly what Gerard Henderson said of how Indonesia was 
easiest and hottest commodities within Australian politics.528
Answering the second question, there was no reference of conflict between Australia 
and Indonesia except during the time of confrontation between Indonesia and 
Malaysia. But during the East Timor crisis, very little reference was made about the 
previous conflict. This is interesting as the armed forces of Indonesia and Australia 
were at conflict just over thirty years ago but no reference was made here.
In general the Australian media relationship with Indonesia was often difficult. 
Stories by David Jenkins regarding Soeharto’s wealth were enough to make the 
Indonesian government bar any Australian journalists coming to Indonesia. In 
fairness the term: 4 bad news is good news’ is reflecting the relations. For Australian 
journalists, unfortunately the news that would be of interest for Australian media is 
about bad things that happened in Indonesia. But as Damien Kingsbury described, the 
Australian media perceived Indonesia through a one way mirror. What interests 
them is based upon the criteria of Australian media. The perspective presented is the 
perspective of Australian media.
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So without any reference to the past, what was presented was about the present 
situation in East Timor after the referendum. This is not about how bloody the 
confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia was back in 1963 -  1966. What is 
important and the focus of the story is just anything to solidify Australian perceptions 
of what is happening in East Timor. Thus the presented statements, frames and 
languages is merely presenting a reality, a social construction of reality to the 
Australian public about what is happening in East Timor and why Australia should be 
involved.
Indonesian newspapers also follow a similar path with the Australian newspapers. No 
reference was made to the confrontation period or events within Indonesian 
newspapers reports. Indeed there were abundant opinions and statements that 
presented Australia as an ‘enemy’ to the Indonesian public. Several graphics and 
most obviously statements from Indonesian officials were constantly published to 
reinforce the official standing of Indonesia. But those statements as presented earlier 
are not random occurrences. Everything was carefully constructed to follow a specific 
frame that will be able to be understood well by Indonesian public.
The Indonesian public in 1999 was a society that was full with rage, frustration and 
anger. After thirty years under repressive rules, suddenly everything changed almost 
overnight in 1998. Suddenly Indonesia faced an economic, political and social crisis it 
has not seen since 1960’s. Therefore what would be the best frame to present the 
issue of possible border crossing by Australian troops than to described it as an act
aggression by a foreign country.
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Whether moderate or subtle the presentation of the issue in the Indonesian 
newspapers gave a similar meaning: is Australia going to invade Indonesia? Based on 
Wolfsfeld’s concept above, the good guys here are Indonesian. Indonesia is presented 
as independent and free and will protect its sovereignty at all costs. Australia is a 
foreign country that not just meddles into Indonesia’s domestic affairs but also dares 
to make a statement that it will send its troops over the border to chase the militias.
In this concept, Indonesia is almost an innocent party, a victim of a big western bully 
who has forced its way into Indonesia’s affairs. Fortunately in this incident the 
statement came first from Australia, making it more convenient for Indonesia to 
present itself as passive victim rather than a willing participant whose action may 
have triggered the threat from Australia. The winner here is the Indonesian elite, in 
particular the Indonesian military which after a disastrous referendum found itself 
being blamed solely for orchestrating the rampages. Now the Indonesian military was 
finding itself in a very comfortable position as the defender of Indonesia. Should the 
threat from Australia materialize, TNI will find itself as the hero for the Indonesian 
people.
It was not a secret that Australia always perceived Indonesia as a possible threat. A 
significant proportion and assets of Australian Defence Force (ADF) was directed 
towards Indonesia.531 Indonesian media did not fail in presenting Australia as a 
neighbour that although seemed to be friendly is always constantly suspicious of 
Indonesia.
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When I started to read newspapers (early 1980’s), 1 remember reading many articles saying 
that A D F’s White Book or strategic plan always envisaged that the threat for Australia is 
always coming^ from the north. Indeed the threat always came from the north, such as in 
World War 2 .5j2 But the end o f  World War 2 only reinforced the perceived threat from the 
north. Even as far as 2003, I was told that the most popular foreign language taught in ADF 
academy is Bahasa Indonesia.
During the East Timor crisis, Australian involvement was described as intrusive to say the 
least. But others have gone as far as describing Australia as an ‘enemy’. Indeed several 
incidents did happen such as when Indonesian jet fighters were scrambled to intercept 
Australian fighters above Rote Island.533
Such constant representation of Australia as a possible enemy is something that was 
rarely encountered in the news media until recently. The issue of border crossing was 
simply another event that solidified the Indonesian public perception of Australia as a 
hidden enemy as voiced by the Indonesian newspapers.
5.3. Conclusion.
What this chapter shows is that Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented 
different frames to their own audiences. The frames were carefully constructed by 
using texts that were based upon icons or concepts that were not only understood by 
each society but also relate to a deeper meaning that again connects to values, 
cultures and history of the Australian and Indonesian societies.
The news reports, in this case the texts of the reports, show that it was not a random 
product. In fact, the analysis of the texts shows a deliberate effort to present what the 
media perceived as the reality at that particular time over a specific issue. On the 
issue of possible border crossings by INTERFET troops, Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers presented frames of mistakes (The Sydney Morning Herald), nationalistic
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confidence (The Australian) and defiance (Indonesian newspapers). Nevertheless, in 
general Australian newspapers also presented the Australian government line of the 
justness of the action (of border crossing) and confidence that Australian troops (as 
part of INTERFET) could do so successfully.
The frame of defiance presented by Indonesian newspapers is not because it was the 
stance of Indonesia government. Instead, the stance of defiance is reflecting the pride 
of Indonesia as a nation that earned its independence through war -  among a handful 
of countries in the world. The frame of defiance was at that time the political 
consensus within Indonesian society -Indonesia is under ‘attack’ by foreign power 
including Australia. Wolfsfeld argues that during the time of political contest such as 
during East Timor crisis, the overall political consensus within the political elite and 
the general society can determine the behaviour of the media during the conflict534. 
Wolfsfeld argues that the bigger the overall political consensus, the more the media 
will follow the government line.335
The textual analysis conducted using methods from Robert Entman, Peter White and 
Gadi Wolfsfeld in the frames presented by Australian and Indonesian newspapers 
regarding the issue of possible border crossing, produces some significant findings. 
The findings are:
• Australian and Indonesian newspapers were presenting views from sources 
that came from their own government (officials) and these views are apparent 
in the frames presented by Australian and Indonesian newspapers.
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• The frames from Australian newspapers are of a blunder (The Sydney 
Morning Herald), confidence (The Australian) and general defiance 
(Indonesian newspapers).
• The frames above are generally in line with both governments’ line and that 
represents the frame of the ruling elite for both nations. This was the result of 
overall political consensus within the Australian and Indonesian societies.
• The frames themselves also represent some deeper beliefs rooted in culture 
and history within the Australian and Indonesian societies.
What the finding of this chapter show is the challenge of reporting under difficult 
situation such under the condition of war. Under such circumstances, often the 
situation is problematic by its nature where journalists may not get the full access to 
cover all sides. Often the only access they have is to the side where they gets 
protection from. A classic example is what happened during the Gulf War 1 and 2.
During the first Gulf War, both Iraqi and Coalition force did not know how to utilize 
the media and media were often seen with suspicions. Coalition forces (mainly the 
US military) allows the journalists to be among them within certain extent but in 
general the journalists were put under strict restrictions on their movements and to 
what they can reports.
During the second Gulf War, the situation was different where both sides are keen to 
promote their frames through the media. As such, media was almost a welcome 
addition to troops (US Military only) or as a witness to the destruction on the ground
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(Iraqi side). This way, journalists are not a passive observer but became an active 
participant in war of information.
In East Timor crisis, indeed at some stage, most journalists were expelled from the 
ground. Initially it was the foreign press who was forced to leave when the UN pulled 
out most of their staff out. But during that time, Indonesian journalists are still present 
despite great difficulties. The arrival of the INTERFET changes the situation where 
after the murder of Sanders Thoenes, almost all Indonesian journalists had to leave 
East Timor as the threat against them are mounting.
What happened here is a chaotic situation where sources are hard to come by and let 
alone independent cross checking of the information. Both sides then naturally 
resides to whatever sources available at hand, such as the incoming refugees to 
Australia. These refugees after leaving East Timor under extreme danger and stress 
will understandably may not able to give a neutral comment which in the end may 
support the frames of the Australian government at that time of a situation totally out 
of control.
But what is really interesting is the fact that both Australian and Indonesian media 
continuous to based their reports on sources close to them. Meanwhile they seems to 
ignore the other parties reports that sometimes contradicts their reports. This seems 
contradictory with a credo of journalism that to do a fair reporting. Limitations on 
getting reliable sources is the reality but refusal or ignoring other sources available
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simply because they are ‘from the other side’ seems to compromise the basic idea of 
journalism itself.
The points of this chapter’s findings, were significant. It shows that news media 
accounts created socially constructed realities that were projected back to the both 
societies. But I still believe that it is not proven yet, that media were presenting a 
social construction of realities and most important is how such social construction of 
reality were created beyond the usages of languages.
The study of languages in this chapter and Chapter 4 show that a social construction 
of reality was created through the use of languages. But language here is just the 
means to present the social construction of realities. It is like a truck or plane that 
transports the product but it did not advance our understanding of how the social 
construction of reality was created. My belief is that as Entman and Wolfsfeld 
methods in this chapter show, there is a strong connection between the official 
sources and the message that were presented.
Thus in the next chapter the focus of analysis is going to be regarding the sources of 
the news reports. But to analyse all the articles published during the East Timor crisis 
will be to cover too many articles which is beyond the means of this research. What I 
proposed then is to focus on a specific period of time where a significant event 
happened. The event I proposed is the period of time when almost all foreign 
journalists were forced to leave East Timor during which the reporting continue to 
flow by the foreign media including Australian newspapers.
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The aim for this next step is to refine the research while expanding the focus of the 
study into something different. By understanding how the media operates under 
extremely difficult circumstances, I hope we can have a much more comprehensive 
understanding of why Australian and Indonesian newspapers presented different 
perspectives during East Timor crisis in 1999.
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CHAPTER 6
NEW SPAPERS AND THEIR SOURCES
6.1. Introduction.
In previous chapters, samples of the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports in 
East Timor were analysed. The analysis aimed to show the various frames embedded 
in the news reports and also to show that the frame is actually related to a deeper 
meaning. The deeper meaning is used to ‘relate’ the news events to a contextual 
understanding within the societies of Australia and Indonesia.
Gadi Wolfsfeld argues that behind a frame there is usually a hidden deeper frame.336 
This hidden and deeper frame is often something most fundamental to the related 
society.3-37 Based on this concept, this chapter will try to look b e y o n d  the s u r fa c e  
frame and understand the deeper frame. This process is important in order to 
understand the respective realities created by the Australian and Indonesian media in
reporting the East Timor crisis in 1999. Wolfsfeld describes his concept:
Cultures’ frames exist at a variety o f  levels and as a rule one would expect that deeper frames 
would be less contested and thus more resilient to change.
The depth o f  a given frame can be judged by considering its level o f specificity and its age  ̂
while the deepest cultural frames about conflict may go back thousands o f years. T ose wit 
less depth may be as recent as yesterday’s news. The power o f  the deepest frames comes om
the fact that they are rarely examined and usually taken for granted.
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The existence of the deeper frame is the main focus of this thesis. I believe, as shown 
in the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5, that there are deeper messages or meanings within 
the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports. The messages or meanings were 
constructed upon the cultures, values and social conditions within Australian and 
Indonesian societies. In other words, the deeper frames were designed to relate to 
something fundamental within Australian and Indonesian society.
Besides frames, sources also played an important role in creating the media 
construction of reality (Zelizer, 1989, dayman, 1990, Kurpius, 2002, McCullagh, 
2002). David Kurpius stated that if journalism is a reflection of a society then the 
quality of this reflected reality is to some extent dependent upon sources used.539
Wolfsfeld argues that one of the keys to understanding a political conflict is by 
understanding the concept that the political process will have more influence on 
media reports than the media will on the political process.''40 The role of political
actors as main players is central within this process but it has to be understood in a
. . • • 541broader context. One of the roles that political actors played is by acting as sources.'
The role of political actors as sources is very important as political actors provides a
significant amount of information regarding the political conflict.542
A good deal o f  the information about political conflicts used by the news media comes from 
outputs generated by political actors. Outputs refer to all actions, information and interpretive 
frames produced by political antagonists.
The success o f  antagonists in promoting their frames to the news media will depend on their 
ability to ensure that the coming information and events offer a good narrative fit with t eir 
preferred media frames.5̂
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In this chapter the main focus will be on the role news sources played in the East 
Timor’s crisis reports in 1999. It is my belief that by identifying, classifying and 
analyzing the role of the source, we will come to a more thorough understanding of 
the issue.
6.2. The rule of three sources.
It is the aim of journalism to provide fair and balanced reporting. But how to achieve 
such an outcome is the never ending question. How can a report be classified as 
‘balanced’ and ‘fair’? How about the issue o f ‘objectivity’?
An extensive literature has discussed the issue of objectivity, fairness and balance in 
media reporting yet none has been able to fully define what is the ultimate 
objectivity, fairness and balanced report (Wright, 1986b, Said, 1980, Lichtenberg, 
1991, Berger and Luckmann, 1966, Hackett, 1984, Reeb Jr, 1999). The core problem 
is that all those issues are all relative meaning that they will always relative to many 
factors, in particular to a specific society, where the media operates. It is in this 
context that objectivity, fairness and balance need to be judged.
Peter L. Berger said that the social scientist as a person is a product of their society, 
thus he or she will have and be affected with his/her own beliefs, values and 
experience544, a view that I hold myself. Nevertheless when they do their role, social 
scientists should strive as best they can to be value free.“45 This striving is to
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maintain the highest level of research quality which will be impossible if the social 
scientist failed to strive to be value free.546
The definition of fair reporting for me as a journalist was shaped by two major 
experience. First was my training in Australia, in the Graduate School of 
Journalism.547 There it was emphasized that what’s most important quality for 
journalist is to be fair instead of being objective.548 The second most important 
experience was my own working experience with SWA magazine and The Indonesian 
Observer newspaper. During my time with both media, I considered myself to be 
very lucky to have excellent experiences.
SWA magazine was the leading business magazine in Indonesia. It was part of 
TEMPO magazine group until 1994, from which SWA got its high quality reporting. 
The high quality reporting here was defined (loosely) by these standards: Always 
look for the most credible sources (the more credible the better); Always have at least 
two comparative sources (a single comparative source is used only when there is no 
other option); More credible sources are better (for main coverage, it is better too 
have at least four sources); Last but not least is always verify any information given 
by the sources f 49
During my tenure in The Indonesian Observer, I was often did my work besides 
Mandiri Online editors.550 Mandiri Online have a very strict guidelines that any 
stories will only be published after the journalist can verify their story with at least 
two sources. Thus combined with the role of journalist as the eyewitness, the two
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other sources rule made into three sources rule. I believe this practice to be a good 
standard of a fair reporting -  by basing the report to as many credible sources as 
possible.
Sources are an important process of news gathering and news reporting.551 Sources
give a report its credibility which is the main strength of news reports.552 But this
comes at a price that the source has the ability to influence what is being reported.
Ericsson et al give their arguments regarding sources:
N ew s also constitutes an authoritative vision o f  social order through what sources are cited as 
saying. Sources are used to cite the facts o f  the matter without further investigation 
(Tuchman, 1978; Ericson et al, 1987), and to give credibility to what reporter visualizes.55j
In the reality of daily news reporting in Indonesia, often journalists were put into 
difficult position when they had to protect the identity of their sources while at the 
same time presenting to the public with the information.554 This is very delicate issue 
where the public’s right to know is contradicted by the need to protect the person(s) 
who had divulged the information from possible harm because of their action. These 
sources then were generally categorized as un-attributed sources or sources without 
any clear identity.
Un-attributed sources in my experience as a journalist were not encouraged at all. 
Such sources are difficult to be verified and especially during the New Order regime, 
can lead to the allegation of spreading rumors or even slandering. Slandering or 
spreading rumors was a highly dangerous issue during the New Order regime as often 
part of the Indonesian elite may do whatever it takes to ‘punish any media that they 
considered to be spreading wrongful information about them." Thus, unless it was
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absolutely necessary, Indonesian media tended not to publish any un-attributed 
sources. Unfortunately this trend change after the fall of the New Order regime.556
During the New Order regime, un-attributed sources were mostly found in criminal 
articles involving minors or sexual crimes. Under Indonesian press ethics, victims of 
crimes particularly if they were minors or victims of sexual crimes must not be 
identified clearly. It is permissible to state the gender or age but not their true identity. 
After the fall of New Order regime such practices spread into political reports, which 
can be found in even the most respectable media.5d7 Though according to Indonesian 
law such practice is permissible it also brought serious issues about accuracy of the 
information and the honesty of the sources.558
The point of bringing this issue up is that the issue of un-attributed source is going to 
be part of the issue analyzed. Before we embark into analyzing this contested issue, 
we need to clarify the position about the un-attributed source. Un-attributed sources 
are permissible in both Australian and Indonesian newspapers but in particular for 
Indonesian newspapers such source is not the norm. It means as far as I know, in 
Indonesian press practices such practices can only be done if there is no other way to 
present the information and protect the source at the same time.
Under normal circumstances, when reporting conflicting ideas or parties, a journalist 
should strive for accuracy and fairness. This means all sides should be reported in a 
fair manner; if one side was quoted then the other side should be reported as well.
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During my journalism training in Australia, there was an informal rule of three 
sources that address the issue of the fair and balanced sources.
The three sources rule here was supposed to give a fair coverage to all parties; one for 
each of the warring parties and one for a neutral source. Theoretically, these three 
sources will give a fair, balanced and neutral report. No parties were overly 
represented and there is a third source acting as a neutral source. During my 
association with The Indonesian Observer, this rule was applied in slightly different 
manner.
In T h e  I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e n ’e r  I often worked next to the M a n d ir i  O n l in e , our sister publication 
that became the second fully dedicated online newspapers in Jakarta at that time. One thing 
that impressed me most with M a n d i r i  O n l in e  was o f  their professionalism. It was run and 
controlled by three editors, all former A N T A R A  news agency editors. They took turn to collect 
and process the raw reports from their field reporters.
Every time a reporter called the office to report the news, these editors never failed to ask 
back to their reporters: have they verified their news or not? Any news that was not verified 
yet, was processed but not published. Usually the editors would be satisfied until the news 
was verified with at least another source but normally they would prefer a third source to 
verify the story. Within months o f  their move to become fully based in the internet in 
February 1999, M a n d i r i  O n l in e  became one o f  the most accessed Indonesian web based 
newspapers besides D e tik .  c o m .559
Indeed in reality, it is very hard to get three different sources within very short time. 
For daily newspapers, where the deadlines are always tight the pressure is even 
higher. This is as true for Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Thus, often 
newspapers have to make do with whatever comes without much ability to fully 
verify them.
Australian journalist Ben Bohane who went to East Timor after the arrival o f INTERFET, 
said that the conditions in East Timor (when he arrived) were very difficult. Electiicity and 
communications were damaged and in many areas were not available at all. The journalists 
who were accredited (or in current terms: embedded) with INTERFET, were saved from those 
difficulties as INTERFET provided them with electricity and communication lines.
Nevertheless, Ben admitted, the pressure for those journalists embedded with INTERFET 
were very high too. For the Australian journalists (either print or broadcast journalists), their 
editors constantly demanded for new reports. At least once a day those journalists ha to
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report something to their offices. To report a proper news report under such circumstances is 
very difficult. Being an independent journalist who has more forgiving schedules, Ben 
Bohane did not have such difficulties with schedules.560 ’
As described above, the condition in East Timor during the crisis in 1999 was very 
difficult and dangerous. This situation led to some journalists to ‘relax’ their standard 
and ends up publishing stories that later were found to be wrong. A famous case was 
the story from Lindsay Murdoch where he reported that there was a houseful of 
bodies in the pro-Indonesian militia’s headquarters/''61 The journalist later simply 
claimed that he was not able to check and verified the story, let alone comply with the 
‘three sources rule’.
East Timor during the crisis in 1999 was not an ordinary place. The on-going conflict 
since 1975, have made East Timor a very hostile place. The risk for any journalist 
working in East Timor was very real and this was even so during the 1999 crisis 
where at least two journalists were shot at. One was killed and numerous others had 
their lives threatened. Nevertheless, the basic journalistic standard and practices 
should be followed otherwise the work will be meaningless. It is the focus of the 
study in this chapter and the following one, to understand how the journalists were 
able to works under very difficult situations.
6.3. Focus of study.
In this chapter the focus of the study is about how media operate within the constraint 
of the situation and what was the outcome. Issue of violence, soon escalated into the 
issue of emergency (within Australian media reports). For Indonesian newspapers, it
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is about one issue within a wave of problems faced by Indonesia at that time. Indeed 
the outcome as presented in previous chapters is significantly different.
The focus of this chapter is the media reports between the time referendum result 
announcement until the arrival of INTERFET (September 4th -  September 20th). The 
significance of the dates are: 1. It was considered the ‘peak’ of the crisis time. 2. Most 
significant was the absence of foreign journalists from East Timor around that time.
As a background, In September 4th the result of the referendum was announced by the 
UNAMET as the coordinator of the referendum. Within hours, pro-integration 
supporters went on a rampage, attacking any alleged supporters of the pro­
independence. The pro-integration supporters (often described as militias or pro­
Jakarta militias) attacked not only East Timorese but also anyone they considered to 
be the supporters of the pro-independence. These included church officials, UN staff, 
foreign aid workers and foreign journalists.
Within days the violence had pushed most of the foreigners out from East Timor. By 
September 10th, the only place considered to be ‘safe’ was the UN headquarters in 
Dili. Within the compound, were hundreds of East Timorese refugees and what was 
left of UN staff and foreign journalists. Finally at the 10th of September, with heavy 
security provided by Indonesian forces (Police and TNI), almost all the staff, 
journalists and refugees left Dili by air, leaving only a handful of UN staff that 
volunteered to stay behind. With this departure, all foreign journalists had left East
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Timor (there were already just a handful as the majority have left as soon as the 
violence escalated).
For the Indonesian press, the situation was different. Kompas and Suara Pembaruan 
had reporters/correspondents in East Timor until the evacuation of most of Indonesian 
journalists on September 22nd. Nevertheless Indonesian journalists were able to 
maintain their presence until October 1st, when Indonesian forces officially were 
pulled out from East Timor. Some newspapers like Republika were not able to 
maintain a continuous presence of their own reporter in East Timor and had to base 
their reports mostly to ANTARA news agency.563
The data collected from the period of September 4th -  September 20th 1999, shows a 
different pattern between Australian and Indonesian newspapers in term of sources 
used. The first discrepancy is the number of articles published. Australian newspapers 
published significantly more articles regarding East Timor compared to the 
Indonesian Newspapers. For the full list of articles selected to be analysed, please 
refer to Appendix A.
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Table 5
Articles published period September 4th - 20th’ 1999
Newspapers Articles published
The Sydney Morning Herald 264
The Australian 269
Kompas 59
Republika 49
Suara Pembaruan 40
Media Indonesia 54
Within the same period Australian newspapers on average published almost four 
times the number of articles regarding East Timor compared to the Indonesian 
newspapers. The articles analysed are all articles relating or regarding East Timor 
excluding public response (such as letters to the editors). Personal commentaries in 
the format of articles are included.564
The Table 1 shows how prominent East Timor issue is for Australian media. Within a 
17 days period, on average each Australian newspaper published around 16 articles 
each day. On the contrary, Indonesian newspapers only published between two to 
three articles each day. So on average, Australian newspapers published seven times 
more articles compared to the Indonesian newspapers.
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6.4. Research method.
In the previous chapter, we have used various models including the model from Peter 
White in order to analyse the frames within news reports. While very versatile, 
White s model is very specific upon the use of languages in presenting specific 
messages. Thus, that is White’s model’s main strength — to bring up and analyse 
specific parts of the news reports and to consider its salient meaning.
The other research model, Gadi Wolfslfed’s, has its strength in the contextual 
approach -  understanding the specific events within the context of the specific 
society.565 Wolfsfeld’s model strength also lies with the fact that it can seek 
understanding within a greater time span -  some of today’s events maybe understood 
by analyzing events in the past. Thus Wolfsfeld’s true strength is the ability to 
analyse events through its context.
The position of this thesis is that beyond simply understanding the issue of the role of 
the media in political conflict (East Timor crisis is a political conflict), there should 
be a greater understanding of the role of the media. Media today no longer can claim 
itself as a passive observer. Media in reality has become an active agent of change for 
the society.
The analysis in this chapter is based upon grounded theory in conjunction with 
content analysis method. The findings from the content analysis are constantly being 
analysed using various theories and commentaries and content analysis method which
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is part of the grounded theory. Commentaries in the grounded theory method, in order 
to maintain credibility, are based upon commentaries already available in the public 
domain (media reports etc). In certain cases, specific commentaries by knowledgeable 
sources may also be use.
Grounded theory is used in this thesis as it is considered to be the best approach here.
A more thorough explanation regarding the usage of Grounded Theory and about the
Grounded Theory itself can be found in Chapter 1 & 2. Barney Glaser explained the
strength of the grounded theory in which he made it relevant to this thesis.d66
Grounded theory allows the relevant social organization and social psychological organization 
o f the people studied to be discovered, to emerge -  in their perspective! Grounded theory does 
justice to the data. The methods in Basics o f  Qualitative research will always produce 
research products, but not the aforementioned ones o f emergence in the perspective o f the 
substantive area participant.567
Grounded theory is deemed to be most suitable to this research as this research is 
aimed to understand why Indonesian and Australian newspapers presented the East 
Timor crisis in 1999, differently. A quantitative oriented research such as the 
AKSARA Foundation’s568 research shows the differences in quantitative manner, but 
as Glaser said^69, it offers little in understanding the greater issue. Nevertheless in 
order to gain a solid data to be analysed using grounded theory another method -  
content analysis, is to be used here.
The content analysis method is used here to analyse the data by identifying, 
classifying and finally analyzing the data collected. The main focus of this chapter, as 
detailed earlier, is about the source of news during the time frame of this analysis
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(September 4,h until September 20,h). The definition of the content analysis used in 
this thesis comes from Charles R. Wright.570
Content analysis is a research technique for the systematic classification and description o f 
communication content according to certain usually predetermined categories. It may involve 
quantitative or qualitative analysis, or both. Technical objectivity requires that the categories 
o f  classification and analysis be clearly and operationally defined so that other researchers can
follow them reliably.....It is important to remember, however that content analysis itself
provides no direct data about the nature o f  the communicator, audience or effects. Therefore, 
great caution must be exercised whenever this technique is used for any purpose other than 
the classification, description and analysis o f  the manifest content o f the communication.571
Berger described content analysis as best applied with a historical and comparative 
approach. This is exactly the method employed in this chapter in order to analyse 
the role played by news sources within East Timor’s Crisis reports. This makes 
content analysis as the most suitable method in this chapter in conjunction with the 
grounded theory. Content analysis can provide a solid identification and classification 
of the raw data, while grounded theory will complete the analysis by allowing the 
collected data to present the researcher with perspectives based upon the data itself.
By using the combined method of content analysis and grounded theory, I believe 
that as Glaser said, the data collected will be able to speak for itself. The aim is that 
grounded theory will in the end shed the light or give greater understanding about the 
issue. At the same time, all of this is done by allowing the data to ‘speak for itself 
and by not forcing the data to fit into particular point of view.
An important note here is that content analysis in this thesis is used within a bigger 
context of qualitative research method, as outlined in Chapters 1 & 2. Some experts 
such as Neuendorf574 believes that content analysis is only suitable with quantitative
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analysis. Others believe that content analysis is applicable for both quantitative and 
qualitative research method.575
The research method employed in this chapter is conducted through several steps but 
is using two different methods. The first method is to use the content analysis method 
to identify and categorize the data, in this case news sources in Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers. After the data has been categorized, grounded theory method 
is used to explain the data by putting them into a greater perspective.
The research method employed in this chapter is conducted through several steps. 
Initially it is to use the content analysis method to help identify and classify the data. 
The first step is to identify all sources used in the articles within the period. Second is 
to tabulate how many times a similar source was used in comparison to the total 
numbers of articles published by each newspapers. Third is to make an analysis from 
the total tabulation.
Grounded theory came in as the analysis method for the data was collected. The data 
compiled will show a certain trend within the Australian and Indonesian newspapers 
-  in this case the choice of sources. What the data shows is just the trend. It does not 
give interpretation nor meaning unless it was put in the bigger perspectives such as. 
the social condition of both societies, political situation (at the time), historical 
background, values, culture and beliefs.
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The main point is that data, though it may be grounded at an empirical level needs to 
be connected to the bigger and more complex background in order to understand it 
better. As detailed before, news is part of a social construction of reality.576 The 
essence of news is information which means knowledge. The question now in this 
chapter is where does this knowledge come from? Does the choice of sources 
affecting knowledge create the outcome?
The news sources in this chapter are defined as all persons/institutions to which the 
news is attributed to; this means all persons quoted or whose comments are based 
upon. It also includes all institutions mainly press institutions of which the news may 
be based upon. The sources usually can be identified by the reference form such as 
but not limited to: ‘said’, ‘said by’ and ‘according to’.
To create the categorization of the sources, an initial research has been conducted by 
analyzing all newspapers reports within the time frame; September 4th -  20th. All 
reports were analysed in terms of who and what sources did they use in the reports. 
Based on that, a summary was created.
The categorization on the newspaper reports put sources into these categorizations:
• Australian officials -  all personnel who were under official employment by 
the Australian government or person/s who are a member or part of any 
Australian legislative/judicative/executive body and were quoted on their 
official capacity.
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• UN Officials. All personnel who were under the employment of the UN and 
quoted as sources, based on their official capacity.
• Indonesian Officials. Any person/s who were under official employment by 
Indonesian government or person/s who are member or part of any Indonesian 
legislative/judicative/executive body and were quoted on their official 
capacity.
• Pro-Independence. Any East Timorese who were identified or identified 
themselves as part of or the supporter of the Independence movements (i.e. 
FALINTIL, FRETILIN etc).
• Pro-Integration. Any East Timorese who were identified or identified 
themselves as part of or the supporter of the Integration groups (AITARAK, 
PPI etc).
• Refugees. Any East Timorese who were not identified nor identified 
themselves as part of any groups above (pro-independence or pro-integration).
• Australian people. Any Australian citizen (identified or claimed to be) that 
was not a member or affiliated with Australian government.
• Indonesian people. Any Indonesian citizen (identified or claimed to be) that 
was not a member or affiliated with Indonesian government.
• Australian press. Any members of Australian press (i.e. journalists, editors or 
photojoumalists) or the institution itself (i.e. ...based on reports in THE 
A USTRAL1AN newspaper...).
• Indonesian press. Any members of Indonesian press (i.e. journalists, editors or 
photojoumalists) or the institution itself (i.e. ...based on repoits in KOMPAS 
newspaper...).
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• Foreign press. Any members of non Australian or Indonesian press (i.e. 
journalists, editors or photojoumalists) or the institution itself (i.e ...based in 
reports on THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper...).
• Unnamed or un-attributed sources. Any sources that were quoted but not 
identified (i.e. based on a source at the defence department).
• No sources used. To identify any articles that used no sources other than the 
writer itself (i.e. opinion piece).
• Other sources. For any other sources that cannot be categorized as above (i.e. 
President of the United States).
The sources categorization above is based on the aim of this research; to understand 
the different view of the East Timor crisis by Australian and Indonesian newspapers 
(through their reports). Thus it was oriented to look for the interaction between the 
alleged main players: Australia, Indonesia, the UN and East Timorese. But the 
categorization is not based on random examples, Table 6 below will show that all that 
were considered ‘major’ players were indeed used significantly as news sources 
either by Australian or Indonesian newspapers (or both).
The categorization above is also in line in particular with grounded theory concept 
regarding categorization.577 The categorization based upon patterns which were 
provided by the raw data — the articles themselves. After finding such a pattern, a 
tabulation based on the pattern follows. The result is presented in Table 6 but the full 
list of the articles analysed is available on Appendix A.
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An important note about the data presented in Table 6 findings for each newspaper is 
presented as a percentage to the total of the articles published by each newspaper. The 
aim of a grounded research theory is to create an understanding578, in this case how 
each newspaper presented their views on the East Timor crisis. Each newspaper is 
perceived to have a unique perception about the crisis and in the end it helps create a 
social construction of reality of the crisis for their readers. With such an approach, the 
aim is to allow each newspaper to be understood as they presented their views.
It is worth mentioning again about the social construction of reality. The social 
construction of reality is based upon the theory by Peter Berger.^ Berger believes 
that what is constituted as knowledge is not an independent event nor occurrence.580 
In fact it is a socially constructed event in which the knowledge is a relative concept, 
depending upon the interpretation of the society towards a specific event or issue.581 
News is a social construction of reality and source as part of the news is an important 
part of how the reality is being defined.“82 So understanding the role of source is 
important in understanding the knowledge created by the news.
A significant portion of the grounded theory analysis will be conducted in Chapter 7, 
as the scope of analysis that can be covered by Grounded Theory is very wide. This 
chapter will deal mainly with the categorization and classification of sources as the 
data. Analysis of this chapter will deal mainly with the data compiled but again the 
aim is to allow the data to speak for themselves just as what grounded theory is 
aiming at.
263
The timeline for the research is set between September 4th and September 20th 1999. 
The rationale is September 4 is the starting date when foreign press were leaving 
East Timor due to increasing violence. Thhe foreign press only returned later on 
September 20th with the arrival of INTERFET.
6.5. Research findings.
The significance from the numbers of articles published in relevance to Robert 
Entman’s concept.' .Entman argues that the importance of an issue can be seen from 
the relative size of articles (words).583 My argument here is not only the number of 
words is important but also the relative amount of attention in the form of articles 
published. Both aspects shows an amount of attention given to a specific issue.
Regarding the number of articles published, the numbers can also be deceiving. 
Australian newspapers have more pages on average (around 40 pages daily more on 
the weekends) compared to Indonesian newspapers (12 pages daily). What Australian 
newspapers can do in their much bigger space, Indonesian newspapers have to make 
do in a much less available space. The issue is important but the space is limited and 
does not permit extensive reporting. . So in this context East Timor issue is still a 
very important issue for Indonesian newspapers.
But furthermore there is no strong evidence to tell whether the relative importance of 
the East Timor crisis is directly reflective on the numbers of news item created or the 
pages available. Every newspaper has at their own discretion, pages plans or page lay
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outs in newspapers terms. For example the lay out for pages of The Sunday Observer 
(The Sunday edition of The Indonesian Observer newspaper) is listed below.586
• Page 1: Headline news. The latest news. Made at the very last hour before 
printing. The aim is to present the very latest news.
• Page 2: News but not the necessarily the latest news. Often it is general news 
that still current but deemed not fit for first page.
• Page 3: Features. Normally about the hottest topic of the week. These can be 
about foreign or domestic issues.
• Page 4: Environment. About news regarding the environment.
• Page 5: Science and Technology news.
• Page 6: Arts news.
• Page 7: Arts or Fashion news.
• Page 8: Entertainment news.
• Page 9: Entertainment news.
• Page 10: Living -  recipes, tips and other household interests.
• Page 11: Travel.
• Page 12: Photo galleries.
The description above shows the lay out plan for the newspaper. Under normal 
circumstances, this plan is followed rather strictly. It means no news about foods can 
go to page 2 unless it is about some Indonesian winning a prestigious cooking award 
for example. But there are exceptions such as for page 11 which was nicknamed as. 
Halaman KKN (pages for collusion, corruption and nepotism) mainly due to the fact
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that it is the page where various ‘news’ from sponsors, business relations and public 
relation materials were placed.587
The pages plan above is not absolute. From time to time if there is breaking news that 
was deemed extremely important, then the whole page 1 can be filled with just a 
single story. Then page 2 may carry more about the story in page 1. Page 3 then can 
be filled with regular news that usually goes into page 1 & 2. Normally such decision 
lies with the board of editors but the editor in charge has the ultimate veto regarding 
the layout of the pages.588
The illustration above is to show that in particular Indonesian newspapers, numbers 
of articles published though related with number of pages available may not 
necessarily reflect the perception of importance by the newspaper. News selection is 
often described as a process based upon intuition and logic rather than scientific 
art.589
In the opinion of the author, the data from Table 1 is best understood by counting on 
average how many articles were published within such a short period (17 days). For 
instance Suara Pembarnan published the least numbers of articles; just 40 articles 
within that period. This means on average just two to three articles everyday. But 
does this mean the issue of the East Timor crisis is not an important issue for them? 
The Chief of editor of Suara Pembaruan, Atmadji Sumarkidjo stated that it was not 
the case at all.590
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Instead other factors may have played in such as access and maintaining it. The 
Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald are representing two of the largest media 
companies in Australia: News Limited and Fairfax Corporation. Both of these 
companies are international level media players, backed by strong financial resources. 
Their journalists are often equipped and supported by state of the arts technologies 
and they can sustain overseas assignments in difficult areas such as East Timor much 
easier than their Indonesian counterparts.591
Besides technologies, the ability to send and sustain difficult assignments is an 
important advantage that Australian newspapers have. Both Republika and Suara 
Pembaruan admit that they could not afford to send nor maintain a journalist in East 
Timor continuously.592 Republika admits that on many occasion, they have to send 
their journalists with officials contingents visiting East Timor.593 Such practices made 
access to different parties very difficult.594
Before the 1997 crisis, very few print media in Indonesia could afford to sent their journalists 
traveling around Indonesia to cover news stories. The main reason was usually financial. To 
send a reporter and a photojoumalist is very expensive especially if the travel requires 
traveling by air. In the end, many media relies heavily on ‘invitations’ as usually it contained 
the traveling arrangement and the accommodation for the journalists.
Within the two print media that I used to work, such arrangements were normally the case. 
The air ticket often came from special arrangements with the airlines where they barter plane 
tickets with advertising space. When in S W A , normally the accommodation was covered by 
S W A , unless it was provided by the host. For assignments in difficult areas such as areas not 
covered by regular flights, the media relies on official visits (or kunjungan din as) by the 
officials where they can tag along. More often than not, these visits were the initiatives o f the 
officials instead o f  the media itself.595
So in the end the argument here is that regarding the number of articles published 
within the researched period, it is best understood that all newspapers researched here 
perceived East Timor to be an important issue to cover. The gap between numbers of 
articles published by each newspaper may not necessarily state the level of perceived
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importance but also affected by many other factors such as the newspapers policies, 
access to sources and ability to send their own journalists.
6.6. Media reports and the News sources.
Between September 4th and September 20th, news reporting was particularly difficult 
in East Timor. Immediately after referendum result was announced, pro-autonomy 
militias went on rampages. Their target were pro-independence supporters, UN staff 
and foreign journalist; parties that they deemed responsible for the result of the 
referendum.
As the violence escalated, many foreign journalists decided to leave East Timor. 
Within days, almost all UN staff and foreign journalists left East Timor. What was 
left was just a skeletal number of UN staff. It is believed that the last foreign 
journalists left East Timor on September 9th, together with the refugees in the UN 
compound in Dili.
The question that arises then how is the news media, in particular Australian 
newspapers going to get their stories? How about the Indonesian newspapers? 
Theoretically, Indonesian newspapers should be better off as the perpetrator of the 
violence -  pro autonomy militias are not targeting Indonesian journalists. Does that 
means Indonesian newspapers would have a much better representation (in terms of 
sources) than Australian newspapers at the same period? Also whose frame is likely 
to be pushed in the media under such circumstances?
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The data analysed shows that during the same period, Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers were doing the best they could under the circumstances. The numbers of 
articles published in Australian newspapers shows that their intensity were not 
diminished under difficult circumstances. Indonesian newspapers on the other hand 
seemed to be unable to match the level of intensity shown by the Australian 
newspapers.
M elvin Singh from T h e  N e w  P a p e r  -  Singapore told me that the East Timor crisis in 1999 
was a very important issue. Logically it is a very big issue. Never since the Balkan crisis, was 
the UN were involved in deciding the fate o f  a nation, East Timor.
For the majority o f  Indonesians at the time, the issue was important as it raised the issue 
whether Indonesia was still a united republic or not. Various areas in Indonesia such as Aceh 
and Irian Jaya have called for cessation from Indonesia. We, Indonesians, always feared that 
once an area ceased to be part o f  Indonesia, it will set a precedent for the others.
But when speaking with my Australian friends the issue was very different. For the majority 
o f  Australians, the issue was about human rights, about the fate o f  people that have been 
oppressed for a long time. O f course, most Indonesians agree that what the Indonesian 
military did in East Timor or anywhere (the human rights abuses) else was wrong. But most 
Indonesian w ill find it really hard to accept that the unity and the future o f  Indonesia, that has 
been fought for since 1945 to the death o f  the students in 1998 was about to be undermined 
with the support o f  foreign countries.596
The different views and perception of the East Timor crisis above influenced the 
saturation and intensity of Australian and Indonesian newspapers. For Australian 
newspapers, the issue is in East Timor. What is going to happen there? Now Australia 
has committed its military again for the first time since the Vietnam War, it is in the 
interest of the Australian public to know how the mission goes and hopefully for a 
successful outcome. Apart from that, Australian newspapers never ceased to promote 
the historical link between Australia and East Timor in World War 2.
Indonesian newspapers perceived the East Timor crisis as the biggest gamble that the 
Indonesian government took since the fall of New Order regime in 1998. With this
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crisis, lies the future of Indonesia. As stated above, many feared that if one area 
ceased to be part of Indonesia, it will set a precedent that will be followed by other 
areas such as Aceh and Irian Jaya (now called Papua). Thus the issue is very 
important but at the same time, the bigger issue lies within Indonesia itself with the 
economic and political crisis still going. The main issue is how the Indonesian 
government is going to deal with the issue of East Timor, not just what is going on in 
East Timor alone.
Data also shows that there is a strong tendency that news reports tend to reflect the 
views of parties closely related or affiliated with the particular news organization. In 
other words, Indonesian newspapers tend to quote more of their own people or those 
close to Indonesian people/govemment. The situation is vice versa with the 
Australian newspapers.
The Table 2 shows categories of sources used by Australian newspapers in the period 
of September 4th -  20th. The numbers in the tables shows how many articles are using 
a specific kind of source. This table is not showing how many times a specific 
sources is being used. The aim here is to show how many articles are basing their 
reports into a specific kind of sources.
Various references have argued that media sources are more than just the source of 
the news (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Bennet, 1983, Center, 2000c, Entman, 1989, Gans, 1999, 
Shoemaker and Reese, 1991, Wolfsfeld, 2003b, McCullagh, 2002). Sources aie the 
reference point for a news report. Sources can influence how an event is being told
270
through news report. Sources also help in creating credibility. Most importantly,
source can shape the frame within a news report.“''97
The issue o f  sources was a very difficult issue for the journalists working in East Timor 
during the 1999 crisis. Melvin Singh, describes that it was a juggling act forhim to maintain 
good rapport with all parties, including the Indonesian military when he was in East Timor. 
Coming from a relatively neutral country like Singapore does help a lot as he was perceived 
to be a neutral party.
For Melvin it is about maintaining balance, trying to get as many sources as possible. Having 
a deep knowledge about Indonesia and speaking fluent Bahasa Indonesia, allows Melvin to 
have a very wide range o f  contacts from the INTERFET, Indonesian officials to the pro­
integration militias. These sources, were later used in his reports.
Australian journalists may have difficulties in covering different sources. Melvin stated that 
most that came to East Timor could not speak Bahasa, an important language in East Timor. 
Ben Bohane admits that after the arrival o f  INTERFET it was difficult to get access to the 
Indonesian officials or the pro-integration militias. Australian journalists at that time, 
according to Ben, were naturally more acquainted with INTERFET officials, UN officials and 
the pro-independence supporters.398
Sources used, according to the Melvin Singh and Ben Bohane also depends upon the 
available access. Ben Bohane said that he would love to interview the pro-integration 
militia leaders but there were none left after the arrival of the INTERFET, while 
Indonesia would not allow him to enter Indonesia. This situation is in fact played well 
with any parties wanting to win political influence, just as Wolfsfeld asserted. The 
arena is not even; some parties have the arena only for themselves with little 
opposition from the other party. Thus it would not be surprising if the result is 
overwhelming one sided reporting.
Table 6 presents the findings after sources in all newspapers reports were classified 
and categorized. The presentation is in percentage terms to the total number of 
articles published by each newspapers. So for instance, Kompas published 50 articles 
within the researched period and 38% of the articles were quoting Indonesian
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officials. Another example is The Sydney Morning Herald which published 264 
articles and quoted Australian officials in 25% of the total articles published by them.
Again as mentioned earlier, such methods of presentation are based upon the 
grounded theory approach -  allowing the data to speak for itself. Content analysis 
method is used to classify and categorize but not to analyse. In grounded theory, the 
data will show its meaning when it is put within perspectives of different theories,
• • . •  599opinions or perspectives .
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T a b le  6.
News Sources by Categories — Indonesian & Australian Newspapers
(In percentage to total articles o f each newspaper to the articles published by each newspaper)
S o u r c e s  c a t e g o r y k o n i p a s  
(5 0  a r t ic le s )
K e p u b l ik a  
(4 9  a r t ic le s )
S u a r a  P e m b a r u a n  
( 4 0  a r t ic le s )
M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia  
(5 4  a r t ic le s )
T h e  A u s t r a l ia n  
( 2 6 9  a r t i c le s )
T h e  S y d n e y  
M o r n i n g  H e r a l d  
( 2 6 4  a r t i c l e s )
A u s t r a l i a n  O f f i c i a l s 12 1 2 .2 4 12.5 9 . 2 5 2 2 . 3 2 5
U N  O f f i c i a l s 18 6 . 1 2 12.5 11.11 1 7 .8 4 1 7 .8
I n d o n e s i a n  O f f i c i a l s 3 8 4 0 .8 1 4 0 4 0 . 7 4 1 3 .7 5 1 0 .6
P r o - I n d e p e n d e n c e 6 4 . 0 8 10 1 .85 9 . 6 6 7 . 9 5
P r o - A u t o n o m y 4 2 0 . 4 0 5 13 1 .85 2 . 2 7
f a s t  T i m o r e s e  r e f u g e e s 6 0 2 .5 5 . 5 5 3 .7 1 5 . 6 8
I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e 3 8 2 8 . 5 7 3 5 2 2 . 2 2 3 . 3 3 4 4 . 9 2
A u s t r a l i a n  p e o p l e 0 0 5 0 1 6 .7 2 2 5 . 7 5
A u s t r a l i a n  P r e s s 0 0 2 .5 0 4 . 0 8 1 .8 9
I n d o n e s i a n  P r e s s 4 8 . 1 6 0 0 3 .7 1 2 . 6 5
N e w s  A g e n c i e s  -  f o r e i g n  
P r e s s  .
2 0 4 . 0 8 2 7 .5 11.11 4 . 0 8 2 . 6 5
U n - a l t r i b u t e d  s o u r c e s 6 0 5 1.85 1 6 .3 5 1 8 .5 6
N o  s o u r c e s  u s e d 16 3 4 . 6 9 2 7 .5 1 6 .6 6 2 6 . 3 9 2 4 . 6 2
O t h e r  s o u r c e s  ( t h a n  a b o v e ) . 2 2 8 . 1 6 7 .5 3 .7 15.61 1 3 .2 5
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The data in Table 6 shows the sources used by Australian and Indonesian newspapers in 
the period of September 4th till September 20th. In this period most foreign journalists -  
in particular Australian journalists had to leave East Timor due to escalating violence.
But the data presented in Table 6 may not present the full story nor a better 
understanding of the how the media operates under extremely difficult situation. The data 
from Table 6 needs to be put within their perspectives, in this case to be viewed as 
representative of the newspapers views about the crisis -  at the particular time. Each 
newspaper has their own perception over the crisis and this is reflected over their choice 
of sources.
Table 6 shows what sources were used by Australian and Indonesian newspapers during 
the height of crisis where almost all foreign journalists, and the presence of Indonesian 
journalists was at the minimum. The question asked here is how the Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers continue doing their work at that difficult time? Who will be theii 
sources? What sources will they use? Are Australian and Indonesian newspapers going to 
behave differently with their choices of source or not?
274
T ab le  7
Sources ranks -  Australian & Indonesian Newspapers
R a n k T h e  S y d n e y  M o r n in g  
H e r a ld
T h e  A u s t r a l i a n R O M  P A S S U A R A
P E M B A R U A N
R E P U B L I K A M E D I A  I N D O N E S I A
1. A u s t r a l i a n  p e o p l e N o  s o u r c e  u s e d  
( o p i n i o n )
- I n d o n e s i a n  
o f f i c i a l s
- I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e
I n d o n e s i a n
o f f i c i a l s
I n d o n e s i a n  o f f i c i a l s I n d o n e s i a n  o f f i c i a l s
2. A u s t r a l i a n  o f f i c i a l s A u s t r a l i a n  o f f i c i a l s O t h e r  s o u r c e s - N o  s o u r c e s  
( o p i n i o n )
- N e w s
a g e n c i e s / f o r e i g n
p r e s s
N o  s o u r c e  u s e d I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e
J . N o  s o u r c e  u s e d  
( o p i n i o n )
U N  o f f i c i a l s N e w s
a g e n c i e s / f o r e i g n
p r e s s
- A u s t r a l i a n  
o f f i c i a l s
- U N  o f f i c i a l s
I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e N o  s o u r c e  u s e d  ( o p i n i o n )
4. U n - a t t r i b u t e d  s o u r c e A u s t r a l i a n  p e o p l e U N  o f f i c i a l s P r o - I n d e p e n d e n c e P r o - a u t o n o m y P r o - a u t o n o m y
5. U N  o f f i c i a l s U n - a t t r i b u t e d  s o u r c e N o  s o u r c e s  
( o p i n i o n )
O t h e r  s o u r c e s A u s t r a l i a n  o f f i c i a l s - N e w s  a g e n c i e s / f o r e i g n  
p r e s s
- U N  o f f i c i a l s
6. O t h e r  s o u r c e s O t h e r  s o u r c e s A u s t r a l i a n  o f f i c i a l s - U n - a t t r i b u t e d  
s o u r c e
- P r o - a u t o n o m y
I n d o n e s i a n  p r e s s A u s t r a l i a n  o f f i c i a l s
7. I n d o n e s i a n  o f f i c i a l s I n d o n e s i a n  o f f i c i a l s - P r o - I n d e p e n d e n c e
- f a s t  T i m o r e s e  
r e f u g e e s
I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e U N  O f f i c i a l s - f a s t  T i m o r e s e  r e f u g e e s
- O t h e r  s o u r c e
8. P r o - I n d e p e n d e n c e P r o - I n d e p e n d e n c e - P r o - A u t o n o m y
- I n d o n e s i a  p r e s s
- f a s t  T i m o r e s e  
r e f u g e e s
- A u s t r a l i a n  p r e s s
- N e w s
a g e n c i e s / f o r e i g n
p r e s s
- P r o - I n d e p e n d e n c e
- U n - a t t r i b u t e d  s o u r c e s
- P r o - I n d e p e n d e n c e
9. f a s t  T i m o r e s e  r e f u g e e s A u s t r a l i a n  p r e s s - - - -
10. I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e - f a s t  T i m o r e s e  
r e f u g e e s
- A u s t r a l i a n  p r e s s
1 1 - I n d o n e s i a n  p r e s s
- N e w s  a g e n c i e s / f o r e i g n  
p r e s s
I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p le
12. P r o - A u t o n o m y P r o - A u t o n o m y - - - -
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Table 7, shows the finding from Table 6 in different perspectives. In Table 7, the sources 
used by each newspaper were rank based upon their proportion to the total articles 
published by each newspaper. From the table 3, it is clear now that Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers presented a totally different view during the particular period 
based upon the sources they used.
Selection of sources show a cultural, political and sociological orientation to create a 
social construction of reality by the newspaper {Wolfsfeld, 1997 #86;McCullagh, 2002 
#31;Cottle, c2003 #18}. This analysis will based upon the social construction of reality. 
The social construction of reality is a concept based upon the condition of a particular 
society600. In this research the related society will be Australian and Indonesian society, 
as they are the based on the newspapers that are being analysed.
6.7. Top sources and its implication of the perspective created.
At the top of sources featured in The Sydney Morning Herald are the Australian people 
(25.75% of the total articles published by The Sydney Morning Herald) followed by 
Australian officials in the second place (25% of the total articles published by The 
Sydney Morning Herald). In the third place are opinion piece (24.62% of the total 
articles published by The Sydney Morning Herald).
For The Australian the view is rather different, but not by much. The top sourc 
are actually no sources used (opinion pieces) which consisted of _6.j 9 / o  of th
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articles published by The Australian. In second spot are the Australian officials as 
sources for 22.3% of the total articles published by The Australian. It is followed in third 
place by UN officials as sources in 17.84% of the total articles.
Fiom the top three sources used by Australian newspapers, Australian officials rank as
the most often used sources. Australian people also ranked among the highest (as
Australian people in The Sydney Morning Herald). In The Australian the opinion piece is
written by Australian people (in different capacities or backgrounds) thus it is safe to
assume that the opinion piece is actually reflecting the Australian people to an extent.
The general perception o f  the Australian newspapers was o f  an emergency situation in East 
Timor. This view was generally supported by Australian government in particular after the 
decision to send troops to East Timor. But behind the scenes, a different perception was being 
played out.
Started by Captain Andrew Plunkett, an army intelligence officer during East Timor crisis, there 
were allegations that behind the scene, the Australian government was trying to minimize the 
impact o f  its involvement in East Timor. Captain Plunkett and later Lieutenant Colonel Lance 
Collins have accused the Australian government o f  sabotaging its own military operation during 
East Timor crisis.
Both former officers alleged that the Australian government had known the hidden campaign by 
Indonesian military in East Timor long before it was known by the public. Those former officers 
also alleged that when Australian troops found more damning evidence against Indonesia, the 
Australian government had deliberately hid or sabotaged the evidence. The goal o f such efforts 
was allegedly to cover Australia’s deep knowledge regarding the Indonesian military’s covert 
campaign in East Timor and to protect Indonesia, to an extent, from further fall out in the 
international community.602
The accusations and evidences brought up by the two former officers, seriously 
challenged the frames promoted by Australian government as well as the Australian 
media. The official frames of the Australian government were always of surptise and 
later a position of assertiveness towards Indonesia (by sending the troops). But the 
accusations from the two former army officers have challenged those frames. Instead the
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Australian government was accused of trying to cover up its knowledge of the 
Indonesian military covert campaign in East Timor.
In June 2006, a new development in East Timor brought new challenges towards the 
frames promoted by Australian government in 1999. In April 2006, a domestic quarrel 
between East Timor’s Government under Prime Minister Marie Alkatiri against a group 
of Army officers ended with the dismissals of around 600 officers and soldiers. The 
soldiers instead decided to ran away with all their weapons and equipments.
Within weeks, in May and June 2006, the situation worsened with security conditions 
deteriorating. Clashes between various armed factions erupted and the conflict had 
escalated towards civil war. Chaos again engulfed East Timor, almost a repetition of the 
violence in 1999, except now there are no pro-integration militias as the obvious culprit.
What this situation challenges was the frame promoted back 1999 that the chaos and 
mayhem prior and after the referendum was purely due to Indonesian military’s covert 
campaign. The Australian government in 1999, publicly rejected Indonesian perception 
that the chaos and violence is due to the disappointment of the pro-integration groups 
towards the result of the referendum.
Australian perception that horizontal conflict in East Timor is due to Indonesia’s campaign was 
severely challenged in May -  July 2006. The quarrels and the subsequent riots between vaiious 
factions in East Timor is a proof how volatile the relationships between factions and groups in 
East Timor. Indonesian military itself has acknowledged this condition and used to their own 
advantages in the past.60j The Australian government and media flatly rejected that such seeds of 
horizontal conflict existed. The frame from Australian government was that the chaos and 
violence were due to Indonesian military’s covert campaign.
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In May -  July 2006, suddenly Australian government were faced with a repetition o f similar 
violence in 1999. The difference is the violence was triggered by a domestic quarrel and yet the 
outcome is similar violence and riots like 1999 cr isis“ -1 Ironically, Australia had to assemble an 
almost similar contingent with INTERFET (the majority o f  new troops were Australian and 
Malaysian troops -  similar to INTERFET) to stopped the violence. Unlike 1999, the international 
troops were not greeted as heroes by the locals.605 ’
The irony of the mayhem in 2006 is that history is repeating itself. Similar chaos and 
violence as in 1999, was again repeated in East Timor. Again, Australia had to send its 
troops back to East Timor to prevent the whole country collapsing. But this time, the 
frame of horizontal conflict due to Indonesia’s involvement was not applicable. The 
conflict proved that the seed of horizontal conflict is very strong within East Timor 
society.
In the Indonesian newspapers, the situation is totally different than in the Australian 
newspapers. In all Indonesian newspapers (except with Kompas that also put Indonesian 
people as their top sources), Indonesian officials were the top source used. In all 
Indonesian newspapers, the Indonesian officials as sources were used significantly. 
Kompas quoted Indonesian officials and Indonesian people in 38% of their published 
articles while Suara Pembaruan, Republika and Media Indonesia were 40%, 40.81% and 
40.74% respectively. With an average of 40% of the total articles published, Indonesian 
officials as sources are significantly more often quoted (in percentage to total articles 
published by each newspaper) in comparison to Australian officials quoted by Austialian 
newspapers.
As described earlier, the issue o f  East Timor in 1999 is a complex issue foi the majority o f 
Indonesians. In general, Indonesians sympathize strongly with the suffeiings o f the East Timorese 
under the military rule. In reality, the whole o f  Indonesia suffers from the same fate. But or 
Indonesians, the issue o f  separatism is a very sensitive issue.
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In 1999, while Indonesia was having a very critical economic, social and political crisis, suddenly 
East Timor was given the choice to be remain with Indonesia or to be a free country. Such options 
were a nightmare for Indonesia as it might lead other areas to demand for similar options. When 
East Timor decided to be fiee, it took Indonesia by surprise and later turned into anger as it was 
alleged that Australia was pressing Indonesia too much in the matter.606
For Indonesians, the issue of East Timor lies within how the Indonesian government is 
going to prevent other areas demanding similar treatment? Now the precedent has been 
set, all it takes is just enough international pressure and a referendum can be held. As the 
issue is more about the Indonesian government (its actions and reactions), it should not 
come as a surprise as the main sources for the Indonesian newspapers were Indonesian 
officials.
As sources, Indonesian officials give Indonesian newspapers an easy access of 
information though it may not be the case every time. Indonesian officials were also well 
known to not give useful information to the media in order to give them power over the 
media reports.607 Therefore it was imperative for a good media and their journalists to be 
very careful with what the officials said and try to verify the information with as many
sources as possible.
Angela Romano’s book regarding the way Indonesian press worked during the Soeharto regime is 
an excellent inside o f  the work Indonesian press. Nevertheless, a lot more aspects o f Indonesian 
press were not covered in it. For instance, during my tenure with S W A  magazine, I often found 
that sources asked for our scripts before it was published. This bad practice o f public relations by 
the source, was often exacerbated with the practices o f bribery. S W A  prides itself as an honorable 
media and anyone caught accepting bribery or giving away scripts to the sources, ran a risk o 
being fired.
But sometimes, some sources has some ingenious ways like having their own tape recorder durin_, 
the interviews. This way, we did not have to argue about sending the sciipt, there was no nee to. 
If there was any dispute about the content o f the interview, the source has its own solid evi ence. 
Unfortunately not many sources used this practice. With public officials things were even more 
difficult as they tended to dictate what was to be published. Often we had to be more care a 
usual if  we are going to use public officials as sources.
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Public officials are a very important source of news. Their position made them a very 
strong source as only they can give official statements regarding official issues. But in 
the case of Indonesian officials, often it was better to carefully use them as sources.
Second most often quoted sources in Indonesian newspapers were in general opinion
pieces in the majoiity by Indonesian people. The only exception is Koinpcis whose
second most often quoted sources were other sources . An interesting finding is with
Suara Pembaman, where news agencies or foreign press also rank the second most often
quoted sources. This was followed at the third rank by news agencies/foreign press
(Kompas — 20% of its total articles); Australian and UN officials (Suara Pembaman —
12.5% of its total articles); Indonesian people (.Republika - 28.57%) and opinion piece
(Media Indonesia -  16.66% of its total articles).
An immediate lesson that I learned when I became a journalist was to understand who the 
audiences are. With the three media I worked for, S IV A , T h e  I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r  and T h e N e w  
P a p e r  each has their own particular audiences and each required me to learned how to address the 
audiences properly.
It was like having a conversation regarding issues that were familiar with the audiences. 
Indonesian media naturally would prefer to have Indonesian sources as they can address the 
Indonesian public much easily. When I was working for T h e  N e w  P a p e r , I had to imagine what 
would be interesting for the Singaporean audiences. Often, for T h e N e w  P a p e r  issues that were 
important for them were the stories o f  Singaporeans in Indonesia.609
Having local sources (for instance Indonesian sources for Indonesian media) is more than 
just a convenience. Often the local audience can relate more easily with local sources. 
But there is also the issue for access here. During the time of the study, very few 
Indonesian newspapers had direct access to East Timor except with Indonesian officials, 
either military or civilians. But another issue is that East Timor becomes a conflict 
perception, where Indonesia’s perception of the East Timor crisis was in conflict with the
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Australian perception of East Timor crisis. In this context, logically the Indonesian media 
seems to prefer presenting Indonesia’s perception as the main issue.
For the third rank of the most often used sources by Indonesian newspapers are news
agencies, Australian officials, Indonesian people and opinion pieces (no source used).
Kompas quoted news agencies/foreign press at the third place (20% of its total articles).
Suara Pembaruan quoted Australian officials and UN officials evenly (12.5% of its total
articles published). Republika quoted Indonesian people (28.57% of its total articles).
Media Indonesia quoted opinion/no source used in 16.66% of its total articles.
News agencies often were the lifeline o f  the newspapers. In T h e I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r , 
approximately 50% o f our contents came from news agencies. For the Sunday edition that I 
worked for, the contents from news agencies can reach 70%. The reason is technical; we simply 
did not have the access, manpower and time to cover all possible news by ourselves.610
The pattern emerging from the top three sources used by Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers shows a different but at the same time similar pattern. In the top three 
sources, all newspapers from Australia and Indonesia show a tendency to quote sources 
close or within their own society, in this case Australian or Indonesian officials and 
Australian or Indonesian people. As East Timor during the period is de facto a hostile 
place for both Australian and Indonesian press, thus this pattern shows that both 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers decided to refers back to their own society 
members to report about something outside their own society. The distinct pattern is 
more visible when the analysis is expanded to the top five sources used.
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T ab le  8.
Five most often used sources -  Australian newspapers
Rank The Sydney Morning Herald The Australian
1. Australian people Opinions (No source used)
2. Australian officials Australian officials
o
J. Opinions (no source used) UN Officials
4. Un-attributed source Australian people
5. UN Officials Un-attributed source
In the Table 8, the top five sources used by Australian newspapers were listed. As 
described above, the top five sources are similar between The Sydney Morning Herald 
and The Australian. Both newspapers basically are using the same type of sources. The 
difference is just the rank.
Another finding similar with the earlier description is the sources listed are all closely 
related with Australian society. In fact except for UN officials, most of the sources are 
part of Australian society. This raised a serious question of why during a difficult 
situation for the Australian press to work on East Timor, instead they were relying on 
sources within their own society? Also how about the Indonesian press at the same 
period?
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T ab le  9.
Five most often used sources -  Indonesian newspapers.
Rank Kompas Suara
Pembaruan
Republika Media Indonesia
1. -Indonesian 
officials 
- Indonesian 
people
-Indonesian
officials
-Indonesian
official
-Indonesian
officials
2. -Other sources -Opinion (no 
sources used) 
-News
agencies/foreign
press
-Opinion (no 
source used)
- Indonesian people
o
J . -News
agencies/foreign
press
-Australian 
officials 
-UN officials
- Indonesian 
people
-Opinion (No 
source used)
4. -UN Officials - Pro­
independence
- Pro-autonomy - Pro-autonomy
5. -Opinion (No 
source used)
-Other source -Australian
officials
-News
agencies/Foreign
press
- UN officials
Table 9 outline the top five sources used by Indonesian newspapers. The finding in table 
5 shows a more diverse choice of sources within Indonesian newspapers compared to 
Australian newspapers (Table 4). There is a similarity of the type of sources used by 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers; both were using sources close to their own 
society.
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The most often source used in Indonesia are their own officials. Then it was followed by 
Indonesian people and opinion from (mostly) Indonesian people. So up to this point, 
Indonesian people (officials and citizens) were quoted significantly just like Australian 
newspapers did (Table ->), but then the similarities dissipate. Indonesian newspapers then 
quoted a much more diverse choice of sources including pro-autonomy supporters, news 
agencies/foreign press and even Australian officials. Such diversity did not exist at this 
level in the Australian newspapers which for example rank Indonesian officials in 
seventh place.
6.8. Significance o f  source choices.
In Chapter 4 and 5, in discussions regarding frames, it was found that Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers are promoting a different set of frames. The frames are by nature 
different for each report as each report will most likely be presenting a different issue. 
Nevertheless by analyzing certain topics or subject and how they were framed in the 
news reports we can see the differences in general in how Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers framed their reports.
Different frames mean a different way of seeing things. In sociology a frame is part of 
social construction of reality. News media created a perception ol a "reality but the 
reality in social term is a relative term depending upon how the reality was defined. In 
this chapter the focus is on the creation of "reality’ based upon the usage of the sources.
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Findings in Table 2 show that one difference was the selection of sources by Australian 
and Indonesian newspapers. The significance of the source selection is even more visible 
in the Table 3 and 4. In Table 3 and 4 the sources can be described as those that the 
media can identify with best (at that time) to describe the issue. The findings show that 
those sources that the media thought they can identify themselves with are sources that 
originated or are closely associated with the society where the particular media came 
from.
Table 7 shows that the Australian media identify themselves best with their own 
country’s officials, their own people, UN officials and surprisingly unknown sources. 
Indonesian newspapers identify themselves best with Indonesian officials and people. So 
the significance is very clear here.
In the concept of framing, this can be described that newspapers from both Australia and 
Indonesia are actually presenting the views and perceptions of their own society. In the 
end the views and perceptions are almost totally different. Again this should not come to 
as a surprise as these are two distinctly different societies.
Society is not a singular entity; it is constituted with various factions that may have 
different interests, views or views (to say the least). Nevertheless, in this research such 
possibilities were accommodated with using various newspapers fiom both Australia and 
Indonesia as research subjects. As described in Chapter 1 and 2 that by focusing with
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different newspapers, it was hoped to have as wide as technically possible, the different 
views and perceptions.
In Table 6, 6.j and 6.4,we see that the usage of sources is very close to Australian 
society; Australian people and officials are among the most significant. UN officials are 
the most significant sources used from outside Australia. Also significant are the opinion 
pieces written by the Australian public. Indonesian officials are the least significant 
sources used.
The data from Table 7 presented another picture; the East Timor crisis from the 
perception of the Australian society. Almost all of the major sources are coming from 
within Australian society. The only exceptions are the UN officials as sources and the 
Indonesian officials as sources.
For Indonesian newspapers, the situation is very much similar. All the major sources are 
in fact part of the Indonesian society but there is a significant difference with Australian 
newspapers. There is also a less uniform tendency in the choices of the news sources. In 
Indonesian newspapers, the selections of sources tend to follow the general stance taken 
by the newspapers itself, such as in Republika or Media Indonesia.
One of the main distinctions between Australian and Indonesian newspapers is perhaps 
the tendency of the newspapers to perhaps disguise or balance their sources. Table 6 and 
6.3 show how within Australian newspapers the selection of sources is spread rather
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evenly. As significant the numbers may be, it is still less obvious than Indonesian
newspapers, such as in using their own country’s officials as sources. The bottom line is 
Indonesian newspapers tend to portray their position (through the usage of sources) than 
their Australian counterpart.
Just like what Toeti Adhitama o f  M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia  or .Atmadji Soemarkidjo o f S u a r a  P e m b a r u a n  
said6 ', the issue o f  East Timor in 1999 was a very difficult issue for majority o f Indonesians. 
Generally the Indonesian public symphatise deeply with the sufferings o f the East Timorese but 
the decision to break away from Indonesia plus the notion that foreign countries allegedly 
supported such moves excites the Indonesians as it comes at the worse possible moment.
At the same time, Indonesia was facing the most serious social, economic and political crisis since 
1966. The future o f  Indonesia itself was on the very edge with many areas wanting to separate 
itself from Indonesia. The general feeling then was Indonesia is a pariah country and being 
compared to repressive regime such as the former republic o f Yugoslavia. The continuing brutal 
criticism from outside Indonesia, towards Indonesia that did not distinguish between Indonesian 
people, government and the military really stirred nationalistic feelings in most Indonesians.
Nevertheless, not all Indonesians would prefer to demonstrate in the street against Australia as 
they have more pressing issues, such as daily survivals. Despite that, I believe most Indonesian 
were not happy with the ‘blind’ criticism towards Indonesia due to the crisis in East Timor. The 
Indonesian newspapers knew about this deep sentiment and they successfully exploited it in many 
of their reports. The term o f  ‘enemies’ towards Australia was more than once used in some 
articles, reflecting the deep seated animosity towards international pressures.61'
In the end, it was not just about the message that is important but also who gives/presents 
the message in the first place. The data above shows that while there were options to 
different sources (or political actors as Wolfsfeld said), Australian and Indonesian media 
tended to quote or base their reports to their own people.
Another significant finding is the relative importance of un-attributed sources especially 
in Australian newspapers reports. Basically sources are the standard where news 
reliability and credibility are measured (Gans, 1999). Having a significant amount of un 
attributed sources in news reports will damage the news credibility. But whethei such an
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issue happened in the case of East Timor crisis’s reports is something to discuss in later 
chapter.
In Chapter 7, there will be a more lengthy and in-depth discussion regarding the 
significance of such action. What this chapter has aimed at was to show the pattern 
within the selection of the news sources in relation with ‘created image of reality’ by the 
newspapers.
6.9. The deeper fram e an alysis .
Wolfsfeld (Wolfsfeld, 1997b) described about the presence of deeper frame beyond the 
‘normal’ frames that can be immediately seen. Wolfsfeld argues that the deep frame is 
actually the connecting the news as the product of media organization with the society 
that existed (Wolfsfeld, 1997b). Deep frame is like the foundation upon which the frame 
is constructed and connected to the particular society (Wolfsfeld, 1997b).
It is also the position of this thesis to take the view that news is part of the social 
construction of reality. The essence of news is information -  information for the society. 
Information is the essence of knowledge, which is socially constructed . So to 
understand the news regarding the East Timor crisis in the context of Australia 
Indonesia — East Timor in a social and political frame, is to see the news as the socially 
constructed product aimed at specific societies (in this case Australian and Indonesian 
societies).
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To understand the media role during East Timor crisis, we can look at the case o f Indonesia. 
Access to East Timor was generally very limited for Indonesian general public Only in the late 
1980’s was East Timor declared an ‘open’ area. Even then, not many Indonesian, could travel 
there unless they were officials, journalists or the new influx o f traders/migrants.
Prior to the referendum many o f  the migrants from other areas o f Indonesia, had left East Timor 
due to escalating violence. This left the sources o f news to Indonesian officials, journalists and o f  
course the foreign journalists. This meant, the majority o f Indonesia learned o f what’s happening 
in East Timor through the media, either local Indonesian or foreign media. Frankly, at that time 
the difference o f  the Indonesian and foreign media position on East Timor crisis was getting wider 
and wider by the day.
The question then is which side is the Indonesian wanting to take sides with? The local Indonesian 
media including the newspapers knew that they would get the positive attention o f the Indonesian 
public by tapping into the general sentiment o f the Indonesian people. The same thing is 
happening with Australian newspapers too. The press is the only sources o f information out o f  
East Timor, so they have the full capability to shape the public opinion. They did use this 
capability.614
Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 have show that during the most difficult period of reportage in East 
Timor (September 4th -  20th), Australian and Indonesian newspapers reacted in distinctly 
similar but at the same time different manners. The Australian press as part of the foreign 
press had to leave East Timor during that period due to escalating violence. The result 
was the loss of capability to report directly from East Timor. As expected, when direct 
reporting is not possible, Australian journalists continue their reporting by using other 
means.
The first finding in the Australian and Indonesian newspapers choice of sources is the 
tendency to quote significantly their own officials and citizens. In Australian newspapers 
this is apparent with the fact that four of five most often quoted sources are Australians 
(as officials or as citizens). Indonesian newspapers also quoted Indonesians significantly 
(as officials and as citizens) but Table 9 shows that Indonesian newspapers also have 
more diverse sources.
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In understanding this we can start by understanding the way Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers operate. We also need to put into consideration the social, political and 
histoiical context in understanding the way both countries’ newspapers operates. The 
analysis will be put in context as below:
6.10.1. Press system s.
Australian and Indonesian newspapers are representing two different press systems. 
Australian newspapers come from a liberal press system where it is marked by the 
relative independence of the press from the institution of power (the state) (McQuail, 
1986, McQuail, 2001). Indonesian newspapers come from a developmental press system 
where the emphasis is strongly put in assisting development programs of the society 
{McQuail, 1986 #9;McQuail, 1986 #201;Oetama, 2001 #55}. More discussions 
regarding this issue is in Chapter 1 and 2.
The impact of the different system is huge as it affects the way the press perceived issues 
such as the East Timor crisis. As the data in Table 2 till 5 shows the perception is already 
different. Part of the explanation is within the inherent divide between the two press 
systems.
It is publicly acknowledged that the Australian press often perceived Indonesia in general 
with disdain but this is rarely admitted. Damien Kingsbury argues that the issue between
291
the Australian press and Indonesia has existed for almost 30 years now.615 What is
worrying is that trend is still continuing today. Below is his general observation:
In broad terms, the Australian news media have, according to regional leaders behaved with 
insensitivity, ignorance and an overriding sense o f cultural chauvinism in their reporting o f  
Australia s near neighbours. The have, according to this view, offended cultural sensibilities, 
interfered in domestic affairs, imposed a set o f values that are not only alien to the region but 
which have imperialist or neo-imperialist overtones and are, implicitly, racist. By extension, this 
perspective presents Australia as a remnant o f the colonial past, an imperial outpost clinging to an 
unfounded sense o f  superiority and cast adrift in a rising sea o f post-colonial states616.
The description above is generally still valid until today and though almost all Australian
people will reject the idea of racism, the issue is well and alive in the media context. The
big media circus relating the reports of convicted drug trafficker, Schapelle Corby in
2005 shows exactly that.617 But what Schapelle Corby’s case show is how sensitive is
Australian media towards Indonesia, in particular with issues related with human rights.
• • * 618The case itself was perceived totally different by Indonesian media and public.
The choices of the top five sources show that no sources from Indonesia were quoted. 
Australian newspapers did quote sources from Indonesia but they were not ranked veiy 
highly. On the contrary, Indonesian newspapers (Republika & Suaru Pembaruari) quoted 
Australian officials as one of its top five sources. This is interesting as Republika is one 
of Indonesian newspaper that tend to show a greater sign of nationalism . This shows a 
general pre-occupation with Australian society or what consideied to be close with
Australian society (the UN).620
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The finding above is significant as the Australian press, as described earlier, came from a 
much developed and freer press than the Indonesian press. Being part of a liberal or 
developed pi ess, the Austialian press took pride with the quality and the standard of 
journalism. This means the choice sources as shown in Table 2, 3, and 4 means it was an 
act of fiee choice. The Indonesian press on the other hand came from different press 
systems and as it will described later, may not have the same level of press freedom as 
the Australian press has.
In comparison with Indonesian newspapers (Table 9), it seems that the Australian press 
is pretty much occupied with their own society or their own society’s perception over the 
East Timor crisis’. The Indonesian press on the other hand seems to try to present a more 
diverse view of the issue. This is interesting that theoretically the Australian press have 
the same access to much of the sources that were used by Indonesian newspapers, except 
perhaps the pro-autonomy supporters621. But why did the Australian press behaved 
differently?
A possible explanation as mentioned earlier is the animosity between the Australian 
press and in particular the Indonesian government6--. In particular during the New Order 
regime, the Indonesian government have made a negative impression towards the 
Australian press (Kingsbury, 2000, Tiffen, 2000, AKSARA, 2000). But what really set 
the animosity between the Australian press and the Indonesian government in general is
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the different political system and situation between the two countries (Kingsbury, 2000, 
Tiffen, 2000).
The Australian press in 1970 s until today is representing a modern, liberal and 
democratic Australia. The press in Australia is acting as a counter-balance to the 
government (Tiffen, 2000, Kingsbury, 2000). The New Order regime in particular is a 
right wing, almost dictatorial kind of regime (Romano, 2000, Kingsbury, 2000). This is a 
contradiction to the perception of democratic government in western democracy 
including Australia. In Australia, it is not uncommon to have a press that is very critical 
to a level of almost being the adversary to the government.62j Such a situation is almost 
impossible during the New Order regime.
Melvin Singh said to me that Australian press could have done a much better job in covering the 
East Timor crisis. In his opinions, Australian journalists were too occupied in following their own 
perception o f the crisis, just as promoted by their own government. But Ben Bohane said that it is 
easy to understand why Australian journalists view Indonesia negatively. The destruction and the 
sufferings o f  the East Timorese were very visible and the main culprit was the pro-integration 
militia which in turn were created and supported by the Indonesian military.
But Melvin Singh believes that there are other ways to view this crisis. For him, the destruction 
and sufferings is there and real but he also wanted to understand why the pro-integration 
supporters did what they did. He said that for the pro-integration supporters the result o f the 
referendum means they will lose the privilege they have now (i.e. gambling). It means a loss o f 
livelihood for them. Melvin also described how the pro-independence supporters immediately 
created new businesses as soon as they took power. It’s all about a struggle o f livelihood. '
In the East Timor crisis, Australian press and foreign press were caught in the political 
conflict just as Wolfsfeld said. Even the UN body, UNAMET admitted that they were 
not 100% neutral as they felt that they had to ;level the field’ by giving more access and 
support to the pro-independence supporters. Their excuse was that Indonesian influence
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and power in East Timor was so great that the only way to balance things up is by giving 
more supports to the pro-independence supporters.625
Other aspects that create a divide between Australian press and Indonesian press is the 
way the Indonesian government maintain their control over the press. During the New 
Order, the press is tightly controlled under the notion of being a ‘partner’ of the 
government. “ This situation was maintained by various means such as: tight 
regulations; tight control over what the press can publish and up to the ‘advice’ given to 
press by various government institutions.627 Of course such actions or situations are not 
known in Australia.
On the other hand, there are other cultural aspects or practices that were hard to 
understand by the Australian press, simply due to the different culture and values 
between Australia and Indonesia. For instance maintaining honour is almost absolute 
especially in public space. Public humiliation by the media is non existent in Indonesia as 
such action will effect severely to both the victim and perpetrator. Even if someone is 
known to have done something wrong, in the public space, all efforts are taken to avoid 
humiliating the person. Again such a thing is not a taboo in Australia with a great 
example from the ‘seven o’clock’ programs such as “A Current Affair’ . The list of 
differences can go on but the main idea is that Australian and Indonesian culture and 
political system are inherently different. Such differences create a friction when one
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society has to contend with the way the other society’s press reports something that 
maybe sensitive for the first one or vice versa.
The core of the issue here is that the Australian media believes that they are working for 
the Australian public; bound by Australian law; regulated by the Australian press system 
and reporting for the Australian public (Kingsbury et al., 2000, Tiffen, 2000). In effect it 
creates a position of conflict (in some cases) with the position of Indonesian government, 
people or Indonesia in general.629 But what is this inherent disdain or issue between 
Australia and Indonesia related with the findings in this thesis? The answer lies with the 
history of relations between Australian press and Indonesia.
As described above, the Australian press believes it should report news as they know best 
how to -  based on Australian journalism standard of practices. The standard of practices 
is not an empirical method but instead a complex set of values, ethics and beliefs. It is 
rooted within the quest in journalism for objective reporting, something which even 
today is still being sought by the media.6j0 But an important issue to remember here is 
that ‘objectivity’ is a relative term and it is heavily based upon the standard imposed 
upon the society where the media is located.
For decades, the Australian press have worked in Indonesia but the past 40 yeais as 
described by Kingsbury (Kingsbury et al., 2000) have been the most difficult era for both 
Australian press and Indonesia. Papers by Kingsbury6̂ 1 and Rodney Tiffen desciibed
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that often the way Australian press perceived and reports news about Indonesia have put 
them at odds with Indonesia. Often, the reporting by Australian newspapers have come 
between the relationship between Australia and Indonesia such as the reporting by David 
Jenkins on the then Indonesian president Soeharto.634 The best defence on Australian 
press behaviour was outlined by Damien Kingsbury below:
Australian journalists are, on the whole, better educated, more articulate and more socially 
engaged than their forebears often were. They are broadly less inclined to the boozy stereotypes 
that characterized the old school’ and once a blokes ‘club’ for long lunches and drunken nights, 
is more these days a meritocracy. This more thoughtful journalism is reflected in their approach in 
reporting regional affairs. In the region, rather than simply reporting bad facts, Australian 
journalists are more inclined to look at the context o f  those facts, to understand their history and to 
consider their local implications. The problem is not so much that Australian journalists are not 
sufficiently professional, rather it is that they are simply journalists just doing the job o f  
journalism, and perhaps they are doing it better. The term ‘professional’ therefore means this 
regional context, a willingness to bow to desires o f  politicians. As a matter o f principle, Australian 
journalists tend not to do this.
So if  there is a distinction between the political landscape o f  Australia and some o f  its 
neighbouring states and, on balance, the standards o f  Australian journalism have not declined, 
perhaps the real issues lies in other than the rhetoric o f  offence taken by neighbouring 
governments. It could be suggested that the sensitivity on the part o f  Australia’s neighbours 
reflects more the direction o f  their own developments.6'0
So within this context, we can see that the tendency for Australian newspapers to quote 
their own people (as their top sources) is part of the press system of which, Australian 
journalists saw themselves as doing a proper and professional journalism job. The 
criticism that come follows, in particular by Indonesian (as government and people) can 
easily be dismissed as irrelevant. Don Greenless from The Australian commented on the 
working condition he had to worked with:
So whatever you do, don’t assume that we sit down in a cool, complex way and think we are 
going to run our stories in particular tendentious way, because we believed East Timor should be 
independent or if  you are an Indonesian journalist, you think it should be integiated with 
Indonesia and so sit down and coolly make this things up. We were on the ground working under 
tight deadlines, under pressure, concerned for our safety and trying to do the best job we could on 
the day. That’s true for Indonesian journalists and that’s true for foreign journalists.
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The comment from Don Greenless above shows how difficult it is for foreign journalists 
(in particular) to report under the difficult situation in East Timor. It reinforced the 
perception above though that Australian journalists do believe that they were doing what 
they thought as good journalism.
The questions that arises now is how about the Indonesian press system? Does it have 
any impact towards the selection of sources? But the most important issue is whether the 
selection of sources (at least the top five) are acceptable by journalistic standard; and 
what does it tell us?
The Indonesian press system as described earlier is very much part of the developmental 
press (Soesilo and Washburn, 1994, McQuail, 1986, McQuail, 2001, Oetama, 2001, 
Kingsbury, 2000). Part of the trait of the developmental press is a strong commitment to 
the developmental effort in particular by the government (Soesilo and Washburn, 1994, 
McQuail, 1986, McQuail, 2001). This can have consequences that the Indonesian press 
can be susceptible to propaganda efforts by the Indonesian government in the name of 
promoting development (Kingsbury, 2000, Oetama, 2001, Siahaan et al., 2001, 
AKSARA, 2000).
In 1999, during the East Timor crisis, such practices were still rampant though the 
Indonesian press has finally already won their press freedom. One regular excuse as to 
why Indonesian journalists allow themselves to be ‘bullied occasionally in East Timoi is
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simply because in East Timor in 1999 (and even before that), their safety was guaranteed 
by their ‘good’ relations with Indonesian military. J One example was given a former 
journalists who was assigned to East Timor:
As soon as I arrived there, I got continous mysterious phone calls in my hotel room. Finally, I 
thought I had enough and I called the local military office asking for the intelligence commander. 
After a meeting with the commander, I was able to do my job without any problem. But who says 
East Timor is a tourist area.6j8
A similar comment was voiced by Suara Pembarna Chief of editor’s Atmadji 
Soemarkidjo. Mr Soemarkidjo voiced the difficulties found in repotting in East Timor. 
The problem, he said, is not just from people who are traditionally hostile towards 
Indonesians (such as the pro-integration supporters) but also from within the rank of 
Indonesian officials in East Timor.
There was a feeling o f  suspicion on the pro-independence side as well. ‘What are the reporters 
from Jakarta up to?’ Be that as it may, in the field our reporters were viewed with more suspicion 
by the pro-integration members. They were seen as traitors, selling out their own country. So it 
was truly difficult on all sides. With TNI as well: ‘Come on. Don’t report that. You re an 
Indonesian right? Defend Indonesia. This is Red and White (Indonesian flag) w e’re talking 
about’. But that era has passed.6"’9
The comment above shows how, though that theoretically the Indonesian press has 
finally earned its freedom, real challenges are still present. The enactment of the No 
4/1999 press law does not mean that the Indonesian press will enjoy the institutionalized 
press freedom that were enjoyed by their Australian counterpart. In fact, reality in the 
field requires great care simply to survive640. Just as one Indonesian journalist who was 
assigned many times to East Timor (during Indonesian occupation time) put it to me,
Working in East Timor (during Indonesian rules) is not something like strolling around in a tourist 
area. During one o f  the assignments there, as soon as I arrived I was terrorized by anonymous 
phone calls in my hotel. Finally I felt enough is enough so I called the local authorities and as e 
them not to hassle me anymore. A meeting later with an intelligence officer so ve t e pro e 
but you are always on your toes there.
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Within this context, it maybe understandable how all Indonesian newspapers chose 
Indonesian officials as theii number one source and in significant numbers as well. But 
still the fact is that Indonesian newspapers used nine different type ot sources in their top 
five of sources used during that period. This shows not just diversity but a significant 
effort to present different views in their reports. What is more significant is the fact that 
those sources came from different backgrounds. Some even came from Australia.
The significance of the finding of sources used and the press systems is that press system 
theory may explain some but not all. The fact that the Indonesian press quoted 
Indonesian officials and people significantly may reinforce the developmental press 
theory. Nevertheless at the same time, the Indonesian press shows a great effort in 
presenting different views from different sources. The Australian press on the other hand 
shows a tendency to quote their own society (officials and people) at the same level.
As part of a liberal or developed press system, the Australian press took a pride in 
working based on a strong standard in journalism. The Australian press also has an 
almost ideal press freedom, something that the Indonesian press does not have. But if the 
balanced reporting by presenting different views from different sources is the hallmark of 
good journalism, it may seems that from the press systems points of view, the Indonesian 
press may come equal or better than their Australian counterpart.
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The final argument here is that the Australian and Indonesian press came from two 
different press systems. Within the two systems was a long animosity that lasted for more 
than two decades. In relation of how the Australian and Indonesian press reported the 
East Timor crisis, in particular during the difficult period of September 4th -  20th, the 
different systems may offer some explanations but that may not be all. More analysis 
from different points of view are needed.
6.10.2. N ew s as social produ ct -  a social construction  o f  reality.
Sources choice is not a random occurrence as news gathering and reporting is a 
systematic process that follows a set of procedures and standards {Cottle, c2003 
#18;McCullagh, 2002 #31}. The decision by Australian newspapers to use sources that 
are close with them (Australian society) is not a random occurrence. The choice of 
sources during the difficult period reflects the frame of mind within the Australian 
newspapers. But the point is news is a product of journalism in order to reflect upon a 
reality faced by them and presenting it in a format that best understood by their 
readers/audiences {Gieber, 1999; McCullagh, 2002; Cottle, c2003}. Walter Gieber 
described it below:
To a sensitive, thoughtful newspaperman, writing the news story is a singularly personal 
experience. For despite what ‘professional’ or ‘ethical’ control he enforces upon himself, or for 
that matter, the bureaucratic controls that are thrust upon him, the news story is -  should be -  a 
product o f  his disciplined perception and his evaluation o f  the environment, o f the social arena 
from which the story and its characters come, and o f  the bureaucratic climate in which it is 
written.642
Gieber argues that newspapers are in reality acting like gatekeepers, screening which 
information they can pass on to the society.64j Within this concept, news is a product of a
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deliberate, systematic and rational process of the media organisation. But as the heart of 
any organization is the people, the organization involved needs to be understood within
the social context where they existed where the society acted both as the target audience 
for the particular media.
McCullagh also argues the same line as Gieber; news is a social process.644 The
production of news according to McCullagh follows the view that audience is central in
the news production.643 The audience, she said, is the main issue as it becomes the target
and context of which the news was created for.646 She explained it below:
The notion that the audience is important in influencing the production o f media messages comes 
from two sources: the first is that media organizations need to attract an audience and to do this 
they must cater to its need; the second (and more complex) source is in the nature o f social 
communication. Successful communication requires us to have some idea about the people with 
whom we are communicating. To be sure that they will understand us we must adapt our style of 
communication to fit the mental image we have o f  them.647
So the use of sources close to Australian and Indonesian societies is basically an effort to 
better communicate the message -  situation in East Timor, to their own respective 
society. Within this context it is understandable why the top sources are all close with the 
Australian and Indonesian society (in particular Australian society). Nevertheless, it still 
do not explain why Indonesian newspapers used much more diverse sources compared to 
Australian newspapers. To answer that we need to analyse the role of sources within the 
context of news as social construction of reality.
The finding in Table 2, 3 and 4 show that during a difficult time in doing ‘proper 
reporting from the field, Australian and Indonesian newspapers show a tendency to
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‘reflect’ back their own society perception of the East Timor crisis. The question that 
arises now is what is the impact of such action? Each country’s newspapers provided 
their best defence as it was the best that they could do just as Don Greenless said 
earlier648 or to what Mr Hamami from Republika649 or Mr Soemarkidjo from Snara 
Pembaruan620 stated. Also above we have seen the argument that such actions were 
understandable due to the different press systems existing in Australia and Indonesia. But 
it is still does not answer the question what actually is the impact of referring back to 
their own society while reporting something physically and socially external of their 
society?
When the situation becomes difficult to report directly from East Timor, especially for 
Australian newspapers they need to find substitute sources. As the finding in table 2, 3 
and 4 show, the substitute sources are Australian officials, Australian people and UN 
officials. Indonesian newspapers also have difficulties as well in reporting from East 
Timor but were able to maintain their presence in East Timor. Nevertheless the finding 
also shows that they also follow the trend to quote more on Indonesian society. But let’s 
examine the finding above; major similarities between Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers are that they quoted more on their own officials and people.
Research often shows that the press tends to quote the powerful more often than those 
who do not have power.631 McCullagh describe that government officials, and 
institutional sources -  such as professional organizations, pressure groups, business 
associations and ‘experts’ — predominate the as the sources of media stories . In
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contrast, ordinary citizens very seldom appear as news sources except in some cases 
mostly to put human faces into a tragedy.653
Furthermore McCullagh describe the relationship between the press and powerful 
sources as a paradox of contradiction (McCullagh, 2002). The press are inherently 
worried about being used in particular by powerful sources such as the government as 
their propaganda machine (Oetama, 2001, Siahaan et al., 2001). The Indonesian press 
community right after the fall of the New Order regime were particularly wary about 
such issues and they were right as the during New Order the press was strongly used and 
controlled by the Indonesian government and the ruling elite (Romano, 2003, Oetama, 
2001, Siahaan et al., 2001, Romano, 2000, Center, 2000c, Center, 2000a, Center, 2000d, 
Simaremare, 2001).
But in reality, the press during the difficult time of reporting from East Timor has shown 
a tendency to quote significantly from officials sources (Table 2). This happened in both 
the Australian and Indonesian press, simultaneously. The possible explanation was what 
Murphy described that officials as sources are giving the media a shortcut while 
maintaining an image of strong credibility.654 This is described by McCullagh:
' Such source (officials) solve a number o f  production and newsgathering problems; most notably, 
they solve the problem o f  verification because stories were originating with official sources are by 
definition ‘reliable’. If a news editor challenges a journalist on a story, the fact that the source is a 
powerful individual or organization in society establishes it as legitimate and as newsworthy. The 
information that such sources provide is also by definition ‘significant’ because it comes from the 
significant and important individuals and institutions.6̂
Within this frame, it is now clear why Australian and Indonesian press tend to quote their 
own officials as their top sources during the difficult times of reporting from East Timor
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-  it’s a reliable (for their own society); it’s politically acceptable (for their own society 
again) and it is convenient. In other word as Don Greenless stated earlier -  East Timor is 
just another assignment, albeit a difficult ones. From Greenless point of view, the goal is 
to report about the crisis as best as they could. Where the sources come from or what 
kind of sources is a secondary issue. At the end of the day, the main issue is that the 
newspapers have something to publish to their audiences. How the stories and where the 
stories came from is not important as long they are legally valid. It’s just another day in 
the business of selling news.
6.10.3. Issue o f  O rientalism .
In Chapter Seven, a more in depth analysis regarding the content of the articles within the 
period will be conducted. Within the in depth analysis, a significant portion will be 
related to the way Australia perceives Indonesia and vice versa. It is believed that such an 
aspect, influences very much the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting 
the East Timor crisis.
As described earlier, Australia and Indonesia have two distinctly different press systems, 
cultures, political systems and beliefs. Such differences have arguably shaped the way 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the East Timor crisis in particular under 
extremely difficult circumstances.
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The possibility of the orientalism issue in particular within the way Australian press 
perceived Indonesia was raised initially by Damien Kingsbury.656 But Kingsbury himself 
refused to accept that criticism over Australian press reporting approach in the South 
East can be described as ‘orientalism’.637 He described it below:
In trying to defend Australia more generally from some the more scurrilous attacks upon it by 
regional leaders, it would be very easy to here to slip into what Edward Said has referred as the 
‘politics o f  congratulation’ (Said, 1981). This paper is not intended to be ‘self congratulatory’ 
although it would disingenuous to deny that it is polemical. Rather, it is intended to point out the 
basic distinction between Australia and its political culture and that o f some neighbouring 
governments that from time to time express disapproval o f Australia.638
Kingbury’s argument above raised another important finding related very much to the 
issue of orientalism and the deeper frame in Australian and Indonesian newspapers 
reports. The issue is the perception that certain South East Asian governments tend to be 
hostile towards Australia and in particular the Australian press — thus they needed to be 
treated as such. This perception is not just belonging to Kingsbury alone but is also 
shared by other critics about South East Asian governments view towards Australia 
(Kingsbury, 2000, Tiffen, 2000, Romano, 2000).
In my perception such a view is an over simplification over the complex issue in 
representing South East Asian societies (in particular Indonesia and Malaysia). The 
perception shared by Australian academics above is simply stating that the problem is 
within the government -  i.e. the Indonesian government. The Indonesian government 
(under the New Order regime), being a representation of a corrupt, closed, and dictatorial 
regime will End that the Australian press is a challenge (Tiffen, 2000, Kingsbury, 2000, 
Romano, 2000). This is because the Australian press are representing a free, democratic
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and libeial society, something that is at odds with the Indonesian government during 
New Order regime659.
As described earlier in this chapter as well as in Chapters 4, 5 and 7, the conflict in 
representing East Timor crisis in 1999 within Australian and Indonesian newspapers is 
about differences above. The Australian press is often perceived to be unable to clearly 
define the differences between the Indonesian people, the Indonesian government (after 
the fall of New Order regime) and the Indonesian military. This is also supported by 
reports from AKSARA Foundation.660 Reports about East Timor and Indonesia often are 
mixing the barriers between the behavior of the Indonesian military in East Timor; the 
Indonesian government reactions; and the actual perception of the Indonesian public 
regarding East Timor issue (AKSARA, 2000, Siahaan et al., 2001).
In August 1999, there was just over a year from the fall of New Order regime in 
Indonesia. Within Indonesia, the whole country was engulfed by massive political, 
social, economic and security crises.661 During my study in Australia until July 1998, the 
Australian media I remembered reported meticulously about the political and security 
upheavals in Indonesia, almost in great detail66-. But in my living memory, not veiy 
much was reported about the daily hardships for Indonesian in surviving those difficult 
times, in mid-1999, it seems that the Australian media again was focusing very much 
into the violence and hardships in East Timor, while in the process blaming Indonesia (in 
general) for letting such things happened in East Timor.
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The refusal of Australian newspapers in perceiving the situation other than in their own 
society’s perspective is visible from the choices sources (Tables 3 and 4). The top five 
sources used by Australian newspapers are from Australian society or the UN which 
politically and socially considered to be part of Australian psyche as well, at that time. 
This, in my opinion is sign of orientalism.
As the scope of the discussion of this chapter is very wide and deep, more in-depth 
discussion will be conducted in the Chapter 7.
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C H A P T E R  7
A U ST R A L IA N  A N D  IN D O N E S IA N  N E W SPA P E R S STA N D A R D  AND  
P R A C T IC E S  D U R IN G  E A ST  T IM O R  C R ISIS IN 1999
7.1. Introduction .
Discussion in Chapters 1 to 6 has revealed a new general understanding of the different 
perspectives within Australian and Indonesian newspapers regarding reporting on East 
Timor’s crisis in September 1999. It is clear that media reports are part of society’s 
perception of the events. We have referred to and understood the different national 
perspectives as 4 frames’.66j But the discussion in previous chapters shows that there is 
more than just interpretation. The media frames are often part of an ongoing process, an 
interactive process within the society itself.664 This interactive process is actually an 
essential process within society that allows the society to develop.
The study of newspaper reports of the 1999 East Timor crisis in Austialian and 
Indonesian newspapers has shown that the two societies perceived the same crisis 
differently. Both Australian and Indonesian societies, through their media (newspapeis in 
this study), saw the same issue through totally different point of views. Austialian society
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perceived the event as a humanitarian crisis that warranted serious military intervention 
by national and international forces. This perception was perhaps not free from prejudice, 
reflecting some unresolved issues within the history of Australia -  Indonesia relationship 
which were amplified by recent events.
Discussing Australian and Indonesian relationship is like a never ending story. At the end o f the 
day it really depends on where you want to see it and when do you want to stop the discussion. 
Some Indonesians were intrigued why for a country that supported Indonesian independence 
struggle back in 1945 -  1949, Australia could act differently with the East Timor issue in 1999 
and later the Papuan refugees in 2006.
For Australia, the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005 have changed their perception o f Bali (and 
Indonesia in general) as ‘paradise’. Bali for Australians has become synonymous with danger. 
Either terrorism or being caught for using/smuggling drugs from and to Bali, it’s a fact that many 
Australians do not feel comfortable to go Bali or Indonesia anymore. With over a hundred 
Australians killed or injured in the bombings, plus those who were sentenced to death or life by 
Indonesian courts (mostly for drugs charges), it understandable why Australians have such views.
On the other hand, Australians were among the most generous donors for Indonesia in early 2005 
after the tsunami disaster. I remember listening and seeing on television how Australians from all 
walks o f life, gave their money to help the tsunami victims, particularly in the Aceh area. The 
most memorable moment was when I heard some school children were donating their milk money 
for the fellow children in Aceh.
Beyond politics, Australia and Indonesia are like two neighbours who love to hate each other but 
always come to the rescue when needed. Unfortunately in Australia, except for a few academics, 
students, military officials and intelligence officials, there is very little interest in serious study 
about Indonesia. In Indonesia, there is even less interest in studying about Australia. So the 
ignorance, misconception and misunderstanding continue even until today.663
666For Indonesian society, the issue of crisis is of a matter of perception differences. At 
the time the world was pressuring Indonesia, Indonesia was also facing a crisis of their 
own; the future of the country itself.667 The sudden collapse of the New Order regime due 
to the massive economic crisis in 1998 brought a sudden power vacuum. This condition 
led to the most serious economic and security crisis since the 1960’s.
Riots were the norm of the day; massive unemployment and sudden rise of poverty the 
reality. Politically, the transition towards democracy was marred by a trial and error
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process of rewriting the political rules of the game including the constitution. On top of
that, many provinces that were oppressed during New Order regime were declaring their
intention to break free from Indonesia. All these problems needed urgent solutions but
Indonesia was rapidly losing the means.668
There is nothing that Indonesia fears more than breakaway provinces. Since independence in 
1945, Indonesia has been plagued with rebellions. Most o f  the rebellions were fueled by same 
reason: dissatisfaction with Indonesia’s central government. Unfortunately, until recently 
successive Indonesian governments have always seen military solutions as the only solution for 
rebellions.
The referendum o f  East Timor was truly a nightmare come to life for Indonesia. It was such a 
traumatic experience that when the Indonesian government declared war against Aceh’s rebellion 
in 2002, the majority o f  Indonesia did not object to new bloodshed. This is an irony that just a few 
years earlier, the findings o f  human rights abuses in Aceh (particularly by the Indonesian military) 
brought serious trouble for the Indonesian military. After East Timor, it seemed that majority o f  
Indonesians were silently willing to sacrifice peace and human rights for the integrity o f  
Indonesia.669
Thus for Indonesia, the East Timor crisis was just another crisis for an already unstable 
country. East Timor’s population of 800,000 is nothing compared to 210 million in the 
whole of Indonesia. East Timor was heavily supported by the Indonesian economy. It 
was logically unsurprising that some Indonesians (including President Habibie) thought 
that East Timor was just a burden of history. For them, East Timor was a mistake from
the past and like a cancer that needed to be taken away.
When I first heard about the options (referendum) for East Timor, my thought was: this is a really 
serious gamble for Habibie and Indonesia. Most Indonesians including me did not want East 
Timor to be engulfed into chaos such as what happened before and after the referendum. But 
learning from what happened in Jakarta in May 1998, such things were not surprising for us.
Many o f  us thought, that this is really the most damaging thing that President Habibie could do to 
Indonesia. Others rather believed a ‘conspiracy theory’ that President Habibie was listening only 
to his private advisers instead o f  his ministers and the advisers had advised a quick solution for 
East Timor. But in the end, seeing how the General Assembly (MPR) rejected President Habibie s 
explanation on East Timor during the General Assem bly’s meeting in 1999, I knew that wou e 
the end o f Habibie’s political career in Indonesia.
Unfortunately the reality was not that simple. The sudden decision to conduct a
referendum for East Timor by President Habibie infuriated elements within Indonesian
society including the military. Being the de-facto ruler of East Timor, the Indonesian
military was not very keen to release East Timor overnight. Events that took place later
were a matter of history. President Habibie invited the UN to oversee the referendum.
I remember that among the first group that demonstrated against the referendum for East Timor 
were the children o f  East Timor’s veterans and soldiers that were killed there since 1975. I 
remember it because I remember publishing the story in T h e  I n d o n e s ia n  O b s e r v e r .  It reminds me 
o f the stories told by my father and uncles who were in the Army about how the Indonesian 
military lost thousands o f  its soldiers in East Timor since 1975. For these former officers and 
soldiers, the loss o f  East Timor was like betraying the sacrifices given by those soldiers slain in 
East Timor since 1975. The issue was really something deep and very personal for them.671
When the UN arrived, a hidden campaign was allegedly already underway in East Timor 
to undermine the referendum. When the results showed that majority wanted to be an 
independent nation, elements within East Timor society went on a rampage. These 
elements were armed militias created, trained and armed by the Indonesian military as 
support for their efforts to quell the rebellion by FRETILIN. In September, these militias 
went on a rampage as they felt disappointed by their losses.
The real reason why the militias went on rampage is still being debated, even today. But 
what is undisputed is that due to the escalating violence, the UN had to be pulled out 
from East Timor. This crisis led to the creation of a peace keeping force -  INTERFET
under the leadership of Australia.
Singaporean journalist Melvin Singh, believed that there are more issues about East Timor than 
what appears to be most obvious. As a start he believed that there aie seeds for honzonta 
conflicts within the East Timor society itself. As an illustration he described how the main leaders 
o f FRETILIN and CNRT are Portuguese descendants, while the pro-integration militias mostly 
were indigenous or what Melvin described as ‘black people . He said that in the social structure o 
East Timor, descendants o f  the Portuguese were often seen as a highet l ank (the hig est amon., 
the indigenous but still below the Portuguese) among the society. The indigenous peop e
312
often the neglected part o f  the society. They are often poor, uneducated and sometimes looked 
down upon by the higher rank groups. This is a seed for social jealousy and conflict.
Secondly, Melvin believed economic factors were ‘trigger factors’. The pro-integration militias 
benefited significantly from the presence o f  the Indonesian military in East Timor. The militias 
were not just involved in fighting the FRETILIN but also in illegal gambling and other businesses. 
When the referendum result was announced, the pro-integration militia suddenly lost their income 
as they lost their privileges due to their proximity to Indonesian officials. According to Melvin, 
one thing that a pro-independence leader did immediately after the referendum was create a hotel. 
So for Melvin there are other issues than politics at play in East Timor such as ethnic and historic 
rivalries and economic factors.672
The point of this argument is that there are many aspects of East Timor society that were 
not known by outsiders. In the past, East Timor was badly divided by internal conflict 
that often put brother against brother.67̂  Such divisions were not just known but also 
heavily utilized by both Portuguese and Indonesia as rulers of East Timor.674 When the 
East Timor crisis escalated in 1999, the Australian public and press were merely pointing 
out that the Indonesian military was using the crisis for their own ends.
In the media arena, media from both Australia and Indonesia were busy presenting the 
crisis to their own audiences. What this chapter will do is extend the analysis to create 
the final theory regarding this issue — how Australian and Indonesian media presented 
East Timor crisis in 1999. All quoted articles in this chapter are available in Appendix D.
7.2. T heoretical background.
When presenting certain news events, the media does not just give a neutral lepoit of 
events but inscribes its own interpretation of the event.675 As weak or as minimal the 
interpretation may be, it is still an interpretation. Those interpretations, often called
13
frames, are common process within media reports.676 Jaap van Ginneken gives a more
detailed description of the concept o f ‘frame’:
The news media bring some features o f  ‘reality’ to our attention, placing them in the light, 
whereas most o f  the rest is kept in the dark. It is mostly the same features which are brought to 
our attention time and time again. But even then, the illumination is intermittent at best: it is rather 
like the beam o f  a lighthouse, the stroboscopic lights in a disco, or the flash o f a camera lighting 
up the night every now and then. It permits us to develop only a very partial and slanted view of 
our environment.677
Framing is seen by some scholars as the way media connect to their society.678 Basically 
a news event is a social event -  something that the society wants to know or what the 
media wanted the society to know.679 In order to have that event best understood or 
received, the media then packages the reports in a way that will be (hopefully) 
understood best by the society. Thus the study of frames becomes important.
My research about the studies of frames shows, however, that there is nothing exact 
when trying to understand frames. Many theories of frames offer understanding but not a 
systematic way to understand frames let alone understand the hidden message within the 
greater context of the particular society. It was this uncertainty that led me to develop a 
new approach.
7.3. A New T heory o f  M edia and E ast T im or Crisis.
The method used here is to use several layers of analysis in order to create a new 
understanding and later a theory regarding media reports and the East Timoi cnsis in 
1999. The rationale for using multiple layers of analysis is because the nature of the 
object of research — frame, is an elusive object. Frame as a focus of study has been
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discussed numerous times by both media practitioners and academics but few are able to 
fully describe a thorough method to analyse frames. Some scholars such as Robert 
Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld have created methods to analyse frames but 
each uses a different point of view and thus creates a different method of analysis. Thus, 
it is deemed necessary in this thesis to utilize more than one method of analysis in order 
to analyse frames in the Australian and Indonesian newspapers reporting on East Timor 
crisis in 1999.
The use of different methods of analysis is necessary to create a strong argument in the 
conclusion and also because the topic covers a very complex issue. The methodology 
here is based on qualitative method in general but also based on grounded theory in 
particular. The rationale for drawing on both of these is that the issue is a very complex 
in its nature. Various variables need to be put under consideration such as history, 
culture, values and historical events in both Australia and Indonesia. Being a research 
method that is specifically suited to analyse complex events, a qualitative methodology is 
deemed the most suitable method as the basic approach in this Thesis. Grounded theory, 
as founded b Glaser and Strauss680, is a research method that created a theory by 
analyzing data by continuously challenging the findings until a new theory emerges. I 
have relied upon grounded theory throughout this thesis to analyse and re-interpret the 
data.
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The analysis of the news articles in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 has shown the different 
perceptions about East Timor crisis within Australian and Indonesian newspapers. 
Chapter 4 and 5 deal specifically with how to foreground the different perceptions.
In Chapters 4 and 5, several cases were studied thoroughly using not just one method but 
three different methods drawn from Robert Entman, Peter White and Gadi Wolfsfeld. It 
was deemed necessary to use the three different methods for several reasons:
• To gain maximum understanding of the frames and how frames were 
constructed within those news reports.
• To minimize possibilities of basing the interpretation solely on single factors. 
The issue is not about avoiding bias but instead giving a fair and more thorough 
understanding.
• Each method offers different aspect of analysis -  creating a much bigger picture.
• Each method allows a meticulous analysis to be applied to particular aspects of 
the news reports. Taken together, the analysis develops a more holistic 
approach.
In this chapter, the new theory will be formulated in the final section of the chapter. The 
early part of this chapter will continue what was discussed in Chapter 6, namely 
understanding the use of sources in the news reports. As in previous chapters, the 
analysis is limited to the time frame described in Chapter 6; September 1 -  20 , 1999. 
This is arguably the most critical period of the East Timor crisis. It started with the 
announcement of the referendum result; the escalation of violence; the withdiawal of UN
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and foreign press from East Timor and finally the arrival of UN sanctioned troops -  
INTERFET in East Timor.
The withdrawal of almost all foreign press from East Timor during that period created a 
void of access. The question asked in Chapter 6 was how both the Australian and 
Indonesian press reacted to such a situation. The result was both the Australian and 
Indonesian press reacted by looking for sources within their own society. Also, even 
though the access to direct sources in East Timor was difficult, there was still access to 
the East Timorese people (Pro-integration, Pro-independence or refugees/civilians). Yet, 
the study shows that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers generally considered the 
East Timorese as less important sources compared to other sources such as Australian 
and Indonesian officials.
7.4. The E ast T im or C risis from  the M edia Point o f View.
Each society, represented by their news media, was trying to comprehend the emerging 
and complex issue of East Timor as a new nation. What this chapter will try to do is to 
apply the grounded theory approach in a more comprehensive manner to the data 
collected in Chapter 6. The aim of using grounded theory here is to create a new 
understanding -  formulated into a new theory about media, society and crisis. Grounded 
theory provides the best possible method as it allows the data to ‘speak for itself , thus 
allowing a new theory to be created from the raw data by continuously challenging the 
new findings until a new concept or theory emerges. The data in Chapter 6 has shown
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how Australian and Indonesian news media represented the East Timor crisis, in 
particular during the peak of the crisis. The findings show that both country’s 
newspapers present the issue using sources that are close to their own society. If this is 
so, then it is a possibility that each country’s news reports were merely reflecting the 
perception within their own society.
The process of news reporting as written language in newspapers can be likened to the 
process of photojournalism. In Chapter 1, a nature photographer Galen Rowell described 
how humans perceive visual stimuli (in this case photography) by comparing it to already 
present knowledge within the human itself. " The knowledge here is a product of a 
lifetime experience of each individual, and unique to the individual. As the knowledge 
(or experience) of each individual is different, every person will perceive the photograph 
differently.684
The same situation exists for written news. Readers respond to the information given to 
them by the newspapers. The information which is packaged within the news frame, is 
designed to convey specific information to the readers. This is the major difference 
between photographs and written news. A photojournalist can only present (in his oi her 
photograph) what was present. Any form of manipulation such as adding or deliberately 
deleting some element within the photograph can result in the photograph being 
described as ‘manipulated’, and thus the photograph will lose its news value. Written 
news theoretically should be based upon the actual facts but in ieality it is a 
manufactured product.
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Written news is created by words carefully selected by the journalist and refined by the 
editors which means it is a created product. This carefully constructed effort aims to 
present the audience with the best possible description of the news events or the facts. 
This presented information may reflect the conception and perception by the journalists 
themselves which later is being presented to the audience. A photograph can only present 
what was present (and recorded) in front of its lens. Even so, the photograph itself may 
only represent a distortion of reality.685
The point here is that if a photograph, sometimes considered to the most truthful 
journalistic medium, may not represent the full reality, what about written news where 
everything is created by the journalist? The most common answer is because the 
audience believed that the journalists were presenting them with facts as known by the 
journalist, the written is accepted by the readers as ‘reality’. But the question that still 
lingers is how about the subjective perception of ‘facts’ here especially with the fact that 
presented ‘reality’ is actually a reconstruction of facts as perceived and comprehended by 
the journalist themselves?
Journalists as human beings will react to their surroundings using knowledge that they 
already have. Thus for example a conflict situation like East Timor in 1999 may be 
perceived differently by different journalists as each journalist has different sets of 
knowledge (including values, norm and cultures). The journalists themselves knew oi
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During the Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky affair in 1998 -  1999, I remember r e a d i n g  
significant number o f  reports from US print media (through the news wire services) that were 
greatly divided. The US media basically was divided about the issue whether President Clinton 
affair can be constitute a violation o f  his mandate or not (as it was just’ a private affair). But 
what was interesting was the reaction around the world with some reports said that majority o f the 
global audience were more interested with the details o f  the ‘affairs’ itself. I remember one 
comment from a man in a middle east country who said that he couldn’t understand why 
American people made a big fuss about the affair. He said, in his society a man like President 
Clinton can have more than one wife so an affair like that should not be a big issue.686
though t th e y  k n e w  th a t  th e ir  c o n c e p tio n  o f  th e  s itu a tio n  th e y  face w ill be th e  base o f
percep tion  fo r  th e ir  a u d ie n c e .
In the end, as explained in Chapter 1 and 2, the core of this research is not about whether 
Australian and Indonesia presented truthful reports or not regarding the East Timor crisis 
in 1999. The core of this research is about how the Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers perceived and represented the East Timor crisis in 1999 in particular to their 
home audiences. The differences found in the presentation of the issue, is evidence that 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers and societies perceived the issue differently.
7. 5. The data analysis.
The analysis in this chapter will be divided into several parts to reflect the findings in 
Chapter 6. Each section will contain a more in-depth analysis regarding the findings. The 
method of analysis relies on identifying and quantifying sources used in news reports. 
The data discussed in previous chapters is re-categorized here and divided into five 
categories on the basis of sources accessed:
• Australian and Indonesian officials as sources.
• Australian and Indonesian citizens as sources.
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• East Timorese as sources.
• Press as sources.
• Un-attributed sources.
7.5.1. A ustralian and Indonesian  officia ls as sources.
In Chapter 6, officials from Australia and Indonesia were defined as those representing 
either country in their official capacity. In this thesis, that would mean 
public/government officials and members of state governing bodies such as the house of 
representatives. This definition includes all persons, either civilian or military, regardless 
of their rank, as long as they were quoted in their capacity as ‘officials’. If the person 
were quoted as a private citizen, then they would be categorized as ‘citizen’.
The data in Chapter 6 shows that both Australian and Indonesian newspapers relied 
extensively on their own country’s officials as sources. In Chapter 6, a possible 
explanation for the (over)reliance on officials was linked to the nature of their position. 
As representatives of the state, officials are traditionally ranked very high (in terms of 
credibility) as sources 688 This explanation will probably explain why officials rank 
almost uniformly in both Australian and Indonesian newspapers as the top souices used. 
Nevertheless the findings in Chapters 6 did not provide an in depth view of the 
complexity of using officials as sources.
representatives of their country, at least politically. When they are quoted, in particular
government officials, the understanding is that they are representing the views of the
ruling power. So it needs be to understood here that officials are representing just one
element within a very complex society -  the elite, ruling element.
For Indonesian journalists, officials are the most common sources o f news. This was particularly 
true during the New Order regime as the government was the center o f the society. During the 
New Order regime, public officials were part o f  the central structure o f  the state, they w e r e  the 
state, depending upon their position. Further away from the central power o f Jakarta, local 
officials were often known as the ‘local Tsar’. Therefore major news organizations assigned 
certain journalists to cover specific government departments. The more important the department 
(eg The State Palace), the more likely a journalist will be stationed there full time so they can 
monitor and report any news from the officials as early as possible.689
The main argument here is that officials (especially government officials) represent one
element of the particular society — the ruling element. Their position as officials makes
them very visible and important in term of their value as sources. But again, they are
simply representing one element within complex societies such as Australia and
Indonesia.
O ffic ia ls  u n d e rs ta n d  w e ll th a t in th e ir  o ff ic ia l c a p a c ity  th e y  w ill be seen  as the
From Tables 2, 3 and 4, the relative importance of officials as sources is clear. Both 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers put a relatively high importance on officials as 
sources. This is understandable from several points of view:
• East Timor in 1999 was an official issue. It started back in 1974-1975 with the 
crisis within East Timor itself which ended when the Indonesian military invaded 
East Timor in December 1975. The invasion which led to East Timor s 
integration to Indonesia was an international issue, debated in the UN foi
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decades. It was always an issue between the Indonesian government and other 
governments.
• The agencies involved within the East Timor crisis in 1999 were official 
agencies including the UN, Portugal, Indonesia (the signatories of the tripartite 
agreement), and later Australia and other international forces. In addition non 
governmental organizations (NGOs) played important roles even if the main 
players were official agencies.
Within the reports itself, the frames promoted (in relation to the officials as sources) are 
continuously shifting. This is probably the most important issue in connection to 
understanding officials as sources -  they reflect the changing (official) perceptions of the 
situation in East Timor.
In the early September 1999, the Australian government was shocked by the escalating 
violence in East Timor. This shock immediately turned into political pressure on 
Indonesia, as Indonesia was responsible for the security based upon the tripartite 
agreement. A sample report from early September appears below. In this report,
691Australia signals its interest in keeping at arm’s length from the events:
Canberra ruled out yesterday the possibility o f  Australia participating in any non-United Nations 
military force in East Timor.
The Minister for Defence, Mr Moore, said Australia was prepared to meet any need for 
evacuation from East Timor, but added: "Troops from Australia will not go in unless its at t e 
invitation o f  the United Nations with the sanction o f  Indonesia."
A spokesman for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, said last night that he had been
surprised by Mr McKinnon's reported comments and had sought clarification.
"Mr McKinnon's office re-assured us that non-UN intervention in East Timor is not an option la 
is being promulgated by N ew  Zealand because o f  the self-evident complications associate 
it," he said.
For th ose w h o have still not g o t the m essa g e , A ustralia w ill not be invading Indonesia."692
The report above from The Sydney Morning Herald, dated 2nd of September, shows some 
uncertainty within the Australian government in deciding its official stance. Within days, 
as the violence escalated rapidly, the perception of the government changed accordingly. 
By the 7 of September the tone of the Australian government had changed 
dramatically:69̂
Prime Minister John Howard last night called an emergency meeting o f  the Cabinet's national security 
committee to consider Australia's response to the deteriorating relationship and to the East Timor 
crisis.
Mr Howard earlier yesterday said there was "no doubt in the world that at the moment Indonesia is not 
fulfilling its obligations to maintain law and order".
Government sources said all aspects o f the relationship, including defence links and aid, would be on 
the table if  Indonesia did not live up to its promises to ensure peace.
It is understood Defence Minister John Moore has failed in his efforts in recent days to speak to 
Indonesian armed forces commander General Wiranto, now widely believed to have sanctioned the 
growing violence in East Timor.
"The situation has really got much worse in the last 48 hours," Mr Howard said.
Australia has mounted a major diplomatic effort to try and shame Indonesia into restoring peace in 
East Timor, and to win support for an early deployment o f  peacekeepers.694
The two articles above show how the frames presented in this case by Australian officials 
were changing. The basis of the changes was the increase in violence in East Timor after 
the referendum. In the first article, the frame was that the Australian government would 
not enter East Timor without Indonesian permission. In the second article, the frame has 
shifted to put pressure on Indonesia to give the permission for armed peacekeepers in 
East Timor. This happened in less than a week.
One thing that has never been clearly understood by most o f the Indonesian people was why 
Australia changed its mind dramatically during the East Timor crisis in 1999. In the beginning, 
Australia was publicly supporting Indonesian efforts for making the referendum a success. But 
when the pressure from the Australian public becomes too strong, the Australian government 
position changed dramatically. This is the point where many Indonesians even those who may not 
be government supporters feel that Australia has changed its position towards Indonesia. The
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‘declaration’ o f  the ‘Howard Doctrine’ really fuels the assumption that Australia wanted to 
become a ‘local bully with a super power ally’ in South East Asia.
Long after the 1999 crisis passed, I still met people from different ethnic or social groups that 
think Australian involvement in East Timor crisis (1999) was way out o f line. But when probed 
deeper, it seems that much o f  the angst came from the bombastic political campaign by Australian 
officials regarding the crisis. The problem in my opinion is that though such methods o f  
harvesting o f  public support is common in Australia, such a thing was long abandoned in 
Indonesia. I think the last time Indonesian officials used such methods was when President 
Soekarno declared the armed conflicts back in 1960’s. I believe most Indonesians have seen that 
the result o f  such campaign was bloody conflict and more victims o f conflict.695
Later, as the INTERFET arrived in full strength in East Timor, the tone of Australian 
reports changed again. Before the arrival the frame promoted was concern about possible 
casualties amongst Australian troops. When INTERFET had been fully deployed in East
Timor, the frame changed again into self gratification:
The other thing that stirs the emotion o f the Indonesian public towards Australia was the 
publicized comments by Australian media. The Indonesian public also watched with horror the 
way the pro-integration militias behaved during and after the referendum. But unfortunately, some 
Indonesian media in particular newspapers have successfully exploited reports about the arrogant 
behaviour o f  the UN staff and Foreign (in particular Western) journalists.
One thing that Indonesians do not like is arrogant behaviour. So it was easy to stir up the emotion 
by playing on perceived arrogance. But when the Australian media returned to East Timor after 
being expelled by the pro-integration militias, the impression was that the Australian wanted to 
came back for revenge. This time, the Australian media brought their own protector -  INTERFET 
and it was easy to see how the Australian media were taking sides with INTERFET in their 
reporting that almost sounds like hyperbolic boasting.696
The strong support for INTERFET from Australian newspapers may have come from a 
combination of public demand, political support from the government and not to be 
under estimated, were the previous demands by Australian journalists for an Austialian 
intervention in East Timor. All parties in Australia seem to be in a winning position, the 
government gained political support, the public felt their demands were being met and 
the media felt that their campaign was successful. The loser unfortunately was Indonesia 
which suffered from strong condemnation by the international community and relentless 
negative reporting about Indonesia.
The frames promoted by the Indonesian government were different from the frames 
above. In the beginning of September, it was a surprise that the majority of East 
Timorese decided to decline the offer of full autonomy, and this led to the independence 
process. As soon as reports of escalating violence emerged, the frame was of surprise and 
confidence that the Indonesian security apparatus would be able to handle the situation. 
When it was obvious that things were out of control, a whole new set of frames were 
promoted.697
Furthermore General Wiranto said that it is clear that the deployment o f security forces to East 
Timor is not going to make the situation more explosive. This is because the security forces were 
there to secure the situation. If there are no security forces, the situation will be more explosive. 
It’s due to the ability to act brutally, attacking one another without any interference.698
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in his press conference said that the result o f the referendum will be 
followed up by the Indonesian government with meetings with the UN, Portugal and other parties. 
These meetings will be concerned with many aspects including assets, security and transfer of 
authority, before the formal process o f  transfer to the UN later.699
Indonesia will keep on trying to find the best solutions in there (East Timor) and still rejects the 
presence o f  foreign troops until the third stage said Minister o f Cabinet Secretary; Muladi to 
reporters. The third stage is the period after the result o f  the referendum is accepted by the 
General Assembly (MPR) at the next General Assembly meeting.700
The frame promoted was confidence that Indonesian security forces will be able to 
manage the security, and that business will go on as usual as according to the tripartite 
agreement between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN. The Indonesian government 
presented a frame of confidence and at the same time a subtle defiance. President 
Habibie as Indonesia’s president at the time claimed that he would bear all responsibility 
for everything that happened in East Timor. In the same statement he also stated that he 
declared that Indonesia had successfully conducted a peaceful and transparent 
referendum.701
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What is happening in East Timor at present is one thing. The other fact is that we have 
successfully conducted a referendum process that was peaceful and transparent. Apa yang terjadi 
di Timtim saat ini adalah satu hal. Fakta lainnya, kita telah melaksanakan proses jajak pendapat 
yang transparan dan damai (Republika, September 7)/702.
The frames in the government ranks were more or less stable. Governments as major 
political players always try to hold a consistent line as far as possible (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, 
Wolfsfeld, 2003b). Smaller political players, however, who do not possess the same level 
of power and importance often have to change their message in order to maintain their 
importance.
The point here is the stronger the player is in terms of political influence, the more able 
they are to maintain a consistent frame. Nevertheless a consistent frame is neither 
positive nor negative. By their nature, governments need to preserve a sense of stability 
to maintain order. This warrants a consistent frame and ‘everything is in order’ position 
by the government.
Even during the peak of the crisis — when the UN forces were about to arrive in East 
Timor, both governments still maintained the ‘everything is in order’ frame. But there is 
more to that issue than is apparent on the surface. For the Indonesian government, to 
maintain such a stance was seen more as a ‘facing saving’ effort. The Indonesian 
government had finally lost in its effort to maintain its status as a credible security 
provider in East Timor -  thus failing its commitments to the tripartite agieement. This 
constitutes the ultimate humiliation after the majority of East Timoiese tejected the 
Indonesian autonomy offers.
3 2 7
That morning when my editor from Singapore called me, telling me that the East Timorese had 
rejected the Indonesian offer o f  autonomy, I was really shocked. Never before as an Indonesian 
did I think I would see such a thing happen. Indonesia was still in financial, social and politicai 
crisis, a few other provinces have been nagging for independence and now East Timor ceased to 
be part o f  Indonesia. .
Humiliation for Indonesia was not in Indonesians’ minds at that time. It was more like a shock 
But when the situation deteriorated very quickly and it was obvious that the Indonesian military 
and police could do very little -  to be precise too little, too late; that’s when we felt so ashamed 
Most Indonesians know how efficient and brutal the military and police are when dealing with 
such riots and yet they failed. The well published international pressure only heightened our 
feeling o f  being cornered.703 s
After the decision to send LTN sanctioned troops was made by the UN, the Indonesian 
government’s frame was to accept the UN decision and to welcome the UN troops. 
Hostile frames from the Indonesian government ceased when the UN decision was 
accepted.
For Australia the frame can be understood as an attempt to contain the anxiety within
Australian society. For weeks, the Australian press had been pressuring the government
to send troops to East Timor. The Australian press, members of Australian society and
East Timor’s independence activists presented a unanimous view that Australia should
send troops to East Timor. This concerted effort was successful.
I remember the most shocking news about East Timor was not the burning or refugees, for after 
the 1998 crisis we were used to that. The most shocking news was that suddenly Australia was 
preparing its troops in Darwin to go to East Timor, way before the UN resolution. For us 
Indonesians, regardless whether or not we agreed with what the military did or not, such an act 
from Australia was like a statement o f war, just like before the Dutch colonialists wanted to re­
occupy Indonesia after World War 2.
For Indonesians, since the end o f  the War o f  Independence in 1949, we had never seen foreign 
troops going to Indonesia for a conflict. Conflict is part o f Indonesian history. The Javanese, are 
proud to carry their weapons (The K e r i s ) .  But the K e r i s  is always carried in the back and anyone 
carrying weapons up front (except for the military and police) is considered very rude and will 
attract negative attention -  in most places in Indonesia.
Now the image o f Australian soldiers, fully armed with their armored vehicles saying they are 
ready to go to East Timor was filling the front pages o f  Indonesian newspapers. Such a thing is 
like reminding us o f  the rude and arrogant Dutch colonials 1946-1948. In the end it s just fueling 
the long held fear and prejudice about western societies’ attitudes towards Indonesia. Just today, a
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friend told me how his office colleague (an Australian) was calling him ‘Dickhead’ in his office 
without clear reason why. My friend did not realize what the word meant until we told him.704
Having made the commitment to send troops in East Timor, the Australian government 
faced the grim reality of casualties in East Timor. There was also an alarming possibility 
that sending troops might incite conflict with Indonesia. In the end the frames produced 
by the Australian government were a mix between warning of the worst possible case (of 
casualties but not conflict with Indonesia) and drumming up support for the troops.
In 2004, the frames produced by Australian and Indonesian governments were 
challenged by a new comer. Some news articles were mentioning that the Indonesian 
military were not just supporting but also coordinating and arming the pro-integration 
militias. The fact that pro-integration militias were created and trained by the Indonesian 
military is not a new story. In fact it goes along way to the early days to the annexation 
of East Timor by Indonesia (Subroto, 1997, Conboy, 2003).
The significance of the new reports was that the Australian government was very aware 
about what had been going on in East Timor including the intentions of pro-integration 
militias. The report made by Captain Andrew Plunkett also stated that the Australian 
' government was very aware about the plan to destroy East Timor should the people reject 
the autonomy offer.7(b Captain Plunkett claimed that he knew these facts as he was the 
senior Australian army intelligence officer assigned to 1NTERFET.
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Captain Plunkett’s report was later reinforced another report by another former 
Australian Army officer. Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins was the officer assigned to 
head the intelligence section within INTERFET. He claimed that not only was the 
Australian government very aware of Indonesian military plans but that the Australian 
government was also deliberately trying to cover up such knowledge (Davis, 2004, 
Daley, 2004, Lyons, 2004a). Lieutenant Colonel Collins claimed that the cover up was 
due to the strong influence of powerful ‘pro-Indonesian’ lobby group within Australia 
(Lyons, 2004a, Lyons, 2004b, Daley, 2004, Davis, 2004).
Lieutenant Colonel Collins argued that the ‘pro-Indonesian’ lobby group saw that the
relationship with Indonesia was very important for Australia707. The ‘pro-Indonesian’
lobby group itself is a loose association of academics, government officials (either still
serving or retired) and business people. In this group’s view, a fall-out between Australia
and Indonesia over East Timor should be avoided but if that were not possible , it should
be contained as far as possible. Captain Martin Toohey, the officer in charge for
investigating Lieutenant Colonel Collins’ allegations of a cover up stated:
He describes the Jakarta lobby, as "a cabal o f  both uniformed and civilian personnel within DIO 
and Defence who take every-thing emanating from the TNI [Indonesian military] at face value. 
This so-called 'intelligence' is written with the object o f distancing the TNI from atrocities 
committed by the Kopassus [read 'terrorist'] arm o f the TNI ... two basic premises o f the Jakarta 
lobby are firstly to deny atrocities committed by the TNI, followed by publicly attributing those 
outrages including those human rights violations in East Timor [pre-Interfet] to 'rogue elements 
o f the TNI and not the TNI per se."708
The presence of the pro-Indonesian lobby group or ‘Jakarta lobby’ was one of the main 
issues in the case of Lieutenant Colonel Collins and Captain Plunkett. Various reports by
the Australian media highlighted the presence of the ‘Jakarta lobby' as a scandal within
the Australian federal government. Paul Daley from The Bulletin reports:
Talk about the so-called Jakarta lobby - those Australian political, military and diplomatic elites 
are said to be pursuing an entrenched policy o f appeasement with successive Indonesian 
administrations ahead o f  human rights - was rife. The arguments varied in sophistication. Some 
analysts were willing to entwine stories about the Jakarta lobby with conspiracies about alleged 
cover-ups o f  paedophile activity in the foreign service. The more sophisticated, however, saw the 
Jakarta lobby more prosaically as an alignment o f  decision-makers who pragmatically considered 
strong relations with Indonesia, and the ensuing security and trade benefits, to be the necessary 
bedrock o f  the bilateral relationship, ahead o f  human rights.709
Captain Plunkett and Lieutenant Collins’s reports challenged the previous frames 
presented by the Australian and Indonesian governments during the crisis in 1999. The 
reports also challenged the foundations of both governments’ frames at that time. For the 
Indonesian government this new construction represented their officials (especially the 
senior military officers like General Wiranto) as having questions of credibility. 
Indonesian officials (especially the military officials) had always denied the claim that 
there was a plan to destroy East Timor should the autonomy offer being rejected. For the 
Australian government the report presented a different meaning.
Captain Plunkett and Lieutenant Colonel Collins’ reports shows a possibility of a new, 
deeper frame within the Australian government’s frames during the East Timor crisis. 
The hidden frame can be understood as pleasing the Australian public while at the same 
time managing the crisis with Indonesia. One of the damning facts presented by Captain 
Plunkett was the finding of an alleged mass grave containing victims of the conflict in 
East Timor. Not only that, Captain Plunkett also alleged that Kim Beazley, the head of 
Australian Labor Party was compromised due to his close association with Indonesia.
JO  1
By mid-2001, Captain Andrew Plunkett, an intelligence officer with outer-Sydney Holsworthy- 
based parachute regiment the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment, had written a report asserting that 
Beazley's past friendship with a prominent Indonesian had brought him to the attention o f 
Indonesian intelligence agencies.
Plunkett alleged that Beazley, a former defence minister, had been compromised by Indonesian 
intelligence because o f  the friendship and was therefore a risk to Australia’s national security. 
Plunkett says he first verbally detailed his claims to the commanding officer o f the 1st Intelligence 
Battalion at Sydney's Victoria Barracks. Plunkett says he then emailed a written report to the°same 
superior officer before giving a copy to the office o f  then-defence minister Peter Reith.710
The mass grave found by Captain Plunkett would have pushed the UN to create an 
international tribunal in East Timor, something that Indonesia strongly resisted. Almost 
immediately, Captain Plunkett was ordered to close the investigation of possible 
atrocities in East Timor. Closing down the investigation meant that it was difficult for the 
UN to have reasons to create an international tribunal.
We may now return to the media frames presented by government officials. It is clear 
that both governments presented frames that supported the political stand of the 
Australian and Indonesian governments. But within those frames, lie hidden frames. For 
the Indonesian government, the hidden frame was concerned with maintaining the 
integrity of Indonesia in the domestic and international communities. For the Australian 
government, the hidden frame was concerned with acknowledging the pressure from the 
Australian public while at the same time trying to minimize the fall out with Indonesia.
In 2006, this hidden frame was fully publicized in a report by the East Timor s truth and 
reconciliation commission.711 The report was made about the time Indonesia took over 
East Timor from Portugal in 1975 until the referendum in 1999. Within the report, there
were allegations that Australia strongly preferred East Timor to remain a part of 
Indonesia despite reports of thousands of victims of violence in East Timor.
AUSTRALIA wanted East Timor to remain an Indonesian province and the Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, lobbied Jakarta to delay a vote for independence, a report to the United 
Nations has found.
The report says Australia "contributed significantly to denying the people o f Timor-Leste then- 
right to self-determination before and during the Indonesian occupation".
In order to maintain a good relationship with Indonesia, Australia violated its obligations under 
international law and backed the bigger neighbour's push to take over East Timor in 1975. It also 
was influenced by a desire to get the most it could out o f maritime boundary negotiations 
affecting oil and gas reserves.
Australia also gave Indonesia economic and military assistance throughout the 24-year occupation 
and advocated on its behalf in the international community, the commission said.
It also makes special mention o f the more recent role o f Mr Downer before the vote for 
independence in 1999. It says he lobbied Indonesia to delay the poll because it was in Australia's 
interests for East Timor to remain part o f  the archipelago.712
Regardless of the evidence of the deep frame within Australian government frames, it 
still does not answer why there were changes of frames promoted by the Australian 
government. The first answer may lie in what Wolfsfeld said that political antagonists 
always do their best to promote frames that best suit their interests according to the 
situation.713
A second answer is that the Australian government at that point of time was in a difficult 
position. On one hand it was clear that the Australian government wanted to keep East 
Timor as part of Indonesia for various reasons. On the other hand, the continuous reports 
of violence especially after the referendum had triggered a very strong emotional 
response within Australian society. The pressure from the Australian public reached a 
point that was impossible to be ignored by the Australian government. The description
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by Richard Woolcott, former Australian ambassador to Indonesia, is probably the best
i • • 714description:
I have been sickened by many o f  the scenes from East Timor. Nobody can condone the savagery 
o f the anti-independence militias and any support they have received from the Indonesian armed 
forces (TNI). Many Indonesians will also be shocked by these acts.
The situation o f  the East Timorese -  those we sought to help -  is horrific; much worse than it 
was at the beginning o f  this year. We now face a devastated East Timor with an unknown number 
o f casualties, many o f  whom might otherwise still be alive.
How did we allow all this to happen? The first error was to assume that President B.J.Habibie, an 
erratic and transitional figure whose legitimacy, hold on power and support from the armed forces 
was always in question in Indonesia, could deliver without strong opposition on his undertakings 
to John Howard.
The second was to overlook the likelihood o f  a violent backlash to the expected vote against 
autonomy on August 30. Many Indonesians, including East Timorese, warned o f this.
The third mistake was the Government's response to domestic pressure groups demanding 
immediate independence for East Timor, with which it virtually joined hands. While community 
feelings were very strong, it overreacted to the East Timor lobby, a sometimes hysterical and 
committed media, the more radical elements in the Catholic Church and a handful o f ex­
servicemen who feel Australia has a debt to the East Timorese who helped them after Australia 
had invaded the Portuguese colony in 1942.713
In the end, the point of the argument is that Australian newspapers with the complicity of 
Australian officials promoted frames that suit the interests of political players in 
Australia -  the government. The frames were not visibly known until members of 
Australian Defence Force, Captain Plunkett and Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins broke 
the silence and declared that the Australian government knew more than what they 
claimed during East Timor crisis in 1999. The revelations also suggested that the 
Australian government was deliberately trying to minimize the impact of their action (to 
Indonesia) in order to preserve their interests with Indonesia.
On the other hand, the Indonesian press also arguably fell in l ine with the In d o n e s ia n  
government’s position regarding the East Timor crisis in 1999. Nevertheless, the
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positions of the Indonesian newspapers were due to rising nationalistic sentiment caused 
by international pressure towards Indonesia. The Indonesian government at the time was 
also structurally weak unlike the New Order regime. Nevertheless, the combination of a 
lack of resources and the systematic control of information by the Indonesian military 
made it difficult for Indonesian newspapers to fully cover the East Timor crisis.
Seven years after the East Timor crisis in 1999, another crisis came to East Timor, 
opening the old wounds again. In April -  May 2006 tension was rising in East Timor due 
to differences within the East Timor Defence Force and East Timor's government under 
Prime Minister Marie Alkatiri. The tension climaxed with the sacking of around 500 
soldiers. Immediately the soldiers ran away to the jungle carrying all their equipment and 
weapons, creating the most serious crisis since 1999.
Apparently the main issue was concerned with the unfair treatment towards soldiers that 
came from the western side of East Timor. These soldiers were thought to be associated 
with the pro-integration militias in 1999. Soon after the soldiers were dismissed, armed 
conflicts erupted in many areas.716 East Timor became engulfed with violence as bad as 
1999 crisis. Nevertheless this time, the crisis was a major blow for Australia.
After promoting the frame that the Indonesian military was solely lesponsible for the 
crisis in 1999, Australia now faced a crisis that was fueled and sparked from within East 
Timor society itself. The frame of horizontal conflict - that there were roots of conflict
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within East Timor society that were dismissed in 1999, now suddenly came out in the
717open. Suddenly Australia had to backtrack on its frame as ‘local super power’ as the 
condition of East Timor were clearly beyond control.718
For Australian newspapers, such a situation was like a reversal of the 1999 crisis. Instead 
of being perceived as hero and liberator719, Australia now had to act as a forced mediator 
to restore law and order. “ As in 1999, Australia now saw no other option than to send 
their troops but the situation was now completely different. A description is given by 
Paul Kelly:
AUSTRALIA'S necessary military intervention in East Timor is now hostage to the political 
divisions and constitutional deadlock that have been played out during the past week. This should 
end the romantic and unrealistic view o f  East Timor that has shaped Australia's public debate 
since the 1975 Indonesian invasion, driven relentlessly by Australia's media. The ministries in 
Jakarta will be rocking with laughter this week. In seven short years East Timor has ceased to be 
Indonesia's problem and has become Australia's problem.7-1
Seven years since Australian newspapers and officials promoted the frames of historical 
links, the emergency situation and regional security, the frame is now being put under 
scrutiny. This time the ‘romantic and unrealistic view of East Timor’ as Paul Kelly 
described has disappeared. Instead Australia now faced a long commitment of a country 
riven with horizontal conflict that could turn violent any time. Unlike before, Australia, 
including the press and government, did not have Indonesia as the main scapegoat to 
demonize — the cause and root of the problem now appeared to lie within East Timor 
itself - something that was rejected by the frames promoted in 1999.
7.5.2. East T im orese as sources.
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The crisis in East Timor in 1999 was allegedly about the East Timorese. In December 
1998, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, wrote to the Indonesia’s President BJ 
Habibie to find a solution for East Timor. PM Howard claimed that his letter was merely 
asking for Indonesia to be ‘more lenient’ towards East Timor.722 President Habibie 
instead replied by suddenly announcing that he was willing to grant East Timorese 
special autonomy within Indonesia. Refusal of the autonomy offer would result, 
however, in a managed transition to independence.
In term of the frame, the offer of autonomy suggested by President Habibie was to the 
people of East Timor. As the referendum was essentially a survey of popular opinion, the 
main focus was on the people of East Timor. Later as the media picked up the stories of 
the referendum, the issue of the East Timorese became more prominent in the Australian 
and Indonesian media. Nevertheless in both Australia and Indonesia, the focus on East 
Timor and its people was different.
For Australian newspapers, out of the issues concerning East Timorese, the process of 
referendum, violence and forced displacement, the latter took the priority. J For 
Indonesian newspapers, the referendum process had a higher priority as well as the 
stories on the efforts to bring peace and conflict resolution.7“4 For the latter, again
. . . . 725Australian newspapers did not perceive that as an important issue.
The East Timor crisis in 1999 fitted in perfectly to the Australian media format. Over the time 1 
was studying journalism in Australia I found there was almost an obsession within the Austra lan 
media (and the people too) with human interest stories especially with anything that c ose y 
related with Australian society. The newspapers often carries headlines such as Wollon^on-, man 
injured in an accident” which turned out to be a story o f  a man involved in a common tra i c
n
J J  /
accident in Indonesia. But what makes it different is because there is an A u s tr a l ia n  involved with 
it.
Six years after East Timor crisis I witnessed another kind o f ‘hysteria’ fueled by the Australian 
media. Soon after the December 26th 2004 tsunami, the world including Australia learned that 
Aceh, a province o f Indonesia was the hardest hit area with the number o f victim rising by 
thousands every day. Although there were no Australians in Aceh at the time, the emotion stirred 
from seeing the footage o f  the tragedy was so great that Australian public end up donating 
millions o f  dollars. In a concert for charity Australians, from school children to celebrities donated 
anything from milk money to thousands o f  dollars.
Being Indonesian the tsunami tragedy struck me hard. When I went to Jakarta in January 2005, I 
saw massive reportage in the Indonesian media about the tsunami. Then I realized how differently 
the story was represented. For Australian society, it was clear that what connected them to the 
tsunami tragedy were the reports from the Australian Defence Forces, Red Cross and volunteers -  
all Australians, who went to Aceh and gave dramatic impression o f the tragedy. For Indonesian, 
the tragedy was presented as a tragedy in the family where all family members came together and 
quietly helped each other out. For the Australian media what was important was the role of 
individual Australians in Aceh. For Indonesian, what important was how the community could be 
mobilized to help more.726
Peter White has noted that society perceives what is considered important by measuring
*70 "7 »the event against the values of the society itself. “ The values of the society are a 
reflection of the society itself and some values are more fundamental than others. This 
will be reflected in what is transcribed by the society in the daily interaction. “ That 
events in East Timor are reflected differently by Australian and Indonesian newspapers is 
not surprising as the two societies are two distinctly different societies.
In this context, when we examine East Timorese as sources, the deep frame is not about 
just what was said in the newspapers at that particular time. Instead, I believe that the 
number of East Timorese used as sources in comparison to the total articles published 
will show the deep frame. To be able to look what is the deep frame, we need to look to 
the data collected and presented in Chapter 6.
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In Table 2, the data shows that the average East Timorese quoted as sources is quite low, 
less than 10 per cent. The exceptions were Republika and Media Indonesia. These papers 
quoted pro-integration supporters to a significant degree. This tendency, which might 
regarded as biased towards certain groups, was readily admitted by the newspapers.729 
Both newspapers admitted that the connection with Indonesia that was shown by the pro­
integration groups was a factor underpinning the support given by those newspapers.730
The argument here is that in the terms of East Timorese as sources, there was a tendency 
to downplay the importance of the East Timorese. Both Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers (except for Republika and Media Indonesia) showed little interest in drawing 
on the East Timorese as sources.
In a classic m ovie -  T h e  S e v e n  S a m u r a i  by Akira Kurosawa, many people thought that the central 
role and the winners in the movie were the Samurai that were hired by the villagers. I remember 
seeing the m ovie with a hall full o f  people who cherished the moment when the Samurai finally 
defeated the bandits that were attacking the villages. Instead, the real reality was put in context 
when the head o f  the Samurai said: “It’s not the samurai that wins. It’s the peasants, the villagers 
that hired them that win”.
For me East Timor is like the movie. Various parties and nations claimed that they were helping 
the East Timorese. Even the Indonesian used the same reason in 1975 when they invaded East 
Timor. But in the end the reality was that the East Timorese were just pawns in a bigger political 
game.7jl
This finding contradicts the frames promoted (officially) by both the Australian and 
Indonesian governments. Both governments always insisted that the main issue was not 
about East Timor as land but about the people. PM Howard’s letter to President Habibie 
in December 1998 was allegedly urging Indonesia to treat the East Timorese people 
better. During the campaign and preparation for the referendum, the issue often promoted 
was the future of the East Timorese. Then when the UN and Australia became involved
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militarily, the frame promoted was to save the East Timorese from the rampaging pro­
Indonesian militias.
At the height o f  tension between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor, most Indonesians did 
not believe that Australia’s motivation to ‘save’ East Timor was just a humanitarian issue. Many 
commentators in the Indonesian newspapers were accusing Australia o f wanting to reap benefits 
from East Timor’s gas and oil. Other commentators claimed that Australia wanted to build 
military bases in East Timor to be used as defensive ‘forts’ in case o f Indonesian invasion.
The point here is that between Australian and Indonesian society, apparently very little 
understanding existed despite the long contacts between the two societies. What seems to be 
flourishing well is the prejudice and wariness that one country might invade the other. In the 
present day the issue has changed into terrorism where Indonesia being accused to be harboring 
anti-Australian terror groups simply because the majority o f Indonesian people are Muslims. A 
ridiculous perception in my opinion but that was the reality. The result is the same: there is little 
trust or understanding within the two societies and that has made it easy to spark a possible 
conflict between Australia and Indonesia.7'2
Figures presented in Chapter 6 show that the East Timorese had relatively little 
importance as sources. Even when they were quoted, there were also tendencies to quote 
more from groups that were perceived to more 'accessible’ or ‘friendlier’ to specific 
media (such as pro-integration towards Indonesian journalists and the pro-independence 
towards western journalists). So there was an imbalance between promoted frames and 
the reality.
The reality here is that within that time frame, when the media have a significant amount 
of energy and space focused on a single issue, the East Timorese have little diiect 
representation. Even when there was direct representation (as sources), theie vveie 
tendencies to favour certain groups. The papers which demonstrated this tendency most 
clearly were Republika and Media Indonesia.
340
We might conclude then, first, that there is little direct representation of East Timorese 
(as sources). This brings up the question of whether the frames promoted by both the 
Australian and Indonesian governments and media represent the actual concern regarding 
the people of East Timor. Second there is a tendency within Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers of bias towards certain groups. The bias was more visible in certain 
Indonesian newspapers. Third, the low numbers of East Timorese used as sources also 
raises the question of what kind of social construction of reality being created here. In 
comparison, sources coming from both Australian and Indonesian societies were more 
significant than the numbers of East Timorese used as sources. This aspect will be 
discussed in detail later.
7.5.3. A ustralian  and Ind on esian  citizen s as sources.
Data from Chapter 6 shows that Australian and Indonesian citizens were used 
significantly as sources during the East Timor crisis. In fact, both Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers quoted their own citizens much more frequently than they quoted 
the East Timorese. As explained above, this raises the question of what kind of social 
construction of reality is being created here?
Sources play an important role in news and the ‘reality’ that is created (O'Connor, 2000, 
Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Wolfsfeld, 2003b, Bennet, 1983, Gans, 1999, Goodhart, 2004, Said, 
1980). By emphasizing sources within their own society, while the main story is
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regarding a different society, there is a danger that the focus may not be grounded in 
what the papers claim to be their news focus.
The finding in Chapter 6 has clearly challenged the frame that East Timorese were the 
focus of the news. In Table 2, it was clear that there were more Indonesian or Australian 
people used as sources than the East Timorese. The media claimed that their focus is the 
plight of the East Timorese, but they were clearly presenting their stories based upon the 
information coming from their own citizens.
On the surface the frames from Australian and Indonesian sources were different but not 
by much. Australian newspapers put much emphasis on the escalating violence and 
efforts to save the East Timorese. As a consequence of these frames, increasingly 
negative perceptions developed towards Indonesia and there were demands to send 
Australian troops in order to resurrect the law and order in East Timor. Indonesian 
newspapers also put emphasis on the escalating violence especially after the 
announcement of the referendum result on September lN But this frame later was 
sidelined with the frame of increasingly hostile international pressure towards Indonesia. 
When the INTERFET was formed, the frame was dominantly about the role of Australia
in the process of creating the INTERFET and the subsequent deployment of INTERFET.
In my opinion the East Timor crisis in 1999 is a good example o f how little Australia and 
Indonesia know and understand each other as societies. During the six years I lived in Austra la, 
found Australian society to be generally caring and even passionate towatds human rig ts issues. 
On the other hand, the history and the belief in Indonesia in human rights lies with the communa 
life, and is contradictory with the individual human rights as understood in Australia.
Unfortunately instead o f  prompting a search for greater understanding the political Pow^ s ^ot 
Australia and Indonesia seem to use this deep seated animosity and mistrust or eu 
advantage. After the East Timor crisis in 1999, there have been moie cases t at amp
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animosity such as the Schapelle Corby case, The Bali bombing and the case of nine youn* 
Australians convicted o f  drug smugglings in Bali (dubbed as 'Bali Nine) In these cases’
politicians have been quick to use it to amplify fear and ignorance and unfortunately the media 
seems to be more than happy to assist. J
The deeper frame presented by Australian and Indonesian citizens is perhaps the key to 
understand the different perceptions within the two societies. For Australian people the 
deeper frame is of panic watching helplessly a crisis unravel at the door step of Australia. 
This feeling of panic was more pronounced with the continuing reminder of ‘the debt to 
the East Timor people in World War 2’ and (to a limited scale) the death of five 
journalists working for Australian media in 1975.
For Indonesian people, the deeper frame is perhaps disbelief at the way things were 
unravelling in East Timor, and the consequences for Indonesia. This deep frame was later 
replaced by sense of nationalism triggered by the increasing pressure from international 
community including Australia.7j4 To make matters worse there is a strong bias and 
prejudice that existed within Australian press in their perception of Indonesia.7̂  Lowe 
understands the problem in this way:
But their construction o f  Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines is weighted heavily on the 
downside o f  life in the life o f  those countries. It describes these countries as appearing to falter in 
their quest for modernity, prosperity and brutality, danger and disappointment. The negative news 
focus may be partly been result o f  habit. Insurgency, disasters, repressive politicians and sleaze 
have been loud themes in International news media coverage o f South East Asia for decades. It 
seems difficult for media gate keepers to refocus on other issues. The innate conservatism o f news 
production practice determines that they keep doing things the traditional way, until they are 
confronted with com pelling reasons to look for new issues.7"’6
Thus the deeper frames or the social construction of reality within Australian and 
Indonesian newspaper reports about the East Timor crisis present something quite 
profound. The social reality constructed here represents something fundamental within
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the societies in their relations with the media. This will be the core concept to be 
presented by this thesis.
7.5.4. Press as sources.
As sources, the press played a limited role during the East Timor crisis but this does not 
mean that it played an unsignificant role. Findings in Chapter 6 show that as an openly 
attributed sources the press was less often quoted than other sources. Nevertheless, two 
Indonesian newspapers Kompas and Suora Pembaruan quoted other press institutions 
(news agencies) quite significantly. It is also interesting to note that both newspapers 
have been perceived to be the most neutral in their reporting about East Timor crisis.7j7
Though the findings in Chapter 6 may show that the press as source was not as 
significant a source compared to other sources, there are still important findings. First, 
two Indonesian newspapers (Kompas & Suara Pembaruan) relied significantly on and 
quoted other press institutions. Second, it is possible that newspapers analysed here 
based their reports upon other press but did not mention their sources clearly in their 
articles.
Regarding the first finding, the only explanation is that both Kompas and Sitata 
Pembaruan probably took the view that they should present the issue of the East Timoi 
crisis from various angles, and news agency reports provided a way of doing this. The 
other two Indonesian newspapers, Media Indonesia and Republika, openly stated that
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they perceived information sourced from non-Indonesian sources was biased and so they 
avoid using them as sources.7j8
For the Australian press, the sentiment also involved media ego. Both The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The Australian had journalists on the ground in East Timor (until 
they were pulled out due to escalating violence). Having their own journalists on the 
ground in East Timor provided both newspapers with fresh reports from the front line 
and made it unnecessary to have to rely on secondary sources, unlike the Indonesian 
newspapers.
Having a journalist in the ground of East Timor may not mean that the issue of media 
ego was resolved. Foreign journalists often worked under the principle that their job was 
to report what’s happening as they saw it. On one hand this is a well established function 
of journalism. But on the other hand, did the journalist present the issue in a ‘fair’ 
manner -  which means giving enough depth of coverage to all sides reported. During the 
East Timor crisis, one of the major criticism from the Indonesian side was that foreign 
press (including Australian press) downplayed or even omitted the fact that Indonesia 
had been supporting and working hard in East Timor to improve the standard of living. 
The reports of AKSARA Foundation highlighted the issue:
In accusations against international press coverage o f  Indonesia, a common complaint was the 
lack o f  attention given to the development which had occurred in East Timor during its tenuie as 
Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province. Many members o f  the Indonesian community felt that the 
international press excessively dwelt on the people killed during Indonesia s initial annexation o f  
the territory while ignoring the roads, schools and churches built by the Indonesian government.
When asked about this lack o f  attention, several members o f the international press stated, Well 
that isn’t news. We were reporting on what was occurring, as it was occuning. They also felt t at 
the violence that occurred during the Indonesia’s annexation o f the piovince and the years o
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intimidation suffered at the hands o f  the Indonesian military were far more relevant in explainin* 
why the Timorese voted for independence than Indonesia’s development o f the province.739 °
For Indonesian newspapers, even before the violence escalated (after the referendum 
result announcements), they already had difficulties in fielding and maintaining their own 
journalists in East Timor. The difficulty is basically operational: the Indonesian media 
often lack the financial power to send their own journalists over an extended time even 
within Indonesia. For instance, when SWA business magazines (the leading business 
magazine in Indonesia) sent their journalists to other areas, they often had to rely on 
airline tickets provided by airline companies as barter with advertisement space. Other 
arrangements were dependent on 'fully covered’ invitations740.
The economic crisis in 1997 made this situation even worse. When the East Timor crisis 
broke out in 1999, many Indonesian newspapers had to rely on the Indonesian news 
agency ANTARA as the source of news. Otherwise, Indonesian newspapers had to rely on 
‘official visits’ to East Timor by Indonesian officials. These circumstances made the 
position of Indonesian journalists very difficult at times. It is best illustrated by reference 
to the situation faced by Republika .
Nurul Hamami, R e p u b l ik a ' s  editor responsible for East Timor, confirmed the difficulty o f access 
to East Timorese sources. R e p u b l ik a  sent reporters to East Timor on three occasions to covei the 
referendum and on two o f  these occasions, the reporter were part o f an official TNI delegation, 
staying at the military headquarters. Arriving with TNI made it very difficult for them to get 
access to the pro-independence side, he stated. He also admitted that R e p u b l ik a  has the reputation 
o f being closely affiliated with the Indonesian government at the time and as such, was viewed 
with suspicion by the pro-independence movement “.
Press sources played a more limited role during the East Timor crisis, in particular when 
the violence barred most journalists (especially foreign journalists) from reporting
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directly from East Timor. But the issue is far more complex than that. Some Indonesian 
newspapers felt that they had to deliberately avoid using foreign press agencies as 
sources as they perceived these agencies to be biased against Indonesia.743 At the same 
time, some other Indonesian newspapers seemed not to have the same difficulty.744
Nevertheless behind the biased or nationalistic rhetoric, for practical reasons Indonesian 
papers must have used other press as sources. Republika admitted openly that they could 
send journalists only three times into the field and they were not stationed East Timor745. 
The lack of financial resources meant it would be difficult for Indonesian media to 
maintain a continuous presence in East Timor, unlike their foreign counterparts. So in 
order to maintain the news flow in particular during the peak of the crisis (after the 
referendum result announcement), the Indonesian press must have used press services as 
sources.
It is possible that the agency or service they relied on was the Indonesian news agency -  
ANTARA. Established in 1937 to counter the Dutch Colonial Press Agency, ANTARA is 
the government sanctioned news agency.746 Even today, ANTAR.4 is still maintained 
(though not reporting to) by the secretary of state office.747 Its journalists are technically 
state employees. ANTARA is the largest media institution in Indonesia and naturally it 
was able to maintain its presence in East Timor during the crisis.
During the East Timor crisis, naturally ANTARA was one of the major news sources for 
Indonesian newspapers.748 Unfortunately, during the crisis, ANTARA was also accused
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for often being biased towards Indonesia (particularly the frame promoted by Indonesian 
officials). This led to the perception of Indonesian newspaper reports being low in quality
1 749and accuracy.
For the Australian press, the East Timor crisis is a major issue for various reasons. First 
it’s about history: about how the East Timorese helped defend Australia in World War 2 
and then how five journalists working for the Australian media were killed there in 1975. 
Second is the issue of politics: Australia was the major supporter for Indonesia in 
annexing East Timor in 1975. Third, the East Timor Crisis presented a major 
humanitarian crisis right at the doorstep of Australia.
Given these reasons, it is easy to see why the East Timor crisis was a big issue for the 
Australian press. The Australian media sent as many journalists as they could to cover 
the issue (either from print or broadcast media). With correspondents on the ground, the 
Australian media did not need to rely on secondary sources in the way the Indonesian 
papers did.
The huge amount of attention given to the East Timor crisis also brought out the issue of 
media bias. The Indonesian people and media have often accused the Australian media of 
bias towards the idea of independence (of East Timor) and the supporters of the idea 
(including FALINTIL and FRETILIN). The bias is particularly visible in terms of the 
amount of coverage given to the pro-independence supporters and theit positive 
representation of the pro-independence forces.730 The positive perception (seen as
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outward support) by the Australian media towards East Timor’s independence was 
alleged to be the deep frame within Australian media reports of East Timor's crisis.751 In 
other words, the Indonesian press and society had the perception that the Australian press
were supporting the independence of East Timor all along instead of acting as neutral 
observers.
7.5.5. T he issue o f  u n -attrib uted  sources.
The Watergate scandal was probably the best example of the usage of un-attributed 
source (at that time). Two Washington Post journalists followed up a story that there was 
a possibility that the Republican Party was spying on Democrat Party. Part of the story 
concerned a break in at a Democrat Party office in Washington which led to the 
accusation of spying. The investigation later led to a serious allegation that the spying 
was directed by the most senior level of the Republican Party. When the story was 
published it created a scandal that led eventually to President Nixon’s resignation. The 
issue here is that the two journalists who broke the story based their story by information 
coming from a un-attributed source, nicknamed ‘Deep Throat’.
The case cited above show that usage of un-attributed sources can be a very serious issue, 
it turned out the information the journalists published was correct. Nevertheless the 
impact was far reaching creating huge fame for the media and journalists that broke the
3 4 9
story. For journalists sometimes, the hunger for the fame which also creates publicity for 
their publication, encourages the attention on ‘breaking stories’.
An un-attributed source may be used when there was no other means available, and the 
story has an overwhelming significance that such means are necessary to tell the news. 
Again the classic example is the Woodward and Bernstein famous source -  ‘The Deep 
Throat”. Woodward and Bernstein agreed never to disclose the identity of this source 
unless the source itself did -  something which happened 30 years later. In this classic 
case, Woodward and Bernstein were able to use such arrangements partly due their 
strong evidence (which was also attributed to this ‘un-attributed’ source). Their action 
was vindicated and they gained fame and recognition for themselves and their 
newspaper. But then the question that arises is what if the information from the source 
was wrong?
Ideally, any journalists should never take information given to them at face value732. 
Standard journalism practice is to verify all information with other sources or means 
before publicizing it.73j Unfortunately even the most well known newspapers or 
magazines in the world may not be free from publishing wrong information734.
In Table 2, within Australian newspapers there are a significant number of reports that 
utilize un-attributed sources. Ethically and legally, this is not a serious issue as in 
Australia, as long as the reports are correct in content. It is not compulsory to name the
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sources. A similar position regarding this issue was the case in Indonesia.755 Nevertheless 
the practice has serious implications for media credibility.756
As explained and illustrated above, un-attributed sources may pose serious problems as 
well as presenting the possibility of publishing important information without 
endangering the source757. But in the East Timor crisis, at its peak, it was apparent that 
un-attributed sources played a significant role in Australian newspapers reports (Table 2). 
On the other hand, Indonesian newspapers used un-attributed sources significantly less.
7. 6. C onclusion  -  the Social C onstruction  o f  R eality  and the M edia.
As I have argued and described in this and previous chapters, the media are an instrument 
of the society that creates a particular ‘construction of reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, McCullagh, 2002). But it is important to understand that media does not dominate 
as a source of ‘social construction of reality’. Nevertheless media is an important source 
especially due to its function and ability to create and convey news.
The social construction of reality is an important part of the society as it is the part that 
defines what counts as knowledge for the society. During the East Timor crisis in 1999, 
both Australian and Indonesian newspapers were presenting different social 
constructions of reality. This should not come as a surprise as both societies aie 
inherently different. Both Australian and Indonesian society perceived the situation
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differently according to their own history, and the social and political situation at that 
time.
What makes understanding the social construction of reality important here is the fact 
that it was created by the media - in this case newspapers. The media here have 
successfully created and circulated their social construction of reality to their own 
societies. The evidence for this lies in the increasing attention given by the media to the 
crisis, and the range of opinions within the newspapers as the crisis unfolded. It shows 
how both Australian and Indonesian societies perceived the media to be a valid channel 
to present their views. In the end, even the political actors (Australian and Indonesian 
governments) had no other option than to listen to increasing voice of concern presented 
by the media.
As described earlier as well, Gadi Wolfsfeld has argued that each political conflict is 
unique.760 In the case of the East Timor crisis, the conflict is mainly about meaning -  
how the conflict was to be understood at the cultural level. The newspapers from both 
Australia and Indonesia did their best to define the crisis according to the cultural 
language available and meaningful for them.
In the end, the result of this political conflict amounts to a culturally subjective 
interpretation of the crisis. I argue that what was represented as a conflict ovei the fate of 
East Timor and its people, ended up as a conflict over subjective meaning within 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Thus the issue of East Timoi, though still centi al,
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was in fact sidelined in favour of the issue of how Australia and Indonesia perceived 
each other in this conflict. The theoretical principles I draw out of this examination are as 
follows:
• The frames found within Australian and Indonesian newspapers during the East 
Timor crisis in 1999 were a reflection of how Australian and Indonesian societies 
perceived the conflict and not just means by the newspapers to ‘reach out’ to their 
readers.
• The representation of particular realities created by Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers reports are distortions of reality. The representations or construction 
of events mirrored both society’s perceptions over the issues and were informed 
by the history, social, political and cultural situation at that time.
• The reason why such contradictory perceptions over the East Timor crisis exist is 
because the promoted frames or the social construction of realities created were 
able to connect with the deep meaning or beliefs existing within Australian and 
Indonesian society.
• The existence of this deeper level of meaning or belief made the issue become 
strongly contested as it is based upon something deeply believed in both societies.
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C H A PT E R  8
C O N C L U SIO N
Starting in Chapter 1, a quest was started to understand the different perspectives about 
the East Timor crisis as presented within Australian and Indonesian newspapers reports 
from August 1 - October 1, 1999. The quest is about to come an end, with many 
significant findings and new understandings revealed about the Australian and 
Indonesian media during and about the East Timor crisis. Elowever, before we arrive at 
the final conclusion, we are going to review the quest briefly.
8.1. T heoretical review .
Susan Sontag, an American essayist, in her book On Photography, said that photography 
is a distortion of reality.761 A picture, she said, only captured a fraction of a second of 
what was going on in front of the camera.762 A picture may present only the best the 
moment can provide such as a smiling family where everything looks ‘happy and 
‘normal’. However, the picture may not be able tell of the quarrel between brotheis and 
sisters just prior the picture, or of the disharmony between father and mothei. The 
picture, she claimed, deceived us as it only presented what we wanted to see from the 
point of view of the creator.764
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News, like photography, presents us with a description of a fraction of the moment 
deemed important enough by the journalists to pass on to their readers/viewers. In fact, 
news presented through the medium of photography now has its own title -  
photojournalism. Still, the essence of news is telling or informing the readers/viewers of 
what happened within a specific moment at a specific time and place. What Susan Sontag 
said regarding photography as a distortion of reality even applies to news.
As a distortion of reality, news just presents us with a fraction of the information. It is 
through understanding the greater context that we can de-construct the reality to give us a 
better understanding of the reality being presented. In order to do so with news reports 
about the East Timor crisis, the framing method was applied as the research method of 
this thesis. The framing approach is based upon the concept that the media functions like 
a gateway, selecting the information to be passed on to the audience, or in the context of 
this thesis, to society.
By selecting the information to be passed on, often defined as ‘gate keeping’, the media 
are conducting a process that re-constructs reality into something more in-line with the 
media’s perception. In order to do so, the media are not just selecting but also presenting 
the information they select in a certain manner so that it will be understood in the way 
the media would like. The process of presenting information in a specific mannei in
• * i i *  x? t f  * 9 765order to create a new understanding is the basic concept ot traming .
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In this thesis, framing is the basic method used in order to understand the studies that 
were conducted on the Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports of the East Timor 
crisis in 1999. Framing is deemed the most suitable method for analysis as it is designed 
to give a greater understanding about the meaning of the message presented in the 
reports. Framing does that by placing the reports within a certain context, thus grounding 
the message from a conceptual and abstract level to a level from which the event can be 
understood as it is and not as it was projected.
By grounding the information presented, the distortion that was part of the news can be 
minimized and a better understanding of the actual event can be uncovered. In this thesis, 
the grounding process focused exclusively on the text of the newspaper reports. The 
reason for this is that the news text itself is the message that needs to be grounded and 
de-constructed in order to free it from distortion and to be able understand the greater 
meaning of the message.
8.2. Focus o f Study & Research M ethodologies.
The difficulty in conducting the research as outlined by the theory above is that the East 
Timor crisis represents a very complex issue. It relates to a history of 24 years of conflict 
if the time frame starts at the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. It could also relate 
to the history of East Timor under the occupation of Portugal for 400 years, which gives 
East Timor a distinct identity compared to the rest of the region colonized by the Dutch 
or British. However, it could also relate to the political hegemony of the past 30 yeais
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with the Cold War as the bigger context. It also could be understood through the 
perceptions Australia and Indonesia have of their positions in the region, their own 
histories and the way the two societies looked upon themselves and each other. All of the 
possibilities mentioned are just examples and in no way represent all the issues related to 
East Timor.
To analyze the East Timor crisis in 1999 by looking at all possible issues would be an 
extensive and complex task. Thus, it was decided to put the analysis in the context of the 
societies of Australia and Indonesia and in the way the societies perceived the East Timor 
crisis . As this thesis is about journalism, the focus of the study is limited to the 
Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports of the crisis written between August 1st -  
October 1st, 1999.
The rationale for the selection of this time frame is because August 1st marked the start of 
the campaign for the referendum, and October 1st marked the time when the INTERFET 
took over control in East Timor. Thus, October 1st is significant as it effectively denoted 
the end of Indonesia’s control over East Timor. Nevertheless, this time frame still yielded 
almost 2000 articles and covered a very wide range of issues. Therefore it was not 
feasible to cover everything within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, further le-focusing 
was necessary to narrow down the study without sacrificing the quality.
The re-focusing of the study was conducted in several steps. The first one focused the 
research onto the text of the newspapers. As suggested by the flaming appioach, it is
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completely possible to understand the underlying messages by putting the reports within 
more global parameters such as article size and placement as advised by Robert 
Entman.766 Because of this, Entman’s approach is used in this research, but only to a 
limited extent.
Due to limited resources on the researcher’s side, Australian newspaper articles had to be 
obtained using electronic means. As such, it was not possible to analyze them using the 
full method advised by Entman.767 This condition also prevented the full analysis of 
Indonesian newspaper articles using Entman’s method as it would not provide equal 
comparisons with the Australian newspaper analyses. However, the Entman approach 
gave a significant advantage in that it was able to give a much clearer methodology for 
analyzing frames768 as demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5.
Robert Entmant’s frame analysis method is considered to be the most systematic in 
analysing frames (McCullagh, 2002) but in this thesis, it was deemed insufficient to lely 
only on the Entmant method of analysis. In this thesis, frames are perceived as a part of a 
very complex process of social interactions within a society and as such, require furthei 
analysis in order to be fully understood.
In order to meet the requirements of a more thorough analysis, a further two methods for 
frame analysis were employed, each focusing on different aspects within the fiames. The 
first method other than Entmant’s was from Peter White.769 White has done extensive 
research upon the usage of English grammar in conveying specific messages, o
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within news reports.770 White argues that, in the English language, the news process from 
selection to presentation is not a random occurrence, but part of a complex social order. 
White then devised methods that allow researchers to analyse the content and see the 
representation of social order in news reports. As White’s method is based upon 
language, in this case English, his method is focused very much upon language usage.
In the context of this thesis, there are two different languages within the news reports 
being analysed: Indonesian and English. Although White’s method was devised for the 
English language, its main focus is on the content of the language reflected in the 
structure of the news reports. As such, it is deemed suitable to analyse news reports in 
languages other than English, in this case Indonesian, as the researcher here can 
understand both languages as required by White’s method.
The other method of analysis used to analyse frames in this thesis was the method 
devised by Gadi Wolfsfeld. Wolfsfeld is a professor from Israel who has done major 
studies regarding the representation of conflicts in the Middle East in the news media. 
Like White and Entman, Wolfsfeld found that the news reports represent a certain kind 
of social order but unlike the other two, Wolfsfeld focused his studies on the political 
context of the frames that he analysed. As his studies were conducted on news media 
reports about conflicts, Wolfsfeld came to the conclusion that conflicting news media 
reports during conflict actually represent a latent political conflict, which became the 
focus of his analysis.
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The three methods of analysing frames as outlined above are used in this thesis as it was 
decided that no single method of analysis would be able to give comprehensive 
understandings of frames. All three complemented each other as each focused on 
different aspects of frames not analysed by the other methods. The usage and results of 
these methods were presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Frame analysis methods, such as the one created by Robert Entman, were indeed very 
versatile, very systematic analytical methods771, but as it was noted in Chapters 1 and 2, 
it was not possible to utilize the Entman method fully due to the limitation of materials. 
Nevertheless, the Entman method also has a significant drawback as it is possible to fall 
into the trap of quantifying a very abstract concept such as frames, thus eliminating the 
possibility of understanding the frames better in a holistic approach.
By quantifying the data, for instance by separating based on the size of the articles, I was 
afraid that the data would be forced to fit into a specific category instead of being 
allowed to release all its salient information. Thus, it was deemed necessaiy to employ 
another research method that complemented the framing methods of analysis. The
772
method chosen was Grounded Theory as first formulated by Glaser and Stiauss.
The other frame analysis methods used from Wolfsfeld773 and White774 placed emphasis 
in understanding the salient or hidden message of the news stoiies by undei standing them 
through the context or the structure of the language. As such, these methods aie actually
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very much in line with the concept of grounded theory because they ground the news 
stories by placing them in their contexts as their means of analysis.
The second step in re-focusing this study was to direct the research to concentrate on 
specific events. As described earlier, to explain or analyze every single report regarding 
East Timor would be impractical in the limited space of this thesis, due to the number of 
the articles and the wide range of topics covered. Instead, several events will be selected 
as case studies to exemplify the way Australian and Indonesian newspapers reported the 
East Timor crisis. The criteria for the case studies were that the event must have been 
considered significantly important to have been reported by the majority of the 
newspapers analyzed here from both countries. After much deliberation, two topics were 
selected: the death of the Dutch journalist, Sanders Thoenes, and the issue of the border 
crossing by FNTERFET troops.
The death of Sanders Thoenes was significant due to several factors. First, it was 
reported widely in both Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Second, it involved the 
death of a foreign journalist, the only civilian foreigner casualty during the East Timor 
crisis. Thoenes’ status as both a foreigner and a journalist were of interest here. Third, as 
shown in Chapter 1, this case showed the significantly different perceptions and 
representations within Australian and Indonesian newspapers over the East Timoi crisis.
The issue of a border crossing by INTERFET troops was also considered significant 
enough to be analysed here due several factors. First, the issue was widely reported in
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both Australian and Indonesian newspapers. Second, the crossing of any border of any 
sovereign countiy in the world by armed foreign troops without the permission of the 
country whose border is being breached, represents a possible trigger for war. Third, the 
statement about the possible border crossing was made by a very high ranking Australian 
official, Australian Defence Force chief General Michael Moore. This issue caused 
confusion over the mandate of the INTERFET as well as the intentions of Australia 
towards Indonesia. Fourth, this case provided a good sample of the controversy 
surrounding the East Timor crisis that was well reported within both Australian and 
Indonesian newspapers.
The third step in re-focusing the research was to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the 
Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports regarding the issues. As explained earlier, 
the methodology that was used here was based on the framing approach. The framing 
approach stated that media reports do not merely present us with information based on 
facts, but they also present us with the packaging through which the information ought to 
be understood (Mander, 1999, Galtung and Ruge, 1965, Gamson, 1989, Gamson et al., 
1992, Gamson, 1992, Goffman, 1974, Wolfsfeld, 1997b, Edelman, 1988, McCullagh, 
2002). In other words, media reports do not simply tell us the stories, but they also tell us 
how to understand them.775 To use all the framing methods available was not possible, 
but realising that the East Timor crisis was unique, I decided to use not a combination of 
the framing methods of White, Entman and Wolfsfeld.
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8.3. R esearch  F ind in gs.
Earlier, the East Timor crisis was explained as a very complex issue. In order to 
understand the complexity of the issue and to be able to create a thorough understanding, 
the issue needed to be analysed from various points of view. Each framing method tried 
to understand a specific event/issue from a particular point of view. For instance, the 
strength of Robert Entman’s method is its systematic nature and ability to quantify 
abstract data.779 Peter White’s method is based in textual analysis.780 White’s method is 
able to reflect the state of the mind of the writer of the news reports and the salient 
meanings within the written texts. Gadi Wolfsfeld’s method is particularly suitable for 
analysing frames within political and cultural contexts. These three framing analysis 
methods were the methods 1 used in analysing the two case studies chosen.
Because this research is in journalism practices and standards, the focus was mainly on 
the end product of journalism- news reports. As mentioned earlier, the main focus was 
the text of the news articles within Australian and Indonesian newspaper reports about 
the East Timor crisis. Accordingly, the selected methods above were applied in 
understanding the news reports.
In order to analyse the case studies, the methods chosen were used in stages. Each stage 
used a single method to explain the frames within the news leports by focusing on a 
different aspect or point of view in reviewing the frames. Each stage also leviewed the 
frame on different levels, the latter stages related to deeper levels of analysis. I started
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with the most obvious approach: analysing the size of the articles, their placements and 
acknowledgements according to Entman’s methods. I then moved to a deeper, much 
more abstract level which I analysed using White’s and Wolfsfeld’s methods. As 
described earlier in Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 5, the reason why such an approach was used 
here was because it is evident that there is not a single approach that could explain the 
issue. Also, as I described above, the different approaches actually work in conjunction. 
As a continuous process, it was necessary to begin from the most obvious level, such as 
placement, and then move to more abstract or conceptual levels such as cultures as in the 
Woflsfeld method.
The first method applied was Robert Entman’s. As explained before, Entman’s method is 
deemed to be significant as it was among the first methods that were able to analyse 
frames in a more systematic, but albeit a more quantitative way.782 Such a method was 
very important as it was able to clearly show the frames within the news reports.
Nevertheless, as explained earlier, Entman’s method could not be fully applied here 
because of the limitations within the data collected.783 The second factor was that 
Entman’s method is based on a quantitative approach which in itself is vulnerable to 
forced explanation as the data will have to conform to pre-selected theories. Any data 
that failed to conform would then be considered unusable. This contradicted the principle 
of this research which was to allow the data to speak for itself in line with the general 
method employed in this thesis, grounded theory.
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The second method applied was the textual analysis method by Peter White.785 Peter 
White suggested that within daily news reports there were salient meanings that came out 
as the writers or journalists wrote their stories. The reason was that journalists are not 
detached human beings when they write their stories. Journalists are part of a more 
complex structure called society, for which the stories were written.786 The concept of 
journalists being part of society was further discussed, but basically evolves from the 
concept that news, and in particular frames, are part of a systematic process of creating a 
sense of ‘reality’ for society. This concept is based on the theory by Max Weber and 
later evolved into the concept mentioned particularly through the works of Erving 
Goffman (Goffman, 1969, Goffman, 1974, Goffman, 1997) and Peter Berger.788
Peter White’s method is in many aspects more meticulous and requires a significant 
understanding of the usage of language. Understanding the usage of language in order to 
understand the salient meaning within the news story requires a significant understanding 
of the way the language is used. This method is significantly more complex than the 
method proposed by Entman789 but in my opinion, can also act as a compliment lather 
than an anti-argument. White suggests that to analyse the frame, we should look at two 
aspects, the newsworthiness and the voice of the writer within the news leports.
Newsworthiness for White is a significant issue as it defines why such an event is 
deemed important enough to be known by the general member of society. In othei 
words, with millions of things happening in a single day, it is important to figuie out why 
a specific event warrants the attention and the efforts of both the media and the soc y
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Central to White’s idea is the idea that newsworthiness is actually a reflection of 
society.791 Something is deemed newsworthy, White says, when it actually breaches the 
line of what is considered to be normal by society.792 Thus, news selection is actually a 
part of the social process where symbols are created and used to represent a form or 
reality which is communicated back to that society. This is just like what Max Weber 
described when he said that society is based upon the understanding of the interactions of
*70social symbols. J
Newsworthiness here is perceived as how the society perceived the unfolding events 
from their point of view. As such, different society will perceived the same event 
differently as each society has their own particular point of view as shaped by but not 
limited to their culture, values, law and history. A simple example is when an Australian 
got into a traffic accident in Bali the newspaper in his/her town will ran a story about 
him/her. Meanwhile such event may not be perceived as newsworthy by Indonesian 
media even in Bali where such accidents often happened.
So in this case, newsworthiness is a reflection of each society. What is considered to be 
newsworthy in Australia may not be perceived as newsworthy. This is a simple case of 
cultural relativism where things are being perceived differently within different culture. 
Newsworthy as a parameter based on the perception of the society itself will leflect such
differences.
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As thorough as Peter White’s method can be in explaining the process of news selection 
and writings in relation to the salient meanings within the news reports, also known as 
the frames, it was still deemed insufficient. White’s method is significantly more detailed 
and deeper in analysis compared to Entman’s method, but still there are some limitations 
that make the understanding less than complete. The limitations are first, that White’s 
method relies heavily upon language. Language indeed is a deliberate process where the 
selection of the words can reflect the mood, intention and intended messages. 
Nevertheless, understanding the language itself may not be enough to understand the 
bigger context of the news reports. The language may suggest some meanings, but 
understanding the bigger context requires a method that was designed to analyse the 
news as the product of the social process in a broader term.
The second limitation of White’s method is that by relying on written language too 
much, it may lead to a trap of ‘cultural tolerance’, thus negating the possibility of further 
analysis as the researcher is already satisfied with their own understanding. An example 
of this was seen, in Chapter 5, regarding the issue of a border crossing by INTERFET 
troops. The word, ‘hunt down’ was used in Australian newspapers. Some English­
speaking researchers may not see anything wrong with the usage of these words or 
expressions. Nevertheless, that expression relates to the salient meaning of hunting down 
prey, normally an animal.
What makes the usage of the term ‘hunt down very alarming is that the piey in the 
articles, consisted of pro-integration militias composed of humans. Thus, athough such
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an expression is in fact very strong, someone from an English speaking background may 
see the usage of the expression, though not regular, as something not unusual in daily 
situations.
Further deliberation in Chapter 5 showed that the usage of term ‘hunt down’ was 
deliberate in the sense that it was chosen consciously by the writer. In fact, as White’s 
method revealed, the usage of the term actually reflected the mood at that time, 
particularly within the Australian press, that viewed the pro-integration militias as 
dangerous people who wanted to harm them.
It was also found that prior to the arrival of INTERFET troops, the pro-integration 
militias had often threatened journalists, particularly foreign journalists, in a very violent 
manner. There were many accounts in Australian newspapers where the militias directly 
threatened journalists. As such, it created an atmosphere of fear so that when the situation 
was turned for the benefit of the Australian press, such euphoria was clearly conveyed in 
the reports. In this context, the usage of the term, ‘hunt down’ can be seen as an 
expression of vengeance towards the militias.
This leads us to the final method used in analysing the study cases, the political contest 
model from Gadi Wolfsfeld.794 Wolfsfeld argues that in a political contest between two 
parties or countries, the media plays a major role. The media, Wolfsfeld aigues, can 
influence the way the world views the conflict, but its most important function is to
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convince the societies involved of the justness of both the conflict and the position that 
they have taken.
The East Timor crisis in 1999 was a political conflict that involved many parties: 
Indonesia as the de facto ruler; Portugal as the ruler prior to 1975; the United Nations as 
the mediating party between Indonesia and Portugal; the organizations in East Timor that 
fought for independence; Australia as a neighbour of Indonesia and the forward base of 
UN operations in East Timor in 1999. Although many parties were involved, this 
research focused mainly upon the political conflict between Australia and Indonesia that 
occurred during the East Timor crisis in 1999.
The political conflict between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor was what 
Wolfsfeld described as a conflict over meaning. In the beginning, Australia was not a 
major player in the East Timor issue, though it was PM John Howard’s letter to President 
Habibie in December 1998 that led to Habibie’s decision to grant East Timor a 
referendum to choose whether or not they wanted to part of Indonesia with special 
autonomy. If the first option had been rejected, the UN would have taken over East 
Timor to prepare it to become an independent country. Even when Indonesia signed the 
agreement regarding the referendum, it was between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN. 
Australia was not formally involved except that it was used as a staging base for UN 
operations in East Timor. This lasted until East Timor ceased to be part of Indonesia.
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Australia became involved with the East Timor crisis after most foreign journalists and 
UN staff were expelled from East Timor following the announcement of the 
referendum’s results on September 4th, 1999 The reason for this was that the pro­
integration supporters went on rampages that became out of control, endangering the 
safety of the UN staff and foreign journalists. The news of the crisis shocked the world, 
but it was in Australia where the news was received with very strong reactions.
Australia, as a nation, believes that it esteems the noble value of humanity as in the UN 
charter. Such beliefs were evident in many cases when looking at the relationship 
between Australia and Indonesia. In 1997-8, when an economic crisis hit Indonesia, 
Australia quickly lent $1 billion of aid. In December 2004, when tsunami waves 
destroyed the Indonesian province of Aceh, Australia became one of the first foreign 
nations to send help and became the largest donor with at least $1 billion raised from the 
Australian government and public. However, in 1999 the reports of the suffering of the 
East Timorese civilians re-opened the claim that Australia owed East Timor their 
independence. During World War II in 1942 -  1945, East Timor played a major role in 
protecting Australia from the invasion of Japanese imperial forces. Thousands of East 
Timorese fought alongside the Australian forces and later, when Japanese forces 
overtook East Timor, thousands became victims because of their role in defying the 
invaders.
This sentiment, combined with the news reports of frightened East Timoiese civilians, 
touched deep emotions in the Australian public. However, the news leports themselves
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were not the sole reason for the strong reaction from Australian society. In 1975, five 
journalists working for the Australian media were killed in East Timor, allegedly by 
Indonesian forces that were invading East Timor at that time (Ball and McDonald, 2000, 
Subroto, 1997, Conboy, 2003). Their deaths were never fully investigated which created 
a conspiracy theory alleging that the Australian and Indonesian governments covered up 
the truth.796 In 1999, ironically, the former Indonesian officer accused of being directly 
involved with the death of the five journalists, General Yunus Yosfiah797, was the 
Indonesian minister for information.
Besides the sentiment of the World War II ‘debt’ and the death of journalists working for 
the Australia media, Australia was also the base for many East Timorese independence 
movements. Many of East Timor’s independence activists, like Jose Ramos Horta, took 
asylum in Australia after the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Though the Australian 
government officially supported Indonesian annexation of East Timor, many Australian 
citizens became supporters of East Timor’s right to independence.
When the violence escalated in East Timor after the announcement of the referendum on 
September 4th, the Australian media immediately seized it as a valuable commodity. As a 
news event, East Timor was priceless. Here, the media had a situation that could be 
easily presented in a good-versus-evil context where a long oppressed society suddenly 
found their chance for freedom. At the same time, this freedom was being held hostage 
by brutal hoodlums working for the oppressor. It was almost like scene fiom a classic
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movie where the good guys finally, with the help of heroes from the outside, overcame 
the evil oppressor.
For the Austialian media, the perception was almost as simple or even as naive as that. In 
general, the Australian media genuinely believed that they were working for a noble 
cause — helping the poor and long oppressed East Timorese to become an independent 
nation. On the other hand, for the Indonesian media, as explained in previous chapters, 
the situation was the opposite and much more complex.
Indonesia, by 1999, had just experienced a very traumatic transfer of power, a bloody 
revolution. In 1998, a severe economic crisis crippled the Indonesian economy. Within 
months, thing went from bad to worse, culminating in May riots in Jakarta. Then, 
because of the combination of pressure from the public, students and public officials, 
President Soeharto stepped down on May 21, 1998. This effectively ended the New 
Order regime but it came with heavy price as thousands of people were killed during the 
process, mostly in the riots.
For the Indonesian media, the end of the New Order was the start of a new era. The 
subsequent government starting from President Habibie declared and kept their promise 
to give freedom of speech and freedom of press. Unfortunately, as in any rapid change, 
this new-found freedom was not yet supported by the available infrastructure, man powei 
or culture of the press. Therefore, while theoretically the Indonesian pi ess had become a
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free press with the end of the New Order, it still would take some time until the 
Indonesian press could fully utilise their new-found freedom and power.
While changes were taking place in the social, political and cultural fronts in Indonesia, 
the East Timor ciisis added a new twist to these historical events. The subsequent 
escalating violence, which was well recorded by the foreign media including Australia, 
brought international pressure onto Indonesia. Suddenly, Indonesia found itself in the 
position of a pariah state, something they had never experienced before.
The Indonesian media were then forced into a difficult position. As a free press, they 
could see how the crisis in East Timor evolved from the very beginning into a major 
international crisis. The Indonesian media was also well aware of the major political 
struggle that lay hidden behind the East Timor crisis. Unfortunately, the strong 
international pressure on Indonesia put the Indonesian media in a dilemma between 
protecting the facts and defending Indonesia’s pride against the onslaught of international 
condemnation and pressure, seen by some Indonesians as incited by the foreign press.
Finally, after describing the events that preceded and proceeded the East Timor crisis, as 
well as the salient social and political context behind the events, we finally arrive at the 
conclusions. The conclusions, presented here in the same structure as the research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1, are these:
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1. T he A ustralian  and Indonesian  new spapers reports regarding the East Tim or 
crisis, defined here w ith in  the tim e fram e o f  A ugust 1st until O ctober 1st’ 1999, to an 
extent represented  the A ustralian  and Indonesian societal perceptions of the crisis.
A sample report published during the crisis of the story of Sanders Thoenes described in 
Chapter 4, showed the differing views of the East Timor crisis. The death of Thoenes, a 
member of the foreign press, with which the Australian press identified strongly, was 
described by them in dramatic detail, with a tone of tragedy and accompanied by visible 
anger towards the pro-integration militias and Indonesia. The Indonesian press, on the 
contrary, presented the death of Thoenes in detail, but in the way a daily crime was 
reported- without emotion, with an emphasis on gory details and in an impersonal tone.
In some sense, the story about Sanders Thoenes represented strong emotions, namely a 
strong sense of justice and an attachment to history as Sanders Thoenes was European 
and Australians still see themselves as descendants of European people. For Australian 
newspapers, the reports represented the sentiments of the Australian people at the time, 
feelings of anger at seeing seemingly helpless East Timorese being terrorized by pio- 
integration supporters while Indonesian security forces, who were supposed to maintain 
law and order, stood by and did almost nothing. At the same time, Indonesia was actually 
bound by an agreement with the UN and Portugal, but the UN was obviously helpless to 
stop the carnage.
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Such strong emotion was also not without contexts; In December 1975, five journalists 
working for the Australian media were killed during the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor. History then recorded that Australia was in fact directly and indirectly involved 
with the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in that same year. Australia also then became 
the first country who acknowledged the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. However, 
at the same time, many East Timorese independence supporters or activists moved to 
Australia and used Australia as a base to launch their campaigns for the independence of 
East Timor.
A much stronger context was the frame promoted by some Australian World War II 
veterans that Australia actually owed its freedom from Japanese occupation to the East 
Timorese. Another context was how, during the Balkan conflict, especially in Bosnia 
(1994 -  1996), the UN and Europe were forced to watch the destruction caused by the 
conflict in agony. In the Balkan conflict, the press strongly reported the massacres 
conducted right in front of the Western world while they were helpless to come to the aid 
of the innocent civilian victims.
When Sanders Thoenes was killed, his death became an illustration of the penalty paid 
for standing by silently and earned him an almost martyr-like fame as he was 
representing what Australia, as part of the western world, wanted to pi event fiom 
happening again.
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From the Indonesian newspapers’ point of view, Sanders Thoenes’ death was just like 
any other news story. It was as tragic as the death of Agus Mulyawan, an Indonesian 
journalist killed in East Timor almost at the same time. The irony was that the death of 
Agus Mulyawan was barely mentioned in Australian newspaper reports. As detailed in 
Chapter 4, there was more reported about Sanders Thoenes’ death, such as the 
‘recklessness’ of the ojek driver that took him to the fateful area that day, the alleged 
refusal of the INTERFET to accept the initial report from the ojek driver regarding the 
fate of Sanders Thoenes, and finally the ongoing quarrel over what actually killed 
Sanders Thoenes. Was Sanders was shot or hacked to death?
These conflicting views illustrated but failed to completely represent the bigger context 
of the different perspectives presented by Indonesian and Australian reporters. As much 
as it was painful for the Australian public to watch the escalating violence in East Timor 
before and after the referendum, it was more painful for the Indonesian public. For much 
of the Indonesian public, the terror, the helplessness and the loss of hope was not just 
happening in East Timor, it was happening all over Indonesia during the same period and 
even possibly over a longer time frame.
The loss of Sanders Thoenes was tragic, but what about the shooting of two Indonesian 
journalists prior to the referendum in East Timor? Bea Wiharta from Reuters and another 
journalist from Kompas were assaulted and shot while they were doing their job. Agus 
Mulyawan was killed while doing his job. Bea Wiharta was working for a foieign news 
agency but physically, he looked like any other Indonesian because he was Indonesian.
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From my personal experiences, Indonesian journalists were often deliberately targeted -  
something that rarely happened with foreign-looking journalists. Other reports about the 
assault of foreign journalists rarely ended in such tragic circumstances.798
In 1998, a colleague of mine who I often met during assignments, Sayuti, from Media 
Indonesia, was shot while covering riots in Jakarta. An ANTARA photo journalist was 
assaulted by the police during a demonstration in August 1998 and was seriously injured 
and was lucky to be able to continue to work at a later stage. More Indonesian journalists 
have been assaulted and beaten, often becoming seriously injured while doing their jobs 
in Indonesia and East Timor. But their plight was rarely described in Australian 
newspaper reports. Suddenly, the death of a tall, blue-eyed journalist from the 
Netherlands was very important.
The point here is that newspapers from both Australia and Indonesia defended their 
reporting vigorously by saying that their reporting was aimed solely at their audiences, 
comprised of their own society, their own people. Such a one-sided representation of the 
news event was permissible as it was deemed to be the most appropriate facts that should 
have been reported back to the Australian or Indonesian society, even though the actual 
points reported differed markedly between the two countries.
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2. A ustralian  and Indonesian new spapers reacted in line with the alleged press 
system s they subscribed to, but only to an extent.
In Chapter 1, it was noted that the Australian and Indonesian presses represent two 
different press systems. The different press systems here predicted the totally different 
behaviour from the Australian and Indonesian press. Indeed, the behaviour of the two 
countries’ newspapers was different, but at the same time, they did not fully comply with 
what their press systems predicted.
The Australian press system categorically falls into the category of free press which, in 
theory, has traits such as: independent reporting, as opposed to government control or 
censorship, orientation towards facts rather than the news itself and freedom in 
publishing anything deemed newsworthy (McQuail, 1986, McQuail, 2001). Instead, this 
research found different realities. Australian newspapers relied significantly on their own 
government and people as sources, presenting almost exclusively views that closely 
represented the Australian views of the East Timor crisis.
Indonesian newspapers also reacted and behaved along similar lines. A significant 
portion of their sources were Indonesian officials, creating criticism that the Indonesian 
press strongly represented government views on the East Timor crisis . Howevei, the 
Indonesian press represented the developmental press, which is almost totally the 
opposite of the free press. The developmental press generally has traits such as: 
supporting the government in the context of promoting development, limited fieedom of
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press and strong control by the government over the press (McQuail, 1986, Soesilo and 
Washburn. 1994).
As found in this research, it was not just the choice of both countries’ officials as 
sources, but also the selection of frames that showed the deviation of Australian 
newspapers from their political system. As shown in the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 
the newspapers promoted frames based on the Australian government’s stance at that 
time. In Chapter 7, a closer look at the frames promoted by Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers also discovered that Australian newspapers presented frames based on or 
closely representing the Australian government’s and people’s views of the East Timor 
crisis at that time. What was significant in the promotion of such frames and the lack of 
diversity in the choice of main news sources, was the lack of critical analysis about the 
government’s position as would be expected to happen under ‘normal’ circumstances.
The frames promoted by Australian newspapers were shown to strongly present views of 
anger, fear and distress felt by the Australian people, including members of the press, 
over things that happened in East Timor at that time. But again, such views weie 
considered to overwhelm other views, as reports that critically challenged those views 
were often sidelined or even ridiculed. In the end, the view that Australia s involvement 
in East Timor was justified and proper, could be best illustrated by John Howard’s words 
that, “it was right, but because it was in our national interest to do so .
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Such un-critical promotion of government stances contradicted the description of the 
Australian press as a free press system according to the description by Rodney Tiffen801. 
The free press system, to which the Australian press belongs, warrants independent 
reporting. But the term independent here is within the context that such reporting is 
conducted in a fair and balanced manner. The research showed that during the period of 
time where it was difficult for foreign journalists to report from East Timor (September 
4th -  20th), the Australian newspapers fell back on their own government and people as 
their main source of news as even the UN was considered part of the Australian sphere at 
that time. The result was reporting that was heavily biased towards the Australian view 
point.
What this research shows to some extent is journalism is an issue of relativity. Under 
‘normal’ circumstances, the press are always being put under scrutiny for the ethics and 
standards. But when the situation changed, the expectation of the press also changed. As 
an example in the beginning of US invasion to Iraq in 2003, FOX Television clear 
supports to US government views was not strongly opposed by the American society. 
This is an example how during a conflict, often press may ‘take sides’ and this is totally 
acceptable to the particular society.
But what is in question is here is the application of journalistic standard and practices to 
which journalism earn their honourable place in the society. If such things aie acceptable 
with the excuse of a condition during a war or conflict, then there should be a diffeient 
journalistic standard and practices for such situations. One aspect of journalism values
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accepted globally is journalism should not take sides even during conflict. Acceptance to 
a different standard during conflict will mean that such universal values is no longer 
applicable.
Moving back to the Indonesian press, the period of the East Timor crisis was a difficult 
period for both Indonesia and the Indonesian press. Being a journalist in Indonesia at that 
time, my recollection was of a chaotic period, where we, the Indonesian people, were 
living from day to day, not knowing what tomorrow would bring. A journey to the office 
for instance, often meant having to pass through several areas where riots or 
demonstrations were still rampaging. Nevertheless, I remember well that almost no one 
in my office, The Indonesian Observer, excused themselves from coming to work even 
when the situation was very difficult. As Don Greenless said ", we worked as best as we 
could under extremely difficult circumstances to produce the best reporting we could for 
that day.
As this research showed, the result of the Indonesian newspaper reports on East Timor 
during the same period of September 4th — 20th was quite different to Australian 
newspapers. Indeed, true to the press system it subscribed to, the developmental pi ess, 
the Indonesian press put much attention and emphasis on Indonesian government stances 
regarding the East Timor crisis at that particular time. At the same time, the Indonesian 
press showed a significant effort to do more. This research showed for instance, that in 
term of sources, Indonesian newspapers used a more diveise selection compaied to theii
Australian counterparts.
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In terms of reporting style, as shown in the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5, Indonesian 
newspapers also seemed to present more impersonal and un-emotional reporting. 
Indonesian reporting also was shown to be based upon the facts known at the time, 
unlike some Australian newspaper reports that further reinforced some conspiracy theory 
allegations. While Australian newspapers prided themselves as part of a more advanced 
and developed press system, the Indonesian press showed evidence that despite their 
limitations, they tried to maintain a high quality of reporting.
In conclusion, Australian newspapers may come from a more developed press system 
and enjoy more freedom when compared to Indonesian newspapers. Nevertheless, during 
the period of September 4th -  20th,when it was difficult to get reports from East Timor, 
study cases and in depth analysis showed that the behaviour and performance of the 
Australian and Indonesian newspapers did not seem to represent the press system they 
belonged to.
3. T he m edia reporting in A ustralian and Indonesian news reports served certain 
political interests.
Gadi Wolfsfeld argues that in a political conflict, the media act as faci 1 itatois and aie 
sometimes subservient to certain political parties or interests . This was arguably the 
case during the East Timor crisis in 1999 as Australia and Indonesia weie caught in a
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political war. The warring parties here were Indonesia as the de facto ruler of East Timor 
at that time, and Australia as the representation of the international community, 
particularly, the UN. The war was over who was to determine what happened in East 
Timor. Australia perceived it as a humanitarian crisis where military intervention was 
inevitable while Indonesia perceived it as a domestic crisis where its own apparatus 
should have been able to control the situation.
Over the period of September 4th -  20th, foreign media were expelled from East Timor. 
That situation effectively prevented the foreign media, including Australia, from 
reporting directly from East Timor. What happened then was, instead of diminishing the 
number of reports about East Timor, Australian newspapers kept reporting about East 
Timor. The problem was that instead of reporting based on actual observation, Australian 
newspapers were relying significantly on official statements from the Australian 
government, accounts by members of Australian society and un-attributed sources. Thus, 
the reports that came from Australian newspapers represented Australia’s perception of 
the crisis.
Within the same period, Indonesian newspapers also presented Indonesian peispectives 
by significantly quoting Indonesian officials and Indonesian people. Thus, they created a 
political conflict described by Wolfsfeld as a ‘conflict over meaning ■ Austialian and 
Indonesian newspapers were competing over the interpretation of what was happening in 
East Timor at that time. The arena was the newspaper reports and the spectators were the 
people from both Australia and Indonesia.
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The significant pioblem found by this research was regarding an imbalance in the 
representation of views. In Indonesian newspapers, different views from different 
sources, even Australian sources, were represented. Although quantitatively it may not 
have been as significant compared to the number of Indonesian sources, still the 
perspective from Australia was significantly represented. On the other hand, the 
perspective from Indonesia was barely represented in Australian newspapers. For me, 
this was like watching a group boxing match where one side was represented by 
overwhelming numbers while the boxers from the other side were nowhere to be seen.
This finding was rather alarming as what was explained before as one of the basics of 
journalism is fair and balanced reporting (White, 1991, Granato, 1991). What this 
research found is that both Australia and Indonesia did not represent balanced reporting 
as they did not represent the other side in balanced numbers in terms of sources. 
However, what was more significant was that Indonesian newspapers tended to try to 
present a more balanced representation of views. Another significant finding was that 
this unbalanced reporting from both sides was excused by both sides because that was 
how their own audiences wanted to see the East Timor crisis.
The conclusion here is that during the East Timor crisis, in particular during the peiiod 
where reporting directly from East Timor was difficult, both Australian and Indonesian 
newspapers waged an almost one-sided war of meanings. Howevei, this one-sided 
representation was more apparent within Australian newspaper reports lather than within
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Indonesian newspaper reports. This led to my next point that this war of meaning was 
about the cultural understanding of the crisis rather than just a simple matter of 
journalistic standards and practices.
4. A ustralian  and Indonesian  new spaper reports on the E ast T im or crisis were 
about the social un d erstan d in g  o f the crisis.
A basic but often forgotten fact in understanding the differences of Australian and 
Indonesian reports on the East Timor crisis is that Australia and Indonesia are two 
different societies. Australia and Indonesia have been neighbours since their inception 
but come from different backgrounds. Australia evolved from the settlement of British 
convicts which later expanded with new immigrants. It was originally a British colony 
that later was expanded with the arrival of European immigrants. This shaped the 
perception that Australia is ‘part of Europe located in Asia’.
Indonesia, before being colonised by the Dutch in the 16th century, was a collection of 
smaller kingdoms often at war amongst themselves. In fact, Indonesia acknowledged that 
the Dutch colonialisation actually helped shape Indonesia’s sense of identity. In 1945, 
Indonesia declared its independence but it took four years of war to finally earn 
recognition from the Dutch in 1949. This led to a strong sense of nationalism in 
Indonesia, in particular against any perceived ‘foreign interference’. While their histories 
and backgrounds differ markedly, culturally the two societies are even more significantly
different.
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Duiing the East Timor ciisis such diffeient backgrounds shaped the perceptions of each 
country. Australia was proudly a part of the Western community: founders of the UN, 
members of coalition forces in World Wars I and II. allies of the US during the Vietnam 
War, part of British forces fighting rebels in Malaysia in the 1950’s, forces fighting 
against Indonesia during the confrontation period (1963 -  1966) and last but not least, 
boasting its cultural view of human right that believes Australia has a strong sense of 
humanity. In the East Timor crisis, Australia, in line with such a background, believed 
that they were socially and historically compelled to help the East Timorese who had 
voted for independence and were being attacked by pro-integration supporters.
Australia argued that their sense of humanity prevented them from not doing anything 
while the media continuously presented the news about the situation in East Timor. 
Historically, Australia also claimed that they owed a debt to the East Timorese who 
helped them defend Australia from Japanese invasion during World War II.
For Indonesia, East Timor represented a paradox and a huge dilemma. I remember 
learning about East Timor during high school in the 1980’s and learning that it was the 
27th province in Indonesia. Later in university, I learnt more from rumours and 
government propaganda, the best one being the creation of an East Timorese pavilion in 
the Miniature of Indonesia’s Park (TMII) in Jakarta. One thing 1 learnt as a fact was that 
the integration of East Timor into Indonesia was a very bloody process and until the late
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1980’s, being in a military family, we still heard horror stories about soldiers killed in 
East Timor.
Closer to the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, the issue of East Timor was more 
often raised in different ways. In the late 1980’s, the Indonesian government declared 
East Timor an ‘open’ province, meaning that anyone could visit. Previously, only 
military personnel were allowed to enter East Timor. As a journalist, I later learnt too 
that that only military-approved journalists were allowed to enter East Timor. This was 
true up to the mid-1990’s.
In the 1990’s, East Timor was gradually given more positive coverage in Indonesia, 
mostly through government controlled channels such as the TVRI, the state television. It 
also gradually became apparent, through reports coming out of the mainstream media, 
how bloody was the conflict in East Timor. One of the best accounts was from TVRI’s 
reporter Hendro Subroto.8(b
The horror o f  the fierce battle in Dili can be witnessed by the large number o f  casualties on both 
sides. Thirty-five members o f the 18th Airborne Infantry Brigade were killed in action (KIA), 16 
Para Commandos killed and six men listed as missing in action (MIA). On the Fretilin s side, 122 
were killed, 65 captured and an excess o f  300 or so surrendered. 6
Being Indonesian and growing up in the 1970’s and 1980’s, I can t help but see East 
Timor as part of Indonesia. Nevertheless, hearing the horror stories from both sides
meant I could understand the plight of the East Timorese.
Stories that were very commonly heard were about how, in the early days o f the Indonesian 
invasion, thousands o f  Indonesian soldiers were killed. O f course, we never heard about the actual 
numbers, but what was more important were the stories telling that for every Indonesian soldier 
killed, it was common to have a whole village destroyed.
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Another fact that I learnt m yself was when I visited the Indonesian Army central hospital, RSPAD 
Gatot Subroto in Jakarta in 1987. In the psychiatric wing, there was a chan on the wall r e c o r d i n g  
the names o f the patients. Duiing the 1980 s, the section recording armed forces patients went off 
the chart. \\  hen I asked why that was. the psychiatrist there said, ‘those are the ones who just 
came back from East Timor'.807 '
Thus, hearing of the option of a referendum for East Timor in 1999 was a huge surprise 
for almost all Indonesians. We were in really difficult times during that period. Just a 
year before, President Soeharto had suddenly resigned. We were still under massive 
political, social, security and economic crises. Food was getting more expensive and 
often some basic foods, such as salt and sugar, were missing from the market. Then, 
suddenly President Habibie wanted to perform his own political stunt808. It wasn’t that 
we did not want East Timor to have a better condition, but we were all in a difficult 
situation at that time so hearing that East Timor could be an independent country was 
beyond belief for almost all Indonesians809.
When the process of the referendum was rolling in, it was only more bad news that 
Indonesians heard. I remember how some media often reported the behaviour of UN 
observers or staff as ‘arrogant’. Also, there was no shortage of stories about how the 
Indonesian military for years had fought FRETILIN, which was often portrayed as a 
barbaric rebel group810. However, as we got closer to the referendum date, different 
stories started to emerge.
It was not just the foreign media that sent their journalists to East Timoi, but also the 
Indonesian media. In 1999, the Indonesian media prided itself on being finally fiee fiom
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government control. As such, the Indonesian media’s reporting of East Timor changed 
accordingly. The continuous visits by various Indonesian community leaders to 
FRETILIN leader Xanana Gusmao were frequently reported. Often, it reached the front 
page, meaning it was considered to be important news.
In January 2007, I was assigned to cover a press conference of Timor Leste, the 
Indonesian truth and friendship commission. This commission had a task similar to the 
truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa to find closure, in particular for the 
victims of conflict by finding the truth of what had happened. The Timor Leste -  
Indonesia commission is in fact assigned to seek the truth of what exactly happened 
during the referendum in East Timor in 1999.
As I had the pleasure to interview Dionisio Babo Soares, co-chairman of the commission 
from Timor Leste (the official name of East Timor now), I was able to ask what the truth 
really means for the people of East Timor. His answer summarizes the importance of this 
thesis, that finding and understanding the facts of what really happened during those 
fateful months in 1999 is very important for the victims of the conflict and may biing a 
closure for a very violent and traumatic episode within Indonesian and East Timorese
history.
Indeed, he said that many of the facts are open for interpietation, but by tiyinto to use 
several different methods based on internationally accepted standards, the new
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understanding can be built. It is a complex issue Mr Soares admits, but it is a very 
important process for the future of both Indonesia and Timor Leste.
What is really interesting was that during the press conference all parties analysed in 
thesis were present! Indonesian officials, East Timor officials (as they are now an 
independent country), Indonesian press and Australian press. Most important is the fact 
that during the conference, reporters from the Australian media persisted in asking about 
whether there will be prosecutions of any Indonesian officials found guilty by the 
commission. Meanwhile, the Indonesian press is interested in whether the commission 
will be able to provide a satisfactory finding despite the obvious challenges of getting 
persons of interests (mostly Indonesian officials) to give their testimony to the 
commission.
The different emphasis on the issue echoes the similar views back in 1999 where the 
Australian press was pressing for justice to be done in East Timor. On the other hand, the 
Indonesian press, aware of the complexity of the issue, are very pragmatic regarding the 
issue of justice. However, different perceptions were not just found within the press but 
also within the officials that were present.
Indonesian officials in the commission clearly stated that the commission is not going to 
persecute anyone as that is not within their authority. On the other hand, the East 
Timorese officials on the commission insisted that the victims of violence, particulaily 
the East Timorese, should find a sense of justice through the works of the commission.
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Nevertheless, both Timor Leste’s and Indonesia’s officials are united in the view that the 
outcome of this commission process is to find reconciliation. This reflects the intricate 
relationship between East Timor and Indonesia today as two independent countries that 
shared more than just similar borders where contemporary economic and regional 
political interests may have a more significant role.
In the end, the press conference was like a live dramatisation of the events that happened 
in 1999. Most important was that even though the political circumstances are different, 
the different perceptions and political interests regarding the event in 1999 are still 
clearly visible. This highlights the findings of this thesis that different perceptions caused 
by values, cultures, socio-economic factors, history and political factors had shrouded the 
crisis in East Timor in 1999, creating different and often conflicting perceptions of the 
event. This thesis instead has shown that understanding the event through the factors 
above will bring a new understanding of not just how the print media works in extremely 
difficult circumstances, but also the impact of social processes within Australian and 
Indonesian societies on their own media.
This thesis is, I believe, part of new beginning where the process of media reporting, 
particularly in difficult circumstances, can be seen as part of the social processes of a 
society. As such, hopefully there will be more research in the future to be based or 
inspired by this thesis and a better understanding of media and society particularly from 
journalistic point of view, can be developed. Furthermore, because most of the media 
theories at present have been based upon modern societies in the USA or Western
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Europe, this thesis hopefully can help in the creation of new media and society theories 
based in developing countries.
What this thesis provides is a stepping stone from which a more comprehensive theory 
could be cieated. The finding of this thesis indeed have found that press indeed may act 
as both mirror and facilitator for the society. As mirror, it may reflects what the society 
see but how the society perceived that reflection, is a matter of subjective process by the 
society itself. Understanding this process will help social and media researchers in 
understanding the differences in how media are functioning within different societies. 
The bottom line is media in different society reflects on particular issues differently than 
in other societies as the media is influenced and influencing the society at the same time.
What often happens is researcher reflects upon the process and reflections within media 
from other societies, by using their own values. This is causing an issue as the mirror 
which it was based is different than the one being used by other society. As such, it is 
feared that the conclusion generated by the research process may in fact reflects the 
perception of the researchers themselves rather than the perception of the society 
analyzed.
Finally this thesis is closed by quoting the Prophet Muhammad that learning is something 
that has no end even when the end of one’s life is very close, there is still a lot to learn 
from the societies that exist today. The press conference turned out to be my last official 
assignment as a newspaper reporter, bringing closure to this research journey.
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A PPEN D IC ES
A p p e n d i x  A
Chapter Six -  List of articles analysed 
Period of September 4 -  20, 1999
The Sydney Morning Herald articles
1. State O f Disarray. September 4, 1999 Saturday.
2. Thugs And Fear. September 4, 1999 Saturday.
3. Grab To Control Productive Areas. September 4, 1999 Saturday
4. Ravaged Territory On Knife Edge. September 4, 1999 Saturday
5. Cowardly, But Militias Are Not A Force To Be Ignored. September 4, 1999
Saturday.
6. Kosovo O ption'is UN's Only Chance'. September 4, 1999 Saturday
7. Pair O f Generals Helped Create The Mayhem. September 4, 1999 Saturday.
8. Timor Free. September 5, 1999 Sunday.
9. Australia's Week O f Living Dangerously. September 5, 1999 Sunday.
10. Our Troops' Lives On Line In Timor. September 5, 1999 Sunday.
1 I. 344,580 Voters Cry Freedom. September 5, 1999 Sunday.
12. Force Ready And Waiting. September 5, 1999 Sunday.
13. Freedom For East Timor. September 6, 1999 Monday.
14. Mass With The Bishop As Bullets Fly Outside. September 6, 1999 Monday.
15. No Invitation, No Intervention: Howard. September 6, 1999 Monday.
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16. Humiliated Military Must Face Reality O f Poll Defeat. September 6, 1999 
Monday.
17. Tough-talking IMF Tells Indonesia Its $70bn Is On The Line. September 6, 
1999 Monday
18. Jakarta Has Final Say On Any Plan For UN Force. September 6, 1999 Monday.
19. Time Jakarta Stopped Fooling. September 6, 1999 Monday.
20. Brief Moment O f Joy, Then The Rush To Flee Violence. September 6, 1999 
Monday.
21. Doctor And Wife Flee Home To Seek Shelter With 7,000 In Compound. 
September 6, 1999 Monday.
22. Church Pleads For UN Help As Armed Mobs Take Control. September 6, 1999 
Monday.
23. Jakarta's Bloody Hands: Military Backs Violence. September 6, 1999 Monday.
24. The Precedent For Action. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
25. A Television Turn-off, With Or Without Dick And His Esky. September 7, 1999 
Tuesday.
26. Send Troops Or Live With Shame, Says Cardinal. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
27. There's No Defence For Our Tainted Ties With Butchers In Uniform. September 
7, 1999 Tuesday.
28. Australia's Guilt Rising By The Hour. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
29. Eyes Look To Bishop Belo, The People's Protector, To Pave Way For 
Reconciliation. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
30. Militias Hunt Independence Backers. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
31. Night O f Fear Under Fire Behind The Wire. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
32. UN To Consider Force In Territory. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
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33. A Bargain To Keep. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
34. Union Fires First Shot In National Blockade. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
35. Peacekeeping Force In Search O f Leadership. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
36. 'A Flumanitarian Catastrophe Is Building'. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
37. Race Against Genocide. September 7, 1999 Tuesday.
38. What Must Be Done In Timor. September 8, 1999 Wednesday
39. Dancing With The Dictators. September 8, 1999 Wednesday
40. Indonesia Needs To Hear Some Frank Talk. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
41. If We Go In, We Will Have To Pay A Price. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
42. Visas For 100 Timorese, No More. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
43. US Talks Tough But Does Little To Offer Support. September 8, 1999 
Wednesday.
44. Military C hief Is Out O f Minister's Reach. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
45. 48-hour Deadline To Stop The Killing. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
46. Aid Agencies Warn O f Mass Starvation. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
47. Protests Start With Ships. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
48. A City Unites As Anger Mounts. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
49. As The UN Dwindles, Dili Burns. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
50. 'Vote Again Or We Burn Everything'. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
51. Army Provokes Militia Attack. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
52. Gaumao Vows To Fight For Peace. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
53. Megawati Blames Chaos On Habibie. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
54. Annan Takes A Tougher Line. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
55. After 24 Years, It Seemed Optimism Had A Chance. September 8, 1999
W ednesday.
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56. Crisis Robs Australian Consul O f Celebration. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
57. A Child Born In Midst O f Danger. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
58. Freedom In Flames. September 8, 1999 Wednesday.
59. Time To Stand Up For What's Right. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
60. APEC And East Timor. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
61. Back Then, We Didn't Wait To Ask. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
62. Declaring War On Sanity. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
63. Courage To Call The Shots. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
64. What O f Those Left Behind? September 9, 1999 Thursday.
65. Coalition Forces Await Go-ahead. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
66. Nuns Compile A List O f The Missing. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
67. Wiranto's Role Sparks Unease. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
68. Time, Food And Hope Running Out. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
69. Plan To Cut All Aid Goes Before Congress. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
70. 'Scorched Earth' Plan Officially Backed. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
71. Fear And Looting: Life On The Mean Streets O f Dili. September 9, 1999 
Thursday.
72. Unions Turn Up The Heat By Banning Ships, Flights. September 9, 1999 
Thursday.
73. Hunger Deadlier Than The Militas. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
74. Patchy Response To Industrial Offensive. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
75. Long Shadow O f The Puppet-master. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
76. Hope For Military Solution In Limbo. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
77. Pressure To 'do Something' Could Start A War. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
78. Well-trained Guerillas Quietly Regroup. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
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79. 'Cleansing' Rears U gly  Head Again. S eptem ber 9, 1999 Thursday.
80. Strategy Behind The Bloodbath. S ep tem b er 9, 1999 Thursday.
81. Arm y Is Still The Pivot O f Power. Sep tem b er 9, 1999 Thursday.
82. A People Oppressed Take Their Bishop And His Church To Heart. S eptem ber  
9, 1999 Thursday.
83. Face-saving Deal Promised Chaos. S eptem ber 9, 1999 Thursday.
84. US Ponders Over W hich Trouble Spot To Focus Its 'super Powers' On This 
W eek. S ep tem b er  9, 1999 Thursday.
85. Australia's Powers O f Persuasion Are Limited. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
86. Indonesian Army M ust Withdraw First. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
8 7 .2 4  Hours To Action Stations For Peacekeeping Force. September 9, 1999 
Thursday.
88. Reluctant Exiles Are Keen To Return Home To Help Rebuild Their Country. 
September 9, 1999 Thursday.
89. Treaty Is Steeped In Controversy. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
90. O fficialdom  Seals Own Fate As Balibo Ghosts Ignored. September 9, 1999 
Thursday.
91. Australia's Chequered History O f Duplicity. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
92. W e W ill Shoot Foreign Soldiers: Dili's Mayor. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
93. Just One O f M any Bloody Deaths At Hands O f M ilitia. September 9, 1999 
Thursday.
94. W ounded Thrown To The W olves, Say Surgeons. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
95. N T  O pens Its Doors To 1,000. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
96. A Century On, The Description O f Dili As 'a M ost Miserable Place' Still Rings 
True. September 9, 1999 Thursday.
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97. The Battle o f  Timor. S ep tem b er  9, 1999 Thursday.
98. An Island's Troubled History. S eptem ber 9, 1999 Thursday.
99. Leaving Dili. Sep tem b er 10, 1999 Friday.
100. W e’re N o Force To Be Reckoned With. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
101. PM Cool As Em otions Flare. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
102. With A Great Friend Like Australia . . . Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
103. US Cuts Military Ties With Jakarta. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
104. A  N ight O f Torment For Kofi Annan. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
105. M edia Critics Have Administration 'bastards' On The Defensive. 
S eptem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
106. UN G ives Habibie One More Day. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
107. Softly, Softly And N o Deadline. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
108. Gangs Lash Out At Convoy On Eve O f UN Evacuation. Septem ber 10, 
1999 Friday.
109. Marked For Execution. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
110. Tim e To Pray, And Run The Militia Gauntlet. Septem ber 10, 1999 
Friday.
111. Hunger Strike To Ease The Guilt O f Not Being There. Septem ber 10,
1999 Friday.
112. Angry Public Talks The Talk. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
113. AW U W ill Blockade Outgoing Air Cargo And Mail. Septem ber 10, 
1999 Friday.
114. Nun Prays For Her 'gentle And Compassionate’ Colleagues. Septem ber  
10, 1999 Friday.
115. Rumoured Death O f Resistance Leader. Septem ber 10, 1999 Friday.
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116. Nuns' Story Which Ends In Death. S ep tem b er  10, 1999 Friday.
117. R efugees Cut O ff As Guards Tighten Grip. September 10, 1999 Friday.
118. 250 Reported Slaughtered In Suai. S ep tem b er  10, 1999 Friday.
119. UN Team To Tour Dili Ghost Town. S ep tem b er  10, 1999 Friday.
120. N ervous About Mr N ice  Guy. S ep tem b er 10, 1999 Friday.
121. Reality Still Has To Rule, OK? S ep tem b er 10, 1999 Friday.
122. 'Stacks O f  Bodies W ent Up To The R o o f. S ep tem b er 10, 1999 Friday.
123. Fix It Or Else, Warns Clinton. S ep tem b er 11, 1999 Saturday.
124. Deadline Passes W ithout Action. S ep tem b er 11, 1999 Saturday.
125. M ercy Airlift Brings Respite. S ep tem b er 11, 1999 Saturday
126. Church Anger At Attacks On Its Flock. S ep tem b er 11, 1999 Saturday.
127. W e Don't N eed Your Approval For Peace Force: UN. S eptem ber 11, 
1999 Saturday.
128. R efugee Plight Compared To Nazi Terror A gainst Jews. S eptem ber 11, 
1999 Saturday.
129. M ilitary Exercises Called Off. Sep tem b er 11, 1999 Saturday.
130. Protesters Storm Sydney Airport, Block Passengers. S eptem ber 11, 1999 
Saturday.
131. Tourists Shy Away From Bali, Firms Evacuate. Septem ber 11, 1999 
Saturday.
132. Howard Tetchy At Am bivalent America. S ep tem b er 11, 1999 Saturday.
133. A General Squeeze, And Habibie Quickly Succumbs. Septem ber 11, 
1999 Saturday.
134. Again An Exit Amid Tears And Rage. Sep tem b er 11, 1999 Saturday.
A  Specia l  Relationship? S e p t e m b e r  11, 1999 Saturday.135.
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137. D escen t To C haos. S ep tem b er  11, 1999 Saturday.
138. D ili, Farewell. S ep tem b er  11, 1999 Saturday.
139. T he A B C  O f W arm ongering. S ep tem b er  11, 1999 Saturday.
140. Howard Pushes For U S 'boots On The Ground'. S ep tem b er 11, 1999 
Saturday.
141. The R eality O f East Timor. S ep tem b er  11, 1999 Saturday.
142. Tourists G ive Bali A M iss. S ep tem b er  12, 1999 Sunday.
143. Howard W inning W orld Support. S ep tem b er  12, 1999 Sunday.
144. D ili T oo Risky For UN Human Rights W oman. Sep tem b er 12, 1999 
Sunday.
145. N un W eeps For Her Brave Rescuer. S ep tem b er  12, 1999 Sunday.
146. 15 ,000  Marchers Say Send Troops. S ep tem b er 12, 1999 Sunday.
147. Keating: W hy I M ade A Deal On Security With Indonesia. Sep tem b er  
12, 1999 Sunday.
148. T im or Terror Squad Trained In Australia. S ep tem b er 12, 1999 Sunday.
149. L ine O f  D efence Get Ting Thinner. S ep tem b er  12, 1999 Sunday
150. Indonesia's R esponsibility. S ep tem b er  13, 1999 Monday.
151. East T im or Is On Its Own B ecause . . .  Sep tem b er 13, 1999 M onday.
152. Starving Eat Leaves On Trek Out O f Hell. S ep tem b er 13, 1999 Monday.
153. Hum an Rights C h ief Calls For War Crimes Tribunal. S ep tem b er 13, 
1999 M onday
154. Peace-force Shape Emerges. S ep tem b er  13, 1999 Monday.
155. 'W e Seem  To Be Continually Deserting Them'. Sep tem b er 13, 1999
D e f e n c e  W o e s .  S e p t e m b e r  11, 1 999  Saturday.
M on d ay .
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156. Rape U sed  O ver A nd O ver  A s  A  System atic  Torture. S e p te m b e r  13,
1999 Monday.
157. RAAF Flew Out R efugees With UN Staff. S ep tem b er 13, 1999 Monday.
158. Republican Lobby Ponders Reaction To The Timor Factor. Septem ber  
13, 1999 M onday.
159. Conditions On Foreign Force Could Limit Australia's Role. Septem ber  
13, 1999 M onday.
160. 'Blood O f V ictim s Seeped Out O f Church'. Septem ber 13, 1999
Monday.
161. PM's Pressure For UN M ilitary M ission Vindicated. Septem ber 13, 1999 
Monday.
162. Howard Pleased With 'limited' US Support. Septem ber 13, 1999
Monday.
163. Jakarta Backs Down: N o w  A Chance For Peace. Septem ber 13, 1999 
Monday.
164. East Tim or Breakthrough. Sep tem b er 14, 1999 Tuesday.
165. Sum m it Breathes N ew  Life Into APEC. Septem ber 14, 1999 Tuesday
166. Troops W aiting And At The Ready. Septem ber 14, 1999 Tuesday.
167. W imhurst Outspoken On Failure O f Indonesia To Pursue Killers. 
S ep tem b er 14, 1999 Tuesday.
168. Marry Early, Cancel Trip - Anything To Keep The Peace. Septem bei 14, 
1999 Tuesday.
169. R efugees Shot At As They Starve. Septem ber 14, 1999 Tuesday.
170. W e M ust M ove Q uickly To Stop The Destruction. Septem ber 14, 1999
Tuesday.
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171. A W eek On The D iplom atic Edge. Sep tem b er 14. 1999 Tuesday.
172. Bon V oyage, John, Tim e To See The World. Septem ber 14, 1999 
Tuesday.
173. Don't Rush To Write O ff Our Indonesian Links. Septem ber 14, 1999 
Tuesday.
174. B odies Burn, R efugees Starve Amid Fears O f'final Solution'. Septem ber  
14, 1999 Tuesday.
175. H ow  PM's Triumph C om es At A Cost. Septem ber 14, 1999 Tuesday.
176. Role For Australia Provokes Protests And Calls To Stay Out. Septem ber  
14, 1999 Tuesday.
177. Wiranto May Be Ready To Dump Tainted Generals. Septem ber 14, 
1999 Tuesday.
178. Force Must Be Led By Us, Says Downer. Septem ber 14, 1999 Tuesday.
179. Scorched Earth. Sep tem b er 14, 1999 Tuesday.
180. H ope For The Best, But Prepare For The Worst. Septem ber 15, 1999 
W ednesday.
181. N o  A pologies Over Timor. Septem ber 15, 1999 Wednesday.
182. Free East Tim or Spurs Faria To Fame. Septem ber 15, 1999 Wednesday.
183. Crisis Exposes Hole In Our Defences. Septem ber 15, 1999 Wednesday.
184. K iss That Floored Old Driver George. Septem ber 15, 1999 Wednesday.
185. F ighting Lorna, 92, Wants Action - N ot Talk. Septem ber 15, 1999
W ednesday.
186. Russians Quibble Over Use O f Force. Septem ber 15, 1999 Wednesday.
187. Fears Australians W ill Be Targeted. Septem ber 15, 1999 Wednesday.
188. Lawyers Join Forces To Gather Evidence O f Atrocities. Septem ber 15,
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189. C om m ander Earmarked For Joint Force. S ep tem b er  15, 1999
W ednesday.
190. Last L ine O f  D efiance. S ep tem b er  15, 1999 W ednesday.
191. Security Fears D elay A id  Drops To The Starving. S ep tem b er  15, 1999 
W ednesday.
192. A ll N ecessary  M easures. S e p tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
193. Seek in g  Our Pacific Identity. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
194. Indonesians Hold K ey To Force's S u ccess. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 
Thursday.
195. A ustralia A ccused O ver Failure To A ct. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
196. T hey W anted To See Dad O ff, But Just Couldn't Sw ing It. S ep tem b er  
16, 1999 Thursday.
197. Jakarta T ells Peacekeepers: Heed Danger W arnings. S ep tem b er  16,
1999 Thursday.
198. M ilitias N o w  Fear Indonesian Troops. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
199. Sm arting Over A B low  To Pride. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
200. A dvance Guard O f 2 ,0 0 0  Troops Ready For A ction. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 
Thursday.
201. Pilot's Plea: I W ill Fly In N ow . S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
202. T w o M ilitiam en A m ong R efugees Flown To Darwin. S ep tem b er  16, 
1999 Thursday.
203. U N  Force In For The Long Haul. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
204. Air Drops Start In 24  Hours. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
205. D iggers In First W ave. S ep tem b er  16, 1999 Thursday.
1999  W ed n esd a y .
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206. T im e  T o  Take On D e fe n c e .  S e p t e m b e r  17, 1999 Friday.
207. D eadlock B locks Food For Starving. September 17, 1999 Friday.
208. Belo's A ide Im plicates Top General. September 17, 1999 Friday.
209. Darwin's Mew Hues: N avy Grey, Cam ouflage Green. September 17,
1999 Friday.
210. D isarm ing M ilitias 'a Concern'. September 17, 1999 Friday.
211. Martial Law W ill Stay In M eantime. September 17, 1999 Friday.
212. Surrender Your W eapons N ow , Says Commander. September 17, 1999 
Friday.
213. In The City O f The Damned, A Faint Heartbeat. September 17, 1999 
Friday.
214. M ole Leak Seen A s Bid To Stir Emotions. September 17, 1999 Friday.
215. Torn-up Treaty A Turn For The W orse. September 17, 1999 Friday.
216. D efence Signals Easily Misread. September 17, 1999 Friday
217. R escue Countdown. September 17, 1999 Friday.
218. G usm ao Seeks Talks With Rivals. September 17, 1999 Friday.
219. A Proud M other Bids Her Son Farewell And Waits. September 18, 1999 
Saturday.
220. John W inston Howard Show s His Mettle. September 18, 1999 Satuiday.
221. So Much Hindsight, So Little Foresight. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
222. Army's G am es R ole Disrupted. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
223. First Food Flown To Starving Refugees. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
224. Peacekeepers' Key T ools Are Justice And Dialogue. September 18, 1999
Saturday.
225. PM D enies Strategy Was Flawed. September 18, 1999 Saturday.
434
226 .
227. Freedom  Fighters. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 Saturday.
228. A W ord In Your Ear, PM . . . Look After M y B oy. S ep tem b er  18, 1999  
Saturday.
229. Howard's M essage: Take Care. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 Saturday.
230. 'God B e W ith Y ou . . . P lease Com e Hom e Safely'. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 
Saturday.
231. Squabble Over Deputy's Role. S ep tem b er 18, 1999 Saturday.
232. L aying D ow n The Ground Rules. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 Saturday.
233. UN Force Has A M andate To Shoot. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 Saturday.
234. The Warrior Peacem aker. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 Saturday.
235. Sm all Joys In Tent City. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 Saturday.
236. The End O f An A greem ent. S ep tem b er 18, 1999 Saturday.
237. Indict T hose Murderers, Before The Blood Dries. S ep tem b er  18, 1999 
Saturday.
238. Clear and Present Danger. S ep tem b er 18, 1999 Saturday.
239. B ishop  Fears Another W ave O f Murder. S ep tem b er 18, 1999 Saturday.
240. East T im or A dvance Party Prepares To Leave Darwin. S ep tem b er  18,
1999 Saturday.
241. Ships Sail. S ep tem b er  19, 1999 Sunday.
242. W e D efend What Is Right. S ep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
243. Thirsty For The B lood O f W hites. S ep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
244. W e N eg lected  Tim or Says Judge. Sep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
245. M essages Pour In For 'our Boys'. S ep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
246. I Could S ee What It M eant In His Eyes. S ep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
Insurer S ets  D ea d l in e  For T roops. S e p t e m b e r  18, 1999  Saturday.
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247. 'So Many People Will Die'. S ep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
248. T w ist O f Fate Puts Future In Our Flands. S ep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
249. W hy Alatas Is Out O f Order. Sep tem b er 19, 1999 Sunday.
250. G oing To War To Keep The Peace. S eptem ber 19, 1999 Sunday.
251. Keating H om es In On Wrong Target. S eptem ber 19, 1999 Sunday.
252. Photos That Put Me In M ilitia Hitlist. S eptem ber 19, 1999 Sunday.
253. Learning To Be Our Own Masters. Sep tem b er 20, 1999 Monday.
254. The Timor Challenge. S ep tem b er 20, 1999 Monday.
255. Stretching The Friendship . . . Into The N ext M illennium. Septem ber 20, 
1999 M onday.
256. Timor Talks Set Stage For M ission. Septem ber 20, 1999 Monday.
257. U S C hief Praises Co-operative Effort. Septem ber 20, 1999 Monday.
258. Warning For Australian Residents. Septem ber 20, 1999 Monday.
259. Am ericans Talk Tough. Septem ber 20, 1999 Monday.
260. Gusmao Flees Death Threats To Lead People From Darwin. Septem ber  
20, 1999 Monday.
261. British Jets On Way To Jakarta. Septem ber 20, 1999 Monday.
262. Look After Your Mates, Howard Urges Troops. Septem ber 20, 1999 
M onday.
263. Bringing Back The Draft An Option. Septem ber 20, 1999 Monday.
264. Indonesians W ill Use M ilitias To Fight Peace Force. Septem ber 20, 
1999 M onday.
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T h e  A u s tr a l ia n  ar t ic le s .
1. Troops set for lift-off. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
2. A fragile society  tears itse lf apart. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
3. Timor choose freedom . September 4, 1999, Saturday.
4. UN on the run. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
5. B lossom  in the dust. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
6. Police strategy hard to fathom. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
7. 55 .000  flee m ilitia violence. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
8. A close shave by any other name. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
9. Plea to reporters: stay to tell the world. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
10. W e can help i f  Jakarta let us. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
11. Troops sets for lift off.. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
12. Has Carletonused one o f  his 9 lives. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
13. Reporters flee, UN on run. September 4, 1999, Saturday.
14. Jakarta’s thugs run riot in D ili. September 6, 1999, Monday.
15. Timor faith should be betrayed. September 6, 1999, Monday.
16. Tim e to end the carnage. September 6, 1999, Monday.
17. Downer confirm s peace force. September 6, 1999, Monday.
18. The blood is in W iranto’s hands. September 6, 1999, Monday.
19. N ob od y’s foo ls goes hard, goes home. September 6, 1999, Monday.
20. Long walk to freedom. September 6, 1999, Monday.
21. US policem an shot by militia. S e p t e m b e r  6, 1999, Monday.
22. The world watches, waits on Jakarta. S e p t e m b e r  6, 1999, Monday.
23. Terror paralyses besieged capital. S e p t e m b e r  6, 1999, Monday.
24. Fear for faithful at freedom  M ass. September 6, 1999, Monday.
25. Call for force to back people's w ill. Sep tem b er 6, 1999, Monday.
26. Hope in hands o f  a soldier-poet. September 6, 1999, Monday.
27. Gusmao offered sanctuary. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
28. Belo plucked from hom e. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
29. In flam es. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
30. From jo y  to terror in a w eek. September 6, 1999, Monday.
31. UN airlifts hundreds o f  lucky, grateful and guilty. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
32. The regim e in Jakarta is up to its dirty tricks again. September 7, 1999, 
Tuesday.
33. World pressure key to ending violence. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
34. The people's vo ice must be heard. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
35. Thugs left to murder and maim in peace. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
36. Telstra seen as front runner in East Timor growth. September 7, 1999, 
Tuesday..
37. M ilitias 'cleanse' D ili. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
38. Dili's 'K osovo-like genocide'. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
39. A ussie troops put on 24-hour alert. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
40. Dili's 'K osovo-like genocide'. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
41. Outrage as ambassador is shot at. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
42. M ilitia links stretch all the way to Wiranto. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
43. V iolence met with embargo. September 7, 1999, Tuesday
44. Warm relationship put on very thin ice. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
45. Portugal: UN efforts 'fall short’. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
46. Pleas for help on the darkest day. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
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47. I shall return, says a retreating crusader. September 7, 1999, Tuesday.
48. M arching into tragedy. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
49. A land fit for anti-heroes? September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
50. Howard's choice: to go to war or the U N . September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
51. It would do no good to barge in. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
52. W e must repay debt o f  honour. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
53. Martial law lessness in East Timor. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
54. A Plea from the Cardinal. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
55. Call for U S troops tests alliance. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
56. A SE A N  looks the other way. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
57. US should repay loyalty. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
58. A tortured freedom. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
59. Born into a world underfire. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
60. Nun haunted by her ordeal. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
61. M assacre in church haven. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
62. Protesters take anger to the streets. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
63. R efugees herded into exile. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
64. N ew  Order reborn in bloodshed. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
65. G usm ao freed as Bishop flees. September 8, 1999, Wednesday.
66. A quiet lunch as Dili burns. September 8, 1999, W ednesday.
67. B loody price o f  an invasion. September 9, 1999, Thursday.
68. UN abandons last post. September 9, 1999, Thursday.
69. They cam e, they saw, then left. September 9, 1999, Thursday.
70. Attention on Timor. September 9, 1999, Thursday.
71. Escaping hot air leaves Downer deflated. September 9, 1999, Thursday.
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72. Tim or killers violate all sanctuaries. S ep tem b er 9, 1999, Thursday.
73. Martial law fails to stop the killing. S ep tem b er 9, 1999, Thursday.
74. R elig ious activist seized by Aitarak militia. S eptem ber 9, 1999, Thursday.
75. M asses kept in the dark. S ep tem b er  9, 1999, Thursday.
76. Australia's anger. S ep tem b er  9, 1999, Thursday.
77. Unfuriated neighbours. S ep tem b er  9, 1999, Thursday.
78. Danger o f  pushing into a dark corner. Septem ber 9, 1999, Thursday.
79. R efugees offered escort to safety. Sep tem b er 10, 1999, Friday.
80. Churchgoers pray, unionists push. S ep tem b er 10, 1999, Friday.
81. The awful truth: we'll do nothing to stop the carnage. September 10, 1999, 
Friday.
82. Generals plotted terror. September 10, 1999, Friday.
83. Freedom vote let loose a reign o f  terror. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
84. TEA R S FOR THE SLAUG H TERED. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
85. Indonesia puts $9bn at risk. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
86. PM's heart says yes, but his lips say no. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
87. At war with ourselves. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
88. Rogue elem ent. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
89. Rage, rage against the sitting on hands. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
90. Shattered M yths. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
91. Tim or tragedy show s where we stand. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
92. US under fire for 'timidity'. S e p t e m b e r  11, 1999, Saturday.
93. 'Neighbours' priority is a stable archipelago. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
94. The World reacts. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
95. The tide o f  protests sw ell. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
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96. UN m isjudges again. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
97. Right man for the job. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
98. Im potence exposed to the world. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
99. Last bastion hold on to battered belief. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
100. Trauma o f  those exiting 'dead' city. September 11,1999, Saturday.
101. D ili priest good shepherd. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
102. Countdown to chaos. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
103. Tears for the slaughtered. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
104. 'Utm ost in a very com plex situation'. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
105. The brawl now firmly in Wiranto's court. September 11, 1999, Saturday.
106. Em bassy feels the heat o f  Jakarta's rancour. September 13, 1999, 
Monday.
107. E Timor beat arrests quiet retirement plan. September 13, 1999,
M onday.
108. 'Please do not leave us here we w ill die'. September 13, 1999, Monday.
109. G usm ao applauds Habibie's 'courage'. September 13, 1999, Monday.
110. Howard sets a smart pace with Kissinger shuttle. September 13, 1999, 
M onday.
111. D iggers face blood, sweat and militia. September 13, 1999, Monday.
112. Praise for 'courageous step'. September 13, 1999, Monday.
113. C lim bdown may spell downfalls. September 13, 1999, Monday.
114. PM builds force to be reckoned with? September 13, 1999, Monday.
115. Peacekeepers to go in - Habibie bows to world pressure. Septembei 13, 
1999, M onday.
116. N o  refuge, even for the sisterhood. September 13, 1999, Monday.
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117. War crim e names on 'long chain'. S ep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
118. Carnage cam e as a shock: Annan. S ep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
119. Sole refuge is to head for the hills. S ep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
120. R efugee's plea for help hits UN nerve. Sep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
121. Howard builds force; is it one to be reckoned with? S ep tem b er 13, 1999, 
M onday.
122. Ordinary people demand to be heard. S eptem ber 13, 1999, Monday.
123. PM gains Clinton's pledge on peace plan. Sep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
124. PM no slouch at Kissinger shuttle. Sep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
125. A ct now , UN rights ch ie f told. Sep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
126. Habibie's peace deal. Sep tem b er 13, 1999, Monday.
127. Food drops offer lifeline to thousands. S eptem ber 14, 1999, Tuesday.
128. Fam ilies live in fear o f  things that go 'ring' in the night. September 14, 
1999, Tuesday.
129. Atrocity inquiry go-ahead. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
130. Asian may lead the UN outfit. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
131. Aid airlift to starving. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
132. Cards tell diggers when to shoot. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
133. Bank Indonesia says there's plenty in the till. September 14, 1999, 
Tuesday.
134. Don't forget we're on our own. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
135. Pared-down military barks, but can it bite? Septembei 14, 1999,
Tuesday.
136. Jakarta’s promise must pass the test. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
137. D efence dilemma. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
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138. Support for peacekeepers. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
139. Starvation feared in hill retreats. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
140. Terror tracks refugees to Checkpoint Charnel. September 14, 1999, 
Tuesday.
141. Canberra role stirs regional dilemma. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
142. Enforcers warned: stick to your guns. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
143. Vietnam vets tipped to lead peace force. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
144. D efence spending up, review  tipped. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
145. To reckon with. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
146. Peacekeepers' mandate key to success. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
147. Outrage, re lief amid strained ties. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
148. Don't sack U ncle Sam, it's a case o f  Yankee Dili dandy. September 14, 
1999, Tuesday.
149. Restoring peace in East Timor. September 14, 1999, Tuesday.
150. Belo's promise: 1 will go home. September 15, 1999, W ednesday.
151. Lisbon, Canberra aid new nation. September 15, 1999, W ednesday.
152. Quiet achiever o f  UN debate. September 15, 1999, W ednesday.
153. Peace force may suffer casualties. September 15, 1999, W ednesday.
154. Shoot-to-kill orders. September 15, 1999, W ednesday.
155. Sanctions against Indonesia a tactic fraught with risk. September 15, 
1999, W ednesday.
156. Industry rallies for Timor. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
157. From the lips o f  prime ministers. September 15, 1999, W ednesday.
158. W hen it pays to hear voices in the wilderness. September 15, 1999, 
W ednesday.
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1 5 9 . Spotlight on military's abuses. September 15, 1999, W ednesday.
160. Residents cash in on confusion. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
161. Jurists to collect proof o f  atrocities. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
162. Belo tells Pope o f  the slaughter. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
163. Kosovar formula opens southern havens to evacuees. September 15, 
1999, Wednesday.
164. Envoys assess refugees' plight. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
165. Airlift out for Dili's survivors. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
166. What countries will contribute to the peacekeeping force. September 15, 
1999, Wednesday.
167. EU imposes arms embargo. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
168. Dangerous mission for peace force. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
169. R elief airdrop operation ready for take-off. September 15, 1999, 
Wednesday.
170. Lisbon, Canberra to give the most. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
171. Alatas pushes ASEAN troops. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
172. Media blamed for compassion fatigue. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
173. Vietnam hero back in action. September 15, 1999, Wednesday.
174. Cry from the heart on flights out o f hell. September 15, 1999, 
Wednesday.
175. Drafts diluted to suit Jakarta. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
176. Devotion to duty. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
177. Dili dispatches. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
178. Man in the line o f  fire. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
179. Infant democracy a fragile hope. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
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180. Policy-m akers trail in wake o f  new world order. September 16, 1999, 
Thursday.
181. Defence force rethinking is now a priority. September 16, 1999, 
Thursday.
182. Rebel camp under siege. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
183. For baby Unamet, the name says it all. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
184. Fears that food airdrops will kill more than they save. September 16, 
1999, Thursday.
185. A holocaust o f Canberra's making. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
186. Feeble response makes mockery o f ASEAN claims to solidarity. 
September 16, 1999, Thursday.
187. Clinton suggests revival o f  ANZUS. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
188. Presence needed for up to five years. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
189. Golkar chiefs go cold on Habibie. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
190. Cost o f  military operation could reach $700m a year. September 16, 
1999, Thursday.
191. Militia suspects among evacuees. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
192. UN gives the command. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
193. All dressed up, only one place to go. September 16, 1999, Thursday.
194. Habibie refuses to take call from Howard. September 16, 1999, 
Thursday.
195. Waiting game. September 17, 1999, Friday.
196. Hefty price to pay for meddling. September 17, 1999, Friday.
197. This burden is here to stay. September 17, 1999, Friday.
198. Refugees trapped behind wall o f silence. September 17, 1999, Friday.
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199.
200 . 
201 . 
202 .
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210 . 
211 . 
212 .
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220. 
221. 
222. 
223.
Jakarta's 'final solution' exposed. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Miners pull out expat staff. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Soldiers in bid to clean up their act. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Aceh calls for vote on autonomy. September 17, 1999, Friday.
A people guided by hand o f  faith. September 17, 1999, Friday 
Belo aide cites crime suspects. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Worries at bay on home front. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Are we ready for death? September 17, 1999, Friday.
The humane side o f  tragedy. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Top brass talk tough on job to be done. September 17, 1999, Friday.
It's a blow to lose the pact we had to have. September 17, 1999, Friday 
A deal struck by yesterday's men. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Jakarta 'spy' inquiry call. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Foreign mine staff evacuated. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Jakarta severs security ties with Canberra. September 17, 1999, Friday. 
US fury at our 'failing'. September 17, 1999, Friday.
Habibie sets Howard his toughest test. September 18, 1999, Saturday. 
Bitter pillory to swallow. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
Juggle for a new Jakarta. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
DRESSED TO KILL. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
Troops will need uncommon virtue. September 18, 1999, Saturday. 
Best o f  help for soldiers' families. September 18, 1999, Saturday. 
Tempers fraying in city on front line. September 18, 1999, Saturday. 
Militia threat o f  war in Australia. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
West just as wild for 150,000 'hostages'. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
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224 . UN desperate for a little peace o f history. September 1 8, 1999, Saturday. 
Confronting unknown enemies. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
226. Thais take up Asia's colours. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
227. Homeward bound. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
228. US alliance working, Howard tells critics. September 18, 1999,
Saturday.
229. We're marching a fine line. September 18, 1999, Saturday.
230. 100 Australians establish beachhead. September 20, 1999, Monday.
231. Militia tough talk sounds more like parley for partition. September 20, 
1999, Monday.
232. Dawn landing for Timor vanguard. September 20, 1999, Monday.
233. Real fear strikes those with nowhere to run. September 20, 1999, 
Monday.
234. Redefined alliance shares the load. September 20, 1999, Monday.
235. WWII comrades wish godspeed. September 20, 1999, Monday.
236. A would-be democracy lies in ruin. September 20, 1999, Monday.
237. Robinson crusade for rights violation tribunal. September 20, 1999, 
Monday.
238. Force poised as general sets terms. September 20, 1999, Monday.
239. Don't stretch troops all the way to the border, says Burke. September 20, 
1999, Monday.
240. John Howard's speech to the nation. September 20, 1999, Monday.
241. D-Day dawns for Timor vanguard. September 20, 1999, Monday.
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1. Hasil Penentuan Pendapat di Timtim Diumumkan hari ini. September 4.
2. Mary Robinson: Pasukan Perdamaian Mungkin Diperlukan. September 4.
; Formatted: Finnish
3. Jacinto do Santos kini Rindu Sekolah.... September 4.
4. Keharuan Berbaur Kecemasan. September 5.
5. Timtim "Merdeka", Usaha Jalan T erus.... September 5.
6. Megawati dan Gus Dur Prihatin. September 5.
7. Timtim "Merdeka", "Nasib" Habibie habis .... September 6.
8. MPR Wajib Hormati hasil Penentuan Pendapat. September 6.
9. Ketua DPP Golkar akan Merasa Perlu Evaluasi Capres Habibie. September 7.
10. Pro-Otonomi Dapat Tetap Jadi WNI. September 7.
11. Buah Busuk Warisan Kolonialisme Barat. September 7.
12. Sangat Berbahaya, Bila SU MPR Tolak hasil Penentuan Pendapat. September 7.
! Formatted: Finnish
13. Malaysia Siap Kirim Pasukan. September 7.
14. Pasukan Asing di Depan Pintu Timtim. September 7.
15. Tidak Tertutup, Pengiriman Pasukan PBB ke Timtim. September 8.
16. Komnas HAM Didesak Minta Pasukan Perdamaian. September 8.
17. PBB Desak Indonesia Terima Pasukan Internasional. September 9.
18. Para Jenderal Bertemu Habibie. September 9.
19. TNI AU Siap Halau Pesawat Australia Bila Langgar Udara Indonesia.
September 9.
20. Nasionalism dan Kemerdekaan Timtim. September 10.
21. Pasukan PBB di Timtim Harus di Bawah TNI. September 10. .............................................
I Formatted: Swedish (Sweden)
22. ICMI: Timor Timur Telah Menjadi Komoditas Politik. September 10.
23. Habibie tidak Boleh Mengundurkan Diri. September 10.
K o m p a s  a r t i c l e s .
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24. Kehadiran Pasukan PBB Justru Untungkan Indonesia. September 11.
25. PAN Terima Sepenuh Hati Hasil Penentuan Pendapat. September 11.
26. Segera Terima Pasukan Internasional. September 11.
27. Jangan Jadikan Timtim Komoditas Politik. September 11.
28. Mendagri: Pengalihan ke PBB Secara Bertahap. September 12.
29. Australia dan Prospek Pasukan PBB di Timtim. September 12.
30. Krisis Timtim dan Peranan TNI. September 12.
31. Wiranto Temui Tokoh Pro-Integrasi. September 12.
32. Timtim dan Reorientasi Strategi TNI. September 13.
33. Forum Rektor Temukan 34 Pelanggaran Unamet. September 14.
34. Komisi HAM PBB tanyakan Hubungan TNI - Milisi. September 14.
35. Pro-Integrasi tak Rela. September 16.
36. RI Bahas Masuknya Pasukan Perdamaian. September 12.
37. Jangan Tersinggung Jika PBB Ambii Alih Timtim. September 13.
38. Indonesia Undang Pasukan PBB. September 13.
39. Barat Sambut Baik Keputusan Indonesia. September 13.
40. Ramos Horta Berharap Usui Wiranto jadi Kenyataan. September 13.
41. Pasar Bereaksi Positif. September 14.
42. Sebaiknyatak Dipimpin Australia September 14.
43. Yudhoyono dan Frederick Mengko Dampingi Menlu ke PBB. September 14.
44. Thailand Siap Beri Bantuan Kemanusiaan. September 15.
45. Pasukan PBB Tiba Akhir Pekan Ini. September 15.
46. PBB Harus Hati-hati Tentukan Komposisi Pasukan. September 15.
47. Cerita Somalia. September 15.
48. Australia Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 16. .
■ Formatted: Spanish (Spain-Modern 
I Sort)
Formatted: Finnish
Formatted: Finnish
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49. Megawati Ingatkan PBB. September 16.
50. Gurkha. September 17.
51. Jenderal Australia Ancam Milisi. September 17.
52. Thailand Dampingi Australia. September 17.
53. Masyarakat Sipil Selalujadi Korban. September 18.
54. Sembilan Kapal Perang ke Timtim. September 19.
55. Hari Ini Komandan Interfet Tiba di Dili. September 19.
56. Sukses atau Gagal? September 19.
Formatted: Spanish (Spain-Modern
57. Tentara Indonesia dan PBB. September 19. Sort)...........................................
58. Pagi Ini, Pasukan Interfet Tiba di Dili. September 20.
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1. Hasi] Jajak Pendapat Diumumkan Hari ini September 4.
2. Rakyat Timtim Harus Tetap Bersatu September 4.
3. Timor Timur bukan Bagian dari Nasionalisme Indonesia September 6.
4. Menyikapi Jajak Pendapat Timtim secara Bijak September 6.
5. Pukulan dari Timor Timur September 6.
6. Adieu Timtim September 6.
7. Soal Timtim Harus Diterima Lapang Hati September 6.
8. Negara Timtim Mungkinkah Terwujud September 6.
9. Äset Indonesia di Timtim Harus segera Diselesaikan September 6.
10. Banyak yang Kecewa Timtim Merdeka September 6.
11. Jalan Terjal Diplomasi Timtim September 6.
12. Mengapa UNAM ET Berpihak? September 7.
13. Tamparan-tamparan Perempuan Bule September 7.
14. Implikasi Hasil jajak Pendapat Timtim September 7.
15. Habibie: Saya Tanggung Jawab September 7.
16. Habibie Melempar Bola Panas ke Tangan PBB September 8.
17. PBB belum Putuskan Kirim Pasukan Perdamaian ke Timtim September 8.
18. Ambeno Bisa Jadi Titik Awal Integrasi Timtim September 9.
19. RI Tetap tidak Terima Pasukan PBB September 10.
20. Prof Dr Azyumardi Azra: Lawan Politik Habibie Bersikap Tidak Fair. 
September 10.
21. DPR Minta Keterangan Presiden tentang Timtim. September 10.
22. MPR tak Punya 'Truf untuk Tetap Integrasikan Timtim. September 10.
23. Wiranto Pasukan PBB bisa Timbulkan Masalah Baru di Timtim. September 11.
R e p u b l i k a  a r t i c l e s
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24. Presiden Habibie Tepis Isu akan Mundur. September 11.
25. TNI tak Punya Agenda Lain di Timtim. September 13.
26. Habibie, TNI dan Timtim. September 13.
27. Eep: Timtitm akan Alami Tiga Fase Konflik September 13.
28. Langkah Habibie Ditanggapi Positif. September 13.
29. RI Terima Pasukan Perdamaian PBB. September 13.
30. Pasukan PBB akan Mampu Wujudkan Perdamaian. September 13.
31. Ketika Kangguru Berhati Serigala. September 14.
32. Masuknya Pasukan PBB di Timtim Ciptakan Kepastian Ekonomi'. September 
14.
33. Politisasi Timtim. September 15.
i Formatted: Swedish (Sweden)
34. Mempertimbangkan Em pat i Untuk Timor Timur. September 15. .............................................
35. Pasukan PBB bleh Bertindak Apa saja. September 16.
36. TNI dan CNRT Sepakat Tutup Lembaran Sejarah Masa Lalu. September 16.
37. Revitalisasi Nasionalisme setelah Referendum di Timtim. September 17.
38. Milisi Prointegrasi Minta Pasukan PBB Netral. September 17.
39. Kerikil dalam Sepatu. September 18.
40. Dua Batalyon TNI Mulai Ditarik dari Timtim. September 18.
41. DPR Memahami Keputusan Presiden. September 14.
42. Pasukan Ini Biasanya Dipersiapkan untuk Perang. September 16.
43. PBB Harus Hindari Subjektivitas yang bisa Merugikan Indonesia. September 15.
Formatted: Finnish
44. Australia Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 15.
45. Milisi Timtim Versus Australia. September 19.
46. Banyak Elite Parpol Berperilaku seperti Orang Awam’. September 20.
47. 2.500 Pasukan Interfet Tiba di Dili Pagi ini. September 20.
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48. Hadapi N eo im p eria lisin e Pejuang Integrasi Bersatu. Septem ber 20 .
453
1. Meraba Timor Timur Pascajajak Pendapat. September 4.
2. Timor Timur Tidak Langsung Merdeka. September 5.
3. Timtim Merdeka, Dili Mencekam. September 5.
4. Nasib Habibie setelah Jajak Pendapat. September 5.
5. Viva Timor Leste, Viva Xanana Gusmao. September 5.
6. Melepas Kerikil di Atas Panggung. September 6.
7. Pengumuman Hasil Jajak Pendapat Terburu-buru. September 6.
8. Habibie harus Bertanggung Jawab. September 7.
9. Beban Anggaran Berkurang. September 6.
10. Sejumlah Negara Siap Kirim Pasukan. September 7.
11. Nmegawati Tuntut Tanggung Jawab Presiden Habibe. September 7.
12. Xanana Desak PBB Kirim Pasukan ke Timtim. September 7.
13. Kemerdekaan" Timtim dan Dampak Politiknya. September 8.
14. Presiden Clinton janji Bantu Hentikan Kekerasan di Timtim. September 8.
15. Pasukan Internasional Tinggal Tunggu Waktu? September 8.
16. Membeli Misi Unamet. September 9.
17. PAN Secara Resmi Terima Hasil Jajak Pendapat. September 10.
18. Habibie belum berniat Undurkan Diri. September 10.
19. Bagi saja Timtim Menajdi Dua Wilayah. September 12.
20. TNI Ingkar Janji? September 12.
21. MUI Minta Pemerintah Tolak Pasukan Perdamaian. September 13.
22. Pemerintah Habibie tidak Efektif Lagi. September 13.
23. Nasib Wakil Rakyat dari Timtim. September 13.
24. Menyikapi Pasukan Perdamain PBB. September 14.
M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia  a r t ic le s
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25. Pasukan Perdamaian Terserah PBB. September 14.
26. Pemerintah Diminta Tolak Pasukan Australia. September 14.
27. Konspirasi Politik Global di Timor Tirnur. September 16.
28. Negara Asia Kirim Pasukan tak Seperti Diharapkan. September 16.
29. Australia Pimpin Pasukan Multinasional ke Timtim. September 16.
30. DPR Sesalkan Australia Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 16.
31. Tentang Masuknya Pasukan Perdamaian PBB di Timtim. September 17.
32. Setelah Kalah Timtim Dibelah? September 19.
33. Campur Tangan Australia di Timtim. September 22.
34. Diusulkan Provinsi Ke-27 baru. September
35. Guiteres Tantang Xanana Gusmao. September 17.
36. RI Izinkan Pasukan PBB Masuk. September 13.
37. Dunia Nantikan Komposisi. September 14.
38. Australia Bernafsu Pimpin Pasukan PBB. September 14.
39. Pekan ini Pasukan PBB sudah Masuk. September 15.
40. Timtim Diselesaikan Secara Terbuka. September 15.
41. Kemenangan Bagi Australia. September 17.
42. Thailand Setuju Menajdi Wakil Komandan. September 17.
43. Sanak Keluarga Khawatirkan nasib Pasukan Multinasional. September 18.
44. Cina Kirim lnsinyur Bertugas di Timtim
45. Siapa Deputi Panglima, Thailand atau Malaysia. September 18.
46. AS Kerahkan 200 Orang Tentara. September 18.
47. Tni Gagal, PBB Masuk. September 19.
48. Welcome, Sir! September 19.
49. Derap Langkah si Baret Biru. September 19.
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50. Pasukan PBB akan alami Kesulitan di Timtim. September 20.
51 .2 .000  Tentara Siap ke Timtim. September 20.
52. Ada Tanda-Tanda Perbedaan di Kalangan Pasukan Koalisi. September 20.
53. Pasukan Interfet Tiba di Dili. September 20.
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1. Timor Timur Medeka. September 4.
2. Setelah Timor Timur Menjadi Merdeka. September 4.
3. Pemerintah harus Beri Penjelasan Resmi Kepada DPR. September 5.
4. Presiden Konsultasikan Timtim Dengan DPR. September 6.
5. Marzuki: Selamat Kepada Rakyat Timtim. September 4.
6. Perubahan Status Timtim harus Disetujui MPR. September 6.
7. Mereka Mengajari Kita Arti Kemerdekaan Yang Kita Lupakan. September 6.
8. Presiden, Panglima TNI dan Kapolri harus Bertanggung Jawab. September 7.
9. habibie Harus Pertanggungjawabkan Timtim Di SU MPR. September 7.
10. Pertanggungjawaban Pemerintah Habibie DI SU MPR Potensial Ditolak. 
September 8.
11. Habibie Makin Populer Tapi Diminta Mundur. September 8.
12. Indonesia Tolak Pasukan Asing. September 8.
13. Kondisi Di Timtim Tak Bisa Dikualifikasikan Kejahatan Kemanusiaan. 
September 8.
14. Alatas: Tak Ada Pesan Keras Dari PBB. September 9.
15. MPR Harus Nyatakan Pending. September 9.
16. Mendagri: Membagi Dua Timtim Tak Relevan. September 9.
17. Demi Kemanusiaan, Hubungan Komunikasi Perlu Dipulihkan. September 10.
18. Benny Soetrisno: Embargo Menakutkan Dunia Usaha. September 10.
19. DPR Gunakan Hak Bertanya Soal Timtim. September 10.
20. Biarkan Habibie Selesaikan Tugasnya. September 11.
21. Wiranto: Tawaran Dunia Internasional Penting Dipertimbangkan. September 12.
22. Indonesia Setujui Kerja Sama Keamanan Dengan PBB Di Timtim. September
S u a r a  P e m b a r u a n  a r t ic le s
Formatted: Swedish (Sweden)
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13.
23. Thailand Siapjadi Koordinator Pasukan PBB. September 13.
24. Sukses Di Luar Negeri Karena Pendekatannya . September 13.
25. Try Sutrisno: Pemerintah Secepatnya Jelaskan Masalah Timtim. September 14.
26. Pemerintah Diminta Tolak Negara Yang Tidak Netral. September 14.
27. Perlukah Pasukan Perdamaian PBB Di Timtim. September 15.
28. Prajurit Indonesia Dan Milisi Timtim Dituduh Jarah barang UNAMET.
September 15.
29. Takkan Ada Konfrontasi Pasukan PBB-TN1. September 15.
30. imtim Bagi TNI Seperti AS Dahulu Dengan Vietnam. September 16.
31. Kita Perlu Merasakan Kalah. September 16.
32. Pasukan PBB Tak Selalu Mampu Bawa Perdamaian. September 16.
33. Awasi Resolusi DK-PBB
34. Pasukan Multinasional Tiba Sabtu. September 17.
35. Tak Akan Bentrok. September 17.
36. Dili Porak Poranda. September 17.
37. Habibie Akan Jelaskan Masalah Timtim ke DPR. September 18.
38. Mayjen Cosgrove Tiba Di Dili. September 19.
Formatted: Swedish (Sweden)
39. Kapal Interfet Dilarang Lintasi Timor Barat. September 20.
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Appendix B
Chapters 4 -  Transcripts of articles analysed 
(Quoted articles on Sanders Thoenes)
Thrill of adventure dies in the dust
Don Greenless -  The Australian. 
September 23 -  1999
HE was a tall, strapping Dutchman, with a thick shock o f blond hair, seated 
astride a motorcycle speeding along Dili's seafront.
Only hours before Sander Thoenes died, he appeared to brim with the thrill of 
journalistic adventure.
It came to an end on the dusty verge o f a road in Becora, one o f Dili's many 
bloodstained neighbourhoods.
When the Australian army found his body yesterday, Sander wasn't easy to 
recognise.
This handsome 30-year-old, whose pink cheeks made him look years younger, 
had a bullet through his head and an ear severed by a knife — a gruesome 
memento for the killers.
Sander had ridden on the back o f Floriado Da Conceicao Araujo's motorbike 
into Becora about 4.30 on Tuesday afternoon.
They hadn't gone far before they ran into six men in Indonesian military 
uniforms.
They were ordered to stop, but a familiar fear o f Indonesian authority took over. 
Floriado turned his bike around and tried to speed away. Sander crouched lower, 
tightly hugging his waist.
"I could hear them shooting ... they shot the motorcycle and we fell," Floriado 
said.
He escaped into the trees beside the road with an injured leg. Sander lay in the 
dust, not moving. The assailants came closer, still shooting.
Floriado had only a glimpse before disappearing. "He couldn't run, so he was 
certainly shot," Floriado said.
Sander worked for the Financial Times of London and the Boston-based 
Christian Science Monitor. He had been in Jakarta for nearly two years. He was 
an easygoing, intelligent journalist.
He was the last person any one o f us would have expected to die in Dili. The 
Financial Times, he said, did not have the same intense interest as other papers,
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so he usually only stopped a couple o f days before heading back to Jakarta.
Last Thursday, as the peace enforcers appeared to be on their way, Sander, a 
member o f the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club board, was busy organising 
flights for journalists in, and out of, Dili.
Sander won't be on one1.
Military Tramples Decency and Hope
By Louise Williams -  The Sydney Morning Herald.
September 25, 1999
Several days before he was killed in East Timor, Dutch journalist Sander 
Thoenes discussed concerns he had about the black operations being conducted 
behind the public face o f the Indonesian Government and military. He was 
concerned about the violence and death that a power struggle among the 
Indonesian elite would bring to East Timor.
His own life ended tragically on the outskirts o f the East Timorese capital, Dili, 
his killers dressed in Indonesian military uniforms, his young body mutilated by 
his killers.
His death, some believe, was part o f the bigger picture he had been talking about 
with friends: the use o f terror, intimidation and the provocation o f violence to 
promote the political interests o f the Indonesian military and to maintain the 
status quo.
What killing Sander, one o f the most qualified and insightful members o f the 
Jakarta-based foreign press corps, achieved was to frighten other journalists 
seeking the truth about the Indonesian military and the militia's brutal role in 
East Timor over the past weeks.
But his death was just part o f an ongoing fear campaign to demonstrate that 
despite the democratic face o f the post- Soeharto Indonesian Government, the 
authoritarian forces o f the military still hold the real power and they have no 
intention o f letting it go.
What East Timor represents to the Indonesian military is an unacceptable 
international humiliation. To that end public opinion in Indonesia is being 
manipulated to criticise Australia's role in the peacekeeping force and sow fear 
among Australians in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia.
It is not surprising that snipers this week fired, mysteriously, into the Australian 
Embassy despite the presence of Indonesian military guaids, that demonstiators 
tore down the Australian flag inside the consulate in Balikpapan and raised the
1 G r e e n l e e s ,  D . ( 1 9 9 9 )  In T h e  A i i s t r c i / i c i n S y d n e y ,  pp- 5.
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Indonesian flag instead, that mobs burnt Australian flags in Jakarta, and that 
Australia businesses were the targets o f death threats.
The demonstrators, however, are not ordinary Indonesians, but "rent-a-crowd" 
members o f right-wing groups with links to the military.
Indonesian politicians routinely talk about "provocateurs" stoking violence for 
political ends, playing one religion o ff against another, one culture o ff against 
another along the numerous fracture lines that run through Indonesian society. It 
is important to remember that in May last year massive riots which devastated 
Jakarta were provoked by one faction within the Indonesian military seeking to 
discredit the Commander in Chief and promote the ambitions o f their own 
commander. At least 1,300 ordinary Indonesians died.
"The political and military elite are so accustomed to power that thousands o f 
lives are not too much to achieve their ends," said one Asian diplomat recently.
It is important to point out that there is little that is genuine about this "rising 
wave o f anti- Australian sentiment". Ordinary Indonesians, struggling under the 
weight o f the worst economic crisis since World War II, are not afforded the 
luxury o f misplaced national pride and have had little interest in the Timor issue.
But, it is perhaps even more important to point out that within Indonesia this 
week there were far larger, and more passionate, demonstrations by Indonesians 
against their own armed forces and the political elite which is willing to 
maintain its power.
There were unconfirmed reports that five students died and scores were injured 
in clashes with police on Thursday night as thousands protested outside the 
Indonesian Parliament building over new legislation which would further 
enhance the powers o f the security apparatus.
That legislation mocks the "democratic" victory of tens o f thousands o f student 
demonstrators who last year forced President Soeharto to step down, raising 
hopes o f an end to military abuses and the evolution o f an accountable, 
democratic system.
And the East Timor carnage is a tragic warning to other regions that the 
military will continue to act with impunity.
For Australia the ongoing power struggle in Jakarta is crucial for our own efforts 
to reshape our tattered foreign policy to reflect the realities Timor has exposed.
It appears that right now the Indonesian military is not able to be effectively 
checked.
But it would also be foolish to discount the strength o f the democratic movement 
in Indonesia and the deep resentment o f the armed forces among the people of 
other regions, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya, who have suffered so much.
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Lindsay Murdoch -  The Sydney Morning Herald 
September 23 -  1999
The attackers, allegedly Indonesian soldiers, who murdered Sander Thoenes cut 
his ear and took it away as some sort o f bizarre souvenir.
The 30-year-old Dutch journalist thought it was safe enough to take a ride late 
on Tuesday on the back o f a motorbike through the Dili suburb of Becora, a one­
time independence stronghold that is now a wasteland.
We all had a false sense o f security, after seeing hundreds o f heavily armed 
Australian troops arriving in the devastated capital o f East Timor, and hearing from 
Interfet commander Major-General Peter Cosgrove about the co-operation o f the 
Indonesian military, or TNI.
But they had only secured the airport, wharf and United Nations compound. The 
rest o f Dili remains a dangerous no-man's land.
Motorbike rider Florindo Araujo knew he and Thoenes were in trouble when he 
saw six men dressed and equipped as Indonesian soldiers on the road about 200 
metres ahead shortly before dusk. Although militias sometimes wear bits of 
uniform, Mr Araujo has no doubt these were Indonesian troops.
"I saw them lift their automatic rifles towards us and motioned us to stop. I tried 
to turn around but they started shooting, maybe 10 or 20 times. There were bullets 
all around. My motorbike was damaged and we went down. The journalist looked 
asleep. It looked like they were going to continue shooting so I ran away."
Shortly after dawn the body o f Thoenes, who works for London's Financial 
Times and the Dutch weekly Vrij Nederland, was found by friends face down in 
Becora, his body battered and apparently mutilated.
American photographer Chip Hires and British journalist Jon Swain were not 
greatly worried when they saw a convoy o f Indonesian soldiers on the edge of Dili 
about the same time as Thoenes was killed. But the soldiers, East Timorese from 
one o f the two locally-raised TNI battalions, stopped their taxi.
"For me it was sort o f the year o f living dangerously all over again," said Hires. 
"They started hammering our driver - then his eye came out. He was beaten very 
badly. They put him on the back o f a truck and were still beating him."
One o f the soldiers then pulled out a pistol and shot out the taxi's tyres.
Hires said he and Swain, a veteran Asian journalist who survived Pol Pot's 
occupation o f Phnom Penh in 1975, were then told to go away. "We took cover in a 
small village and called our office in London on a mobile telephone.
The call mobilised more than 100 Australian soldiers, armoured personnel 
carriers and Black Hawk helicopters. The men were rescued early yesterday 
morning.* Sander Thoenes's body will be flown to Darwin in the next few days.
Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office yesterday demanded that those 
responsible for the "appalling" killing be brought to justice.
R e p o r t e r  K i l le d ,  T h e n  M u t i la t e d
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Situasi Dili semakin Tegang -  Wartawan ‘The Financial Times’ Dibunuh.
(S itu a tio n  in  D i l i  is  te n s e  — ‘T he F in a n c ia l  T im e s  ’j o u r n a l i s t  k il le d )
Media Indonesia -  September 23, 1999.
Dili (Media): Memasuki liari ketiga kehadiran Interfet di Timor Timur, situasi di 
Bumi Loro Sae itu semakin tegang. Aksi pembakaran dan penjarahan mulai 
terjadi lagi, bahkan belasan wartawan Indonesia mendapat ancaman 
pembunuhan.
( E n te r in g  th e  th e  th i r d  d a y  o f  IN T E R F E T  p r e s e n c e  in  E a s t  T im o r, th e  s i tu a tio n  
in  th e  L o r o  S a e  la n d  is  b e c o m in g  m o r e  te n se . A c ts  o f  a r s o n s  a n d  r io t in g s  h a s  
s t a l l e d  a g a in  a n d  d o z e n s  o f  o f  I n d o n e s ia n  j o u r n a l i s t s  'w ere th r e a te n e d  w ith  
m u r d e r ) .
Sepanjang hari Rabu, kemarin asap terlihat di sejumlah tempat. Kelompok pro- 
kemeidekaan yang marah karena mengetahui rumah mereka dibakar milisi 
sebelum pasukan PBB mendarat di Timtim melakukan pembalasan dengan 
membakar rumah-rumah yang masih utuh.
( A ll  d a y  lo n g  o n  W e d n e s d a y , s m o k e  w a y  s e e n  in  s e v e r a l  a re a s . The p r o ­
in d e p e n d e n c e  g r o u p s  th a t  w e r e  c m g iy  u p o n  le a r n in g  th a t  th e ir  h o u s e s  h a v e  b e e n  
b u r n e d  b y  th e  m i l i t ia s  p r i o r  th e  a r r i v a l  o f  U N  tr o o p s ,  w e r e  h a v in g  th e ir  r e v e n g e  
b y  b u r n in g  h o u s e s  th a t  w ere s t i l l  in ta c t) .
Di tengah-tengah tidak menentunya situasi keamanan dan politik itu, wartawan 
M e d ia , Edi Hidayat dan Gino F Hadi melaporkan wargayang semula mengungsi 
ke hutan mulai turun ke kota Bakan sejak pagi, mereka melakukan penjarahan 
terhadap gudang Dolog dan gudang Makore, serta mengais-ngais rumah-rumah 
yang sudah terbakar. Ibu-ibu, Bapak-bapak dan anak-anak saling berlarian 
berebut mencari barang yang masih mungkin dibawa pulang.
(In  th e  m id d le  o f  th e  u n c e r ta in  s e c u r i ty a n d  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a tio n , M e d i a ’s  
j o u r n a l i s t s ,  E d i  H id a y a t  a n d  G in o  F. H a d i  r e p o r t e d  th a t  r e s id e m % th a t  h a d  r y n  
to  th e  ju n g l e s  h a y  s t a r t e d  to  r e tu r n  to  th e  to w n s  s in c e  m o rn in g . T he r e s id e n ts  
h a d  l o o t e d  ih e  D o lo g  a n d  M a k o r e  w a r e h o u s e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  s c r a tc h in g  h o u se s  th a t  
w e r e  b u rn e d . M en, w om an  „ a n d  ch ild re n \ were a llT ru n n in g  a r o u n d  h y in g  to  f i n d  
g o o d s  th a t  c a n  b e  ta k e n  h o m e).
Sementara itu sepuluh helicopter Interfet melakukan patroli udara, berputar- 
putar di atas Kota Dili. Sedangkan di darat, 3.000 personel melakukan patroli 
kota hingga menyusur ke daerah perkampungan seperti Decora, Timore, Audian 
dan Aebesi. Para personel Interfet itu melakukan s w e e p in g  kepada setiap warga 
masyarakat yang ingin masuk kota. Sampai kemarin Interfet sudah menangkap 
puluhan anggota milisi, baik yang membawa senjata api maupun senjata tajam.
(M e a n w h ile ,  te n  I N T E R F E T  c h o p p e r s  s t a r t e d  a ir  p a tr o l s ,  f l y i n g  a b o v e  th e  C i ty  
o f  D il i .  O ji  th e  la n d , 3 .0 0 0  p e r s o n n e l  c o n d u c te d  u rb a n  p a t r o l s  ijx th e  r e s id e n t ia l'
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a r e a s  s u c h  a s  D e c o r a , T im o ré , A u d i  cm a n d  A e b e s i .  I N T E R F E T  p e r s o n n e l  
s e a r c h e d  a l l  p e o p l e  w h o  w a n te d  to  e n te r  th e  to w n . Up ////'y e s te r  d a y , IN T E R F E T  
h a s  a r r e s t e d  te n s  m i l i t ia s  m e m b e r s  th a t  w e r e  c a r r y in g  s h a r p  w e a p o n s  o r  
f i r e a r m s ) .
Mengantisipasi keadaan itu seluruh wartawan yang bertugas di Dili dievakuasi 
ke Makorem. Apalagi sebelumnya sudah ada ancaman, belasan wartawan 
Indonesia yang masih bertahan di Dili itu akan dibunuh. sehubunsan densan 
tewasnya wartawan asing, Sandler Toenes, 30 dari T h e F in a n c ia l  T im e s . 
Mendapatkan ancaman itu, seluruh wartawan Indonesia yang bertugas di Dili 
hari ini akan diberangkatkan ke Jakarta via Kupang.
(In  a n t ic ip a t io n  o f  s u c h  a  s i tu a t io n  a l l  j o u r n a l i s t s  th a t  w e r e  w o r k in g  in  D i l i  w e r e  
e v a c u a te d  to  K O R E M  h a ea d c ju a te rs^  s p e c i a l l y  a f te r  th e r e  w a s  a j h r e a t  to  th e  
d o z e n s  o f  In d o n esia n ^  ) o u r n a l i s t s  s t i l l  in  D i l i  th a t  th e y  w o u ld  jo e  k i l l e d  f o l lo w i n g  
th e  d e a th  o f  f o r e i g n  jo u r n a l i s t ,  S a n d le r  T o en es , 30 . f r o m  th e  T he F in a n c ia l  
T im es. A f te r  b e in g  th r e a te n e d ,  a l l  I n d o n e s ia n  jo u r n a l i s t s  who w o r k e d  in  D i l i  
lU U llii  b e  l i f t e d  o u t to  J a k a r ta  v ia  K u p a n g ) .
Sedangkan dua wartawan asing yang dikabarkan hilang, kemarin sudah 
ditemuka patroIi gabungan TNI -  Interfet di Desa Decora pada pukul 24.00 
Wita, Selasa.
( M e a n w h ile  tw o  f o r e i g n  j o u r n a l i s t s  th a t  w e r e  r e p o r t e d  m is s in g  w e r e  f o u n d  
y e s t e r d a y  b y  j o i n t  T N I- IN T E R F E T  p a t r o l  in  th e  D e c o r a  v i l la g e  a t  2 4 .0 0  C e n tr a l  
I n d o n e s ia n  T im e  (W IT A ) o n  T u e sd a y ) .
Menurut Panglima Penguasa Darurat Militer Timtim, Mayjen Kiki Syahnakri, 
kedua wartawan itu pada pukul 17.30 Wita berada di jembatan Decora pada saat 
iring-iringan Batalyon 475 melintas dari Dili ke Atambua, kedua wartawan itu 
berusaha membuat dokumentasi.
( A c c o r d in g  to  th e  C o m m a n d e r  o f  M i l i t a i y  e m e r g e n c y  a r e a  E a s t  T im o r, M a jo r  
G e n e r a l  K ik i  S y a h n a k r i, th e  h v o  jo u r n a l i s t s  w e r e  a t  D e c o r a  b r id g e  a t  1 7 .3 0  
l o c a l  t im e  w h e n  th e  c o n v o y  o f  B a ta l l io n  4 7 5  w e r e  c r o s s in g  f r o m  D i l i  to  
A  t a m b u a .J h e  tw o  jo u r n a l i s t  w e r e  t t y i n g  to  m a ke a d o cu m cn ia i y
B e r b a g a i  r e a k s i  
Various reactions
Dari Jakarta, reaksi atas kematian wartawan asing itu segera mendapat 
tanggapan dari berbagai kalangan. Menhankan/Panglima TNI Jenderal Wiranto 
mengatakan belum secara resmi menerima laporan adanya wartawan asing yang 
tewas di Timor Timur.
(F r o m  J a k a r ta ,  r e a c t io n s  [a, th e  f o r e ig n  j o u r n a l i s t ' s  d e a th  im m e d ia te ly  a r r i v e d  
f r o m  v a r io u s  s e c t io n s .  M in is te r  o f  D e fe n c e /T N I  C o m m a n d e r  G e n e r a l  W ira n to  
s a i d  th a t  h e  h a d  n o t  r e c e i v e d  s i  f o r m a l  r e p o r t  r e g a r d in g  a j o r e i g n  jo u r n a l i s t  
k i l l e d  in  E a s t  T im o r).
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“Saya sudah dengar berita itu, dan saya akan mengecek siapa, mengapa dan dan 
kenapa bisa begitu. Tentunya harus menunggu laporan-Iaporan,” katanya 
sebelum mengikuti Sidang Kabinet Terbatas bidang Ekuin di Bina Graha, 
Jakarta, Rabu.
( “I  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  th e  n e w s  a n d  I s h a l l  c h e c k  w h o , w h y  a n d  h o w  it h a p p e n e d . O f  
c o u r s e  I  h a v e  to  w a i t  f o r  r e p o r ts ,  ” h e  s a i d  b e fo r e  a t te n d in g  th e  l im i te d  C a b in e t  
o n  e c o n o m ic  a n d  in du stry) m e e t in g  a t  B in a  G ra h a , J a k a r ta ,  W e d n e sd a y ) .
Sedangkan Kapuspen Hankam/TNI Mayjen Sudrajat mengatakan, tuduhan yang 
menyebutkan personel TNI terlibat dalam kasus terbunuhnya wartawan Sander 
Toenes di Timtim adalah suatu tuduhan yang tidak adil, tendensius, tidak punya 
dasar dan suatu tindakan provokatif.
( A r m e d  F o r c e s s p o k e s m a n  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  S u d r a d ja t  s a i d  th a t  th e  a c c u s a t io n  
a b o u t  T N I p e r s o n n e l  w e r e  in v o lv e d  in  th e  d e a th  o f  S a n d e r  T o e n e s  in E a s t  T im o r  
is  a n  u n fa ir , t e n d e n t io u s  s ta tem ent, which, h a s  n o  f o u n d a t io n  a n d  isja p r o v o c a t i v e  
a c t) .
“TNI sudah berulang kali mendapatkan tuduhan yang tendensius. Saya tegaskan, 
tuduhan itu adalah tidak etis dan tidak punya dasar,” kata Kapuspen menanggapi 
pertanyaan wartawan di Mabes TNI J1 Merdeka Barat, Rabu malam.
(" T N I  h a s  r e p e a te d ly  r e c e i v e d  te n d e n tio u s  a c c u s a tio n s .  I  a s s e r te d  th a t  s u c h  an  
a c c u s a t io n  is  u n e th ic a l  a n d  h a s  n o  f o u n d a t io n ,  ” s a i d  T N I sp o k e s m a n  a n s w e r in g  
q u e s t io n s  f r o m  jo u r n a l i s t s  a t  th e  T N I H e a d q u a r te r s  in  J a /a n  M e r d e k a  B a ra t,  
W e d n e s d a y  n ig h t) . .
Lalu siapa yang bertanggung jawab atas kematian wartawan di Timor Timur, 
TNI atau Interfet? Beberapa wartawan senior di Jakarta yang didatangi A n ta r a  
Rabu menyebutkan, Pasukan Internasional untuk Timor Timur (Interfet)-lah 
yang bertanggung jawab terhadap keamanan semua wartawan yang menjalankan 
tugas jurnalistik di Timtim, karena pasukan bentukan PBB itu kini 
mengendalikan situasi di wilayah tersebut.
(T h e n  w h o  is  g o in g  to  b e  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  d e a th  o f  a jo u r n a l i s t  in  E a s t  T im or, 
j s  it T N I o r  IN T E R F E T ?  S e v e r a l  s e n io r  j o u r n a l i s t s  in J a k a r ta  th a t  w e r e  
c o n ta c te d  b y  A N T A R A , on W e d n e s d a y  s a i d  th a t th e  IN T E R F E T  is  th e  o n e  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  s e c u r i t y  to  a l l  jo u r n a l i s t s  th a t  w e r e  c o n d u c t in g  th e ir  
jo u r n a l i s m  w o r k , in  E a s t  T im o r  b e c a u s e  U N  tr o o p s  are, n o w  c o n tr o l l in g  th e  
a r e a ) .  —
“Sebagai suatu pasukan Internasional, Interfet sudah tentu mesti melindungi 
wartawan di daerah terjadinya konflik bersenjata,” kata Dja far Assegaf, 
pemimpin Redaksi harian M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia .
(A s  a n  in te r n a t io n a l  fo r c e ,  IN T E R F E T  h a s  to  p r o te c t  j o u i  n a lis ts  in th e  a i e a  o f  
a r m e d  c o n f lic t , ” s a i d  D ja  f a r  A s s e g a f  C h ie f  E d ito r  o f  M e d ia  I n d o n e s ia  d a ily ) .
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Pendapat serupa dilontarkan Parni Hadi, Pemimpin Umum L K B N  A n ta r a  dan 
Harian R e p u b l ik a .  Mantan Sekjen PW1 Pusat itu menegaskan, Interfet 
Sêyogyanya memberikan perlindungan maksimal agar semua wartawan apapun 
kebangsaan mereka, dapat menjalankan tugas jumalistik secara aman dan lancar.
( S im i la r  o p in io n s  w e r e  e x p r e s s e d  b y  P a r n i  H a d i,  G e n e r a l  M a n a g e r  o f  A N T A R A  
n e w s  a g e n c y  a n d  R E P U B L I K A . T he f o r m e r  s e c r e t a i y  g e n e r a l  o f  I n d o n e s ia n  
J o u r n a l i s t  A s s o c ia t io n  a s s e r t e d  th a t  I N T E R F E T  s h o u l d  g i v e  m a x im u m  
p r o t e c t i o n  ip  a l l  j o u r n a l i s t s  r e g a r d le s s  o f  th e i r  n a t io n a l i t i e s  s o  ih c v  c a n  c o n d u c t  
th e i r  j o u r n a l i s t i c  d u t ie s  s a f e ly ) .
Demikian juga pakar hokum pidana yang dekat dengan dunia kewartawanan, 
Prof Loebby Luqman. Loebby menekankan bahwa Interfet harus bertanggung 
jawab atas situasi keamanan, termasuk memberikan perlindungan kepada 
wartawan yang tengah menjalankan tugas di wilayah konflik bersenjata, karena 
saat ini seluruh kendali sudah di tangan pasukan internasional yang dipimpin 
Australia itu.
( P r o f e s s o r  L o e b b y  L u q m a n , _a l e g a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r  w ho w o j k n o w n  to  b e  c l o s e  y  
[ h g j o u r n a l i s i  c o m m u n ity ,  a s s e r t e d  th a t  I N T E R F E T  s h o u l d  b e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  
s e c u r i t y  s i tu a t io n ,  in c lu d in g  g i v i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  j o u r n a l i s t s  w ho w e r e  d o in g  
th e ir  w o r k s  in  th e  a r m e d  c o n f l i c t  a r e a s „ J s  f o r  n o w  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  l e d  
in te r n a t io n a l  f o r c e  h a s  f u l l  c o n tr o l ) .
Sedangkan Ketua Komnas HAM, Marzuki Darusman, mengharapkan tindakan 
stabilisasi keamanan yang kini ditangani pasukan internasional hendaknya bisa 
menciptakan keadilan dan persamaan terhadap semsua warga Indonesia di 
Timor Timur.
( H e a d  o f  N a t io n a l  C o m m is io n  o f  H u m a n  R ig h ts ,  M a r z u k i  D a r u s m a n  is  h o p in g  
th e  s e c u r i t y  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  e f f o r ts  th a t  a r e T n o w  c o n d u c te d  b y  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  
f o r c e  s h o u l d  b e  a b le  to  c r e a t e  j u s t i c e  a n d  e q u a l i t y  to  a l l  I n d o n e s ia n  c i t i z e n s  in  
E a s t  T im o r ) .
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Wartawan Asing Tewas Dibunuh -  ‘Interfet Harus Bertanggung 
Jawab’
Foreign Journalist murdered -  ‘Interfet must bear the responsibility '
Republika -  September 23, 1999.
Dili -  Pasukan multinasional untuk Timor Timur (Interfet) harus bertanggung 
jawab atas keamanan semua wartawan yang menjalankan tugas jurnalistik di 
Timtim. Pasalnya, menurut sejumlah wartawan senior Indonesia, pasukan 
bentukan PBB itulah yang kini mengendalikan situasi Timtim.
(D i l i  -  T h e in te r n a t io n a l  f o r c e  f o r  E a s t  T im o r  (IN T E R F E T ) s h o u ld  b e a r  th e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  s e c u r i t y  f o r  a l l  j o u r n a l i s t s  th a t  w e r e  d o in g  th e ir  
j o u r n a l i s j j c  d u t ie s  in  E a s t  T im o r. T he r e a s o n , a c c o r d in g  to  s e v e r a l  In d o n e s ia n  
s e n io r  j o u r n a l  is  [ŝ  is th a t th e  U N  c r e a t e d  f o r c e  is  th e  o n e  c o n tr o l l in g  E a s t  
T im o r) .
“Sebagai pasukan multinasional, Interfet mesti melindungi wartawan di daerah 
terjadinya konflik,” kata Dja’far Assegaf, mantan ketua Dewan Kehormatan 
Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI).
( “A s  m u l t in a t io n a l  f o r c e ,  I N T E R F E T  s h o u ld  p r o t e c t  j o u r n a l i s t s  in  c o n f l ic t  
a r e a , ” s a i d  D j a f a r  A s se g a f , f o r m e r  h e a d  o f  I n d o n e s ia n  J o u r n a l i s ts  A s s o c ia t io n  
(P W I)  h o n o r a r y  c o u n c il) .
Desakan agar Interfet bertanggung jawab itu berkaitan dengan tewasnya 
wartawan koran Inggris, T h e F in a n c ia l  T im e s  (FT), Sandler Thoenes. Wartawan 
asal Belanda berusia 30 tahun dan telah dua tahun n g e p o s  di Jakarta itu 
ditemukan tewas di Desa Bacora, Dili. Dinyatakan hilang sejak Selasa (21/9), 
mayat Thoenes ditemukan kemarin dalam keadaan mengenaskan akibat luka 
bacok di kepala dan di bagian tubuh lainnya.
( P r e s s u r e  f o r  I N T E R F E T  to  b e a r  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  is  r e la t e d  w i th  th e  d e a th  o f  
th e  B r i t is h  n e w s p a p e r ,  T h e F in a n c ia l  T im e s  (F T ) jo u r n a l i s t ,  S a n d le r  T h o en es. 
T he D u tc h  b o r n  jo u r n a l i s t  a g e d  3 0  w h o  h a ty  b e e n  p o s t e d  in  J a k a r ta  f o r  th e  p a s t  
tw o  y e a r s ,  w a s  f o u n d  d e a d  in  B a c o r a  v i l la g e ,  D ili .  D e c la r e d  m is s in g  s in y e  
T u e s d a y  (2 1 /9 ) ,  T h o e n e s  b o d y  w a s  f o u n d  y e s t e r d a y  in  u _ b a d  c o n d it io n  d u e  to  
s la s h p v o u n d s  in h is  h e a d  a n d  o th e r  p a r t s  o f  h is  b o d y . )
Tewasnya Thoenes ini menyulut aksi balas dendam dari kelompok 
prokemerdekaan. Kemarin sekitar 10 wartawan Indonesia dikabarkan mendapat 
ancaman akan dibunuh dari prokemerdekaan.
(T h o e n e s  d e a th  h a d  s p a r k e d  r e v e n g e  f r o m  th e  p r o - in d e p e n d e n c e  g ro u p .  
Y e s te r d a y , a r o u n d  te n  I n d o n e s ia n  jo u r n a l i s t  r e p o r t e d  th a t  th e ir  l iy y s  h a d  been  
th r e a t e n e d  b y  th e  p r o - in d e p e n d e n c e  g r o u p .)
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Tewasnya Thoenes dibenarkan manajer P u b l ic  R e la t io n  FT, Anoushka Healy. Ia 
menyatakan keprihatinan mendalam mereka atas tagedi yang menyebabkan 
tewasnya korespondennya. “Kami merasa sangat terkejut dan prihatin. 
Khususnya setelah kami mendengar pernyataan dari saksi mata yang 
menyatakan bahwa Thoenes sengaja ditembak sampai mati”.
( T h o e n e s  d e a th  w a s  a c k n o w l e d g e d  b y  F T  P u b l ic  R e la tio n  m a n a g e r ,  A n o u s h k a  
H e a ly .  S h e  s t a t e d  th e ir  d e e p  r e g r e t s  f o r  th e  t r a g e d y  th a t  k i l l e d  th e ir  
c o r r e s p o n d e n t  “ W e a r e  v e r y  s u r p r i s e d  a n d  sa d ^  ;s p e c ia l ly  a f te r  w e  h e a r d  
s ta t e m e n t  f r o m  e y e  w i tn e s s  w h o  s a i d  th a t  T h o e n e s  w as d e l ib e r a te ly  s h o t  a n d
killed). ^
Anoushka mengaku masih belum bisa berkomentar banyak akan peristiwa itu. 
Kami katanya, masih mengumpulkan informasi lebih lanjut tentang bagaimana 
Thoenes tewas. “Baru setelah itu kami akan mengambil keputusan tentang apa 
yang akan kami lakukan, apakah kami akan melayangkan kecaman kepada 
Pemerintah Indonesia atau langkah lain”.
(A n o u s h k a  a d m i t t e d  th a t  s h e  c a n n o t  g iv e  c o m m e n ts  r e g a r d in g  th e  in c id e n t. T h e y  
o i jL S t i l l  c o l l e c t i n g  f u r t h e r  in fo r m a tio n  r e g a r d in g  h o w  T h o e n e s  d ie d . “A f te r  th a t  
w e  w i l l  m a k e  th e  d e c i s io n  o f  w h a t  w e  w i l l  d o , w h e th e r  w e  a r e  g o in g  to  c o n d e m n  
[Uih I n d o n e s ia n  g o v e r n m e n t  o r  la k e  o th e r  s te p s .  ’’)
Florindo Araujo, seorang warga Timtim dalam wawancaranya di BBC, mengaku 
telah mengantarkan Thoenes ke kawasan pinggiran Dili, Becora, Selasa silam. 
Di tengah jalan ujarnya, ia dan Thoenes melihat penghadang jalan yang dijaga 
oleh enam pria bersenjata yang mengenakan seragam polisi RI.
( F lo r in d o  A r a u jo ,  a n  E a s t  T im o r e s e  in  a n  in te n n e w  w i th  B B C , a d m i t t e d  th a t  he  
h a d  ta k e n  T h o e n e s  to  th e  s u b u r b  o f  D ili ,  B e c o r a , la s t  T u e sd a y . O n  th e  w a y , he  
a n d  T h o e n e s  s a w  r o a d  b lo c k  th a t  w a ŝ  m a n n e d  b y  s ix  a r m e d  m e i \  w h o  w o r e  
I n d o n e s ia n  p o l i c e  u n ifo r m s .)
Dalam kesempatan itu, Araujo mengaku membalikkan motornya dan bukannya 
berhenti. Namun ujarnya, orang-orang bersenjata yang sebelumnya berjaga-jaga 
di di dekat penghalang jalan itu langsung mengejar mereka dengan mobil dan 
kemudian menembaki bagian roda depan sepeda motornya.
( O p  th a t  o c c a s io n ,  A r a u jo  a d m i t t e d  th a t  h e  tu r n e d  h is  m o to r c y c le  in s te a d  o f  
s to p p in g .  B u t h e  s a i d  th a t  th e  a r m e d  m e n  th a t  w e r e  p r e v io u s l y  j u s t  s ta n d in g  in  
th e  r o a d  b lo c k  im m e d ia t e ly  c h a s e d  th e m  w i th  c a r s  a n d  s h o t  h is  m o t o r c y c l e ’s  
f r o n t  w h e e l s . )
“Motor saya akhirnya jatuh dan kami terseret sekitar 100 meter. Wartawan itu 
jatuh di aspal. Mereka terus menembak dan saya langsung lari ke hutan,” ujar 
Araujo ke BBC. Menurut Araujo, dia terakhir melihat Thoenes terbaring di 
jalanan, sebelum akhirnya menerima kabar ditemukan tewas.
( “M y  m o to r c y c l e  th e n  f e l l  a n d  we w e r e  d r a g g e d  f o r  a p p r o x im a te ly  1 0 0  m e te r s .
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T h e j o u r n a l i s t  f e l l  to  th e  s tr e e t .  T h e y  k e p i  s h o o t in g  a n d  1 r a n  to  th e  ju n g le ,  s a i  
A r a u jo  to  th e  B B C . A c c o r d in g  to  A r a u jo , h e  la s t  s a w  T h o e n e s  ly in g  in  th e  s t i e e t  
b e f o r e  f in a l ly  r e c e i v in g  th e  n e w s  th a t  h e  w a s  f o u n d  d e a d . )
Bahwa Interfet harus bertanggung jawab atas keselamatan wartawan juga 
dibenarkan Parni Hadi, Pemimpin Umum LKBN ANTARA dan PU R e p u b l ik a .  
Mantan Sekjen PWI Pusat itu menegaskan Interfet seyogyanya membeiikan 
perlindungan maksimal agar semua wartawan, apapun kebangsaan mereka dapat 
menjalankan tugas jurnalistik dengan aman dan lancar. Ia mengingatkan 
perlindungan terhadap wartawan itu sesuai dengan Konvensi Palang Merah 
Internasional.
(T h e  p e r c e p t i o n  th a t  I N T E R F E T  s h o u ld  b e a r  th e r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th e  s a f e ty  o f  
th e  j o u r n a l i s t s  was, s u p p o r t e d  P a r n i  H a d i, A N T A R A  N e w s  A g e n c y  C h i e f  o f  
E d i to r  a n d  R E P U B L I K A 's  C h i e f  o f  E d ito r . F o r m e r  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l  f o r  P W I  
c e n t r a l  s t a t e d  th a t  IN T E R F E T  s h o u ld  g iv e t m  a x  im u m  p r o te c t io n  to  a l l  jo u r n a l i s t s  
r e g a r d le s s  o f  th e ir  n a t io n a l i t ie s  s o  th e y  c a n  c o n d u c t  th e ir  j o u r n a l  i s p c  w o r k s . H e  
r e m in d e d  us th a t  th e  p r o te c t io n  f o r  jo u r n a l i s t s  is  a c c o r d in g  to  th e  I n te r n a t io n a l  
R e d  C r o s s  C o n v e n t io n .)
Sejak pasukan Interfet yang dipimpin Australia masuk Dili awal pekan ini, 
keamanan para wartawan yang meliput situasi di daerah bergolak itu kurang 
terjamin.
(S in c e  th e  a r r i v a l  o f jh e  A u s tr a l ia n  l e d  IN T E R F E T  in D i l i  e a r ly  th is  w e ek , th e  
s a f e ty  o f  th e  j o u r n a l i s t s  th a t  w e r e  c o v e r in g  in th e  c o n f l ic t  a r e a  is  n o t  w e l l  
p r o te c t e d . )
Pakar hukum pidana yang dekat dengan dunia kewartawanan Prof Loebby 
Loqman, menekankan pula bahwa Interfet harus bertanggung-jawab atas situasi 
keamanan Dili. Itu termasuk memberikan perlindungan kepada wartawan yang 
tengah menjalankan tugsa di wilayah konflik bersenjata. Pasalnya saat ini 
seluruh kendali sudah di tangan pasukan multinasional itu.
(A p r im in g  1 la w  e x p e r t  w h o  is  c lo s e  to  iher jo u r n a l i s j  c o m m u n ity  P r o f  L o e b b y  
L o q m a n , a l s o  s t a t e d  th a t  IN T E R F E T  s h o u ld  be  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  s e c u r i ty  
s i tu a t io n  in  D ili .  I t in c lu d e s  g iv in g  p r o te c t io n  to  jo u r n a l i s t s  who a re p o n d u c t in g  
th e ir  d u i te s  in  th e  a r m e d  c o n f l ic t  a r e a s  a s  cit p r e s e n t  a l l  c o n tr o l  i s j n  th e  h a n d s  
o f  th e  m u l t in a t io n a l  tr o o p s .)
“Kendali keamanan yang sebelumnya dipegang TNI telah diambil alih Interfet 
sejak lembaga tersebut mendapatkan mandat dari Dewan Keamanan PBB untuk 
memulihkan keamanan di Timtim,” katanya.
( “ T h e c o n tr o l  f o r  s e c u r i ty  th a t  was p r e v io u s ly  f o n d l e d  b y  T N I h a s  b e e n  ta k e n  b y  
th e  I N T E R F E T  s in c e  it  g o t  th e  m a n d a te  f r o m  th e  U N  S e c u r ity  C o u n c il  to  r e s to r e  
s e c u r i t y  in  E a s t  T im o r, ” h e  s a id .)
Tentang sikap pasukan Interfet, Loebby menilai mereka sudah bertindak di luar
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batas kewajaran, padahal mereka tahu TNI juga melaksanakan tugas di Timtim. 
Mereka itu melakukan operasi tanpa basa-basi, seperti inelakukan razia dengan 
brutal dan tindakan melampaui batas dan tidak memiliki sopan-santun sedikit 
pun,” kata guru besar UI itu.
( R e g a r d in g  th e  I N T E R F E T ’s  a tt i tu d e , L o e b b y  b e l ie v e s  th a t  th e y  h a v e  a c t e d  
b e y o n d  n o r m a lc y ,  th o u g h  th e y  k n o w  th a t  T N I is a ls o  d o in g  th e ir  j o b  in  E a s t  
T im o r . “ T h e y  d i d  th e  o p e r a t io n  w i th o u t  any  reg a rd  >n hx'-j! customs. They
i’l in i^ lL l l i iULlUllcit ra ids..g o ing b eyo n d  th e l im its o f  g o o d  m a n n e rs ,f  s a i d  th e
p r o f e s s o r  f r o m  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  I n d o n e s ia .)
Panglima Darurat Mil iter Mayjen TNI Kiki Syahnakri membenarkan tewasnya 
wartawan F T . Namun ia belum dapat menjelaskan sebab-sebab kematian itu. 
Kiki membantah pemberitaan pers asing bahwa Thoenes tewas setelah terjadi 
kontak senjata antara TNI dan gerombolan.
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a i l i n g  b e y o n d  l i m n s  a n d  n o t  s h o w i n g  a n y  
p o l i t e n e s s  a t  a l l .
(T h e  c o m m a n d e r  o f  m i l i ta r y  e m e r g e n c y  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  K ik i  S y a h n a k r i  
c o n f i r m e d  th e  d e a th  o f  T he F in a n c ia l  T im e s  jo u r n a l i s t .  B u t h e c o u ld  n o t e x p la in  
th e  c a u s e d  o f  th e  d e a th . K ik i  r e je c ts  th e  f o r e ig n  p r e s s  r e p o r ts  th a t T h o e n e s  d i e d  
a f te r  a r m e d  c o n ta c t  b e tw e e n  T N I a n d  a r m e d  g a n g s ) .
Dari Jakarta, Menhankam/Panglima TNI Jenderal Wiranto mengatakan ia belum 
secara resmi menerima laporan adanya wartawan asing yang tewas di Timor 
Timur. “Saya dengar berita itu dan saya akan mengecek siapa, kenapa bisa 
begitu. Tentunya harus menunggu laporan-laporan,” katanya sebelum mengikuti 
Sidang Kabinet Terbatas bidang Ekuin di Bina Graha, kemarin.
(In  J a k a r ta ,  [he M in is te r  o f  D e f e n d  A r m e d  f o r c e s  c o m m a n d e r  G e n e r a l  W ira n to  
s a i d  th a t  h e  h a s  n o t  o f f ic ia l ly  r e c e i v e d  r e p o r ts  r e g a r d in g  th e  d e a th  o f  f o r e ig n  
j o u r n a l i s t  in  E a s t  T im o r. “1 hea rd  the new s and  / nv// ch eck wiin has htynJillLh/L 
i.and how  i t  happened . O f course  I have to  ̂w a i t  1or reports^ h e s a id  p r i o r  to  th e  
l im i t e d  c a b i n e t  m e e t in g  on  f in a n c e  a n d  e c o n o m ic  s e c to r  a t  B in a  G ra h a ,  
y e s t e r d a y . )
Lebih lanjut Wiranto mengatakan ia tidak mau berspekulasi tentang tewasnya 
wartawan asing itu. “Jadi laporan-laporan yang diterima sumbei-sumbernya 
barangkali belum bisa kita pastikan, kemungkinan bisa terjadi masalah-masalah 
baru,” katanya.
(F u r th e r m o r e ,  W ir a n to  s a i d  th a t  h e  d i d  n o t w a i%  to  s p e c u la te  r e g a r d in g  th e  
d e a th  o f  a  f o r e ig n  jo u r n a l is t .  “ W e h a v e n  7 b e e n  a b le  to  v e r i f y  th e  s o u r c e s  o f  th e  
r e p o r t s  th a t  w e  re ce ive d .^  j f o b a b / y  th e r e  w i l l  b e  s o m e  n e w  d e v e lo p m e n ts , ” he  
s a id . )
Tentang tewasnya Thoenes, Panglima Pasukan Interfet, Mayjen Cosgrove di 
Dili, kemarin mengatakan pihaknya sedang melakukan penyelidikan di tempat 
kejadian itu. “Saya mendapatkan laporan tentang kematian itu. Tim pasukan 
Interfet dikirim ke tempat kejadian dan memastikan bahwa koiban adalah 
seorang jurnalis,” katanya.
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(  e g a i  d in g  th e  d e a th  o f  T h o e n e s , IN T E R F E T  c o m m a n d e r  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  
o s g i  o v e  in  D i l i  y e s t e r d a y  s a i d  th a t  h is  s id e  is  d o in g  an in v e s t ig a t io n  a t  th e  
c i im e  s i te .  I  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  r e p o r t s  r e g a r d in g  th e  m u rd e r . The I N T E R F E T  te a m  
w e i e  s e n t  to  th e  s i t e  a n d  it  w a s  v e r i f i e d  th a t  th e  v ic t im  w a s  a  jo u r n a l  i s , ” h e  
s a id t ) .  '
Dia berharap para wartawan yang sedang melakukan peliputan di Timtim lebih 
bei hati-hati dan memberikan laporan yang bijaksana dengan memperhatikan 
keselamatan diri.
(H e  h o p e s  th a t  a l l  jo u r n a l i s t s  who, a r e  c o v e r in g  E a s t  T im o r  w i l j  b e  m o r e  c a r e f u l  
a n d  g i v e s  p r o p e r  r e p o r t s  w h i le  m a in ta in in g  p e r s o n a l  s a fe ty ) .
Di Canberra, Australia, Pemerintah Australia memahami pernyataan Presiden BJ 
Habibie yang menilai reaksi Negara Kanguru itu berlebihan mengenai masalah 
Timtim. “Australia yakin hubungan kedua Negara yang kini merosot suatu 
ketika dapat dibangun kembali, “ kata Howard sebagaimana dikutip Dubes RI 
untuk Australia Wii-yono Sastrohandoyo di Canberra, Rabu, usai keduanya 
bertemu.
(In  C a n b e r r a ,  A u s tr a l ia ,  A u s tr a l ia n  G o v e r n m e n t  s t a t e d  th a t  th e y  c a n  u n d e r s ta n d  
th e  s t r o n g  s ta t e m e n t  b y  P r e s id e n t  B J  H a b ib ie  w h o  th in k s  th a t  A u s t r a l i a ’s  
r e a c t i o n  r e g a r d in g  E a s t  T im o r  is  b e y o n d  its  p r o p o r t io n .  "A u s tr a l ia  b e l ie v e s  th a t  
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  n o w  is  a t  th e  lo w e s t  le v e l,  o n e  
d a y  c a n  b e  r e b u i l j  a g a in , " s a i d  H o w a r d  a s  q u o te d  b y j h y  I n d o n e s ia n  
A m b a s s a d o r  to  A u s tr a l ia  W ir y o n o  S a s tr o h a n d o y o  in  C a n b e r r a , W e d n e sd a y ,  
a f te r  i l .K .p v o  o f  th e m  m e)).
Dubes Wiryono datang ke Kantor PM John Howard untuk pamitan sehubungan 
dengan akan selesainya tugas Wiryono sebagai Dubes RI di Australia pada 30 
September mendatang. Pertemuan itu sekaligus dimanfaatkan untuk bertukar 
pikiran mengenai merosotnya hubungan kedua Negara akhir-akhir ini.
( A m b a s s a d o r  W ir y o n o  c a m e  to  P M  J o h n  H o w a r d ’s  o f f ic e  to  b id  f a r e w e l l  a s  h is  
d u ty  a s  I n d o n e s ia n  A m b a s s a d o r  to  A u s tr a l ia  w i l l  e n d  ory S e p te m b e r  3 0 . The 
m e e t in g  wcys a l s o  u s e d  to  d is c u s s  th e  c u r r e n t r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  
c o u n tr ie s ) .
Dalam kesempatan itu, Howard mengaku terus mengikuti pidato Presiden 
Habibie di depan anggota DPR/MPR. Selasa kemarin melalui jaringan Televisi 
CNN, Howard menilai persepsi rakyat Indonesia yang menilai sikap Pemerintah 
Australia angkuh dan berlebihan tidak terlepas dari peran media yang cenderung 
memanas-manasi.
( f in  th a t  o c c a s io n ,  H o w a r d  s a i d  th a t  h e  a lw a y s  f o l lo w s  P r e s id e n t  H a b i b i e ’s  
s p e e c h  in  f r o n t  o f  th e  p a r l ia m e n t  m e m b e r s . O n  T u e sd a y , th ro u g h  C N N , H o w a r d  
s a i d  th e  I n d o n e s ia n  p e o p l e ’s  p e r c e p t io n  th a t  th in k s  m e A u s tr a l ia n  G o v e r n m e n t  
a t t i tu d e  a s  a r r o g a n t  a n d  b e y o n d  p r o p o r t io n  is  r e la t e d  y y  th e  r o le  o f  th e  m e d ia
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th a t  te n d s  to  in c r e a s e  th e  te n s io n ) .
Kepada Howard, Dubes Wiryono menyatakan sepakat bahwa kedua pemerintah 
perlu inelihat memburuknya hubungan tersebut dengan lebih jernih dan tidak 
larut dengan emosi dan kemarahan. Wiryono juga mengemukakan bahwa 
Kedutaan Besar RI (KBRI) kini telah dapat berfungsi kembali setelah selama 
dua pekan ia dan seluruh staf tidak bisa berkantor di KBRI.
(T o  H o w a r d ,  A m b a s s a d o r  W iiy o n o  s a i d  h e  a g r e e s  th a t  th e  tw o  g o v e r n m e n ts  
n eed , to  s e e  th e  w o r s e n in g  o f  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  w i th  m o r e  c l a r i t y  a n d  n o t  he ta k e n  
b y  e m o t io n  a n d  a n g e r .  W iiy o n o  a l s o  s t a t e d  th a t  the I n d o n e s ia n  e m b a s s y  (K B R I)  
is  noya f u n c t i o n in g  a g a in  a f te r  tw o  w e e k s  h e  a n d  h is  s t a f f  c o u ld  n o t  w o rk , in  th e  
e m b a s s y ) .
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Wartawan “Financial Times” Tewas Dibacok Di Timtim
‘ F in a n c ia l  T im e s  ’’j o u r n a l i s t  d i e d  a f te r  b e in g  s la s h e d  in  E a s t  T im o r. 
Suara Pembaruan -  September 22, 1999.
Pada perkembangan lain, ribuan penduduk Dili yang kelaparan Rabu (22/9) 
menjarah gudang milik Dolog untuk memperoleh bahan makanan. Mereka 
mengambil berkarung-karung beras terigu dan minyak goreng. Meski situasi 
keamanan di Dili berangsur pulih, penduduk yang kelaparan mulai menjadi 
persoalan serius.
In  a  r e c e n t  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  o n  W e d n e s d a y  th o u s a n d s  o f  h u n g iy  D i l i  r e s id e n ts  
r a m p a g e f  th r o u g h  th e  w a r e h o u s e s  th a t  b e lo n g s  to  D O L O G  to  g e t  f o o d ,  T h e y  
to o k  s a c k s  o f  r ic e , f o u r  a n d  c o o k in g  o il. T h o u g h  th e  s e c u r i t y  c o n d it io n  in  D i l i  is  
s l o w l y  b e c o m in g  n o rm a l, th e  h u n g r y  r e s id e n ts  u n b e c o m i n g  a  s e r io u s  p r o b le m .
Pada Selasa malam, juga sempat hilang dua wartawan yaitu Jon Swain dari AS 
dan Chip Hires dari Inggris. Begitu mendapat laporan tentang hilangnya dua 
wartawan tersebut, maka komandan Sektor Dili Kolonel Inf Gerhan Lantara 
memerintahkan untuk mencari kedua wartawan tersebut. Dengan patroli 
gabungan dari TNI dan Pasukan Interfet, kedua wartawan itu berhasil ditemukan 
pada pukul 24.00 Wita.
O n  T u e s d a y  e v e n in g , tw o  j o u r n a l i s t s  w e r e  a ls o  r e p o r t e d  m is s in g. They wereT J o n  
S w a in  f r o m  U S A  a n d  C h ip  H ir e s  f r o m  U K . A s  s o o n  a s  th e  r e p o r t  c a m e  in  a b o u t  
th e  m is s in g  jo u r n a l i s t s ,  C o m m a n d e r  o f  D i l i  S e c to r  C o lo n e l  G e rh a n  L a n ta r a  
g a y e  o r d e r s  to  f i p d  them, T he c o m b in e d  p a t r o l s  o f  T N I a n d  IN T E R F E T , fo u n d  
th e  tw o  j o u r n a l i s t s  p t  m id n ig h t I n d o n e s ia n  c e n tr a l  tim e .
Demikian dilaporkan wartawan P e m b a r u a n  Marcellus Widiarto dan Tinnes 
Sanger dari Dili, Rabu (22/9) siang.
T h is  is  a s  r e p o r t e d  by P e m b a r u a n  j o u r n a l i s t s  M e r c e l l iu s  W id ia r to  a n d  T in n es  
S a n g e r  f r o m  D il i ,  W e d n e s d a y  a f te rn o o n .
Panglima Penguasa Darurat Militer di Timtim, Mayjen Kiki Syahnakri yang 
dicegat wartawan Rabu siang itu membenarkan terbunuhnya wartawan tersebut.
C o m m a n d e r  o f  M i l i ta r y  e m e r g e n c y  in E a s t  T im o r, M a jo r  G e n e r a l  K ik i  
S y a h n a k tr i  c o n f ir m e d , th e  m u r d e r  o f  th e  jo u r n a l i s t .
“BetuI ada satu wartawan yang meninggal terbunuh pada Selasa malam. 
Wartawan itu meninggal akibat luka bacok,” kata Mayjen Kiki.
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I n d e e d  th e r e  is  a  j o u r n a l i s t  th a t  w an , m u r d e r e d  o n  T u e s d a y  e v e n in g . T h a t  
j o u r n a l i s t  is  d e a d  b e c a u s e  o f  s la sh , w o u n d s , ” s a i d  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  K ik i.
Sementara itu Panglima Interfet Mayjen Peter Cosgrove mengatakan, sepertinya 
lmlisi di Timtim telah mencoba untuk meningkatkan kegiatan mereka untuk 
menunjukkan bahwa tidak semua wilayah di Timtim itu aman.
M e a m v h i le  C o m m a n d e r  o f  th e  I N T E R F E T  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  P e t e r  C o s g r o v e  s a i d  
th a t  i t  s e e  m e  cf th e  m i l i t ia s  in  E a s t  T im o r  h a d  t r i e d  to  in c r e a s e  th e ir  a c t i v i t i e s  to  
s h o w  th a t  n o t  a l l  a r e a s  in  E a s t  T im o r  w a s  y sa fe .
Saya setuju itu, kita akan meningkatkan control pengamanannya dengan lebih 
ketat di sebagian,” kata Cosgrove menjawab pertanyaan wartawan Rabu sian® di 
Dili. &
‘7 a g r e e t j f e  s h a l l  in c r e a s e  th e  s e c u r i t y  c o n tr o l  to  b e c o m e  m o r e  s t r i c t  in  s e v e r a l  
a r e a s ,  ” s a i d  C o s g r o v e  o n  W e d n e s d a y  a f te r n o o n  to  j o u r n a l i s t s  in  D ili.
Peter Cosgiove mengatakan tampaknya para milisi meningkatkan aksi mereka 
sebagai leaksi atas pulangnya para pengungsi ke Dili yang kini tinggal puing- 
puing.
P e t e r  C o s g r o v e  s a i d  th a t  it  s e e m s  th e  in c r e a s e  o f  th e  m i l i t i a s ’ a c t i v i t i e s  is  a s  a  
r e a c t io n  to  th e  r e tu r n  o f  th e  r e fu g e e s  to  D i l i  w h ic h  is  n o w  in  ru in s .
“Situasi masih berbahaya 24 jam,” kata Cosgrove. Dia memperkirakan perlu 
waktu beberapa minggu untuk memulihkan keamanan di provinsi ini.
“ T h e s i tu a t io n  is  s t i l l  d a n g e r  f o r  th e  n e x t 2 4  h o u rs , ” s a i d  C o s g r o v e .  H e  f ig u r e d  
th a t  i t  w i l l  take^ s e v e r a l  w e e k s  to  e s ta b l i s h  th e  s e c u r i ty  in  th is  p r o v in c e .
“Ada indikasi para milisi teragitasi oleh kembalinya para penduduk Dili yang 
sempat tercerai berai. Konsekuensinya tampaknya para milisi berusaha 
meningkatkan kegiatan mereka terlihat dari belum pulihnya keamanan”.
“ T h e re  is  in d ic a t io n  th a t  th e  m il i t ia s  w e r e  a g i ta t e d  /¿r th e  r e tu r n  o f  D i l i  
r e s id e n t s  w ju y  w e r e  p r e v io u s l y  r u n n in g  s c a r e d . A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  th e  m il i t ia s  
n o w  t r i e d  to  in c r e a s e  th e ir  a c t i v i t i y  w h ic h  c a n  b e  s e e n  f r o m  th e  s e c u r i t y  
c o n d i t i o n  th a t  is  n o t  sa fe  y e t .
S e m p a t  h i l a n g .
Dua wartawan asing yang dinyatakan hilang pada hari Selasa (21/9) setelah 
diserang para milisi ditemukan selamat.
(T h e  fit’o  j o u r n a l i s t s  th a t w e r e  r e p o r t e d  m is s in g  o n  T u e s d a y  (2 1 /9 )  a f te r  b e in g  
a t t a c k e d  b y  th e  m il i t ia s  h a v e  b e e n  f o u n d  sa fe .
Wartawan S u n d a y  T im e s  Jon Swain, fotografer AS Chip Hines dan pengemudi 
mereka bersama seorang penerjemah harus bermalam di bawah perlindungan
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(S u n d a y  T i m e s ’ j o u r n a l i s t  J o n  S w a in , A m e r ic a n  P h o to g r a p h e r  C h ip  H in e s  a n d  
th e ir  d r i v e r  a lo n g  w i th  a n  in te r p r e te r  h a d  to  s p e n t  th e  n ig h t  u n d e r  IN T E R F E T  
p r o t e c t i o n  s a i d  A u s tr a l ia n  t r o o p s  s p o k e p e r s o n ,  C o l in  B la ir .
Menurut Brigadir David Richards, anggota Interfet asal Inggris, kepada B B C , 
Swain dan Hires mengendarai mobil ke luar kota Dili ketika diserans. Dia 
menuturkana keduanya lari ke semak-semak dan diselamatkan oleh pasukan 
yang oleh pasukan yang berada di helicopter dan kendaraan lapis baja.
(A c c o i  d in g  to  B r ig a d ie r  D a v i d  R ic h a r d s ,  a n  I N T E R F E T  m e m b e r  f r o m  the U K  to  
B B C , S w a in  a n d  H in e s  w e r e  d r iv in g  to  the  ou tsk ir ts  o f  D il i  j v h e n  They were  
a t ta c k e d .  H e  s a i d  th e  tw o  r a n  to  th e  b u s h e s  a n d  w e r e  s a v e d  b y  t r o o p s  th a t  
a r r i v e d  u s in g  h e l i c o p te r s  a n d  a r m o r e d  p e r s o n n e l  c a r r ie r  (A P C ).
Sedangkan wartawan F in a n c ia l  T im e s , Sander Thoenes asal Belanda, dilaporkan 
hilang di Dili setelah meninggalkan hotelnya hari selasa.
( M e a n w h ile  F in a n c ia l  T im e s  jo u r n a l i s t ,  S a n d e r  T h o e n e s  f r o m  H o lla n d , w a s  
r e p o r t e d  m is s in g  in  D i l i  a f te r  le a v in g  h is  h o te l  o n  T u e sd a y .)
Seorang tukang ojek menuturkan dia dan seorang wartawan asing diserang 
sejumlah pria berseragam militer hari selasa.
(A m o to r b ik e  r e n ta l  d r i v e r  s a i d  th a t  h e  a n d  a  f o r e ig n  j o u r n a l i s t  w e r e  a t ta c k e d  b y  
s e v e r a l  m e n  w e a r in g  m i l i ta r y  u n ifo rm  on  T u e sd a y ) .
“Ada sekelompok pria berseragam militer. Mereka menghentikan kami,” kata 
Florindo de Araujo. “Ketika saya berbalik mereka melepaskan tembakan”.
( ' ‘T h e re  w e r e  a  g r o u p  o f  m e n  w e a r in g  m i l i t a i y  u n ifo rm . T h e y ^ s to p p e d  us, ” s a id  
F lo r in d o  d e  A r a u jo . “B u t w h e n  I tu r n e d  th e y  s h o t  us. ”)
Araujo mengatakan enam pria itu memburu mereka dengan sepeda motor sanbil 
menembaki. Akhirnya motornya tertembak dan mereka berdua meninggalkan 
sepeda motor itu. “Saya lari ke hutan tapi mereka tetap menembaki saya,” 
katanya.
(A r a u jo  s a i d  th a t  th e  s ix  m e n  th e n  c h a s e d  th e m  o n  m o to r c y c le s  w h i le  s h o o t in g  
W h en  h is  m o to r c y c le  w a s  sh o t, b o th  o f  th e m  ra n  f r o m  th e  b ike . “I r a n  to  th e  
f o r e s t  b u t th e y  k e p t  s h o o t in g  a t  m e  ”. )
M a s i h  b e r b a h a y a .
Melihat perkembangan yang terjadi saat ini, kata Cosgrove, jelas sekali dalam 
perkembangan kejadian belakangan ini beberapa tempat di Timtim saat ini 
masih berbahaya. Untuk itu kepada wartawan yang meliput di kota Dili supaya 
lebih berhati-hati.
prajurit Interfet, kata juru bicara pasukan Australia, C olin Blair.
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( k l lü ^ ld c f ' in g  th e  r e c e n t  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  C o s g r o v e  s a i d  th a t  c e r ta in  a r e a s  p r e  s t i l l  
d a n g e r o u s .  H e  th e n  a s k e d  a l l  jo u r n a l i s t s ^  to  J h l  m o r e  c a r e fu l) .
“Kepada para wartawan dari media yang meliput di Dili, saya minta kepada 
kalian untuk menggunakan akal sehat yang terbaik dalam perjalanan kalian dan 
menjaga keselamatan kalian di Dili,” katanya.
(T o  a l l  j o u r n a l i s t s  y f o  c o v e r  D ili, l  a s k  a l l  o f  y o u  to  u se  y o u r  c o m m o n  s e n s e  in  
y o u r  t r a v e l s j m f  to  b e  v ig i la n t  f o y y o u r  s a f e ty  j n  D ili , ” h e  s a id . )
Melihat perkembangan kejadian terakhir di Dili, aparat keamanan meminta 
kepada para wartawan yang akan melakukan kegiatan jurnalistiknya di kota Dili, 
khususnya di beberapa daerah yang dianggap berbahaya, untuk pergi secara 
berkelompok dan sebelum berangkat memberi informasi kemana tujuannya dan 
untuk apa.
( C o n s id e r in g  th e  l a te s t  d e v e lo p m e n t  in  D ili ,  th e  s e c u r i t y  a p p a r a tu s  a s k e d  a l l  
j o u r n a l i s t s  in  D i l i  e s p e c ia l l y  th o s e  w h o  w a n ts  to  g o  to  v o la t i le  a re a s , to  t r a v e l  in  
g r o u p s  a n d  to  g i v e  in fo r m a tio n  a b o u t  th e  d e s t in a t io n  a n d  p u r p o s e  o f  the ir v is it, 
p r i o r  to  th e  d e p a r tu r e . )
Suasana Dili pada Rabu siang sudah hidup dan sudah banyak masyarakat yang 
ada di jalanan kota Dili. Mereka bergerombol berjalan kesana kemari dan 
melihat aparat keamanan dari pasukan Multinasional yang nampak berjaga-jaga 
di sepanjang jalan kota Dili.
( D i l i j  c o n d i t i o n s  d u r in g  W e d n e s d a y  a f te r n o o n  h y p e  b e c o m e  l iv e ly  a g a in  a n d  
m a n y  r e s id e n t s  th ro m se d . th e  s t r e e t s  in  D ili. T h e y  t r a v e l l e d  in  g r o u p s  a n d  v i e wed^ 
m u l t in a t io n a l  t r o o p s  th a t  w e r e  s e e n  s ta n d in g  a lo n g  th e  s t r e e t s  o f  D ili.)
Ketika Batalyon 745 yang sudah di 1 ikuidasi dan sebagian sudah berangkat 
dengan kapal laut namun karena kapal tidak mampu memuat, maka sebanyak 11 
kendaraan besar dan 2 kendaraan kecil harus berangkat lewat darat dengan 
dikawal 50 orang. Waktu lewat di Lalea itu mereka dihadang oleh kelompok 
tertentu yang belum jelas identitasnya dan sempat terjadi kontak tembak 
menembak. Kejadian itu hanya berlangsung sebentar dan tidak ada korban jauth, 
kata Mayjen Kiki.
(W h e n  th e  t r a n s p o r t s  s h ip  w a s  u n a b le  to  c a r ry , th e  r e s t  o f  7 4 5  b a tta l io n  th a t  h a p  
b e e n  e v a c u a t e d  a b o u t  11 la r g e  a n d  tw o  s m a l l  v e h ic le s  h a p  to  g o  b y  la n d  a n d  
w e r e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  5 0  p e r s o n e l .  W h en  p a s s in g  L a le a , th e y  w e r e  a m b u s h e d  b y  an 
u n k o w n  g r o u p  a n d  s h o o t in g  e n su e d . The in c id e n t p j j y . f r i e f  a n d  ih e te  w a s  n o  
c a s u a l t i e s  s a i d  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  K ik i.)
Menjarah . , , ^ . ,.
Ribuan penduduk Dili yang kelaparan hari Rabu menjarah gudang Dolog di 
timur Dili. Mereka menganibil berkarung-karung beras, tengu dan minyak 
goreng.
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( T h o u s a n d s  o f  h u n g r y  D i l i  r e s id e n ts  l o o t e d  D o lo g  w a r e h o u s e s  o n  th e  E a s t  o f  
D ili* OIL W e d n e s d a y . T h e y  to o k  s a c k s  o f  r ic e , f l o u r  a n d  c o o k in g  o il .)
Meski pasukan Interfet mulai mengembalikan situasi keamanan, penduduk yang 
kelaparan mulai menjadi persoalan. Penduduk yang kembali dari kawasan 
perbukitan mendapai kota merekatidak dapat lagi didiami dan makanan menjadi 
persoalan utama. Sulit mendapatkan air dan listrik di kota yang 80 persen 
hancur.
(T h o u g h  I n te r fe t  t r o o p s  s t a r t e d  to  r e s to r e  o r d e r ,  h u n g iy  r e s id e n ts  s t a r t e d  to  
b e c o m e  a_ s e r io u s  is su e i R e s id e n ts  w ho w e r e  c o m in g  b a c k  f r o m  th e  h il ls  f o u n d  
th e ir  to w n s  to  b e  j in h a b i ta b le  a n d  f o o d ,  b e c a m e , m a jo r  is su e . E le c t r ic i t y  a n d  
w a t e r  is  h a r d  to  w i f  in  th e  c i t y  th a t  it;,*.' 8 0 %  d e s tr o y e d .)
Rasa frustasi ini memaksa ribuan penduduk mengepung gudang Dolog itu, 
mendobrak gerbangnya dan mulai menjarah apa saja. Sejumlah prajurit TNI 
yang menjaga kompleks itu tak bisa berbuat apa-apa karena banyaknya massa 
yang menyerbu.
( F r u s tr a te d ,  th o u s a n d s  o f  r e s id e n ts  e n c i r c l e d  th e  D o lo g  w a r e h o u s e , b ro k e  d o w n  
th e  g a t e  a n d  l o o t e d  e v e r y th in g  th e re . T he f e w  T N I s o ld i e r s  g u a r d in g  th e  c o m p le x  
could, n o t  d o  m u c h  d u e  th e  la r g e  n u m b e r  o f  in v a d in g  m a s s e s .)
Beberapa menit kemudian sekitar 30 prajurit Australia tiba dan mengusir 
penduduk, memblokir pintu masuk
( S e v e r a l  m in u te s  la te r  a r o u n d  3 0  A u s tr a l ia n  s o ld i e r s  a r r iv e d ,  d is p e r s e  th e  
p e o p l e  a n d  b lo c k e d  th e  e n tr a n c e  g a te .)
“Kami perlu beras. Kami lapar,” kata seorang pria yang mengusung sekarung 
beras di punggungnya. Setelah kejadian itu, prajurit Australia dengan senjata 
tempur lengkap menjaga pintu masuk gudang. Ribuan pengungsi masih 
berkeliaran di seputar fasilitas itu.
(W e  n e e d  r ic e . W e a r e  h u n g iy ,  ” s a i d  a  m a n  c h ip  c a r r i e d  a  s a c k  o f  r ic e  o n  h is  
b a c k . A f te r  th e  in c id e n t ,f u l ly  a r m e d  A u s tr a l ia n  s o ld i e r s  w e r e  g u a r d in g  th e  g a te .  
T h o u s a n d s  o f  r e f u g e e s  a r e  s t i l l  l in g e r in g  in  th e  c o m p le x .)
Pasukan Interfet hari Rabu ini telah mulai bergerak kea rah Timor Barat dalam 
upaya membuka koridor untuk memasok bantuan bagi para pengungsi yang 
kelaparan. Sedangkan pengiriman bahan makanan yang terhenti sejak hari 
Minggu, karena semua pesavvat digunakan untuk mengangkut pasukan Interfet. 
telah dimulai kembali.
( This W ed n esd a y  I n te r fe t  tr o o p s ,  s t a r t e d  to  d e p lo y  to w a r d s  W est T im o r in an  
e f f o r t  to  o p e n  th e  c o r r id o r s  to  s u p p ly  th e  h u n g iy  re fu g e e s . M e a n w h ile , f o o d  
s u p p l ie s  th a t  w e r e  h a l te d  s in c e  S u n d a y , b e c a u s e  a l l  p la n e s  w e r e  u s e d  to  c a r p  
I N T E R F E T  tr o o p s ,  h a v e y e s u m e i f  th e ir  o p e r a tio n s .
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“Kami berharap dapat mencapai sebagian besar penduduk yang rawan yang 
menghindari pertempuran sejak pecah krisis, sehingga hitungan hari untuk 
menyelaniatkan jiwa,” kata Abbi Spring dari Program Pangan Dunia (WFP).
(W e  h o p e y w e  c a n  r e a c h  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  the c r i t i c a l  p o p u la t io n  w ho w e r e  h y i n g  
to  a v o i d  c la s h e s  a f te r  th e  c r i s i s  b r o k e  ou t. I t is  a  m a t t e r  o f  d a y s  to  s a v e r life , ” 
s a i d  s a i d  A b b i  S p r in g  f r o m  th e  W o r ld  F o o d  P r o g r a m .)
WFP telah mencarter sebuah pesawat khusus jenis C-130 Flercules dari Afrika 
Selatan bernama Snowdropper yang dirancang khusus untuk menyalurkan bahan 
makanan dari udara.
(W F P  h a s  c h a r t e r e d  a  C - 1 3 0  H e r c u le s  f r o m  S o u th  A f r ic a  n a m e d  S n o w d r o p p e r  
th a t  is  s p e c i a l l y  d e s ig n e d  to  d r o p  f o o d s  f r o m  a ir .)
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A p p e n d i x  C
Chapter 5 -  Quoted articles on The Border crossing issues
Blunder escalates tensions -  Defence Minister warns troop may 
cross Timor border.
Patrick Walters, Robert Garran -  The Australian.
Friday, October 1, 1999.
Tensions with Indonesia worsened yesterday after John Moore declared that an 
Australian-led peace force might cross the East Timor border in “hot pursuit” o f 
militia.
His statement prompted warnings from Jakarta o f “adverse consequences” and 
forced the commander o f  the force, Major-General, to clarify his role and insist 
that it was limited to East Timor.
The Defence Minister’s comment on the laws o f “hot pursuit”, allowing troops 
to cross borders to pursue attackers, risk escalating the deepest crisis in 
Australia-Indonesia relations in three decades.
Yesterday, Mr Moore sought to clarify his comments that the East Timor peace 
force had the “ability, under Chapter Seven, o f hot pursuit” to deal with militia 
threats from West Timor.
Senior Indonesian military sources said that last night they were concerned 
about Mr Moore’s comments which would have “adverse consequences” and 
they would seek explanation and clarification.
And US Defence Secretary William Cohen said last night: “I think we ought not 
to speculate at this point what the reaction o f the UN force would be.”
The row came as the Pentagon chief warned President B.J. Habibie and other 
senior government figures that Indonesia would suffer “severe damage” if the 
army failed to disarm the Timor militia.
His warning was one o f the harshest made by a visiting envoy. It was spurred by 
intelligence reports o f intense militia activity in West Timor and fears o f militia 
raids across the border, and followed US threats that vital International 
Monetary Fund credits to Indonesia could be withheld.
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Mr Cohen defended Australian troop behaviour, saying that the peace force 
needed to act in a “very aggressive manner” to confront militia elements 
threatening violence.
But Australia’s role in Indonesia has accused increased friction, coming under 
attack yesterday from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and 
provoking a warning last night from the departing Indonesian ambassador. S. 
Wiryono, that tensions were climbing “like a ladder and had reached the top 
step”.
Mr Moore’s comments on “hot pursuit” added to the diplomatic heat.
He yesterday elaborated on his Wednesday comments, during a press conference 
with Mr Cohen, on the hot pursuit o f  militia.
“To have our troops there unable to defend themselves against hostilities 
wouldn’t make sense to the Australian public,” he said.
“If they are engaged under those circumstances and they happen to be near the 
border...then they may cross the border”.
John Howard said early yesterday the peace force “has no authority to go into 
West Timor, none whatsoever” but later explained his comments did not apply 
to “hot pursuit” ...
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We II Hunt Down Militias
Bernard Lagan and Peter Cole-Adams. - The Sydney Morning Herald.
September 30, 1999
The Australian -  led force in East Timor might cross Indonesia’s border in “hot 
pursuit” if Indonesia allowed Timorese militias to launch attacks from its 
territory, the Defence Minister, Mr Moore warned yesterday.
Expressing concern at a build-up o f militias in Indonesian West Timor, Mr 
Moore said the mandate given to the international force Interfet under Article 7 
o f the United Nations charter authorised such interventions. This allows raiders 
to be chased to their hideouts across the border.
The United States stepped up its contribution to Interfet yesterday, with the 
visiting US Defence Secretary, Mr William Cohen, announcing that an 
amphibious landing ship equipped with four heavy-lift helicopters would go to 
East Timor.
After talks with Mr Moore in Darwin, Mr Cohen said the US had apprehensions 
about a militia build-up that would attack East Timor. He foreshadowed tough 
words for Indonesia’s President B.J. Habibie in a meeting in Jakarta today. He 
would insist that Indonesia’s military in West Timor ensured the militias did not 
attack across the border, that deported people to be allowed to return home, and 
that Indonesia hold an inquiry into atrocities in East Timor.
The extra US contribution to Interfet meets an Australian request to supply four 
heavy-lift helicopters that will operate from a US amphibious vessel off East 
Timor and to position military vehicles and other equipments. The US will also 
add a 130-strong army communications team which will set up a satellite based 
communications system for the force, and more military planners and 
intelligence specialists. About 260 Americans are already with Interfet in non­
combat positions.
Mr Cohen said the new US contributions would greatly add to Interfet’s 
capabilities.
Australia had made no formal request for the US to place ground troops in East 
Timor, but the US stood with Australia in supporting “the Indonesian people in 
their quest and struggle for democratic reform, including a civilian-controlled 
military”.
The Prime Minister insisted yesterday that he and Mr Mooie had canvassed the 
issue o f  an American contribution o f ground troops with President Clinton and 
Mr Cohen.
However, the Government had not made a formal request, he said, because the 
Americans had made it clear they felt unable to provide combat troops. “The 
reality is that...you formally request what you know will actually get. You don
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not formally request something you know from earlier conversations...is simply 
not going to be available”.
Mr Howard said he had told Mr Clinton on September 6 that Australia expected 
a US involvement, but Mr Clinton had said there were already 14.000 US troops 
in Kosovo, and Congress was unsympathetic. There had been similar exchanges 
later between him and Mr Clinton, and between Mr Moore and Mr Cohen.
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Kapuspen: TNI akan Hadapi Interfet Bila Masuk Timor Barat.
TNI will faced INTERFET if entered West Timor: Spokes person.
Republika.
Friday -  October 1st, 1999.
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) bersikap tegas menghadapi Interfet. Menurut 
Kapuspen Hankam/TNI Mayjen TNI Sudradjat, bila pasukan multinasional yang 
dipimpin Australia itu ineinasuki wilayah territorial RI di Timor Barat tanpa 
izin, TNI akan menghadapinya.
( I n d o n e s ia n  A r m e d  F o r c e s  (T N I)  w i l l  r e a c t  s w i f t l y  in  d e a l in g  w i th  IN T E R F E T .  
A c c o r d i n g  to  T N I s p o k e m a n  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  S u d r a d ja t ,  i f  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  l e d  
m u l t in a t io n a l  t r o o p s  e n t e r e d  I n d o n e s ia n  t e r r i t o r y  in  W e s t T im o r  w i th o u t  
p e r m is s i o n ,  T N I w i l l  f a c e ; th e m ).
“Kita tidak akan membiarkan bila Interfet benar-benar memasuki wilayah Timor 
Barat tanpa izin dan apabila itu terjadi, mereka akan berhadapan dengan TNI 
karena telah melanggar kedaulatan RI,” kata Sudrajat kemarin di Jakarta.
( “ W e a r e  n o t  g o in g  to  a l l o w  d  i f  I N T E R F E T  r e a l ly  e n te r e d  W e s t T im o r  w i th o u t  
p e r m i s s i o n  a n d  i f  th a t  h a p p e n e d ,  th e y  w i l l  f a c e  T N I b e c a u s e  th e y  h a v e  b r e a c h e d  
I n d o n e s ia n  t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r i ty , ” s a i d  S u d r a d ja t  in  J a k a r ta  y e s t e r d a y . )
Penegasan tersebut dikemukakan Kapuspen Hankam/TNI Mayjen TNI Sudrajat, 
sehubungan dengan pernyataan Menhan Australia John Moore bahwa Interfet 
mempunyai wewenang untuk melintasi perbatasan Timor Barat bila terlibat 
pertempuran dengan milisi pro-integrasi. Bahkan, Interfet wajib melakukan 
pengejaran (h o t  p u r s u i t ) .
(T h e  T N I s p o k e s m a n  r e l e a s e d  th e  s ta t e m e n t  a f te r  A u tr a l ia n  D e fe n c e  M in is te r  
J o h n  M o o r e  s t a t e d  th a t  I N T E R F E T  h a s  th e  a u th o r i ty  to  c r o s s  th e  b o r d e r  o f  W e s t  
T im o r  i f  i n v o lv e d  in  a r m e d  c la s h e s  w i th  p r o - in te g r a t io n  m il i t ia s .  I N T E R F E T  is  
a l s o  r e q u i r e d  to  d o  h o t p u r s u i t . )
Menurut Sudrajat, ketentuan h o t  p u r s u i t  dalam Konvensi Jenewa hanya berlaku 
di perairan. Berkaitan dengan it, Sudrajat mengimbau Interfet menghormati 
Konvensi Jenewa sekaligus wilayah kedaulatan RI. Ini demi mencegah terjadi 
bentrokan di perbatasan territorial RI.
( A c c o r d in g  to  S u d r a d ja t ,  th e  r e g u la t io n  r e g a r d in g  h o t p w s u i t  a c c o i  d in g  to  
G e n e v a  C o n v e n t io n  o n ly  a p p l i e d  Jjj th e  s e a . R e la t e d  w i th  th a t, S u d i a d ja t  a s k e d
th e  I N T E R F E T  to  h o n o u r  th e  G e n e v a  C o n v e n t io n  a n d.a ls o  th e  I n d o n e s ia n
t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r i ty .  T h is is  to  a v o i d  a n y  c la s h e s  in  th e  I n d o n e s ia n  b o r d e r  a r e a .)
Meski demikian, menurut Sudrajat, Indonesia membuka kemungkinan Interfet 
masuk ke Timor Barat bila meminta izin terlebih dulu kepada Pemerintah RI. 
“TNI akan mendukung Interfet bila mereka memenuhi prosedur-prosedur yang
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(E v e n  so , I n d o n e s ia  o p e n s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  1 N T E R F E T  to  e n te r  th e  W e s t T im o r  
i f  it  a s k e d  p e r m is s i o n  to  I n d o n e s ia n  g o v e r n m e n t . “ 77V/ w i l l  s u p p o r t  IN T E R F E T  
i f  th e y  f o l l o w  th e  p r o c e d u r e s  th a t  a p p ly ,  ” h e  s a id . )
Lebih jauh Sudrajat menyatakan TNI tidak ingin wilayah Timor Barat menjadi 
kantong baru milisi pro-Integrasi. Ia mengimbau para milisi agar kini 
memikirkan langkah-langkah rekonsiliasi. “Pemerintah Indonesia tidak akan 
membiarkan Kupang, Atambua atau wilayah kain dijadikan kantung-kantung 
baru sebagai basis perjuangan milisi pro-Integrasi,” kata Sudrajat.
(F u r th e r m o r e ,  S u d r a ja t  s t a t e d  th a t  T N I d o e s  n o t w a n t  W e s t T im o r  to  b e c o m e  a  
n e w  b a s e  f o r  p r o - in t e g r a t io n  m il i t ia s .  H e  a s k e d  th e  m i l i t ia s  to  th in k  f o r  
r e c o n c i l ia t io n  e f fo r ts .  “The I n d o n e s ia n  g o v e r n m e n t  w i l l  n o t a l lo w  K u p a n g ,  
A ta m b u a  01 o th e i  a i  ecis to  b e  u s e d  a s  b a s e s  f o r  p r o - in te g r a t io n  m il i t ia s , ” s a i d  
S u d r a ja t . )  ’
Spekulasi yang merebak di kalangan politisi dan Pemerintah Australia terhadap 
diperbolehkannya Interfet mengejar milisi hingga ke Timor Barat/NTT itu 
berawal dari jumpa pers Menhan Australia John Moore dengan Menhan 
Selandia Baru Max Bradford di Canberra, kamis pagi. Moore mengklaim bahwa 
Interfet diperbolehkan mengejar milisi Timtim prointegrasi yang berada di 
Timor Barat. Pernyataan tersebut diperkuat oleh PM Australia John Howard 
dengan embel-embel: “Selama ada jaminan keamanan dari pihak Indonesia bagi 
personel Interfet”.
( S p e c u la t io n  a m o n g  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  p o l i t i c ia n s  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t r e g a r d in g  th e  
i s s u e  w h e th e r  I N T E R F E T  c a n  c h a se , th e  m il i t ia s  in to, W est T im o r  (N T T ) s t a r t e d  
f r o m  a  p r e s s  c o n f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  A  u s tr a l l ia n  D e fe n c e  M in is te r  a n d  N e w  Z e a la n d  
D e f e n c e  M in is te r ,  jy ja x  B r a d f o r d  in  C a n b e r ra , on T h u rsd a y  m o rn in g . M o o r e  
c l a i m e d  th a t  I N T E R F E T  is  p e r m i t t e d  to  p u r su e , th e  p r o - in te g r a t io n  m il i t ia s  th a t  
w e r e  l o c a t e d  in  W e s t T im o r. T he s ta te m e n t  w a s  f u r th e r  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  
A u s tr a l ia n  P r im e  M in is te r  J o h n  H o w a r d  w h o  s a i f  “ A s  lo n g  th e re  j s  a, s e c u r i t y  
a s s u r a n c e  f r o m  I n d o n e s ia n  s id e  f o r  th e  IN T E R F E T  p e r s o n n e l . ”
Kontroversi tersebut mencuat setelah diperoleh informasi dari intelejen AS. 
Disebutkan bahwa ada indikasi sekitar 2000 hingga 4000 anggoto milisi sedang 
menyiapkan serangan gerilya kepada pasukan Australia. “Kami mempunyai 
informasi intelejen mengenai sejumlah aksi milisi di Timor Barat dan kami telah 
mempersiapkan diri terhadap segala kemungkinan yang terjadi,” kata Moore.
(T h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  a r o se , a f te r  U S  in te l l ig e n c e  g a in e d  in fo r m a tio n  r e g a r d in g  th e  
a c tjo n  cf y e v c r g i m i l i t i a s . The r e p o r t  s t a t e d  th a t  th e r e  is  qi i n d i c a t i o n  th a t  th e r e  
a r e  2 0 0 0  to  4 0 0 0  m il i t ia s  p r e p a r in g  g u e r i l la  w a r  a g a in s t  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  tro o p s .  
“ W e h a v e  in te l l ig e n c e  in fo r m a tio n  r e g a r d in g  s e v e r a l  m i / i f i a s j i n  W est T im o r  
a n d  w e  h a v e  p r e p a r e d  o u r s e lv e s  a g a in s t  a l l  p o s s ib i l i t i e s ,  s a i d  M o o t e.
Namun Komandan Interfet Mayjen Peter Cosgrove menepiskan pernyataan
berlaku,” katanya.
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Moore. Menurutnya pasukannya hanya mendapat mandapat mandat beroperasi 
di Timtim sesuai dengan dengan resolusi DK PBB. Penegasan Cosgrove itu 
untuk menepiskan spekulasi dikalangan politisi dan Pemerintah Australia 
tentang boleh-tidaknya Interfet memasuki Timor Barat, NTT.
(B u t th e  I N T E R F E T  c o m m a n d e r ,  M a jo r  G e n e r a l  P e t e r  C o s g r o v e  s i d e l i n e d  th e  
s ta t e m e n t  f r o m  M o o r e .  A c c o r d i n g  to  C o s g r o v e ,  h is  t r o o p s  o n ly  h a v e j i  m a n d a te  
to  o p e r a t e  in  E a s t  T im o r  a c c o r d in g  h y th e  U N  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  r e s o lu t io n .  
C o s g r o v e  's s t a t e m e n t  r e f u te d  s p e c u la t io n  a m o n g  A u s tr a l ia n  p o l i t i c i a n s  a n d  
G o v e r n m e n t  a b o u t  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  I N T E R F E T  e n te r in g  W e s t T im o r , N T T .)
Sementara itu berbagai pihak terus menyoroti kehadiran pasukan multinasional 
yang dipimpin Australia di Bumi Lorosae tersebut. Malaysia misalnya menilai 
ulah pasukan Australia telah melampaui batas. “Apakah perlu membidikkan 
senjata kepada orang yang sudah jelas-jelas tidak bersenjata? Itu sudah 
keterlaluan, “ kata Perdana Menteri Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad pada jumpa 
pers di Markas Besar PBB New York, Rabu.
( M e a n w h ile ,  v a r io u s  f a c t i o n s  c o n t in u e d  to  h ig h l ig h t  th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  A u s tr a l ia n  
l e d  m u l t in a t io n a l  f o r c e s  in  th e  l a n d  o f  L o r o s a e .  M a la y s ia  f o r  in s ta n c e  b e l i e v e d  
th a t  A u s t r a l ia n  t r o o p s  b e h a v io u r  h aty g o n e  b e y o n d  l im its . "Is i t  n e c e s s a r y  to  
p o i n t  g u n s  siL  c l e a r l y  u n - a r m e d  p e o p l e ?  T h a t is  to o  m u ch , ” s a i d  M a la y s ia n  
P r im e  M in is t e r  M a h a th ir  M o h a m m a d  in  a  p r e s s  c o n f e r e n c e  a t  U N  H e a d q u a r te r s  
in  N e w  Y o rk , W e d n e s d a y .)
Ia pun meminta Sekjen PBB Kofi Annan untuk mengurangi jumlah pasukan 
Australia di Timtim. Saat ini jumlah pasuka Australia di Timtim yang 
diperkirakan akan ditarik pada Maret 2000 mencapai 3.377 dari recana 
sebanyak 4.500 personel. Secara keseluruhan jumlah pasukan multinasional di 
Timtim, 5000 orang.
(H e  a l s o  a s k e d  U K  U N  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l  K o f i  A n n a n  to  d e c r e a s e  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  
t r o o p s  n u m b e r  in  E a s t  T im o r . A t  p r e s e n t  th e  n u m b e r  o f  A u s tr a l ia n  t r o o p s  a r e  
3 .3 7 7  o u t  o f  p l a n n e d  n u m b e r  o f  4 .5 0 0  p e r s o n e l  w h ic h  is  g o in g  to  be p u l l e d  o u t  
o n  M a r c h  2 0 0 0 .  O v e r a l l  th e  t o ta l  n u m b e r  o f  IN T E R F E T  tr o o p s  in  E a s t  T im o r  Js, 
5 0 0 0 J
Sehubungan dengan memburuknya hubungan Indonesia -  Australia, sejumlah 
Dubes dari negara anggota ASEAN menunjukkan simpatinya, saat melepas 
Dubes R1 untuk Australia Wiryono Sastrohandoyo. Di acara perpisahan yang 
mengharukan tersebut, semua Dubes negara anggota ASEAN hadii teikecuali 
Myanmar dan Kamboja. Mereka menunujukkan rasa solidaiitas dan simpatinya.
(In  r e l a t i o n  w i th  th e  w o r s e n in g  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  I n d o n e s ia  a n d  A u s t ia l ia ,  a  
n u m b e r  o f  a m b a s s a d o r s  f r o m  A S E A N  c o u n tr ie s  s h o w e d  th e ir  s y m p a th ie s  d u r in g  
th e  fa r e w e ll  c e r e m o n y  for,, the I n d o n e s ia n  a m b a s s a d o r  to  A u s ti  a l ia  W ir y o n o  
S a s t r o h a n d o y o .  In  th e  e m o t io n a l  f a r e w e l l ,  a l l  A S E A N  a m b a s s a d o r s  w e r e  p r e s e n t  
e x c e p t  f o r  M y a n m a r  a n d  C a m b o d ia .  T h e y  s h o w e d  th e y  s o l i d a r i t y  a n d  s y m p a th y .)
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liyono mengakui banyak mengalami perlakuan tidak menyenangkan dari 
me 1a Austialia mengenai masalah Timtim Perlakuan itu berupa kritikan, 
pertanyaan tajam, bahkan dalam beberapa kasus seperti diinterogasi.
( W ir y o n o  a d m i t t e d  th a t  h e  h a d  r e c e i v e d  m u c / \  u n p le a s a n t  t r e a tm e n t  f r o m  
A u s tr a l ia n  m e d ia  r e g a r d in g  E a s t  T im o r  is su e . T h e trea tm en t^  Js_ in  fo r m , o f  
c r i t ic i s m ,  s h a r p  q u e s t io n s  a n d  in  s e v e r a l  c a s e s  i tp i 'jjjs  l ik e  b e in g  in te r r o g a te d . )
Teius teiang saya tidak begitu menghormati cara-cara media Australia yang 
cenderung berorientasi kebencian kepada Indonesia demi menaikkan tirasnya 
ketimbang memberikan informasi yang konstruktif kepada publik,” katanya.
( ‘‘To be q u ite h orn-[ s f l  d o  n o t  r e s p e c t  th e  w a y  d n y  A u s tr a l ia n  m e d ia  th a t  te n d s  to
o r ie n ta te  J ia tr e jJ  a g a in s t  I n d o n e s ia  in  o r d e r  to  r a i s e j h e i r  c i r c u la t io n  ra th er th a n  
g i v i n g  c o n s t r u c t i v e  in fo r m a tio n  to  th e  p u b l ic ,  ” h e s a id . )
Ia mengakui tidak semua pers Australia yang melakukan tindakan yang tak 
terpuji. Bahkan, sebenarnya, cukup banyak surat maupun telepon simpati yang 
berasal dari warga Australia.
(H e  a d m i t t e d  th a t  n o t  a l l  the A u s tr a l ia n  p r e s s  h a d jd o n e  u n p le a s a n t  a c t io n s .  In  
f a c t  th e r e  a r e  m a n y  l e t t e r s  o r  in c o m in g  te lep h o n e^  m e s s a g e s  ^ e x p re ss in g  s y m p a th y  
th a t  c a m e  f r o m  [he A u s tr a l ia n  p u b l ic . )
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 ̂ Formatted: Swedish (Sweden)
PM Howard: Pasukan Multinasional Tidak Akan ke Timor Barat.
Multi national force is not going to West Timor: PM Howard 
Suara Pembaruan -  Friday, October 1st, 2004.
Dalam usaha meredakan ketegangan dengan Indonesia, PM Australia, John 
Howard, hari Jumat (1/10) berupaya meredam pemberitaan mengenai tindakan 
pasukan multinasional yang akan mengejar milisi hingga ke Timor Barat.
(In  a n  e f f o r t  to  r e d u c e  t e n s io n  w i th  I n d o n e s ia ,  A u s tr a l ia n  P M , J o h n  H o w a r d  
t r i e d  o n  F r id a y  to  d o w n p l a y  r e p o r t s  a b o u t  th e  m u lt i  n a t io n a l  f o r c e  th a t  is  g o in g  
to  p u r  su p  th e  m i l i t i a s  to  W e s t  T im o r ) . Deleted: //
Guna menenangkan Jakarta, Howard kepada Radio 3AW mengungkapkan, 
“Saya kira hal itu tidak akan terjadi, karena kita memusatkan perhatian di 
Timtim dan tidak akan menghina martabat Indonesia”.
(T o  c a lm  J a k a r ta ,  H o w a r d  s a i d  to  3 A  W  r a d io :  “/  th in k  th a t  w i l l  n o t  h a p p e n  a s  
w e  f o c u s  o u r  a t t e n t io n  in  E a s t  T im o r  a n d  w i l l  n o t  b r e a c h  I n d o n e s i a ’s  in te g r i ty ) .
Sumber Intelijen AS dan Australia telah memberi sinyal waspada atas 
penyusunan kekuatan milisi pro Jakarta di Timor Barat. Washington dan 
Canberra khawatir bahwa milisi, dukungan TNI tersebut akan melancarkan 
serangan gerilya ke Timor Timur.
( U S  a n d  A u s t r a l ia n  in te l l ig e n c e  s o u r c e s  h a v e  g iv e n  w a r n in g  s ig n s  f o r  th e  p r o ­
J a k a r ta  m i l i t ia s  b u i ld  u p  in  W e s t T im o r. W a sh in g to n  a n d  C a n b e r r a  a r e  
c o n c e r n e d  th a t  th e  m i l i t ia s ,  w i th  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  T N I w i l l  la u n c h , g j .ie r il la  a t ta c k s  
¿11 E a s t  T im o r .)
Pemerintah Australia hari Kamis mengungkapkan pasukan multinasional di 
Timtim memiliki hak hak untuk melintasi perbatasan Timor Barat bila 
melakukan pengejaran terhadap pemberontak.
(T h e  A u s t r a l ia n  g o v e r n m e n t  o n  T h u r s d a y  s t a t e d  th a t  th e  M u lt in a t io n a l  f o r c e  in  
E a s t  T im o r  h a s  th e  r ig h ts  to  c r o s s  th e  W e s t T im o r  b o r d e r , w h e n  p u r s u in g  th e  
r e b e ls ) .
Pernyataan tersebut membangkitkan kegeraman publik di Jakarta yang 
menganggap keberadaan pasukan Internasional di Timoi Barat sebagai ancaman 
terhadap kedaulatan Indonesia.
(T h e  s ta t e m e n t  h a s  c a u s e d  p u b l i c  a n g e r  in  J a k a i t a  th a t  c o n s id e i  e d  th e  p i  e s e n c e  
o f  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  f o r c e  in  W e s t T im o r  a s  a  th r e a t  to  I n d o n e s ia n  in te g r i ty ) .
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A S E A N  B a n t u
Sementara itu, seorang pejabat tinggi ASEAN dalam pertemuan menteri 
ekonomi organisasi regional tersebut di Singapura, berusaha meredakan 
ketegangan yang terjadi antara Australia dan Indonesia, Kamis (30/9)
( M e a n w h i le  o n  T h u r s d a y , a  h ig h  r a n k in g  A S E A N  o f f ic e r  d u r in g  th e  e c o n o m ic  
m in is t e r s  m e e t in g  in  S in g a p o r e ,  t r i e d  to  r e d u c e  th e  te n s io n  b e tw e e n  A u s tr a l ia  
a n d  I n d o n e s ia . )
“Untuk saat ini kita belum bisa melihat perkembangan dari usaha tersebut sebab 
kami sedang berusaha menghubungi pihak Australia,” ungkap Sekjen ASEAN 
Rodolvo Severino.
(A s  f o r  n o w , w e  c o u l d  n o t  s e e  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  th e  e f f o r ts  a s  w e  a r e  s t i l l  in  th e  
p r o c e s s  o f  c o n ta c t in g  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  s i d e , ” s a i d  A S E A N  S e c r e ta r y  G e n e r a l ,  
R o d o l v o  S e v e r in o .)
Pertemuan ke-31 Menteri Ekonomi ASEAN tetap dilangsungkan meski 
dikhawatirkan ketegangan antara Jakarta -  Sydney dapat mengganggu 
terciptanya perdagangan bebas dan Investasi di kawasan tersebut.
[ J  h e  3 T '  A S E A N  E c o n o m ic  M in is te r s  m e e t in g  \yasv h e ld  a l th o u g h  th e r e  w e r e  
c o n c e r n s  th a t  th e  t e n s io n s  b e tw e e n  J a k a r ta  a n d  S y d n e y  c o u ld  h in d e r \ th e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  f r e e  t r a d e  a n d  in v e s tm e n ts  in  th e  r e g io n .)
Dalam pidato pembukaannya PM Singapura Goh Cok Tong memperingatkan 
para investor akan mencermati perkembangan situasi yang terjadi di Indonesia. 
Sementara Menteri Perdagangan Indonesia, Rahardi Ramelan mengungkapkan 
tidak ada boikot resmi terhadap produk Australia di Indonesia setelah Jakarta 
mengumumkan akan membantu pengusaha setempat mencari pemasok baru. Hal 
itu dilakukan guna membantu pengusaha Indonesia mencari alternatif Iain di luar 
Australia dalam mengimpor produk pertanian.
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(In  h is  o p e n in g  s p e e c h ,  S i n g a p o r e ’s  P M  G o h  C o k  T o n g  w a r n e d  th a t  th e  
in v e s to r s  w i l l  w a tc h , th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  in I n d o n e s ia . M e a n w h ile  I n d o n e s ia ’s  t r a d e  
m in is t e r  R a h a r d i  R a m e la n  s a i d  th e r e  is  n o  o f f ic ia l  b o y c o t t  o f  A u s tr a l ia n  
p r o d u c t s  in  I n d o n e s ia  a f te r  J a k a r ta  a n n o u n c e d  th a t  i t  w i l l  h e lp  l o c a l  b u s in e s s e s  
to  l o o k  f o r  n e w  s u p p l ie r s .  T h is  is  d o n e  in o r d e r  to  h e lp  thy. I n d o n e s ia n  b u s in e s s  
c o m m u n i ty  to  f i n d  n e w  a l t e r n a t iv e  b e s id e s  A u s tr a l ia  in  im p o r t in g  a g r ic u l tu r a l  
p r o d u c t s . )
Rahardi Ramelan melanjutkan, dirinya telah menerima tawaran dari beberapa 
neaara yang ingin menjual gandum ke Indonesia, namun dia tidak memberi 
penjelasan mengenai negara mana saja yang telah melakukan penawaian 
tersebut. Ramelan menambahkan dia belum tahu apakah bias berteinu secara 
khusus dengan Menteri Perdagangan Australia Mark Valle yang menyatakan 
keinmnannya berbicara dengan dirinya Valle berharap dapat menemui Menteri 
Perdagangan Indonesia dalam kesempatan pertemuan di Singapura itu, guna 
meredakan ketegangan kedua negaia.
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a i a i ^ 1 R a m e la n  s a i d  th a t  h e  a l r e a d y  r e c e i v e d  o f fe r s  f r o m  s e v e r a l  c o u n tr ie s  
t t a t  w a n t e d  to  s e l l  w h e a t  to  I n d o n e s ia ,  b u t h e  d i d  n o t  e l a b o r a te  w h ic h  c o u n tr ie s  
f a i l *  g i v e n  th e ir  o f fe r s . R a m e la n  a l s o  a d d s  th a t  h e  d o e s n ’t  k n o w  i f  h e  c a n  m e e t  
A u s t i  a l ia n  t r a d e  m in is te r ,  M a r k  V a lle  w h o  h a s  s t a t e d  h is  in te n tio n  to  m e e t  w i th  
h im . V a lle  s a i d  h e  w a n t e d  to  m e e t  h is  I n d o n e s ia n  c o u n te r p a r t  d u r in g  th e  m e e t in g  
to  r e d u c e  th e  te n s io n s  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  c o u n tr ie s .)
Ramelan sebelumnya diberitakan menolak rencana pertemuan tersebut, karena 
saat Valle tiba di Singapura Kamis (30/9) sore, dirinya segera kembali ke 
Jakarta, hari Jumat (1/10). Ramelan bersama rekan-rekan dari ASEAN 
sebetulnya dijadwalkan bertemu dengan Valle dan sejawatnya asal Jepang, serta 
Selandia Baru, hari Jumat (1/10).
( R a m e la n  w a s , r e p o r t e d  p r e v i o u s l y  th a t  h e  r e f u s e d  th e  m e e t in g  b e c a u s e  w h e n  
V a lle  a r r i v e d  in  S in g a p o r e  T h u r s d a y  a f te r n o o n , R a m e la n  w o u ld  p e t  u rn  to  
J a k a r ta  o n  F r id a y . R a m e la n  a n d  h is  c o l l e a g u e s  f r o m  A S E A N  w e r e  s c h e d u le d  to  
m e e t  w i th  V a lle  a n d  o th e r  c o l l e a g u e s  f r o m  J a p a n  a n d  N e w  Z e a l a n d  o n  F r id a y .
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Akankah Tentara Interfet Masuk Wilayah Indonesia?
Is Interfet troops are going to enter Indonesian territory?
Media Indonesia -  Friday, October 1, 1999
Akankah Pasukan Internasional untuk Timor Timur (INTERFET) pimpinan 
Australia menyeberang ke Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) untuk mengejar milisi 
Timtim prointegrasi? Sepertinya tidak tertutup kemungkinan kearah sana.
( W i l l  th e  I n te r n a t io n a l  F o r c e  f o r  E a s t  T im o r  (IN T E R F E T ) l e d  b y  A u s tr a l ip  c r o s s  
th e  b o r d e r  to  E a s t  N n s a  T e n g g a r  (N T T ) in  o r d e r  to  c h a s e  th e  E a s t  T im o r e s e  p r o ­
in te g r a t io n  ’s  m i l i t ia s ?  I t  s e e m s  th a t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  is  h ig h ).
Menteri Pertahanan Australia, John Moore, kemarin tidak mengesampingkan 
Interfet akan menyelenggarakan misi mengejar dan menghancurkan milisi 
Timtim yang sembunyi di NTT atau Timor Barat menurut istilah Barat. Tapi ia 
memastikan aksi-aksi yang berkaitan dengan itu akan sangat terbatas.
( A u s tr a l ia n  D e f e n c e  M in is t e r  J o h n  M o o r e , y e s t e r d a y  r e f u s e d  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  [h a y  
th e  I N T E R F E T  w i l l  c o n d u c t  s e a r c h  a n d  d e s t r o y  m is s io n s  to  e l im in a te  E a s t  
T im o r e s e  m i l i t ia s  th a t  w e r e  h id in g  in  E a s t  N u s a  T e n g g a r a  o r  W e s t T im o r  
a c c o r d in g  to  W e s te r n  te r m s , H e  a ls o  s t a t e d  th a t  su c h  a c t io n s  w i l l  v e i y  l im ite d ) .
“Itu adalah soal penilaian dan itu adalah sesuatu yang kita (Australia) tidak 
antisipasi akan banyak melihatnya,” kata Moore dalam wawancaranya dengan 
jaringan radio A B C .
( I t ’s  a b o u t  ju d g e m e n t  a n d  it is s o m e th in g  th a t  w e  ( A u s tr a l ia ) ..¿ m y  n o t
a n t i c i p a t in g  to  h a p p e n  f r e q u e n tly , ” s a i d  M o o r e  in  a n  in te r v ie w  w i th  A B C  R a d io  
n e tw o r k ) .
“Menurut Pasal Tujuh Mandat (Dewan Keamanan PBB kepada Interfet), bila 
tentara Australia dan PBB dipaksa terlibat dalam tembakan bermusuhan, maka 
adalah kemampuan pasukan PBB mengejar mereka yang melakukan agresi 
terhadap mereka,” sambung Moore.
( A c c o r d in g  to  th e  C h a p te r  S e v e n  o f  th e  U N  S e c u r i ty  C o u n c i l ’s  m a n d a te  to  
IN T E R F E T , i f  A u s tr a l ia n  a n d  U N  tr o o p s  w e r e  in v o lv e d  in  h o s t i le  f ir e , th e  U N  
t r o o p s  h a f  th e  c a p a b i l i t y  to  p u r s u e  th o s e  w h o  w e i  e  p g g i  e s s iv e  J o w a i d s  th em , 
a d d s  M o o r e ) .
“Bila itu sampai terjadi, maka pergi menyeberang ke Timor Barat (NTT) dan 
bila kemudian terjadi kontak aktif maka itu diizinkan, namun mereka tidak bias 
pergi jauh dan pada beberapa tingkatan kontak ini, mereka harus segera
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( I f  dwSLJ.:LM ]_Jlcfive con  f a d  it is perm issib le  to cro ss  the b o n ie r  in to  IVesi 
¡()n n m si he h u n te d  a n d  the troops m ust re!urn  im m e d ia te ly  
A U T d J L lN p yc i^  ” h e  a d d s ) .
Amerika Serikat telah menyatakan keberatan mendalam berkaitan dengan 
meningkatnya kehadiran militer di daerah perbatasan NTT -  Timtim. Moore 
juga melontarkan kecemasan tentang kemungkinan peningkatan kekerasan 
disana. Kita (Australia) memiliki data intelijen yang menyebutkan ada sejumlah 
(milisi) di sana (NTT). Kita tidak tahu apa maksud mereka, tapi kita siap 
menghadapi apapun yang akan terjadi pada akhirnya,” sambungnya.
T h e  U n i te d  S ta t e s  h a s  d e c l a r e d  th e ir  d i s a p p r o v a l  o f  th e  in c r e a s e  o f  m i l i t a i y  
p r e s e n c e  in  th e  b o r d e r  b e tw e e n  N T T  a n d  E a s t  T im o r. M o o r e  a ls o  e x p r e s s e d  h is  
c o n c e r n  a b o u t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  in c r e a s in g  v io le n c e , th e re . "W e ( A u s tr a lia )  
h a r e  in te l l ig e n c e  d a ta  th a t  s h o w s  th e r e  a r e  n u m b e r s  o f  m i l i t ia s  th e r e  in  N T T . W e  
d o n ’t k n o w  w h a t  ,  th e y  are  u p  to  b u t w e  a r e  r e a d y  f o r  a n y  e v e n tu a l i t ie s ,  ” h e  
s a id ) .
kem b ali,” katanya lagi.
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Sampai sejauh ini, lanjut Moore, belum ada tindakan seperti itu di Timtim. Jadi 
segala pembicaraan tentang hai itu masih bersifat spekulasi. “Mereka (Interfet) 
punya kekuatan penuh sesuai Pasal Tujuh dan itu memberi mereka semua hak 
untuk mempertahankan diri”.
(S o  f a r ,  M o o r e  a d d s ,  th e r e  is  n o  su c h  in c id e n t  in  E a s t  T im o r. S o  a l l  d i s c u s s io n  
r e g a r d i n g  th e  a c t io n  is  s t i l l  a  s p e c u la t io n .  “ T h e y  (T h e  IN T E R F E T ) h a v e  f u l l  ! Deleted: v 
c a p a b i l i t y  a c c o r d in g  to  th e  C h a p te r  S e v e n  a n d  it g i v e s  th e m  a l l  r ig h ts  to  d e f e n d  
th e m s e lv e s  ’’).
Di tengah-tengah spekulasi tentang kemungkinan Interfet masuk ke Indonesia, 
tentara Falintil mulai masik ke Dili dan menawarkan kerja sama dengan Interfet.
(In  th e  m id d le  o f  th e  s p e c u la t io n  o f  w h e th e r  I N T E R F E T  w i l l  en te r , I n d o n e s ia , Deleted: m
F A L IN T I L  t r o o p s  s t a r t e d  to  en te r , D i l i  a n d  o f f e r e d  th e ir  c o o p e r a t io n  w i th  Deleted:,,/
IN T E R F E T ). '..................
Pasukan yang saat memasuki Dili dipimpin Cornelio Gama, juga menyerahkan 
senjata yang menurut mereka direbut dari tentara Indonesia. Tapi mereka tidak 
mau menyerahkan senjata milik mereka sendiri. “Kami tidak menawarkan untuk 
menyerahkan senjata kami, tapi kami ingin bekerja sama dengan Interfet untuk 
membuat Dili lebih aman,” kata Matu Rusto, juru bicara Gama.
(T h e  t r o o p s  th a t  e n te r e d  D i l i  w a s  c o m m a n d e d  b y  C o r n e l io  G a m a , a ls o  ...................
s u r r e n d e r e d  w e a p o n s  w h ic h  a c c o r d in g  to  th e m  w g r e  ta k e n  f r o m  I n d o n e s ia n  Deleted: .»
t r o o p s .  B u t th e y  d i d  n o t  w a n t j o  s u r r e n d e r ,  th e ir  o w n  w e a p o n s .  "W e d i d  n o t  o ffer, : Deleted: /«/ 
to  s u r r e n d e r  o u r  w e a p o n s  b u t w e  w a n te d  to  c o o p e i  a te  w i th  th e  IN T E R F E T  to  Deleted: ai
m a k e  D i l i  m u c h  s a fe r . \ Deleted:«/
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Interfet belum menanggapi keinginan Falintil mempertahankan senjata mereka, 
padahal Interfet sedang melucuti senjata milik milisi prointegrasi. Siapa saja 
yang dicurigai anggota milisi akan digeledah habis-habisan, bahkan tak jarang 
sampai tengkurap di tanah.
( I N T E R F E T  h a d  n o t  r e p l i e d  F A L I N T I L ’s  a s p ir a t io n  to  s u r r e n d e r  th e ir  w e a p o n s ,  
w h i le  I N T E R F E T  is  d is a r m in g  th e  w e a p o n s  b e lo n g  to  th e  p r o - in te g r a t io n  
m il i t ia s .  W h o e v e r  w a s  s u s p e c t e d  a s  m i l i t ia  w i l l  b e  f u l l y  f r i s k e d  a n d  o f te n  th e y  
h a v e  to  l ie  o n  th e  g r o u n d ) .
Gama dan beberapa orang-orangnya sempat diundang ke Hotel Torismo oleh 
Kolonel Bab Harnes, perwira paling tinggi Australia di hotel tersebut.
( G a m a  w i th  s o m e  o f  h is  m e n  w e r e  a l s o  i n v i t e d  to  H o te l  T o r is m o  b y  C o lo n e l  B o b  
H a r n e s ,  th e  m o s t  s e n io r  A u s tr a l ia n  o f f ic e r  in  th e  h o te l) .
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A p p en d ix  D
Chapter 7 -  Articles quoted
Copyright 1999 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd 
Sydney Morning Herald
September 2, 1999 Thursday 
SECTION: News And Features; International News; Pg.9 
LENGTH: 444 words
HEADLINE: Moore Holds Back Our Troops 
BYLINE: By Peter Cole-Adams And Craig Skehan 
BODY:
Canberra ruled out yesterday the possibility o f Australia participating in any non­
United Nations military force in East Timor.
The Minister for Defence, Mr Moore, said Australia was prepared to meet any need 
for evacuation from East Timor, but added: "Troops from Australia will not go in 
unless it's at the invitation o f the United Nations with the sanction o f Indonesia."
But New Zealand's Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Don McKinnon, said non-UN 
intervention in East Timor was possible if violence escalated in the troubled territory.
"The worst that could happen is absolute chaos by the end of the week," Mr 
McKinnon said, adding that the chances o f getting a UN mandate for intervention were 
very low.
He said a group o f "like-minded" countries could decide to intervene if the situation 
deteriorated. "We can't go on hearing about this bloodshed the way it is now and not 
engage in some sort o f a support base," he said, listing Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
the United States and possibly members o f the Association o f South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as potential participants.
A spokesman for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Downer, said last night that 
he had been surprised by Mr McKinnon's reported comments and had sought 
clarification.
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Mi McKinnon's office re- assured us that non-UN intervention in East Timoi is 
not an option that is being promulgated by New Zealand because o f the self cvi ent 
complications associated with it," he said.
For those who have still not got the message, Australia will not be invading 
Indonesia."
Australia has consistently said armed involvement o f its military could only happen 
with Indonesian Government agreement. Unlike Australia, New Zealand nevei formally 
recognised Indonesia's incorporation o f East T i m o r  after the 1975 invasion and there 
have been tensions between Canberra and Wellington on the policy diveigence.
ASEAN, which also recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, would 
not intervene in East Timor without Jakarta's approval.
Mr Moore will fly to Tindall RAAF base in the Northern Territory this evening to 
be briefed and to speak to troops involved. The minister said he saw no reason why 
normal military exercises with the Indonesian military should not continue, because 
they were in Australia's interests.
Labor's foreign affairs spokesman, Mr Laurie Brereton, said the international 
community, led by the UN, should intervene if Monday's vote went in favour o f 
independence. * A report headed "Mass turnout a triumph for the people" in the Herald 
on August 31 referred to an "anti-Indonesian militia group". It should have read "anti­
independence".
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September 7, 1999, Tuesday
Copyright 1999 N ationw ide N ew s Pty Limited
The Australian
SECTION: WORLD; Pg. 2 
LENGTH: 538 words
HEADLINE: Outrage as ambassador is shot at 
BYLINE: ROBERT GARRAN * Foreign affairs writer 
BODY:
SHOTS were yesterday fired at Australia's ambassador to Indonesia and the 
consulate in East Timor, escalating the conflict into a diplomatic crisis with Australia's 
most important neighbour.
Australia's relations with Indonesia are at their worst since Indonesia launched its 
"confrontation" with Malaysia in 1965.
The Australian Government reacted with outrage to the shootings, saying they were 
completely unacceptable.
Ambassador John McCarthy was driving through Dili when his car was hit by 
gunfire, a failure o f Indonesia's promise to protect foreign diplomats and a clear snub to 
Australia. Mr McCarthy was not hurt and was last night scheduled to fly back to 
Jakarta.
Prime Minister John Howard last night called an emergency meeting o f the 
Cabinet's national security committee to consider Australia's response to the 
deteriorating relationship and to the East Timor crisis.
Mr Howard earlier yesterday said there was "no doubt in the world that at the 
moment Indonesia is not fulfilling its obligations to maintain law and order".
Government sources said all aspects of the relationship, including defence links and 
aid, would be on the table if Indonesia did not live up to its promises to ensure peace.
It is understood Defence Minister John Moore has failed in his efforts in recent 
days to speak to Indonesian armed forces commander General Wiranto, now widely 
believed to have sanctioned the growing violence in East Timor.
"The situation has really got much worse in the last 48 hours," Mr Howard said.
Australia has mounted a major diplomatic effort to try and shame Indonesia into 
restoring peace in East Timor, and to win support for an early deployment of 
peacekeepers.
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. * ^ owar<  ̂ ar|d Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said yesterday Indonesia 
rnan it would not accept international peacekeepers before the vote o f its 
people s assembly (MPR), in late October or early November.
Mr Downer said. The Indonesian Government o f course is now under intense 
piessure, not just fiom Australia, but from the international community, for its clear 
failure to maintain security in East Timor."
Opposition foreign affairs spokesman Laurie Brereton said: "East Timor's descent 
into a maelstiom o f  murder and mayhem must be stopped, and stopped now."
Indonesias ambassador to Australia, S. Wiryono, meanwhile, stormed out o f an 
inteiview with A Current Affair presenter Mike Munro when questioned on the 
"slaughter" o f civilians in East Timor.
* * *
'For our ambassador to be shot at is completely unacceptable and is a matter we are 
pursuing with the Indonesian Government'
Australian Foreign Minister ALEXANDER DOWNER
*
Formatted: Spanish (Spain-Modern 
Sort)
'We are determined to implement what measures are necessary to uphold law and 
order and to ensure security '
Indonesian Foreign Minister ALI ALATAS
*
'The Indonesian Government must not only give assurances or be willing to comply 
with the terms o f the May agreement but the assurances must be seen on the ground '
UN special envoy on East Timor, JAMSFIEED MARKER
'Where is the dignity o f the members o f the Security Council? How many more 
people killed do you want (before you) start acting?'
Portugal's special envoy to Jakarta, ANA GOMES
*
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September 17, 1999, Friday
SECTION: FEATURES; Pg. 15
LENGTH: 990 words
HEADLINE: Hefty price to pay for meddling / EAST TIMOR: THE WAY AHEAD 
BYLINE: RICHARD WOOLCOTT
Copyright 1999 N ationw ide N ew s Pty Lim ited
The Australian
BODY:
The road to hell is often paved with good intentions
1 HAVE been sickened by many of the scenes from East Timor. Nobody can 
condone the savagery o f the anti-independence militias and any support they have 
received from the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). Many Indonesians will also be 
shocked by these acts.
As an Australian who has devoted much o f his working life to strengthening 
Australia's necessary engagement with East Asia and its relationship with Indonesia, I 
am saddened by the situation in which we now find ourselves.
Foreign and trade policy needs to be aimed at securing predictable and achievable 
outcomes which would be in Australia's national and regional interests. The 
Government's intentions were no doubt good. It saw an opportunity to resolve the East 
Timor situation which had been an irritant in our relations with Indonesia for 25 years.
But it is time to consider objectively and unemotionally the grim realities. What are 
the main outcomes o f our recent policies? There are six.
The situation o f the East Timorese — those we sought to help — is horrific; much 
worse than it was at the beginning of this year. We now face a devastated East Timor 
with an unknown number o f casualties, many of whom might otherwise still be alive.
Our relationship with Indonesia — which the Howard Government noted in its first 
ever White Paper on foreign and trade policy in 1997 would "always be fundamentally 
important" and one o f our three or four most important relationships -  has been set back 
perhaps for a generation. The Australian community is now alienated towards Indonesia 
and the Indonesian community now alienated towards Australia. Despite warnings from 
a number o f quarters, the Government has allowed its policy towards Indonesia and the 
region to become a hostage to its policy towards East Timor.
Our wider engagement with East Asia has also been damaged. Countries have been 
surprised by the rush to press for early independence for East Timor; a rush which 
Australia led largely as a combination of domestic pressures and a naive assumption 
that we could secure a great diplomatic success. That both Xanana Gusmao and Bishop
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Cailos Belo believed that for independence to work there would need to be a 
piepaiatoiy period o f five to 10 years of autonomy seems to have been overlooked.
The efforts we have made over many years to come to terms with the geopolitical 
realities o f our place in the world and to be seen as a partner in the East Asian region — 
and not as an Anglo-American outpost in the southern hemisphere — have also been set 
back. Association o f South-East Asian Nations members agreed to join a peace force 
because they wanted to assist Indonesia; not because Australia pressed them to do so.
The domestic situation in Indonesia is also likely to affect adversely our interests. 
The new government in Jakarta, which will be formed early in November, will probably 
now be nationalist and antagonistic to Australia.
Another outcome o f the situation is a huge humanitarian and refugee problem in 
West Timor with which Australia will also have an obligation to assist.
We now face maintaining a peacemaking and later a peacekeeping force in East 
Timor, possibly for a decade, which is likely to sustain casualties in the early stages, as 
well as an obligation to support with substantial aid a broken-back independent mini­
State within the Indonesia archipelago. The combined cost is likely to be at least $500 
million a year for the foreseeable future.
How did we allow all this to happen? The first error was to assume that President 
B.J.Habibie, an erratic and transitional figure whose legitimacy, hold on power and 
support from the armed forces was always in question in Indonesia, could deliver 
without strong opposition on his undertakings to John Howard.
The second was to overlook the likelihood o f a violent backlash to the expected 
vote against autonomy on August 30. Many Indonesians, including East Timorese, 
warned o f this.
The third mistake was the Government's response to domestic pressure groups 
demanding immediate independence for East Timor, with which it virtually joined 
hands. While community feelings were very strong, it overreacted to the East Timor 
lobby, a sometimes hysterical and committed media, the more radical elements in the 
Catholic Church and a handful o f ex-servicemen who feel Australia has a debt to the 
East Timorese who helped them after Australia had invaded the Portuguese colony in 
1942.
But the fourth and, in my view, major misjudgment in terms o f the additional 
tragedy which has befallen the East Timorese was to press for an early United Nations 
Mission to East Timor presence and referendum. It would clearly have been prefeiable 
from the outset to seek to defer the process until mid-November when there would have 
been a constitutionally elected president and vice-president, whose writ would have 
been much more likely to run including with the aimed foices.
Finally there is an important matter of diplomatic style. We may be doing what we 
believe to be right in defending democracy; but in the wrong way. We chose to lead the 
pack and issue ultimatums. We would have been more effective and generated less 
animosity if our diplomacy had been more persuasive and less demanding.
The unpalatable fact which Australia needs to face is that to Asian countries 
including Japan, China and India, as well as the US, the paramount issue ,s the 
successful transition o f 210 million Indonesians to representative government and the 
recovery o f the Indonesian economy. Despite justifiable moral outrage ,n the
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community and the almost total preoccupation with East Timor here, it remains a 
secondary issue to other countries compared with the future stability of Indonesia.
Richard Woolcott is a former secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and a formei 
ambassador to Indonesia and to the UN.
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